PLOTINUS

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IN SIX VOLUMES

III

ENNEADS III. 1-9



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III. 1. ON DESTINY

Introductory Note

THIS early treatise (No. 3 in Porphyry's chronological order) is very much a conventional Platonic school discussion of its period. After a formal scholastic statement of the question to be discussed, the views of opponents of the Platonic position, Epicureans, Stoics and astrological determinists, are stated and refuted on conventional lines, and the treatise ends with a brief statement of the Platonic doctrine, with its discrimination of the parts played in the causation of human action by universal and individual souls which leaves room for human freedom within the universal order. Bréhier, in his introduction to the treatise, cites a number of parallels which show the conventional nature of the contents, and he and Harder, in the introduction to the notes on it in his second edition, have some interesting suggestions about particular opponents at whom some of the arguments may be directed. But, though the subject was well worn and the arguments here are hackneyed, the problem of reconciling human freedom with the universal divine order was an important one for Plotinus, and he treated different aspects of it more fully and originally later, in the work On Providence which comes next in the Third Ennead (III. 2 and 3), in the treatise on astrology (II. 3) and in his writings on the soul (especially IV. 3, 8 and 9).

Synopsis

Formal statement of the problem to be discussed, that of causation. All things have a cause except the first prin-

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ciples. The Peripatetic account of the immediate causes of events accepted as true as far as it goes (ch. 1). But it is lazy and superficial not to look for higher and remoter causes, and philosophera have in fact done so. The principal non-Platonic explanations; all things, even human thought and action are caused by (a) atoms (the Epicureans) or (b) the world-soul (Stoics or stoicising Platonists; see note to ch. 4) or (c) the stars (astrologers) or (d) the universal chain of causation (Stoics) (ch. 2). Refutation of these in the same order (a) ch. 3, (b) ch. 4, (c) chs. 5–6, (d) ch. 7. Brief statement of the true Platonic doctrine; universal soul and individual souls; freedom of rational and virtuous action (chs. 8–10).

III, 1. (3) HEPI EIMAPMENH Σ

1. "Απαντα τὰ γινόμενα καὶ τὰ ὅντα ἤτοι κατ' αίτίας γίνεται τὰ γινόμενα καὶ ἔστι τὰ ὅντα, ή άνευ αίτίας άμφω. ή τὰ μὲν ἄνευ αίτίας, τὰ δέ μετ' αίτίας ενιμμφοτέροις. η τὰ μεν γινόμενα μετ' 5 αἰτίας πάντα, τὰ δὲ ὄντα τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν ἐστι μετ' αίτίας, τὰ δ' ἄνευ αίτίας, ἡ οὐδὲν μετ' αίτίας· ἡ άνάπαλιν τὰ μὲν ὅντα μετ' αἰτίας πάντα, τὰ δὲ γινόμενα τὰ μὲν ούτως, τὰ δὲ ἐκείνως, ἢ οὐδὲν αὐτῶν μετ' αἰτίας. Ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἀιδίων τὰ μέν πρώτα είς άλλα αίτια ανάγειν ούχ οδόν τε 10 πρώτα όντα· όσα δὲ ἐκ τῶν πρώτων ἤρτηται, ἐξ εκείνων το είναι εχέτω. Τάς τε ενεργείας εκάπτων αποδιδούς τις επί τας ούσίας αναγέτων τοθτο γάρ έστι το είναι αὐτῷ, τὸ τοιάνδε ἐνέργειαν ἀποδιδόναι. Περί δέ των γινομένων ή όντων μέν ἀεί, οὐ τήν 10 αθτήν δε ενέργειων ποιουμένων del και? abilas άπαντα λεκτέον γίνεσθαι, το δ' άναίτιον οὐ παραδεκτέον, οὕτε παρεγκλίσεσι κεναῖς χώραν διδόντα

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1. All things that come into being and all things that really exist either have a cause for their coming into being (those that come to be) or for their existence (those that really exist), or have no cause:1 or clac, in both classes, some have a cause and some have not: or all things which come into being have a cause, but things which really exist have some of them a cause and some not, or none of them has a cause: or it is the other way round; all things that really exist have a cause, but things that come into being do so some this way, or some that way, or none of them has a cause. Well, then, among the eternal realities it is not possible to refer the first of them to other things which are responsible for their existence, just because they are first; but it must be admitted that all those which depend on the first realities have their being from them. And in giving an account of the activities of each of them one should refer them to their essences; for this is their being, the due output of a particular kind of activity. But as for things which come into being, or which always really exist but do not always act in the same way, we must say that all always have a cause for coming to be; nothing uncaused can be admitted; we must leave

must have a cause. Plotinus also takes into account the oternal realities, because for him even the Forms in Intellect have a cause, the One, as he indicates in the next sentence.

¹ An interesting variation and expansion of *Timaeus* 28A 4-5. Plato merely says that all things that come into being

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ούτε κινήσει σωμάτων τη εξαίφνης, η ούδενος προηγησαμένου δπέστη, οὔτε ψυχής όρμη ἐμπλήκτω μηδενός κινήσαντος αθτήν είς το τι πράξαι δω 20 πρότερον οὐκ ἐποίει. "Η αὐτῷ γε τούτῳ μείζων1 αν τις έχοι αὐτὴν ἀνάγκη τὸ μἡ αὐτῆς εἶναι, φέρεσθαι δε τὰς τοιαύτας φοράς άβουλήτους τε καὶ άναιτίους ούσας. "Η γάρ το βουλητόν-τούτο δέ η έξω η είσω-η το επιθυμητον εκίνησεν η, εί μηδέν δρεκτον εκίνησεν, [η] ουδ' αν όλως εκινήθη. 25 Γυγνομένων δε πάντων κατ' alrias τὰς μέν προσεχείς έκάστω ράδων λαβείν καὶ εἰς ταύτας ανάνειν οίον του βαδίσαι είς αγοράν το οίηθηναι δεῖν τινα ίδεῖν η χρέος ἀπολαβεῖν· καὶ ὅλως τοῦ τάδε η τάδε έλέσθαι καὶ δρμησαι ἐπὶ τάδε 2 τὸ φανήναι έκάστω ταδί ποιείν. Καὶ τὰ μέν ἐπὶ τὰς 30 τέγνας ἀνάγειν· τοῦ ἑγιάσαι ἡ ἰατρικὴ καὶ ὁ laτρός. Και του πλουτήσωι θησαυρός ευρεθείς ή δόσις παρά του η έκ πόνων η τέχνης χρηματίσασθαι. Καὶ τοῦ τέκνου ὁ πατήρ καὶ εἴ τι συνεργόν έξωθεν είς παιδοποιίαν άλλο παρ' άλλου ήκου οίον συτία τοιάδε ή καὶ όλίγω προσώτερα

> ¹ μείζων edd.: μείζον codd. ² ἐπ τάδε Harder, H-S: ἔπειτα δὲ codd.

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no room for vain " slants " 1 or the sudden movement of bodies which happens without any preceding causation, or a senseless impulse of soul when nothing has moved it to do anything which it did not do before. Because of this very absence of motive a greater compulsion would hold the soul, that of not belonging to itself but being carried about by movements of this kind which would be unwilled and causeless. For either that which it willed-which could be within or outside it-or that which it desired moved the soul; or, if nothing which attracted it moved it, it would not have been moved at all. If all things have a cause for their happening it is easy to apprehend the causes which are immediately relevant to each happening and to trace it back to them: for instance, the cause of going to the market-place is that one thinks one ought to see someone or to collect a debt: 2 and in general the cause of choosing this or that or going after that is that it seemed good to the particular person involved to do that. And there are some things whose causes should be assigned to the arts; the cause of getting well is the medical art and the doctor: and the cause of getting rich is a treasure which has been found or a gift from someone, or making money by labour or skill. And the cause of the child is the father, and perhaps some external influences coming from various sources which cooperate towards the production of a child; for instance, a particular kind of diet, or, slightly remoter, seed, which flows easily for begetting, or a wife well a

¹ The famous uncaused atomic "slant" or "swerve" of Epicurus, the clinamen of Lucretius (II. 292; ep. Bailey's commentary on 11. 216-293 in his edition). Cicero refers to it equally impolitely in De Fato 23 (commenticia declinatio) and De Finitus I. 19 (res commentate).

Cp. Aristotle, Physics II. 5. 196b 33-34.
 Theiler's excellent emendation ((γον)) ή γουή for the MSS

ή γυνή, adopted here, is supported by the fact that it gives a verbal reminiscence of Plato, Laws 740D 6-7, ols αν εύρους ή γένεοις (though the context there is different).

35 εθρους είς παιδοποιίαν (γονή) 1 ή γυνή επιτήδειος είς τόκους. Καὶ όλως είς φύσιν.

2. Μέχρι μὰν οὖν τούτων ἐλθόντα ἀναπαύσασθαι καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἄνω μὴ ἐθελῆσαι χωρεῖν ῥαθύμου ἴσως καὶ οὐ κατακούοντος τῶν ἐπὶ τὰ πρῶτα καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἐπέκεινα αἴτια ἀνιόντων. Διὰ τί γὰρ τῶν ὁ αὐτῶν γενομένων, οἴον τῆς σελήνης φανείσης, ὁ μὰν ἤρπαπεν, ὁ δ' οὔ; Καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐκ τοῦ περιέχοντος ἡκόντων ὁ μὰν ἐνόσησεν, ὁ δ' οῦ; Καὶ πλούσιος, ὁ δὸ πένης ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν ἔργων; Καὶ πλούσιος, ὁ δὸ πένης ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν ἔργων; Καὶ τρόποι δὴ καὶ ἤθη διάφορα καὶ τύχαι ἐπὶ τὰ πόρρω ἀξιοῦσω ἰέναι· καὶ οῦτω δὴ ἀεὶ οὺχ ἱστάμενοι οἱ μὰν ἀρχὰς σωματικὰς θέμενοι, οἷον 10 ἀτόμους, τῆ τούτων φορῷ καὶ πληγαῖς καὶ συμπλοκαῖς πρὸς ἄλληλα ἔκαστα ποιοῦντες καὶ οῦτως

καίς πρός άλληλα έκαστα ποιούντες και ούτως καίς πρός άλληλα έκαστα ποιούντες και ούτως έχειν και γίνεσθαι, ή έκεινα συνέστη ποιεί τε και πάσχει, και τὰς ήμετέρας όρμὰς και διαθέσεις ταύτη έχειν, ώς ἂν ἐκείναι ποιῶσω, ἀνάγκην² ταύτην και τὴν παρὰ τούτων εἰς τὰ ὅντα εἰσάγουσι.

15 Καν άλλα δέ τις σώματα άρχας διδώ και έκ τούτων τα πάντα γίνεσθαι, τη παρά τούτων ανάγκη δουλεύειν ποιεί τὰ όντα. Οἱ δ' ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχὴν ἐλθόντες ἀπ' αὐτῆς κατάγουσι πάντα, διὰ πώντων ψοι ήσασαν αἰτίων καὶ ταύτην

20 οὐ μόνον ⁸ κινοῦσαν, ἀλλά καὶ ποιοῦσαν ἔκαστα λέγοντες, εἰμαρμένην ταύτην καὶ κυριωτάτην αἰτίαν

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adapted to bearing children: and in general, one traces the cause of the child back to Nature,

2. But to come to a halt when one has reached these causes and not to want to go higher is characteristic, perhaps, of a lazy person who pays no attention to those who have ascended to the first and the transcendent causes. For why in the same circumstances, for instance when the moon shines, does one man steal and another not? And when the influences which come from the environment are similar, why does one fall ill and another not? And why does one become rich, another poor from the same activities? And different ways of behaving and characters and fortunes require us to go on to the remoter causes. So philosophers have never come to a standstill [when they have discovered the immediate causes]: some of them posit corporeal principles, for instance, atoms; they make both the way individual things exist, and the fact of their existence, depend on the movements of these, their clashings and interlockings with one another, the way in which they combine and act and are acted upon; even our own impulses and dispositions, they say, are as the atoms make them; so they introduce this compulsion which comes from the atoms into reality. And if anyone gives other bodies as principles, and says that everything comes into being from them, he makes reality the slave of the compulsion which comes from them. Others go back to the principle of the universe and derive everything from it, saying that it is a cause which penetrates all things, and one which does not only move but also makes each single thing; they posit it as fate and the

^{1 (}your) \$\delta\$ your Theiler, H-S2. \$\delta\$. Inc(). \$\delta\$ wBR. IncUSQ, H-S1.

ἀνάγκης Arc, cdd.: ἀνάγκη codd.
 οὐ μόνος Arc, cdd.: μόνος οὐ codd.

θέμενοι, αὐτὴν οὖσαν τὰ πάντα· οὖ μόνον τὰ ἄλλα, ὅσα γίνεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς ἡμετέρως διανοήσεις ἐκ τῶν ἐκείνης ἰέναι κωημάτων, οἶου ζώου μορίων κινουμένων ἐκάστων οὖκ ἐξ αὐτῶν, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ

25 ήγεμονούντος ἐν ἐκάστῳ τῶν ζῷων. *Αλλοι δὲ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς φορὰν περιέχουσαν καὶ πάντα ποιοῦσαν τῆ κινήσει καὶ ταϊς τῶν ἄστρων πλανωμένων τε καὶ ἀπλανῶν σχέσεσι καὶ αχηματισμοῖς πρὸς ἄλληλα, ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκ τούτων προρρήσεως πατούμενοι, ἔκαστα ἐντεῦθεν γίνεσθαι ἀξιοῦσι.

30 Καὶ μὴν καὶ τὴν τῶν αἰτίων ἐπιπλοκὴν πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ τὸν ἄνωθεν εἰρμὸν καὶ τὸ ἔπεσθαι τοῖς προτέροις ἀεὶ τὰ ὕστερα καὶ ταῦτα ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα ἀνιέναι δι' αὐτῶν γενόμενα καὶ ἄνευ ἐκείνων οὐκ ἂν γενόμενα, δουλεύεω δὲ τοῖς πρὸ αὐτῶν τὰ

35 ύστερα, ταῦτα εἴ τις λέγοι, εἰμαρμένην ἔτερον τρόπον εἰσάγων φανεῖται. Διπτοὺς δ' ἄν τις θέμενος καὶ τούτους οὐκ ἂν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἀποτυγχάνοι. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀφ' ἔνός τινος τὰ πάντα ἀναρτῶσιν, οἱ δὲ οὐχ οὕτω. Λεχθήσεται δὲ περὶ τούτων. Νῦν δ' ἐπὶ τοὺς πρώτους ἰτέον τῷ λόγῳ· εἶτ' 40 ἐφεξῆς τὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπισκεπτέον.

3. Σώμασι μέν οὖν ἐπιτρέψαι τὰ πάντα εἴτε ἀτόμοις εἴτε τοῖς ατοιχείοις καλουμένοις καὶ τῆ ἐκ τούτων ἀτάκτως φορὰ τάξιν καὶ λόγον καὶ ψυχὴν τὴν ἡγουμένην γεννῶν ἀμφοτέρως μὲν ἄτοπον καὶ ἀδύνατον, ἀδυνατότερον δέ, εἰ οἷον

5 τε 1 λέγειν, τὸ ἐξ ἀτόμων. Καὶ περὶ τούτων πολλοὶ
1 οἴόν τε ΑΡ, edd.: οἴονται codd.

supremely dominant cause, which is itself all things; they say that not only the other things which come into being but also our own thoughts come from its movements, as when the individual parts of a living creature are not moved by themselves but by the ruling principle in each living thing. Others claim that each and every thing comes to be from the universal circuit, which embraces everything and makes everything by its movement and by the positions and mutual aspects of the planets and fixed stars, relying upon the prediction which comes from them. Then, too, anyone who speaks of the mutual interweaving of causes and the chain of causation which reaches down from above, and the fact that consequents always follow antecedents and go back to them, since they come to be because of them and would not have done so without them, and says that what comes after is always enslaved to what is before, will obviously bring in fate by another way. But if one divided these philosophers, too, into two groups, one would be in accordance with the truth. For some of them make everything depend on a single principle, but others do not. We shall speak about these; 1 but now we must discuss those we mentioned first, and then consider the opinions of the others in order.

3. Well, then, to hand over the universe to hodies, whether to atoms or to what are called elements, and to generate order and reason and the ruling soul from the disorderly motion which they produce, is absurd and impossible on either view, but the more impossible, if one can say so, is the production from atoms. About these atoms many true arguments

εἴρηνται λόγοι ἀληθεῖς. Εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ θεῖτό τις τοιαύτας ἀρχάς, οὐδ' οὔτως ἀναγκαῖον οὔτε τὴν κατὰ πάντων ἀνάγκην οὔτε τὴν ἄλλως εἰμαρμένην ἔπεσθαι. Φέρε γὰρ πρῶτον τὰς ἀτόμους εἶναι.

10 Αδται τοίνον κινήσονται την μέν εἰς τὸ κάτω ἔστω γάρ τι κάτω— την δ' ἐκ πλαγίων, ὅπη ἔτυχεν, ἄλλαι κατ' ἄλλα. Οὐδὲν δη τακτῶς ¹ τάξεώς γε οὐκ οὕσης, τὸ δὲ γενόμενον τοῦτο, ὅτε γέγονε, πάντως. Ὠστε οὕτε πρόρρητις οὕτε μαντική τὸ παράπαν ἃν εἴη, οὕτε ἤτις ἐκ τέχνης

15 πῶς γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀτάκτοις τέχνη;—οὕτε ἦτις ἐξ ἀνθουσιασμοῦ καὶ ἐπιπνοίας· δεῖ γὰρ καὶ ἐνταῦθα ὡριπμένου τὸ μέλλον εἶναι. Καὶ σώμασι μὲν ἔσται παρὰ τῶν ἀτόμων πάσχειν πληττομένοις, ἄπερ ἂν ἐκεῖναι φέρωσω, ἐξ ἀνάγκης· τὰ δὲ δὴ

20 ψυχῆς ἔργα καὶ πάθη τίσι κινήσεσι τῶν ἀτόμων ἀναθήσει τις; Ποία γὰρ πληγῆ ¾ ἢ κάτω φερομένης ἢ ὁπουοῦν προσκρουούσης ἐν λογισμοῖς τοιοῖσδε ἢ ὁρμαῖς τοιαῖσδε ἢ ὅλως ἐν λογισμοῖς ἢ ὁρμαῖς ἢ κινήσεσιν ἀναγκαίαις εἶναι ἢ ὅλως εἶναι; "Όταν δὲ δὴ ἐναντιῶται ψυχὴ τοῖς τοῦ σώματος

25 παθήμασι; Κατὰ ποίας δὲ φορὰς ἀτόμων ὁ μὲν γεωμετρικὸς ἀναγκασθήσεται είναι, ὁ δὲ ἀριθμητικὴν καὶ άστρονομίαν ἔπισκέψεται, ὁ δὲ σοφὸς ἔσται; "Ολως γὰρ τὸ ἡμέτερον ἔργον καὶ τὸ ζώοις είναι ἀπολεῖται φερομένων ἡ τὰ σώματα

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have been brought forward. But even if one did posit principles of this kind, they would not even so necessarily entail universal compulsion or fate of a different kind. Let us start by admitting that atoms exist. Then they will be moved, some with a downward motion-let us grant that there is really a "down"-some with a sideways, just as it chances, others in other ways. Nothing will be orderedthere is no order—but this world which comes into existence, when it has come to be, is completely ordered. So [on the atomic theory | there would be no foretelling or divination, neither that which comes from art-for how could there be an art which deals with things without order?-nor that which comes from divine possession and inspiration; 1 for here. too, the future must be determined. And bodies will suffer, compulsorily, when they are struck by atoms, whatever the atoms may bring; but to what movements of atoms will one be able to attribute what soul does and suffers? For by what sort of atomic blow, whether the movement goes downwards or strikes against it from any direction, will the soul be engaged in reasonings or impulses of a particular kind. or any sort of reasonings or impulses or movements, necessary or not? And when the soul opposes the affections of the body? By what movements of atoms will one man be compelled to be a geometer, another study arithmetic and astronomy, and another be a philosopher? Our human activity, and our nature as living beings, will be altogether done away with if we are carried about where the [primary] bodies take

¹ τακτῶς Orelli, H-S: πάντως codd. ² ποία γὰρ πληγῆ Harder, H-S²: ποία γὰρ πληγὴ codd.

¹ This distinction between the two kinds of divination is taken from *Phaedrus* 2440.

άγει δθούντα ήμᾶς ἄσπερ ἄψυχα σώματα. Τὰ 30 αὐτὰ δὲ ταῦτα καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἔτερα σώματα αἴτια των πάντων τιθεμένους, καὶ ὅτι θερμοίνειν μὲν καὶ ψύχειν ἡμᾶς καὶ φθείρειν δὲ τὰ ἀσθενέστερα δύναται ταῦτα, ἔργον δὲ οὐδὲν τῶν ὅσα ψυχὴ ἐργάζεται παρὰ τούτων ἃν γίγνοιτο, ἀλλ' ἀφ' ἔτέρας δεῖ ταῦτα ἀρχῆς ἰέναι.

4. 'Αλλ' άρα μία τις ψυχή διὰ παντός διήκουσα περαίνει τὰ πάντα έκάστου ταύτη κινουμένου ὡς μέρους, ἢ τὸ ὅλον ἄγει, φερομένων δὲ ἐκείθεν τῶν αἰτίων ἀκολούθων ὰνάγκη τὴν τούτων ἐφεξῆς 5 συνέχειαν καὶ συμπλοκὴν είμαρμένην, οἱον εἰ φυτοῦ ἐκ ρίζης τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχοντος τὴν ἐνιεθθεν ἐπὶ πάντα διοίκησιν αὐτοῦ τὰ μέρη καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα συμπλοκήν, ποίησίν τε καὶ πεῖσιν, διοίκησω μίαν καὶ οἱον είμαρμένην τοῦ φυτοῦ τις εἶναι λέγοι; 'Αλλὰ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο τὸ σφοδρὸν τῆς 10 ἀνάγκης καὶ τῆς τοιαύτης είμαρμένης αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὴν είμαρμένην καὶ τῶν αἰτίων τὸν είρμὸν καὶ τὴν συμπλοκὴν ἀναιρεῖ. 'Ως γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἡμετέροις μέρεσι κατὰ τὸ ἡγεμονοῦν κινουμένοις ἄλογον τὸ

us, as they push us along like lifeless bodies. The same objections apply against those who posit other bodies as causes of all things; and also say that these bodies can make us hot or cold and even destroy the weaker part of us; but no one of all the activities of soul can come from them, but these must come from

another principle.

4. But, then, does one soul, permeating the universe, accomplish everything, each individual thing being moved as a part in the way in which the whole directs it? I And must we, as the consequent causes are brought into action from that one source, call their continuous ordered interweaving "destiny," as if, when a plant has its principle in the root, one were to call the direction which extends from there over all its parts and their mutual interrelation, acting and being acted upon, a single direction and, so to speak, destiny of the plant? But, first of all, this excess of necessity and of destiny so understood itself does away with destiny and the chain of causes and their interweaving. For just as with our own parts when they are moved by our ruling principle the statement

and the philosophical background of the astrological determinism criticised in 5 and 6 is Stoic. But it is odd, in this case, that Plotinus makes so clear a distinction between those who hold that all things are determined by the world-soul and those who hold that they are determined by the universal chain of causation (2, 15–26 and 31–36; 7, 5–3). There was a Platonic view which identified fate as a substantial reality with the world-soul (Ps.—Plutarch, De Fato 568e: Calcidius In Tim., ch. 144, p. 182, 16 Waszink). And it is possible that some Platonists who held this (though not Numerius) may have adopted a Stoic-type determinism, and it is against them that Plotinus is arguing here (cp. Bréhier in his introduction to this treatise).

This section (ths. 4—7 incl.) directed against the determinists has a good deal in common with the long discussion of fate in the commentary of Calcidius on the Timacus (chs. 142—190), which Waszink gives quite good reasons for supposing to derive ultimately from Numerius (cp. the preface to his edition pp. lviii—|xiii). So the immediate source of Plotinus here may well be Numenius. The opponents envisaged throughout may be Stoics: there is nothing necessarily un-Stoic in this chapter,

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καθ' είμαρμένην λέγειν κινείσθαι—ού γάρ ἄλλο 15 μεν το ενδεδωκός την κίνησιν, άλλο δε το παραδεξάμειου καὶ παρ' αὐτοῦ τῆ όρμη κεχρημένου, άλλ' έκεινο έστι πρώτον το κινήσαν το σκέλοςτον αὐτον τρόπον εί και ἐπὶ τοῦ παντός εν έσται τὸ πῶν ποιοῦν καὶ πάσχον καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο παρ' άλλου κατ' αίτίας την άνηγωγην άεὶ έφ' έτερον 20 έχούσας, οὐ δὴ ἀληθές κατ' αἰτίας τὰ πάντο γίγνεσθαι, άλλ' εν έσται τὰ πάντα. "Ωστε οὖτε ήμεις ήμεις ούτε τι ήμετερον έργον οὐδο λογιζόμεθα αὐτοί, ἀλλ' ἐτέρου λογισμοί τὰ ἡμέτερα βουλεύματα οὐδε πράττομεν ήμεῖς, ώσπερ οὐδ οί πόδες λακτίζουσιν, άλλ' ήμεις διά μερών τών 25 ξαυτών. 'Αλλά γάρ δεῖ καὶ ξκαστον ξκαστον είναι καὶ πράξεις ήμετέρας καὶ διανοίας ὑπάρχειν καὶ τὰς ἐκάστου καλάς τε καὶ αἰσχρὰς πράξεις παρ' αδιού έκάσιου, άλλά μη τῷ παντί την γοθν τῶν αἰσχρῶν ποίησω ἀνατιθέναι.

5. 'Αλλ' ΐσως μὲν οὐχ οὖτως ἔκαστα περαίνεται, ή δὲ φορὰ διοικοῦσα πάντα καὶ ἡ τῶν ἄστρων κύνησις οὕτως ἔκαστα τίθησιν, ὡς ἂν πρὸς ἄλληλα στάσεως ἔχη μαρτυρίαις καὶ ἀνατολαῖς, δύσεσί τε 5 καὶ παραβολαῖς. 'Απὸ τούτων γοῦν μαντευόμενοι προλέγουσι περί τε τῶν ἐν τῷ παντὶ ἐυυμένων περί τε ἐκάστου, ὅπως τε τύχης καὶ διανοίας οὐχ ἤκιστα ἔξει. 'Ορᾶν δὲ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῷά τε καὶ φυτὰ ἀπὸ τῆς τούτων συμπαθείας αὐξόμενά τε καὶ μεισύμενα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα παρ' αὐτῶν πάσχοντα τούς

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that they are moved according to fate is unreasonable -for there is not one thing which imparts the movement and another which receives it and takes its impulse from it, but the ruling principle itself is what immediately moves the leg-in the same way if in the All the All is one thing acting and being acted upon, and one thing does not come from another according to causes which always lead back to something else, it is certainly not true that everything happens according to causes but everything will be one. So, on this assumption, we are not ourselves. nor is there any act which is our own. We do not reason, but our considered decisions are the reasonings of another. Nor do we act, any more than our feet kick; it is we who kick through parts of ourselves. But, really, each separate thing must be a separate thing; there must be actions and thoughts that are our own; each one's good and bad actions must come from himself, and we must not attribute the doing of bad actions at least to the All.

5. But perhaps particular things are not brought about in this way, but the heavenly circuit, directing everything, and the movement of the planets, arranges each and every thing according to the relative positions of the planets in their aspects and rising, settings and conjunctions. The evidence for this is that by divination from the planets people foretell what is going to happen in the All and about each individual, what sort of fortune and, in particular, what sort of thoughts he is going to have. And they say that one can see that the other animals and plants grow and diminish under the sympathetic influence of the planets, and are affected by them in other ways; and

10 τε τόπους τούς ἐπὶ γῆς διαφέροντας ἀλλήλωτ είναι κατά τε την προς το παν σχέσιν και προς ήλιον μάλιστα: ακολοιθείν δε τοίς τόποις ού μονον τὰ ἄλλα φυτά τε καὶ ζῷα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνθρώπων είδη τε καὶ μεγέθη καὶ χρόσε καὶ θυμούς κα. 15 ἐπιθυμίας ἐπιτηδεύματά τε καὶ ήθη. Κυρία ἄρο ή του παντός πάντων φυρά. Πρός δή ταθτα πρώτον μέν έκεινο ρητέον, ότι και ούτος έπερον τρόπον εκείνοις άνατίθησι τὰ ημέτερα, βουλάς και πάθη, κακίας τε καὶ όρμας, ήμιν δὲ οὐδὲν διδούς λίθοις φερομένοις καταλείπει εΐναι, άλλ' οὐκ 20 ανθρώποις έχουσι παρ' αύτῶν καὶ ἐκ τῆς αύτῶν φύσεως έργον. 'Αλλά χρη διδόναι μέν τὸ ήμέτερον ήμιν, ήκειν δέ είς τὰ ήμέτερα ήδη τινά όντα καί οἰκεῖα ἡμῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ παντος ἄττα, καὶ διαιρούμενον, τίνα μεν ήμεις εργαζόμεθα, τίνα δε πάσχομεν 2ξ ανάγκης, μή πάντα εκείνοις άνατιθέναι καὶ 25 ιέναι μεν παρά τῶν τόπων καὶ τῆς διαφοράς τοῦ περιέχοντος els ήμας οδον θερμότητας ή ψύξεις έν τή κράσει, ίέναι δὲ καί ταρά τῶν γειναμένων.1 τοις γουν γυνείσιν όμοιοι και τὰ είδη ώς τὰ πολλα καί τινα τῶν ἀλόγων τῆς ψυχῆς παθῶν. Οὐ μὴν άλλά και όμοιων όντων τοις είδεσι παρά τους 20 τοπους έν γε τοις ήθεσι πλείστη παραλλαγή καί έν ταις διανοίαις ένοραται, ώς αν άπ' άλλης άρχης των τοιούτων ζόντων. Αξ τε πρός τάς κράσεις των σωμάτων και πρός τας επιθυμίας έναντιώσεις καὶ ένταιθθα πρεπόντως λέγοιντο αν.

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the regions of the earth differ from each other according to their position in relation to the All, and particularly to the sun; and not only do the other animals and plants correspond to the regions but also the forms and sizes and colours, the tempers and desires and ways of life and characters of human beings. So the universal circuit rules all things. In answer to this we must say, first, that this man too, in a different way, attributes to those principles what is ours, acts of will and affections, vices and impulses, but gives us nothing and leaves us to be stones set rolling, but not men who have a work to do of ourselves and from our own nature. But one must give to us what is ours (though there must come to what is ours, already something and our own, a certain amount from the Al.), and make a distinction between what we do ourselves and what we experience of necessity and no, attribute everything to those principles. And something certainly must come to us from the regions and the difference of the surrounding atmosphere, for instance, heat or coldness in our temperaments, but something also comes from our parents; at any rate, we are generally like our parents in our appearance and some of the irrational affections of our soul. Yet all the same, even when people are alke in appearance, corresponding to their regions, the greatest difference is observed in their characters and thoughts, so that things of this kind would come from another principle. Our resistances, also, to our bodily temperaments and our lusts could appropriately be mentioned here. But if, because,

¹ γειναμένων Sleeman, H-S: γι(γ)νομένων codd.

Εί δ' ὅτι είς τὴν τῶν ἄστρων σχέσιν ὁρῶντες περὶ 35 έκάστων λέγουσι τὰ γινομενα, παρ' ἐκείνων ποιείσθαι τεκμαίρονται, όμοιως άν και οί δρνεις ποιητικοι ών σημαίνουσιν είεν καὶ πάντα, είς ᾶ βλέποντες οἱ μάντεις προλέγουσιι. "Ετι δε καὶ έκ τωνδε ακριβέστερον αν τις περί τούτων ξπισκέψαιτο. "Α τις αν ίδων είς την των άστρων 40 σχέσιν, ην είχον ότε έκαστος έγινετο, τροείποι, ταθτά φασι καὶ γίνεσθαι παρ' αὐτῶν οὐ σημαινόντων μόνον, άλλά καὶ ποιούντων. "Όταν τοίνυν περί εθγενείας λέγωσιν ώς έξ ένδόξων τών πατέρων καὶ μητέρων, πῶς ἔνι ποιεῖσθαι λέγειν ταθτα, α προυπάρχει περί τους γονεις πρίν την 45 σχέσιν γενέσθαι ταύτηι των ἄστραν ἀφ' ής προλέγουσι; Καὶ μὴν καὶ γονέων τύχας ἀπὸ τῶν παίδων της γενένεως και παίδωι διαθέσεις οίαι έσονται καὶ όποίαις συνέσονται τύχαις άπο των πατέρων περί των ούπο γεγονότων λέγουσι καὶ εξ άδελφων άδελφων θανάτους καὶ έκ γυναικών 50 τὰ περὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας ἀνάπαλίν τε ἐκ τούτων έκεινα. Πως αν οὖν ή ἐπὶ ἐκάστοι σχέσις 1 των ἄστρων ποιοί, ἃ ήδη ἐκ πατέρωι οὕτως ἔξειι λέγεται; *Η γὰρ ἐκεῖνα τὰ πρότερα ἔσται τὰ ποιούντα, η εί μη έκείνα ποιεί, οὐδέ ταῦτα. Καὶ μην καὶ ή ὁμοιότης ἐν τοις είδεσι πρός τους γονέας

 1 èni éxáctou syésis Kirchloff, II \mathbb{S}^{3} . Éxáctou syésis èncocol

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looking at the position of the stars they announce what has happened to particular people, they addice this as evidence that the happenings were caused by the stars, then in the same way birds would be the causes of what they indicate, and so would everything at which the soothsayers look when they foretell. Further, one could investigate these matters more exactly starting from the following observations. Whatever someone foretold, looking at the position which the stars held when a particular man was born, this, they say, was brought about by the stars, which did not only indicate but also caused the happenings. But when they talk about peoples noble birth, that is hat they come of illustrious fathers and mothers, how is it possible that the stars caused what the parents had already before the position of the stars came about from which they foretell? And they tell, too, the fortunes of parents from the nativity of their children, and what the children's dispositions are going to be and what fortunes they will meet with from the nativity of their parents speaking of children who are yet unborn, and they tell of the death of brothers from the horoscopes of their brothers, of what concerns husbands from the horoscopes of their wives and, the other way round, of wives from the horoscopes of their husbands. How, then, could the position of the stars over an individual cause what is already stated as going to occur on the evidence of the horoscope of the parents? Either those former astrological circumstances are the cause, or, if they are not, neither are those at the birth of the individual. Again, too, people's likeness in appearance to their parents declares that beauty

55 οἴκοθεν φησι καὶ κάλλος καὶ αἶσχος ἰέναι, ἀλλ' οὐ παρὰ φορᾶς ἄστρων. Εὔλογόν τε κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους καὶ ἄμα ζωά τε παντοδατα κοὶ ἀνθρώπους ἄμα γίνεσθαι· οἶς ἄπασων ἐχρῆν τὰ αὐτα εἶναι, οἶς ἡ αὐτὴ σχεσις. Πῶς οὖν ἄμα μὲν ἀνθρωτους, ᾶμα δὲ τὰ ἄλλα διὰ τῶν υχημάτων, 6. ᾿Αλλὰ γὰρ γίγνεται μὲν ἔκαστα κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν φύσεις, ἵππος μέν, ὅτι ἐξ ἵππου, καὶ ἄνθρωπος, ὅτι ἐζ ἀνθρώπου, καὶ τοιόσδε, ὅτι ἐκ τοιοῦδε. Ἔστω δὲ σπνεργὸς καὶ ἡ τοῦ παντὸς 5 φορὰ συγχωροῦσα τὸ πολὺ τοῖς γεωαμένοις.¹ ἔστωσαν δὲ πρὸς τὰ τοῦ σώματος πολλὰ σωμα-

δορα συγχωρουσα το πολύ τους γενωμενους.
ἔστωσαν δε πρός το τοῦ πώματος πολλά σωματικῶς διδόντες, θερμότητας καὶ ψύξεις καὶ σωμάτων κρώσεις ἐπακολουθούσας, πῶς οὖν τὰ ἤθη καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα καὶ μάλιστα σὐχ ὅσα δοκεῖ κράσει σωμάτων δοιλεύεω, ιὖον γραμματικὸς τίς καὶ η γεωμετρικὸς καὶ κυβευτικὸς καὶ τῶνδε τίς εὐρετής;

10 γεωμετρικός και κυβευτικός και τωνός τις ευρετης, πονηρία δε ήθους παρά θεών ὅντων πῶς ἀν δοθείη; καὶ ὅλως ὅσα λέγονται διδόναι κακὰ κακούμενοι, ὅτι δύνουσι καὶ ὅτι ὑπὸ γῆι φέρονται, ὥσπιμ διάφορόν τι πασχόντων, εἰ πρὸς ἡμᾶς δύνοιεν, 15 ἀλλ' οὐκ άεὶ ἐπὶ σφαίρας οὐρανίας φερομένων, καὶ

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and uglness come from the family, and not from the movements of stars. It is reasonable, too, to suppose that at the same time both all sorts of living creatures and men are born together; and all of them, since they have the same position of the stars, ought to have the same destiny. How, then, are at one and the same time both men and other living creatures produced by the arrangements of the stars?

6. But, in fact, all individual things come into being according to their own natures, a horse because it comes from a horse, and a man from a man, and a being of a particular kind because it comes from a being of a particular kind. Admitted that the universal circuit co-operates (conceding the main part to the parents), and admitted that the stars contribute a great deal corporeally to the constatuents of the body, heat and cooling and the consequent bodily temperaments; how, then, are they responsible for characters and ways of life, and especially for what is not obviously dominated by bedily temperament-becoming a man of letters, for instance, or a geometer, or a dice-player, and a discoverer in these fields? And how could a wicked character be given by the stars, who are gods? And in general, how could all the evils be given by them which they are said to give when they are brought into an evil state because they are setting and passing under the earth—as if anything extraordinary happened to them if they set from our point of view, and they were not always moving in the heavenly sphere

come into being," makes any sense at all here) and is consistent with the whole argument of the preceding lines.

¹ γειναμένοις Sleeman. γινομένοις codd, H-S.

¹ I read here γεινομένοις (Sleeman, U.ass Quert. 20, 1926, 152), for the MSS γινομένοις, because it gives a much better sense (it is difficult, indeed, it see how "the things which

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πρός την γην την αυτήν έχόντων σχέσιν; Ούδε λεκτέον, ώς άλλος άλλον ίδων των θεώι κατ' άλλην και άλλην στάσιν χείριον ή κρείττων γίνετοι. ώστε εὐπαθοῦντας μεν ήμης εὖ ποιεῖν, κακοῦν δέ. εὶ τάναντία. ἀλλά μάλλον, ώς φέρεται μὲν ταῦτα 20 έπι σωτηρία τῶν ὅλων, παρέχεται δὲ καὶ ἄλλην γρείων την του είς αυτά ώσπερ γράμματα βλέποντας τούς την τοιαύτην γραμματικήν είδότας άναγινώσκειν τὰ μέλλοντα ἐκ τῶν σχημάτων κατὰ τὸ άνάλογον μεθοδεύοντας το σημαινόμενου. ώσπερ εί τις λέγοι, έπειδή ύψηλος ό όρνις, σημαίτει

ψψηλάς τινας πράξεις.

7. Λοιποι δε ίδεῦν την επιπλέκουσαν και οίον συνείρουσαν άλλήλοις πάντα και το πώς εξ έκάστου επιφέρουσαν άρχην τιθεμένην μίαν, άφ' ής πάντα κατά λόγους σπερματικούς περαίνεται. 5 "Εστι μέν οδι καὶ αυτη ή δόξα έγγυς έκεινης της πάσαν και σχέσαν και κίνησιν ήμετέραν τε και πασαν έκ της των όλων ψυχης ήκειν λεγούσης, εί και βούλεται τι ήμιν και έκαστοις χαρίζεσθαι είς -δ πορ' ήμερον ποιείν τι. Έχει μέν ούν την πάντως πάντων ἀνάγκην, καὶ πάντων εἰλημμένων 10 των αλτίων ούκ έστιν έκαστον μή οὐ γίνεσθαι. ούδει γάρ έτι το κωλύσον ή άλλως γενέσθαι ποιήσον, εί πάντα είλητται εν τή είμαρμένη. Τοιαθτα δὲ ὅντα τὸς ἀπὸ μιῶς ἀρχῆς τὸρμημένα ήμεν ουδέν κωταλείψει, η φέρεσθαι όπη αν δικείνα ώθη. Αί τε γάρ φαντασίαι τοῦς προηγησαμένοις 15 αι τε όρμαι κατά ταύτας εσονται, δυομά τε μόνου

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and holding the same position in relation to the earth? Nor must it be said that when one of the gods sees another in this or that position he becomes better or worse so that when they are in a good state they do good to us, but harm us when the opposite. We must rather say that the movement of the stars is for the preservation of the universe, but that they perform in addition another service; this is that those who know how to read this sort of writing can, by looking at them as if they were letters, read the future from their patterns, discovering what is signified by the systematic use of analogy-for instance, if one said that when the bird flies high it significs some high heroic deeds.

7. It remains to look at the [theory of the] principle which interweaves and, so to speak, chains everything to everything else, and makes each individual thing be the way it is, a principle assumed to be one, from which all things come about by seminal formative principles. This opinion is close to that which says that all states and movements, both our own and all others, come from the soul of the universe, even if it does allow us, even as individuals, some room for action of our own. It certainly has in it absolute universal necessity, and when all the causes are included it is impossible for each individual thing not to happen: for there is nothing left which will hinder it or make it happen otherwise if all causes are included in fate. If they are like this, starting from a single principle, they will leave nothing for us except to move wherever they push us. For our mental images will depend on pre-existing circumstances and our impulses will follow our mental το εφ' ήμιν εσται· οὐ γὰρ ὅτι ὁρμῶμεν ήμεις, ταύτη τι τλέον ἔσται τῆς ὁρμῆς κατ' ἐκεινα γεννωμένης τοιοῦτόν τε τὸ ἡμέτερον ἐσται, οιον καὶ τὸ τῶν ἀλλων ζώων καὶ το τῶν νηπίων καθ' ὁρμῶς τφλὰς ἰόντων καὶ τὸ τῶν μαινομένων· 20 ὁρμῶς γὰρ καὶ οὖτοι· καὶ νὴ Δία καὶ ¹ πυρὸς ὁρμαὶ καὶ πάντων ὅσα δοιλεύοντα τῆ αὐτων κατασκευη φέρεται κατὰ ταύτην. Τοῦτο δὲ καὶ πάντες ὁρῶντες οὐκ ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ τῆς ὁρμῆς ταύτης ἄλλας αἰτίας ζητοῦντες οὐχ ἔστανται ὡς ἐτ' ἀρχῆς ταύτης.

8. Τίς οὖν ἄλλη αἰτία παρὰ ταύτας ἐπελθοῦσα άναιτιόν τε ούδεν καταλείψει άκολουθίαν τε τηρήσει και τάξιν ήμας τέ τι είναι συγχωρήσει προρρήσεις τε καὶ μαντείας σύκ αναιρήσει, Τοχήν 5 δη δει άρχην ούσαν άλλην επεισφέροντας είς τά όντα, οὐ μόνον τὴν τοῦ παντός, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν έκάστου μετά ταύτης, ώς άρχης οὐ σμικρᾶς οὕσης, πλέκειν τὰ πάντα, οὐ γινομένης καὶ αὐτῆς, ώσπερ τὰ ἄλλα, ἐκ σπερμάτων, ἀλλὰ πρωτουργοῦ αἰτίας ούσης. "Ανει μέν ούν σώματος ούσα κυριωτάτη 10 τε πύτης και έλευθέρα και κοσμικής αίτιας έξω. ένεχθείσα δὲ εἰς σῶμα οὐκέτι πάντα κυρία, ώς ἄν μεθ' έτέρων ταχθείσα. Τύχαι δὲ τὰ κύκλω πάντα, οίς συνέπεσεν έλθουσα είς μέσοι, τὰ πολλά ήγαγον, ώστε τὰ μὲι ποιειν διὰ ταυτα, τὰ δὲ κρατούσαν αὐτὴν ταῦτα ὅπη ἐθέλει ἄγειν. Πλείω 15 δὲ κρατεῖ ἡ ἀμείνων, ἐλάττω δὲ ἡ χείρων. Ἡ ² γὰρ κρόπε πώματός τι ἐνδιδοθσα ἐπιθυμεῖν ἢ ἀργίζεσθαι

κα. Harder, H S²: ai codd.
 ή Orelli H-S: ή codd

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images, and "what is in our power" will be a mere word; it will not exist any more just because it is we who have the impulses, if the impulse is produced in accordance with those pre-existing causes; our part will be like that of animals and babies, which go on blind impulses, and madmen, for these also have impulses—yes, by Zeus, fire has impulses too, and everything which is enslaved to its structure and moves according to it. Everyone else sees this and does not dispute it: but they look for other causes of this impulse of ours, and do not stop at this universal principle

8. What other cause, then, occurs to us, besides these, which will leave nothing causeless, and will preserve sequence and order, and allow us to be something, and not do away with prophecies and divinations? Soul, surely, is another principle which we must bring into reality-not only the Soul of the All but also the individual soul along with it as a principle of no small importance; with this we must weave al. things together, which does not itself come, like other things, from seeds but is a cause which initiates activity. Now when the soul is without body it is in absolute control of itself and free, and outside the causation of the physical universe; but when it is brought into body it is no longer in all ways in control. as it forms part of an order with other things. Chances direct, for the most part, all the things round it, among which it has falen when it comes to this middle point, so that it does some things because of these, but sometimes it masters them itself and leads them where it wishes. The better soul has power over more, the worse over less. For the soul that gives in at all to the temperament of the body, is

ηνάγκασται η πενίαις ταπεινή η πλούτοις χαῦνος η δυνάμεσι τύραννος ή δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς τούτοις ἀντέσχεν, ἡ ἀγαθή τὴν φύσιν, καὶ ἡλλοίωσεν 20 αὐτὰ μᾶλλον ἡ ἡλλοιώθη, ὥστε τὰ μὲν ἐτεροιώσαι,

τοις δέ συγχωρήσαι μή μετά κάκης.

0. 'Αναγκαΐα μέν οὖν ταῦτα, όσα προαιρέσει καὶ τύχαις κραθέντα γίνεται τί γὰρ ᾶν ἔτι καὶ άλλο είη; Πάντων δὲ ληφθέντων τῶν αἰτίων πάντα πάντως γίνεται έν τοῖς ἔξωθεν δὲ καὶ εἴ τι 5 έκ της φοράς συντελείται. "Όταν μέν οὖν άλλοιωθείσα παρά των έξω ψυχή πράττη τι καί όρμα οίον τυφλή τή φορά χρωμένη, ούχὶ εκούσων την πράξιν οὐδὲ τὴν διαθεσιν λεκτέον και όταν αὐτή παρ' αὐτής χείρων οὖσα οὐκ όρθαῖς πανταχοῦ οὐδε ήγεμονούσαις ταις όρμαις ή χρωμένη. 10 Λόγον δε ότων ήγεμόνα καθαρόν και άπαθή του οἰκεῖον ἔχουσα όρμῷ, ταύτην μόνην τὴν όρμὴν φατέον είναι εφ' ήμα καὶ έκούσιον, καὶ τοῦτο είναι το ημέτερον έργον, ο μη άλλοθεν ήλθεν, άλλ' ένδοθεν ἀπὸ καθαρᾶς τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀπ' ἀρχῆς πρώτης ήγουμένης καὶ κυρίας, άλλ' οὐ πλάνην έξ 15 άγγοίας παθούσης η ήτταν έκ βίας επιθυμιών, αξ προσελθούσαι άγουσι καὶ έλκουσι καὶ οὐκέτι έργα έωσιν είναι, άλλά παθήματα παρ' ήμων.

10. Τέλος δή φησιν ο λόγος πάντα μὲν σημαίνεσθαι και γίνευθαι και ' αἰτίας μὲν πάντα, διττὰς δὲ ταύτας καὶ τὰ μὲν ὑπὸ ψυχῆς, τὰ δὲ δι' ἄλλας

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compelled to feel lust or anger, either abject in poverty or puffed up by wealth or tyrannical in power; but the other soul, the one which is good by nature, holds its own in these very same circumstances, and changes them rather than is changed by them; so it alters some of them and yields to others

if there is no vice in yielding

9. So all is necessary that comes about by a mixture of choice and chance; for what else could there be besides? But when all the causes are included, everything happens with complete necessity; if anything from the universal circuit makes its contribut.on, that, too, is counted among the external causes. When therefore, the soul is altered by the external causes, and so does something and drives on in a sort of blind rush, neither its action nor its disposition is to be called free; this applies, too, when it is worse from itself and does not altogether have its impulses right or in control. When, however, in its impulse it has as director its own pure and untroubled reason, then this impulse alone is to be said to be in our own power and free; this is our own act, which does not come from somewhere else but from within from our soul when it is pure, from a primary principle which directs and is in control, not suffering error from ignorance or defeat from the violence of the passions, which come upon it and drive and drag it about, and do not allow any acts to come from us any more but only passive responses.

10. To sum up, the argument says that all things are indicated [by the stars] and all things happen according to causes, but there are two kinds of these; and some happenings are brought about by the soul,

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 1

αίτίας τὰς κύκλω. Πραττούσας δὲ ψυχὰς ὅσα
5 πράττουσι κατὰ μὲν λόγον ποιούσας ὀρθὸν παρ'
τὐ ῶν "ράττειν, ὅταν πράττων, τὰ δ' ἄλλα
ἐμποδιζιμένας τὰ αὐτῶν πράττειν, πάσχεν τε
μᾶλλον ἡ πράττειν. "Ωστι τοῦ μὲν μὴ φρονεῖν
ἄλλα αἴτια εἶναι καὶ ταῦτα ἴσως ὀρθὸν καθ'
εἰμαρμένην λέγειν πράττειν, οἶς γε καὶ ὅοκεῖ
10 ἔξιιθεν τὴν εἰμαρμένηι αἴτιον εἶναι τὰ δὲ ἄριστα
παρ' ἡμῶν παύτης γὰρ καὶ τῆς ψύσεως ἐσμεν,
ὅταν μόνοι ῶμειν καὶ τοῖς γε απουδαίους πράττειν,
καὶ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς τὰ καλὰ πράττειν, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους,
καθ' ὅσον ἄν ἀναπνεύσωσι συγχωρηθέντες τὰ καλὰ
πράττειν, σὐκ ἄλλοθεν λαβόντας τὸ φρονεῖν, ὅταν
15 φρονωσι, μόνον δὲ οῦ κωλυθέντας.

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others through other causes, those round about it. And souls, in all that they do, when they do it according to right reason, act of themselves, whenever they do act, but in everything else are hindered in their own action and are passive rather than active. So other things [not the soul] are responsible for not thinking; and it is perhaps correct to say that the soul acts unthinkingly according to destiny at least for people who think that destiny is an external cause; but the best actions come from ourselves; for this is the nature we are of, when we are alone; good and wise men do act, and do noble actions by their own will; but the others do their noble actions in so far as they have a breathing space and are allowed to do so, not getting their thinking from somewhere else. when they do think, but only not being hindered.

III. 2 and 3. ON PROVIDENCE

Introductory Note

THESE treatises (Nos. 47 and 48 in the chronological order) are Porphyry's divisions of a single long work on Providence which Plotinus wrote towards the end of his life The subject was a traditional one, many Stoics and Middle Platonists had written on Providence before him: but this austere, honest and profound work is the finest of all Greek contributions to theodicy. The object of Piotinus is to explain how belief in the existence and goodness of divine providence can be justified in the face of all the apparent evils in the world: the opponents he has in view are the Epicureans, who denied providence, the Peripatetics, who denied that it extended to the world below the moon, and perhaps most of all his intimate enemies the Gnostics, who held that the material universe was the work of an evil maker. Many of the arguments he uses are traditional, taken over from the Stoics, or developed from Plato's great theodicy in Book X of the Laws (ep. Bréhier's introduction to the treatises). But there is much that is original in his use and elaboration of them. The work is not a systematic one: themes and arguments recur and are handled in different ways from different points of view, not always without some inconsistency. It is one of the works in which we have most vividly the impression of Plotinus thinking aloud, discussing the subject with bimself as he writes.

A notable feature of the work is that Plotinus speaks in it, and it alone, of a logos, a rational forming principle, of the whole universe, which looks at first sight like a distinct

ON PROVIDENCE (I) AND (II)

hypostas.s, incompatible with the normal hierarchy of three and three only, the One, Intellect and Soul, on which he misists so strongly elsewhere. But Bréhier, in his introduction (pp. 18–22), is almost certainly right in understanding logos here, not as a distinct hypostasis, but as a way of speaking of the living formative and directive pattern, derived from Intellect through Soul in the usual way, which keeps the material universe in the best possible order and brings it into a unity-in diversity of contrasting and clashing forces which, though far inferior to the unity of the intelligible world, is its best possible image in the sharply divided world of space and time.

Synopsis

III. 2

It is unreasonable to suppose that the world is produced by chance, but there are difficulties about universal providence which ought to be discussed. This universe is the everlasting product of the true, eternal universe of Intellect, which is at unity and peace with itself (ch. 1) This universe is not truly one: there is separation in it. and therefore conflict. It is not the result of any kind of planning or decision, but the natural product of Intelect, necessarily inferior because of its material element but with its own kind of narmony dominating its conflicts (ch. 2). It is good as a whole, and everything in it is good and seeks the Good, each in its degree (ch. 3). The destruction of one thing by another is necessary, and leads to new life. Disorder and lawlessness result from fature to attain the good, and lead mevitably and justly to punishment (ch 4). Evils often lead to good, for the whole or the individual (ch. 5). How can we reconcile the obvious Lapus according to the manufacture of the state of the st second rate world, after all Individual souls, too, must take their share of responsibility. But providence does

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 2.

really extend to the earth (ch. 7). Man is not the best kind of creature in the universe, but midway between gods and beasts. Men get what they deserve at the hands of the wicked through their own slackness and folly. Divine providence must leave room for human initiative. Men cannot expect the gods to he.p them if they do not do what is necessary for their own well being (chs. 8-9). Free-will and necessity (ch. 10). There must be inequalities in the All (chs. 11-12). It is important to take previous mearnations into account in estimating the justice of men's fates (ch. 13) The wonderful order of the universe, and man's place in it (chs. 13-14). The endless wars among animals and men (which do not affect man's true inner se.f) are part of the great game, incidents in the plot of the play, movements in the dance, notes in the melody of the uriverse, which must be as it is because it is necessarily secondary, imperfect, not fully unified (chs. 15-16). This universe is less one than its rational formative principle, the logos. In its clashing distinity "each man kills the thing he loves." The logos, in producing its play, gives human souls parts in it according to the characters they have already (Jr. 17). But there are still difficulties. We must not think of the actors in our cosmic drama as improvising to fill in gaps in the play. If we take away responsibility for evil from the logos we shall take away responsibility for good as well. But if we give it all responsibility, even the diviner souls will count for nothing in the universe (ch. 18).

III. 3

The universal logos includes the logos of all souls, good and bad, and each of them, while remaining itself, forms part of a complex living unity, within which strife and opposition have their place (ch. 1). The logos is like a general who commands the enemy's army as well as his own (ch. 2). Man's individuality and his acts of choice

ON PROVIDENCE (I) AND (II)

are taken account of in the universal plan. It is absurd to complain because man is not better than he is: he is as good as he can be given his place in the order of things, in this universe which itself follows upon, and is less perfect than, Intellect and Soul (ch 3). Man is not simple, but double, with a higher, free principle besides his lower self. Higher and lower providence, and higher and lower prinuples in man, the lower depend on and are caused by the higher. Again, we must take previous lives into account (ch. 4). The inequalities of the providential order; each individual thing in its place contributes in its ewn way to the single result. Fate (lower providence) and higher providence. Evil actions are not done by providence but their results are worked into the universal order. The differences in men's reactions. Their good actions are done by themselves, but according to providence (ch. 5). Divination is possible because of the universal harmony and correspendence of all things (ch. 6). Diversity, inequality and evil are necessary if there is to be any universal order at all all things in their multiplicity grow from a single root (en 7)

ΙΙΙ, 2. (47) ΠΕΡΙ ΠΡΟΝΟΙΑΣ ΠΡΩΤΟΝ

Ι. Το μέν τῷ αὐτομάτω καὶ τύχη διδόναι τοῦδε τοῦ παντός τὴι οὐσίαν καὶ σύστασιν ώς ἄλογον και ανδρός ούτε νούν ούτε αισθησιν κεκτημένου, δήλόν που καὶ πρό λόγου καὶ παλλαί καὶ ίκανοὶ 5 καταβέβληνται δεικνύντες τοῦτο λόγοι το δε τίς ό τρόπος τοῦ ταῦτα γίνεσθαι έκαστα καὶ πεποιῆσθαι, εξ αν και ενίαν ώς ουκ όρθως γινομένων απορείν περι της του παντός προνοίας συμβαίνει, καὶ τοῖς μεν ἐπῆλθε μηδὲ είναι είπεῖν, τοῖς δὲ ώς ὑπὸ κακοῦ δημιουργοῦ ἐστι γεγενημένος, ἐπισκέψασθα 10 προσήκει ἄνωθεν καὶ ἐξ ἀρχής τὸν λόγον λαβόντας. Πρόνοιαν τοίνον την μεν εφ' εκάστω, η έστι λόγος πρό έργου όπως δεί γενέσθαι ή μή γενέσθαι τι τών ού δεόντων πραχθήναι ή όπως τι είη ή μη είη ημίν, ωψείσθου ην δε του παντός λέγομεν πρόνοιαν 15 είναι, ταύτην ύποθέμενοι τὰ ἐφεξῆς συνάπτωμει. Εὶ μὲν οὖν ἀπό τινος γρόνοι πρότερον οὐκ όντα τον κόσμον 1 ελέγομεν γεγονέναι, την αὐτην αν τώ λόγω έπιθέμεθα, οΐαν καὶ ἐπὶ τοις κατα μέρος

1 κόσμοι Ficinus, Η S: χρωνον codd

III. 2. ON PROVIDENCE (I)

 To attribute the being and structure of this All to accident and chance is unreasonable and belongs to a man without intelligence or perception; this is obvious even before demonstration, and many adequate demonstrations have been set down which show it. But the way in which all these individual things here come into being and are made, some of which, on the ground that they have not rightly come into being, produce difficulties about universal providence (and it has occurred to some people to say that it does not exist at al, and to others that the universe has been made by an evil maker),2 this we ought to consider, starting our discussion from the very beginning. Let us leave out that providence [or foresight] which belongs to the individual, which is a calculation before action how something should happen, or not happen in the case of things which ought not to be done, or how we may have something, or not have it. Let us postulate what we call universal providence and connect up with it what comes after. If, then, we said that after a certain time the universe, which did not previously exist, came into being, we should in our discussion lay down that providence in the All was the same as we said it was in partial things, a

Perphyry in Lafe, ch. 24, 56-57, as "Against those who say that the maker of the universe is evil, and the universe is evil."

¹ The Epicureans: cp. e.g. (Serm, De Vatura Decrum I. 8, 18 and 20, 54-56.

² The Grostics: cp. II. 9 [33], of which the title is given by

ελέγομεν είναι, προόρασίν τινα καὶ λογισμόν θεοῦ, ώς αν γένοιτο τόδε τὸ πάν, καὶ ώς αν άριστα κατά 20 το δυνατόν είη. Έπει δε το αεί και το ούποιε μη τῷ κόσμω τῷδέ φαμεν παρείναι, τὴν πρόνοιαν όρθως αν και άκολούθως λέγοιμεν τῷ παντί είναι το κατά νούν αύτον είναι, και νούν πρό αύτοθ είναι οιχ ώς χρόνω πρότερον όντα, άλλ' ότι παρά νοῦ ἐστι καὶ φύσει πρότερος ἐκεῖνος καὶ αἴτιος 25 τούτου άρχέτυπον οίον καὶ παράδεν/μα εἰκόνος τούτου όντος καὶ δι' ἐκείνον όντος καὶ ὑποστάντος αξί, τόνδε τον τρόπον. ή τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τοῦ ὅντος φύσις κόσμος εστίν ὁ άληθινός καὶ πρώτος, οὐ διαστας αφ' εαυτου ουδέ ασθενής τω μερισμώ ουδέ έλλιπης ούδε τοις μέρεσι γενόμενος ατε 30 ξκάστου μη ἀποσπασθέντος τοῦ ὅλου· άλλ' ή πάσα ζωή αὐτοῦ και πᾶς νοῦς ἐν ἐνὶ ζῶσα καὶ νοοθσα όμοθ καὶ τὸ μέρος παρέχεται όλον καὶ πὰν αὐτῷ φίλον οὐ χωρισθέν ἄλλο ἀπ' ἄλλον οὐδέ έτερον γενενημένον μόνον καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπεξενωμένον· ὄθεν οὐδὲ ἀδικεῖ ἄλλο ἄλλο οὐδ' ἂν 🖞 35 εναντίου. Πανταχού δε ου εν καὶ τέλειου όπουούν εστηκέ τε καὶ άλλοίωσιν οὐκ έχει οὐδὲ γὰρ ποιεί άλλο είς άλλο. Τίνος γάρ αν ένεκα ποιοι ἐλλεῦπον οὐδενί: Τί δ' ἄν λόγος λόγον ἐργάσαιτο

ON PROVIDENCE (I)

foreseeing and calculation of God about how this All might come into existence, and how things might be as good as possible. But since we affirm that this universe is everlasting and has never not existed,1 we should be correct and consistent in saying that providence for the All is its being according to Intellect, and that Intellect is before it, not in the sense that it is prior in time but because the universe comes from Intellect and Intellect is prior in nature, and the cause of the universe as a kind of archetype and model, the universe being an image of it and existing by means of it and everlastingly coming into existence, in this way; the nature of Intellect and Being is the true and first universe, which does not stand apart from itself and is not weakened by division and is not incomplete even in its parts, since each part is not cut off from the whole; but the whole life of it and the whole intellect lives and thinks all together in one, and makes the part the whole and all bound in friendship with itself, since one part is not separated from another and has not become merely other, estranged from the rest; and, therefore, one does not wrong another, even if they are opposites. And since it is everywhere one and complete at every point it stays still and knows no alteration; for it does not make as one thing acting upon another. For what reason could it have for making, since it is deficient in nothing? Why should a rational principle make another rational principle,

but of a spontaneous outflow of creative power without beginning or end. For a particularly notable statement of his reasons for rejecting divine planning and subsequent creation, ep. V 8 [31] 7.

¹ Plotinus frequently attacks the idea that God first planned the universe and then created it, and justes that it is everlasting and not the result of divine deliberation and choice

η νοῦς νοῦν ἄλλον; 'Αλλὰ τὸ δι' αὐττῦ δύνασθα' τι ποιεῖν ην ἄρα οὐκ εὖ ἔχοντος πάντη, ἀλλὰ ταύτη 40 ποιοῦντος καὶ κινουμένου, καθ' ὅ τι καὶ χεῖρόν ἐστι· τοῖς δε πάντη μακαρίοις ἐν αὐτοῖς ἑστάναι καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι, ὅπερ εἰσί, μόνον ἀρκεὶ, τὸ δὲ πολυπραγμονεῖν οὺκ ἀσφαλὲς ἐαυτοὺς ἐξ αὐτοῦν παρακινοῦσιν. 'Αλλὰ γὰρ οὅτω μακάριον κἀκεινο, ὡς ἐν τῷ μὴ ποιεῖν μεγάλα αὖ ἐργάζεσθαι, και ἐν

45 τῶ ἐψ΄ ἐαυτοῦ μένειν οὐ σμικρὰ ποιεῖν. 2. Υφίσταται γοῦν ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου τοῦ ἀληθινοῦ ἐκείνου καὶ ένὸς κόσμος οὖτος οὐχ εἰς ἀληθώς. πολύς γοῦν καὶ εἰς πληθος μεμερισμένος καὶ ἄλλο 5 ἀπ' ἄλλου ἀφεστηκός καὶ ἀλλότριον γεγενημένον καὶ οὐκέτι φιλία μόνον, ἀλλά καὶ ἔχθρα τῆ διαστάσει και έν τῆ έλλείψει έξ ἀνάγκης πολέμιον άλλο άλλφ. Οὐ γὰρ ἀρκεῖ αὐτῷ τὸ μέρος, ἀλλὰ σωζόμενον τῷ ἄλλω πολέμιον ἐστιν ὑφ' οδ σώζεται. Γέγονε δε οὐ λογισμώ τοῦ δεῖν γενέσθαι, άλλη φύσεως δευτέρας ανάγκη ου γάρ ήν τοιούτον 10 έκείνο οΐον έσχατον είναι τῶν ὅντων. Πρῶτον γάρ ήν και πολλήν δύναμιν έχον και πάσαν και ταύτην τοίνυν την τοῦ ποιείν άλλο ἄνευ τοῦ ζητείν ποιήσαι. "Ήδη γάρ αν αυτόθεν ούκ είχει, εὶ ἐζήτει, οὐδ' ἄν ἦν ἐκ τῆς αὐτοῦ οὐσίας, ἀλλί ην οίοι τεχνίτης ἀπ' αὐτοῦ τὸ ποιείν οὐκ ἔχων,

10 άλλ' ετακτόν, εκ τοῦ μαθείν λαβών τοῦτο. Noῦs

τοίνυν δούς τι έαυτοῦ είς ύλην άτρεμής καὶ

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or an intellect another intellect. Being able to make sumething by itself is the characteristic of something which is not altogether in a good state but makes and moves in the direction in which it is inferior. For altogether blessed beings it is alone enough to stay still in themselves and be what they are; restless activity is unsafe for those who in it violently move themselves out of themselves. But that true All is blessed in such a way that in not making it accomplishes great works and in remaining in itself

makes no small things

2. For from that true universe which is one this universe comes into existence, which is not truly one; for it is many and divided into a multiplicity, and one part stands away from another and is alien to it, and there is not only friendship but also enmity because of the separation, and in their deficiency one part is of necessity at war with another. For the part is not self-sufficient, but in being preserved is at war with the other by which it is preserved. This universe has come into existence, not as the result of a process of reasoning that it ought to exist but because it was necessary that there should be a second nature; for that true All was not of a kind to be the last of realities. For it was the first, and had much power, indeed all power; and this is the power to produce something else without ceeking to produce it. For if it had sought, it would not have had it of itself, nor would it have been of its own substance, but it would have been like a craftsman who does not have the ability to produce from himself, but as something acquired, and gets it from learning. So Intellect, by giving something of itself to matter, made all

things in unperturbed quietness; this something of itself is the rational formative principle flowing from Intellect For that which flows out from Intellect is formative principle, and it flows out always, as long as Intellect is present among realities. But just as in the formative principle in a seed all the parts are together and in the same place, and none of them fights with any other or is at odds with it or gets in its way; then something comes to be in bulk, and the different parts are in different places, and then one really could get in another's way and even consume it; 1 so from Intellect which is one, and the formative principle which proceeds from it, this All has arisen and separated into parts, and of necessity some became friendly and gentle, others hostile and at war, and some did harm to each other willingly, some. too, unwillingly, and some by their destruction brought about the coming into being of others, and over them all as they acted and were acted upon in these kinds of ways they began a single melody, each of them uttering their own sounds, and the forming principle over them producing the melody and the single ordering of all together to the whole. This All of ours is not intellect and rational principle, like the All There, but participates in intellect and rational principle. Therefore, there was need of a concord in which "intellect and necessity" come together in which necessity drags it down to what is worse and carries it away to unreason, because it is not a rational principle itsef, but, all the same, "intellect controls necessity." 2 It is the intelligible universe that is nothing but rational principle, and there could not be another which is nothing but rational

¹ The analogy of the seed (which in his way of thinking is superior in its concentrated unity to the full grown plant) is a favourite one with Plotinus: ep., e.g., III. 7 [45] 11. 23-27 ² Plato, Timaeus 48A2.

μόνον λόγος εὶ δέ τι ἐγένετο ἄλλο, ἔδει ἔλαττον ἐκείνου καὶ μὴ λόγον, μηδ' αὖ ὕλην τινά ' ἄκοσμον γάρ ' μικτὸν ἄρα. Καὶ εἰς ἃ μὲν λήγει, ὅλη καὶ 40 λογος, ὅθεν δὲ ἄρχεται, ψυχὴ ἐφεστῶσα τῷ μεμιγμένᾳ, ἣν οὐ κακοπαθεὶν δεὶ νομίζειν ῥῷστα δωωοῦσαν τόδε τὸ πῶν τῆ οἶον παρουσίᾳ

3. Καὶ οὐκ ἄν τις εἰκότας οὐδὲ τούτῳ μέμψαιτο ώς οὐ καλῷ οὐδὲ τῶν μετὰ σώματος οὐκ ἀρίστῳ, οὐδὶ αὖ τὸν αἴτιον τοῦ εἶναι αὐτῷ αἰτιάσαιτο πρῶτον μὲν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντος αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐκ ἐκ ὁ λογισμοῦ γενομένου, ἀλλὰ φύσεως ἀμείνονος γεννώσης κατὰ φύσω ὅμοιον ἐαντῆ· ἔπειτα οὐδὶ εἰ λογισμὸς εἴη ὁ ποιήσας, αἰσχυνεῖται τῷ ποιηθέντι· ὅλον γάρ τι ἐποίησε πάγκαλον καὶ αὐταρκες καὶ φίλον αὐτῷ καὶ τοῦς μέρεσι τοῦς αὐτοῦ τοῦς τε κυριωτέμοις καὶ τοῦς ἐλάιτοσω ώσαὐτως προσφόροις. 'Ο τοίνιν ἐκ τῶν μερῶν 10 το ὅλοι αὐτιώμενος ἄτοπος ᾶν εἴη τῆς αἰτίας· τά

τε γὰρ μέρη πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ὅλον δεῖ ακοπεῖν, εἰ σύμφωνα καὶ ἀρμόττοντα ἐκείνω, τό τε ὅλον σκοτούμενον μη πρὸς μέρη ἄττα μικρὰ βλέπειν. Τοῦτο γὰρ οὐ τὸν κόσμον αἰτιωμένου, ἀλλά τινα 15 τῶν αὐτοῦ χωρὶς λαβόντος, οἶον εἰ παντὸς ζώου

15 των αύτου χωρις Λαροντος, οιον ει παντος ζωος τρίχα η των χαμαὶ δάκτυλον ¹ ἀμελήσας τὸν πάντα ἄνθρωπον, δαιμονίαν τινὰ ὄψιν βλέπειν, η νη Δία

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principle; but if something else did come into existence, it had to be less than that other universe, and not rational principle, nor yet some kind of matter, for that would be without beauty and order; so it had to be a mixture [of both]. Its terminal points are matter and rational principle; its starting point is Soul presiding over the mixture, Soul which we must not think suffers any harm as it directs this All with the utmost ease by a sort of presence.

3. And it is not proper for anyone to speak ill of even this universe as not being beautiful or the best of all things which have body; nor to blame the cause of its existence when, first of all, it exists of necessity and not as the result of any process of reasoning, but of a better nature naturally producing a likeness of itself; then, even if it had been a process of reasoning which had produced it, there will be nothing to be ashamed of in its product; for it produced a whole, all beautiful and self-sufficient and friends with itself and with its parts, both the more important and the lesser, which are all equally well adapted to it. So he who blamed the whole because of the parts would be quite unreasonable in his blame; one must consider the parts in relation to the whole, to see if they are Larmonious and in concord with it; and when one considers the whole one must not look at a few little parts.1 This is not blaming the universe but taking some of its parts separately, as if one were to take a hair of a whole living being, or a toe, and neglect the whole man, a wonderful sight to see; or, really, to ignore the rest

^{1 14} λαβοντος Kirchhoff (accipientis Ficinus): λοβόντα codd. 15 δάκτυλον Kirchhoff · δακτίλου codd.

I Co Plato, Laws X, 903B-C.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III 2.

τὰ ἄλλα ζώα ἀφείς τὸ εὐτελέστατον λαμβάνοι, ἢ τὸ όλοι γένος παρείς, οἱον τὸ ἀνθρώπου, Θερσίτην είς μέσον άγοι. Έπει οθν το γενόμενον ο κόσμος 20 έστιν δ σύμπας, τοῦτον θεωρών τάχα ἂν ἀκούσαις παρ' αύτου, ώς «έμε πεποίηκε θεός κάγω εκείθεν έγενόμην πέλειος έκ πάντιον ζιώτου και ίκανός έμαυτώ καὶ αὐτάρκης οὐδενὸς δεόμενος, ὅτι πάντα ἐν ἐμοί καὶ φυτὰ καὶ ζῷα και στμπάντωι τῶν νενητών φύσις καὶ θεοὶ πολλοὶ καὶ δαιμόνων 25 δήμοι καὶ ψεχαὶ ἀγαθαὶ καὶ ἄνθρωποι ἀρετή ευδαίμονες. Οὐ γάρ δή γή μεν κεκόσμηται φυτοίς τε πασι καὶ ζώοις παντοδαποῖς καὶ μέχρι θαλάττης ψυχής ήλθε δύναμις, άγρ δε πας καὶ αίθήρ καὶ ούρανός σύμπας ψυχής αμοιρος, άλλ' έκει ψυχαί άγαθαὶ πᾶσαι, ἄστροις ζῆν διδοῦσαι καὶ τῆ 30 ευτάκτω σύρανοῦ καὶ άιδίω περιφορά νοῦ μιμήσει κύκλω φερομένη εμφρόνως περί ταυτών ἀεί· οὐδεν γὰρ ἔξω ζητεῖ Πάντα δὲ τὰ ἐν ἐμοὶ ἐφίεται μὲν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, τυγχάνει δὲ κατά δύναμιν την έαυτῶν έκαστα· εξήρτηται γάρ πᾶς μει οὐρανὸς ἐκείνου, 35 πασα δε έμη ψυχή και οί εν μέρεσιν έμοις θεοί, καὶ τὰ ζῷα δὲ πάντα καὶ φυτά καὶ εἴ τι άψεχον δοκεί είναι εν εμοί. Και τα μεν τοῦ είναι μετέχειν δοκεί μόνον, τὰ δε τοῦ ζην, τὰ δὲ μαλλον ἐν τῷ αλαθάνεσθαι, τὰ δε ήδη λόγον έχει, τὰ δὲ πᾶσαν ζωήν. Οὐ γὰρ τὰ ἴσα ἀπαιτεῖν δεῖ τοῖς μὴ ἴσοις.

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of living beings and pick out the meanest; or to pass over the whole race, say, of men and bring forward Thersites. Since, then, what has come into being is the whole universe, if you contemplate this, you might hear it say," A god made me, and I came from him perfect above all Lving things, and complete in myself and self-sufficient, lacking nothing, because all things are in me, plants and animals and the nature of all things that have come into being, and many gods, and populations of spirits, and good souls and men who are happy in their virtue. It is not true that the earth is adorned with all plants and every sort of animal, and the power of soul has reached to the sea, but all the air and aether and the whole heaven is without a share of soul; but up there are all good souls, giving life to the stars and to the well-ordered everlasting circuit of the heaven, which in imitation of Intellect wisely circles round the same centre for ever; for it seeks nothing outside itself.1 Everything in me seeks after the Good, but each attains it in proportion to its own power; for the whole heaven depends on it, and the whole of my soul, and the gods in my parts, and all animals and plants and whatever there is in me (if there is anything) which is thought to be without life. And some things appear to participate only in being, others in life, others more fully in life in that they have sense perception, others at the next stage have reason, and others the fullness of life. One must not demand equal gifts in things which are not equal. It is not the finger's

 $^{^\}circ$ Cp. Laws X, 898 (especially 898A6-B3 on the likeness of the circular motion of the heavens to the activity of interlect) and XII, 967A D.

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40 οὐδὲ γὰρ δακτύλω τὸ βλέπειν, ἀλλὰ ὀβθαλμῷ τοῦτο, δακτύλω δὲ ἄλλο, τὸ εἶναι οἶμαι δακτύλω καὶ τὸ αὐτοῦ ἔχεω.»

4. Πῦρ δὲ εἰ ὑπὸ ὕδατος σβένινται καὶ ἔτεροι ύπὸ πυρός φθείρεται, μὴ θαυμάσης. Καὶ γὰρ εἰς τὸ είναι ἄλλο αὐτὸ ἤγωγεν, οὐκ ώγθεν ὑψ' αὕτοῦ ψπ' ἄλλου ἐφθάρη, καὶ ήλθε δὲ εἰς τὸ εἶνωι ὑπ' 5 άλλου φθοράς, και ή φθορά δε αὐτῷ οὐδεν ἄν ή ούτω δεινόν φέροι, καὶ ἀντὶ τοῦ φθαρέντος πυρώς πθρ άλλο. Τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀσωμάτω οὐρανῷ ἔκαστον μένει, έν δε τώδε τω οθρανώ παν μέν άει ζή και όσα τίμια καὶ κύρια μέρτ, αί δὲ ἀμείβουσαι ψυχαί σώματα και άλλοτε ει άλλω είδει γίγνονται, 10 και όταν δε δύνηται, έξω γενέσεως στάσα ψυχή μετά της πάσης έστι ψυχής. Σώματα δὲ ζή κατ' είδος και καθ' όλα έκαστα, είπερ έξ αὐτών καὶ ζώα έσται καὶ τροφήσεται ζωή γάρ ένταθθα κινουμένη, έκει δε ακίνητος. "Εδει δε κίνησιν έξ άκινησίως είναι καὶ έκ της έν αὐτη ζωης την έζ 15 αὐτης γεγονέναι άλλην, οἱον ἐμπνέουσαν καὶ οἰκ άτρεμούσαν ζωήν άναπνοήν της ήρεμούσης οδσαν. Ζώων δε είς άλληλα άνωγκαΐοι οἱ ἐπιθέσεις καὶ φθοραί οδθέ γαρ άιδια εγίνετοι Eγίνετο δέ, ότο λόγος πάσαν ύλην κατελάμβανε και είχεν έν αύτῷ

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business to see, but this is the eye's function and the finger's is something else, to be essentially finger and to have what belongs to it'

4. But do not be surprised if fire is extinguished by water and something else is destroyed by fire. For something else brought it into existence; it did not bring itself and was then destroyed by something else; and it came to being by the destruction of something else, and its own corresponding destruction, if it comes, would bring nothing terrible to it, and there is another fire in place of the fire which was destroyed. For the incorporeal heaven, each individual part persists, but in this heaven here the whole lives for ever and all the noble and important parts, but the souls, changing their bodies, appear now n one form and now in another, and also, when it can, a soul takes its place outside the process of becoming and is with the universal soul. Bodies live by species, and individual bodies as far as they are wholes, if living things both come from them and are to be nourished by them; for life is in motion here, but unmoved There Motion had to come from tilness, and from the life which remains in itself there had to come the life which proceeds from it. which is different, like a life breathing and stirring which is the respiration of that life at rest. The attacks of living beings on each other, and their destruction of each other, are necessary; they did not come into existence to live for ever. They came into existence because the formative principle took hold of the whole of matter and had in itself all

structure of the earth, but to stop growing when they are cut away from it.

¹ Those individual bodies are probably the elements, earta, air, etc., which are abve and communicate their life to the living beings in them: ep. IV. 4 [28] 27, where stones are said to grow as long as they are part of the living continuous

πάντα όντων αὐτων ἐκεῖ ἐν τω ἄνω οὐρανῷ: 20 πόθεν γὰρ ἄν ἡλθε μὴ ὄντων ἐκεὶ; 'Ανθρώπων δὲ είς άλληλους άδικίαι έχοιεν μέν άν αίτίαν έφεσιν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἀδυναμία δὲ τοῦ τυχεῖν σφαλλόμενοι έπ' άλλους τρέτονται. "Ισχοισι δε άδικοῦντες Sinus nunuriperor rule duxale erepretare nuntas 25 τάττονταί τε είς τόπον χείρονα: οὐ γὰρ μήποτε έκφύγη μηδέν τὸ ταχθέν έν τῷ τοῦ παντός νόμω. "Εστι δέ οὐ διά τὴν ἀταξίαν τάξις οὐδέ διά την ἀνομίαν νόμος, ώς τις οἴεται, ἴνα γένοιτο εκείνα διά τὰ χείρω καὶ ἵνα φαίνοιτο, ἀλλὰ διὰ την τάξιν ετακτόν ούσαν, καὶ ὅτι τάξις, ἀταξία, 30 καὶ διὰ τὸν νόμον καὶ τὸν λόγον, καὶ ὅτι λόγος. παρανομία καὶ ἄνοια οὐ τῶν βελτιόνων τὰ χείρω πεποιηκότων, άλλα των δέχεσθαι δεομένων τά άμείνω φύσει τη έαυτων η συντυχία και κωλύσει άλλων δέξασθαι οὐ δεδυνημένωι. Τὸ γὰρ ἐπακτῷ γρώμενον τάξει τοθτο αν οὐ τύχοι η δι' αὐτό παρ' 35 αὐτοῦ ἢ δι' ἄλλο παρ' ἄλλου· πολλὰ δὲ ὑπ' ἄλλων πάσχει καὶ ἀκόντων τῶν ποιούντων καὶ πρὸς ἄλλο ιεμένων. Τὰ δὲ δι' αὐτὰ ἔχοντα 1 κίνησιν σὐτεξούσιον ζωα βέποι ἄν ότὲ μὲν πρὸς τα βελτίω, ότὲ δὲ πρός τὰ χείρω. Την δὲ πρός τὰ χείρω τροπήν παρ' αὐτοῦ ζητεῖν ἴσως οἰκ ἄξ.ον όλίγη γὰρ ² ξχοντα Theodoretus. ξχόντων codd,

living things, because they all exist There, in the upper heaven; for where could they have come from if they did not exist There? The cause of the wrongs men do to one another might be their effort towards the Good; when they fail through their impotence to attain it, they turn against other men. But the wrongdoers pay the penalty, being corrupted in their souls by their works of wickedness, and are set in a lower place; for nothing can ever escape that which is ordained in the law of the All. But order does not exist because of disorder or law because of lawlessness, as someone thinks, that these good things may exist and be manifested because of the worse ones; but disorder and lawlessness exist because of order, which is imposed from outside It is because there is order that disorder exists, and on account of the law and formative reason, just because it is reason, that there is transgression of the law and folly; not that the better things produce the worse, but the things which ought to receive the better are unable to do so because of their own nature or because of some chance circumstance or hirdrance from others For when something has its order from outside it may fail to correspond to it either of its own accord and from itself or because of and impelled by something else; and many things are affected by others when those which act on them do not intend to do so and are aiming at something else. But living beings which have of themselves a movement under their own control might incline sometimes to what is better, sometimes to what is worse. It is probably not worth enquiring into the reason for this self caused turning towards the worse;

¹ Le. Epicurus (cp. Usener, Epicurea 530 ff.).

40 τροπή κατ' άρχὰς γενομένη προιούσα ταύτη πλέον καὶ μειζον τό άμαρτανομενον ἀεὶ τοιεῖ· καὶ σῶμα δὲ ούνεοιι καὶ ἐζ ἀνάγκης ἐπιθυμία καὶ παροφθὲν τό πρῶτιν καὶ τὸ ἐξαίφνης καὶ μὴ ἀναληφθὲν αὐτίκα καὶ αἰρεσιν εἰς ὅ τις ἐξέπεσεν εἰργάσατο. "Επεταί γε μὴν δίκη· καὶ οὐκ ἄδικου τοιόνδε 45 γενόμενον ἀκόλουθα τάπχειν τῆ διαθέσει, οὐδ ἀπαιτητέον τούτοις το εὐδαιμονεῖν ὑπάρχειν, οἷς μὴ εἴργασται εὐδαιμονίας ἄξια. Οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ μόνοι εὐδαίμονες· διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ θεοὶ εὐδαίμονες

5. Εί τοινυν καὶ ψυχαίς ἐν τῷδε τῷ παντὶ έξεστιν εδδαίμοσιν είναι, εί τινες μή εδδαίμονες, ούκ αίτιατέον του τόπου, άλλα τας έκείνων αδυναμίας οὐ δυνηθείσας καλως ἐναγωνίσαυθαι, 5 οὖ δὴ ἄθλα ἀρετῆς πρόκειται. Καὶ μὴ θείους δε γενομένους θείον βίον μη έχεω τί δεωνόν, Πενίαι δέ και νόσοι τοις μέν άγαθοις οὐδέν, τοις δέ κακοῖς σύμφορα. 1 και ἀνάγκη νοσεῖν σώματα έχουσι. Καὶ οὐκ ἀχρεῖα δὲ οὐδὲ ταῦτα παντάπασιν είς σύνταξιν και συμπλήρα σιν τοῦ όλου. 'Ως γάρ 10 Φθωρέντων ωνών ο λόγος δ τοῦ παντός κατεχρήσατο τοῖς φθαρείσιν είς γένετιν άλλων οὐδεν γαρ οὐδαμή ἐκφεύγει τὸ ὑπὸ τούτου καταλαμβάνεσθαιούτω καὶ κακωθέντος σώματος καὶ μαλακισθείσης δὲ ψυχής τής τὰ τοιαθτα πασχούσης τὰ 2 νόσοις καὶ κακια καταληφθέντα ύπεβλήθη ἄλλφ είρμφ .5 και άλλη τάξει. Και τὰ μέν αὐτοῖς συνήνεγκε σοίς παθούσιν, οδον πενία και νόσος, ή δε κακία

 1 σύμφορα Creuzer (utilia Ficmus): συμφορά ccdd. 2 $\tau a^2\,{\rm A}^{\rm pc},\,{\rm H-S}$ καὶ codd

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for a deviation which is slight to begin with, as it goes on in this way continually makes the fault wider and graver; and the body is there too, and, necessarily, its lust. And the first beginning, the sudden impulse, if it is overlooked and not immediately corrected, even produces a settled choice of that into which one has fallen. Punishment certainly follows; and it is not unjust that someone who has come to be this sort of person should suffer the consequences of his condition; people must not demand to be well off who have not done what deserves well being. Only the good are well off; that too, is what gives the gods their well-being.

5. If, then, it is possible for sous to be well off in this All, we must not blame the place if some are not well off, but their own incapacity, in that they have not been able to take a noble part in the contest for which the prizes of virtue are offered. Why is it disconcerting if men who have not become godlike do not have a godlike life? And poverty, too, and sickness, are nothing to the good, but advantageous to the bad; and men must fall sick if they have bodies. And even these troubles are not altogether without usefulness for the co-ordination and completion of the whole. For, just as when some things are destroyed the formative principle of the All uses them for the generation of others-for nothing anywhere escapes its gr.p—so, when a body is damaged, and a soul enfeebled by suffering something of this kind, what has been seized upon by sicknesses and vice is subjected to another chain of causation and another ordering. And some troubles are profitable to the sufferers themselves, poverty and sickness for

είργάσατό τι χρήσιμον είς το όλοι παράδειγμα δίκης γενομένη καὶ πολλά έξ αὐτῆς χρήσιμα παρασχημένη Καλ γάρ έγρηγορότας έποίησε καλ γούν καὶ σύνεσιν εγείρει 1 πονηρίας όδοις άντιτατ-20 τομένων, και μανθάνειν δε ποιεί οίον άγαθον άρετή παραθέσει κακών ών οἱ πονηροὶ έχουσι. Καὶ οὐ γέγονε τὰ κακὰ διὰ ταῦτα, ἀλλ' ὅτι γρήται καὶ αὐτοῖς είς δέου, ἐπείπερ ἐγένετο, εἴρηται. Τοῦτο δὲ δυνάμεως μεγίστης, καλῶς καὶ τοίς κακοίς χρήσθα. δύνασθαι και τοίς αμόρφεις 25 γενομένοις είς έτέρας μορφάς χρήσθαι ίκανήν είναι. "Ολως δε τὸ κακὸι ελλειψιν άγαθοῦ θετέον" ἀνάγκη δὲ ἔλλειψιν είναι ἐνταῦθα ἀγαθοῦ, ὅτι ἐν άλλω. Τὸ οὖι ἄλλο, ἐν ὤ ἐστι το ἀγαθόν, ἔτερον άγοθοθ ον ποιεί την ελλειψιν τούτο γάρ οὐκ άγαθὸν ήν. Διὸ οὕτε ἀπολέσθαι τὰ κακά, ὅτι 30 τε άλλα άλλων ελάττω πρὸς ἀγαθοῦ φύσω ἔτερά τε τάλλα ² τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς ὑποστάσεως έκειθεν λαβόντα, τοιαύτα δή γενόμενα τῷ πόρρω.

6. Τὸ δὲ παρ' ἀξίαν, ὅταν ἀγαθοὶ κακὰ ἔχωσι, φαῦλοι δὲ τὰ ἐναντία, το μὲν λέγειν ὡς οὐδὲν κακὸν τῷ ἀγαθῷ οὐδ' αὖ τῷ φαύλῳ ἀγαθὸν ὀρθῶς μὲν λέγεται· ἀλλὰ διὰ τί τὰ μὲν παρα φύοιν σούτῳ, τὰ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν τῷ πονηρῷ; Πῶς γὰρ καλῶς νέμειν υὖτω, 'Αλλ' εἰ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν οὐ

1 εγείρει Theodoretus: έγείραι codd. 2 τάλλα Theiler. άλλα codd

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instance, and vice works something useful to the whole by becoming an example of just punishment: and also of itself it offers much that is of use. For it makes men awake and wakes up the intelligence and understanding of those who are opposed to the ways of wickedness, and makes us learn what a good virtue is by comparison with the evils of which the wicked have a share. And evils did not come into existence for these reasons, but we have explained that, when they have come into existence, the formative principle uses even them to meet a need. This belongs to the greatest power, to be able to use even the evil nobly and to be strong enough to use things which have become shapeless for making other shapes. In general, we must define evil as a falling short of good: and there must be a falling short of good here below, because the good is in something else. This something else, then, in which the good is, since it is other than good, produces the falling short; for it is not good. Therefore "evils will not be done away with," 1 because some things are less than others in comparison with the nature of good, and the other things which have the cause of their existence from the Good are different from the Good and have certainly become the sort of things they are because of their distance from it.

6. As for people getting what they do not deserve, when the good get what is bad and the bad the opposite, it is correct to say that nothing is bad for the good man and nothing, correspondingly, good for the bad one; but why do things against nature come to the good, and things according to nature to the wicked? How can this be right distribution? But

¹ The often-repeated quotation from Plato, Theaetenes 7645, one of the cardinal texts of Pletinian Neeplatonism.

ποιεί προσθήκην πρός το εὐδαιμονείν, οὐδ' αὖ το παμὰ ψύσιν ἀφαιρεί τοῦ κακοῦ τοῦ ἐν ψαύλοις, τί διαφίρεο τὸ οὕτως ἢ οὕτως; "Ωσπερ οὐδ' εἰ ὁ μὲν καλὺς τὸ σῶμα, ὁ δὲ αἰσχρὸς ὁ ἀγαθός.

10 'Αλλὰ τὸ πρέπον καὶ ἀνάλογον καὶ τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν ἐκείνως ἄν ήν, ὁ νῦν οὐκ ἔστι· προνοίας δὲ ἀρίστης ἐκείνο ήν. Καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸ δούλους, τοὺς δὲ δεσπότας είναι, καὶ ἄρχοντας τῶν πόλεων τοὺς κακούς, τοὺς δὲ ἐπιεικεῖς δοιλους είναι, οὐ πρέποντα ἤν, οὐδ' εί προσθήκην ταῦτα μὴ φέρει εἰς ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ κτῆσιν. Κλίτοι τὰ ἀνομώ

15 τατα ἄν πράξειεν ἄρχων πονηρός καὶ κρατοῦσι
δ' ἐν πολέμοις οἱ κακοὶ καὶ οἶα αἰσχρὰ δρῶσιν
αἰχμαλώτους λαβόντες. Πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα ἀπορεῖν ποιεῖ, ὅπως προνοίας οὔοης γίνεται. Καὶ γὰρ
εἰ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον βλέπειν δεῖ τὸν ὁτιοῦν μέλλοντα
ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ μέρη ὀρθῶς ἔχει τάττειν ἐν

20 δέοντι αὐτῷ καὶ μάλιστα, ὅταν ἔμψυχα ἢ καὶ ζωὴν ἔχη ἢ καὶ λογικὰ ἢ, καὶ τὴν πρόνοιαν δὲ ἐπὶ πάντα φθάνειν καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτῆ, τοῦτ' εἶναι, τὸ μηδενὸς ἢμεληκέναι. Εἰ οὖν φαμεν ἐκ νοῦ τόδε τὸ πᾶν ἠρτῆσθαι καὶ εἰς ἄπαντα ἐληλυθέναι τὴν 20 δύναμιν αὐτοῦ, πειρῶσθαι δεῦ δεικτύναι, ὅπη

ο δύναμαν αυτού, πειρασσαι σει σεικνοναι, σ Εκαστα τούτων καλώς έχει.

 Πρώτον τοίνυν ληπτέον ώς τὸ καλώς ἐν τῷ μικτῷ ζητοῦντας χρὴ μὴ πάντη ἀπαιτεῖν ἔσον τὸ καλώς ἐν τῷ ἀμίκτῳ ἔχει, μηδ' ἐν δευτέροις

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if what is according to nature brings no addition to well being, nor, correspondingly, does that which is contrary to nature take away anything of the evil which is in the bad, what does it matter whether it is this way or that? Just as it does not matter if the bad man is beaut ful in body and the other, the good man, is ugly. But that other way, which is not the way things are now, would be proper and proportionate and according to merit; and that would be the way of the best providence. Then, again, it is not proper that the good should be slaves and the others masters, and that the wicked should be rulers of cities and decent men their slaves, even if these circumstances add nothing to the possession of good or evil Then, too, a weeked ruler might do the most lawless things: and the bad get the upper hand in wars, and what crimes they commit when they have taken prisoners! All these things cause perplexity shout how they can happen if there is a providence For even if someone who is intending to make something must look to the whole, yet all the same it is right for him to set the parts where they ought to be, especially when they are beings with souls, and have life, or are even rational; and providence ought to reach everything, and its task ought to be just this. to leave nothing neglected. If, then, we say this All depends on Intellect, and that the power of intellect has extended to all things we must try to show in what way each of them is excellently disposed.

7. First, then, we must understand that those who are looking for excellence in what is mixed must not demand all that excellence has in the unmixed, nor look for things of the first order among those of the

ζητεϊν τὰ πρώτα, ἀλλ' ἐπειδή καὶ σώμα ἔχει, 5 συγχωρείν και παρά τούτου ίέναι είς το πάν, άπαιτείν δε παρά του λόγου, ύσον εδύναιο δεζασθαι τό μίγμα, εί μηδέν τούτου έλλείπει οίον, εί τις έσκόπει τὸν ἄνθρωπον τὸν αἰσθητον ὅστις κάλλιστος, οὐκ ἂν δήπου τῷ ἐν νῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἡξίωσε τὸν αὐτὸν είναι, ἀλλ' ἐκείνο ἀποδεδέχθαι τοῦ ποιητοῦ, 10 εἰ όμως ἐν σαρξί καὶ νεύροις καὶ ὀστέοις ὅντα κατέλαβε τῷ λόγω, ώστε καὶ ταῦτα καλλῦναι καὶ τον λόγον δυνηθήναι επανθείν τη ύλη. Ταθτα τοίνυν ύποθέμενοι χρή προιέναι το έντεύθεν επί τὰ ἐπιζητούμενα· τάχα γὰρ ἄν ἐν τούτοις τὸ θαιμαστον ἀνεύροιμεν τῆς προνοίας καὶ τῆς 15 δυνάμεως, παρ' οδ ύπέστη το τᾶν τόδε. "Όσα μέν οθν έργα ψυχών, α δή έν αθταίς ισταται τοίς έργαζομέναις τὰ χείρω, οἷον όσα κακαὶ ψυχαὶ άλλας έβλαψαν καὶ όσα άλλήλας αί κακαί, εἰ μή καί του κακάς όλως αυτάς είναι το προνοούν αλτιώτο, απαιτείν λόγον οιδέ εθθύνας προσήκει 20 καιτία έλομένου » διδόντας· είρηται γάρ ότι έδει καὶ ψυχας κινήσεις οἰκείας έχειν καὶ ὅτι οὐ ψυχαὶ μόνον, άλλὰ ζῷα ήδη, καὶ δὴ καὶ οὐδέν θαυμαστον ούσας ο είσιν άκόλουθον βίον έχειν. ούδε γάρ, ότι κόσμος ήι, έληλύθασιν, άλλα πρό κόσμου τὸ κόσμου είναι είχον καὶ ἐπιμελείσθαι

1 έπανθείν Theiler. ἐπανελθείν codd.

second, but, since they also have a body, one must admit that something comes from it to the All, and demand from the rational forming principle only as much as the mixture can receive, if nothing of it is deficient: for instance, if someone was looking for the most beautiful man that we can perceive by our senses he would not, presumably, expect him to be the same as the man in Ineflect, but would be satisfied with what his maker had done if he had so dominated him, even though he was held in flesh and sinews and bones, by the formative principle, that he made these material things beautiful, and the formative principle was able to come into flower upon the matter. So, then, we must take these principles as the basis of our discussion, and go on from there to our enquiries; for perhaps we may discover in them the wonder of providence and of the power from which this All came into existence. Now, as far as all the works of souls are concerned, those, that is, which remain within the souls which do wrong, for instance, the harm evil souls do to others and the harm they do to each other, unless one is to blame the providential power for their being bad at all, one has no proper reason for demanding an account or a reckoning from it, as one admits that " the blame lies with the chooser":1 for it has already been said that souls must have their own movements, and that they are not only souls but also already [composite] living beings, and that there is nothing surprising if, being what they are, they have a life corresponding with their nature; for they have not come into the uni verse because it existed but before the universe they had it in them to belong to the universe, and to care

 $^{^{1}}$ From the myth of Er in Republic X. 617E4-5 (the soul's choice of lives).

25 καὶ ὑφιστάναι καὶ διοικεῖν καὶ ποιεῖν ὅστις τρόπος, εἴτε ἐφεστῶσαι καὶ διδοῦσαί τι παρ' αὐτῶν εἶτε κατιοῦσαι εἴτε αἱ μὲν οὕτως, αἱ δ' οὕτως οὐ γὰρ ἄν τὰ νῶι περὶ τούτων, ἀλλ' ὅτι, ὅπως πότ' ἄν ἢ, τήν γε πρόνοιαν ἐπὶ τούτοις οὐ μεμπτέον. 'Αλλ' ὅταν πρὸς τοὺς ἐναντωυς τὴν παράθεσιν

30 τῶν κακῶν τις θεωρῆ, τένητας ἀγαθοὺς καὶ πονηροὺς τλουσίους καὶ πλεανεκτοῦντας ἐν οἶς ἔχειν δεῖ ἀνθρωπους ὅντας τοὺς χείρους καὶ κρατοῦντας, καὶ ἐαυτῶν καὶ τὰ ἔθνη καὶ τὰς πόλεις; *Αρ' οὖν, ὅτι μὴ μέχρι γῆς φθάνει; 'Αλλὰ των ἄλλων γινομένων λόγω μαρτύριον

35 τοῦτο καὶ μέχρι γῆς ἰέναι καὶ γὰρ ζῷα καὶ φυτὰ καὶ λόγου καὶ ψυχῆς καὶ ζωῆς μεταλαμβάνει. 'Αλλὰ φθάνουσα οὐ κρατεῖ; 'Αλλὰ ζῷου ενὸς ὅντος τοῦ παντὸς ὅμοιον ἄν γένοιτο, εἴ τις κεφαλὴν μὲν ἀνθρώποι καὶ πρόσωπον ὑπὸ φύσεως καὶ λόγου γίνεσθαι λέγοι κρατοῦντος, τὸ δὲ λυιπὸν

40 ἄλλαις ἀναθείη αἰτίαις, τύχαις ἢ ἀνάγκαις, καὶ φαῦλα διὰ τοῦτο ἢ δι' ἀδυναμίαν φύσεως γεγονέναι.
 'Αλλ' οὐδὲ ὅσιον οὐδ' εὐσεβὲς ἐνδύντας τῷ μὴ καλῶς ταῦτα ἔχειν καταμέμφεσθαι τῷ ποιήματι.

8. Λοιπον δη ζητείν όπη καλώς ταθτα, καὶ ώς τάξεως μετέχει, η όπη μή. "Η οὐ κακώς. Παντός δη ζώου τὰ μὲν ἄνω, πρόσωπα καὶ

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for it and bring it into existence and direct it, and, in one way or another, to make it, either by staying above it and giving something of themselves or by coming down, or some in this way and some in that; for we are not concerned with this in our present discussion; what concerns us is that, however this may be, providence ought not to be blamed for the doings of souls. But what if one considers the comparative distribution of evils to men of opposite character, that the good are poor and the wicked are rich, and the bad have more than their share of the things which those who are human beings must have, and are masters, and peoples and cities belong to them? Is it, then, because providence does not reach as far as the earth? But the fact that the other things happen in a rational pattern is evidence that it reaches the earth too, for animals and plants share in reason and soul and life. Does it, then, reach the earth, but not have full control here? But, since the All is a single living being, this would be as if someone were to say that a man's head and face had been produced by nature and a rational forming principle in full control, but should attribute the rest of the body to other causes-chances or necessities—and should say that they were inferior productions either because of this or because of the incompetence of nature. But it is neither pious or reverent to censure the work by admitting that these lower parts are not excellently disposed.

8. So it remains to enquire in what way these are excellently arranged, and how they have a share in order, and in what way not. Certainly they are not arranged badly. The upper parts of every living

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 2.

κεφαλή, καλλίω, τὰ δὲ μέσα καὶ κάτω οὐκ ἴσα. ανθρωποι δέ ἐν μέσω και κάτω, ἄνω δὲ οὐρανὸς 5 και οί εν αθτή θερί: και το πλείστου τοῦ κόσμου θεοί και ουρανός πας κύκλω, γη δε οία κέντρον καὶ πρὸς εν τι των ἄστρων. Θαυμάζεται δὲ εν άνθρώποις άδικία, ὅτι ἄνθρωπον άξιοῦσιν ἐν τῷ παντί το τίμιον είναι ώς ούδενος όντος σοφωτέρου. Τὸ δὲ κείται ἄιθρωπος ἐν μέσω θεῶν καὶ θηρίων 10 καὶ ρέπει ἐπ' ἄμφω καὶ ομοιοθνται οἱ μὲν τῷ έτέρω, οί δὲ τῶ ἐτέρω, οί δὲ μεταξύ είσιν, οί πολλοί. Οἱ δὴ κακυνθέντες εἰς τὸ έγγὺς ζώων άλόγων και θηρίων ιέναι έλκοισι τους μέσους και βιάζονται οί δε βελτίους μέν είσι τών βιαζομένων, κρατούνται γε μην ύπο των χειρόνων, ή 1 15 είσι χείρους καὶ αὐτοί καὶ οὐκ εἰσὶν ἀγαθοὶ οὐδὸ παρεσκεύασαν αύτους μη παθείν. Εί οδν παίδες ἀσκήσαντες μέν τὰ σώματα, τὰς δὲ ψυχὰς ὑπ' άπαιδευσίας τούτου χείρους γενόμενοι έν πάλη κρατοίεν τών μήτε τὰ σώματα μήτε τὰς ψυχάς πεπαιδευμένων και τὰ σιτία αὐτῶν ἀρπάζοιεν καὶ 20 τὰ ἐμάτια αὐτῶν τὰ άβρὰ λαμβάνοιεν, τί ἄν τὸ

¹ § Are, H S²: ἢ codd

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thing, the face and head, are more beautiful, and the middle and lower parts are not equal to them; but men are in the middle and below, and above are heaven and the gods in it; and the greatest part of the universe is gods and all the heaven round about it: but the earth is like a central point even in comparison with only one of the stars. 1 Unrighteousness in men causes surprise, because people expect man to be the really valuable part in the All, because there is nothing wiser. But the fact is that man has the middle place between gods and beasts, and inclines now one way, now the other, and some men become like gods and others like beasts, and some, the majority, are in between. Those, then, who are corrupted, so that they come near to grational animals and wild beasts, pull down those in the middle and do them violence; these are certainly better than those who assault them, but all the same they are mastered by the worse men, in so far as they are worse themselves too, and are not [really] good, and have not prepared themselves not to suffer wrongs. If some boys, who have kept their bodies in good training, but are inferior in sou, to their bodily condition because of lack of education, win a wrestle with others who are trained neither in body or soul and grab their food and their dainty clothes, would

parallels. Cicero Sommum Scipionia 8 and 12 may also be compared, though the earth here is only insignificantly small, not "a point"). Geocentric cosmology did not lead the ancient astronomers and philosophers to a man-centred view of the universe, an exaggerated view of man's importance in the scheme of things. It led them rather to stress his smallness, insignificance and lowly position in the cosmic order, as Plotanus does here.

¹ Plotinus is insisting here on the smallness and unimportance of the earth in language customary among astronomers from Aristarchus of Samos onwards: op. his On the Sizes and Distances of the Sun and Moon Hypothesis 2 τὴν γῆν οημείου τε καὶ κέντρου λόγου ἔχειν πρός τὴν τῆς οκλήνης σφάφαν. For its use as a theme of moral and religious exhortation, to bring home the insignificance of man and the worthlessness of fame see Marcus Aurelius IV. 3. 3. (A.S. L. Farquharson in his commentary, Vo. II, p. 695, has collected a number of

πράγμα ή γέλως είη; "Η πως ούκ δρθόν και τόν νομοθέτη, συγχωρείν ταθτα μέν πάσχειν έκείνους δίκην άργίας και τρυφής διδόντας, οι αποδεδειγμένωι γυμνασίωι αύτοις οίδ' ύπ' άργίας και τοῦ ζην 25 μαλακ θς και άνειμένας περιείδον έαυτούς άρνας καταπ.ανθέντας λύκων άρπαγάς είναι; Τοίς δέ ταυτα ποιουσι πρώτη μει δίκη το λίκοις είναι καὶ κακοδαίμοσιν ἀνθρώποις: είτα αὐτοῖς καὶ κείται α παθείν χρεών τούς τοιούτους οὐ γὰρ έστη ένταθθα κακοίς γενομένοις ἀποθανείν, ἀλλά 30 τοῖς ἀεὶ προτέροις ἔπεται ὅσα κατὰ λόγον καὶ φύσιν, χείρω τοις χείροσι, τοις δε άμείνοσι τά αμείνω, 'Αλλ' οὐ παλαίστραι τὰ τοιαῦτα· παιδιὰ γάρ έπει. "Εδει γάρ μειζύνων των παίδων μειά άνοίας άμφοτέρων γινομένων άμφοτέρους μέν ζώννυσθαι ήδη και οπλα έχειν, και ή θέα καλλίων 35 ή κατά πάλας γυμνάζοντι νῦν δ' οἱ μὲν ἄοπλοι, οί δε δηλισθέντες κρατούσιν "Ενθα ού θεον έδει ήπερ των ἀπολέμων αυτόν μάχεσθαι, σώζεσθαι γάρ έκ πολέμων φησί δεῖν ὁ νόμος ἀνδριζομένους, άλλ' οὐκ εὐγομένους οὐδέ γὰρ κομίζεσθαι καρπούς εύχομένους άλλά γης ἐπιμελοιμένους, 40 οὐδέ γε ύγιαίνειν μη ύγείας ἐπιμελουμένους οὐδ' άγανακτείν δέ, εί τοις φαύλοις πλείους γίνοιντο καρποί ή ολως αύτοις γεωργούσιν είη άμεινον. Επειτα γελοίον τὰ μέν ἄλλα πάντα τὰ κατὰ τὸν βίον γνώμη τη ξαυτών πράττειν, καν μη ταύτη

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the affair be anything but a joke? Or would it not he right for even the lawgiver to allow them to suffer this as a penalty for their laziness and luxury, these boys, who, though they were assigned traininggrounds, because of laziness and soft and sleek living allowed themselves to become fattened lambs, the prev of wolves? But those who do these things are punished, first by being wolves and ill-fated men; and then as well there lies before them what people like this are destined to suffer; it does not come to a stop when they have become bad here and die; 1 every time the rational and natural consequences follow what has gone before, worse for the worse, but better for the better. But this sort of thing has nothing to do with wrestling schools; what happens there is play. For if both our sets of boys grew bigger with their folly, then they would have to gird themselves and take weapons, and it would be a finer sight than if one gave them wrestling exercise; but as things are, one set are unarmed, and those who are armed get the mastery. Here it would not be right for a god to fight in person for the unwarlike; the law says that those who fight bravely, not those who pray, are to come safe out of wars; for, in just the same way, it is not those who pray but those who look after their land who are to get in a harvest, and those who do not look after their health are not to be healthy; and we are not to be vered if the bad get larger harvests, or if their farming generally goes better. Then again, it is ridiculous for people to do everything else in life according to their own ideas,

commonplace (IV. I. 127) is, however, closer to the present passage than anything in Plate.

¹ For the thought, cp. Plato, *Theactetus* 176D-177A. "wolves" from *Republic* 566A4; Frietetus's version of this

πράττωσιν, ή θεοις φίλα, σώζεσθαι δε μόνον παρὰ 45 θεῶν οὐδε ταῦτα ποιήσαντας, δι' ὧν κελεύουσω αὐτοὺς οἱ θεοὶ σωζεσθαι. Καὶ τοίνυν οἱ θάνατοι αὐτοῖς βελτιους ή τὸ οῦτω ζῶντας εἰναι ὅπως ζῆν αὐτοὺς οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν οἱ ἐν τῷ παντὶ νόμοι ὧστε τῶν ἐναντίων γινομένων, εἰρήνης ἐν ἀνοίαις καὶ κακίαις πάσαις φυλαττομένης, ἀμελῶς ἄν 50 ἔσχε τὰ τρονοίας ἐώσης κρατεῦν ὅντως τὰ χείρω. "Αργουσι δὲ κακοὶ ἀρχομένων ἀνανδρία· τοῦτο

γὰρ δίκαιον, οὐκ ἐκεῖνο.

9. Οὐ γὰρ δὴ οὖτα τὴν πρόνοιαν εἶναι δεῖ, ὥστε μηδὲν ἡμᾶς εἶναι. Πάντα δὲ οὔσης προνοίας καὶ μόνης αὐτῆς οὐδ' ᾶν εῖη· τίνος γὰρ ἄν ετι εῖη; ᾿Αλλὰ μόνον ἄν εἵη τὸ θεῖον. Τοῦτο δὲ καὶ νῶν δ ἐστι· καὶ πρὸς ἄλλο δὲ ἐλήλυθεν, οἰχ ἵνα ἀνέλη τὸ ἄλλο, ἀλλὶ ἐπιόντι οἷοι ἀνθρώπω ἦν ἐπ' αὐτῷ τηροῦσα τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὅντα· τοῦτο δέ ἐστι νόμω προνοίας ζῶντα, δ δή ἐστι πράττοντα ὅσα ὁ νόμος αὐτῆς λέγει. Λέγει δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῖς γενομένοις ἀγαθὸν βίον ἔσεσθαι καὶ κεῖσθαι καὶ εἰς ῦ ὕστερον, τοῖς δὲ κακοῖς τὰ ἐναντία. Κακοὺς δὲ γενομένους ἀξιοῦι ἄλλους αὐτῶν σωτῆρας εἶναι ἑαυτοὺς προεμένους οὐ θεμιτον εὐχὴν ποιοιμένων·

even if they are not doing it in the way which the gods like, and then be merely saved by the gods without even doing the things by means of which the gods command them to save themselves. And certainly death is better for them than to stay living in a way in which the universal laws do not want them to live; so that if the opposite happened, and peace was preserved in every sort of folly and vice, providence would be neglecting its duty in allowing the worse really to get the upper hand. But the wicked rule by the cowardice of the ruled; for this is just, and the opposite is not.

9. Providence ought not to exist in such a way as to make us nothing. If everything was providence and nothing but providence, then providence would not exist; for what would it have to provide for? There would be nothing but the divine. But the divine exists also as things are; and has come to something other than itself, not to destroy the other but, when a man, for instance, comes to it, it stands over him and sees to it that he is man; that is, that he lives by the law of providence, which means doing everything that its law says. But it says that those who have become good shall have a good life, now, and laid up for them hereafter as well, and the wicked the opposite. But it is not lawful for those who have become wicked to demand others to be their saviours and to sacrifice themselves in answer to

people who expect the gods to intervene to get them out of troubles into which they have got themselves by ignoring the divinely established laws of nature and of human life; an intelligent Christian would have no difficulty in agreeing with it.

¹ Cp. Xenophon, Cyropaedia I. 6. 6. As this comparison suggests, this whole passage (8.36-9.19) should not be taken as directed primarily against the Christians (though Plotinus may possibly have them in mind at 9.10-12). It is a general condemnation of the unintelligent and cowardly religiosity of

ού τούνυν ούδε θεούς αὐτών ἄρχειν τὰ καθέκαστα άφέντας τον έαυτων βίον οὐδέ γε τοὺς ἄνδρας τοὺς άγαθούς, άλλοι βίον ζώντας τον άρχης ανθρωπίνης 15 α, είνω, τούτους αὐτῶν ἄρχοντας είναι ἐπεὶ οὐδ' αὐτοὶ ἐπεμελήθησάν ποτε, ὅτως ἄρχοντες ἀγαθοὶ γένοιντο τῶν ἄλλων, ὅπως αὐτοῖς ⟨εῦ⟩¹ ἢ ἐπιμελούμενοι, άλλά φθονούσιν, έάν τις άγαθός παρ' αύτοῦ φύηται έπεὶ πλείους αν εγένοντο αγαθοί, εἰ τούτους 90 εποιούντο προστάτας. Γενόμενοι τοίνυν ζώον ούκ άριστοι, άλλα μέσην τάξω έχον και έλόμενον, όμως εν ώ κείται τόπω ύπο προνοίας οὐκ εωμενον ἀπολέσθαι, άλλὰ ἀναφερόμενον ἀει πρὸς τὰ ἄνω παντοίαις μηχαναίς, αίς τὸ θείον χρήται ἐπικρατεστέραν άρετην ποιούν, ούκ άπώλεσε το λογικον 25 είναι το ανθρώπινον γένος, αλλά μετέχου, εί καί μή άκρως, έστι και σοφίας και νου και τέχνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης, της γοῦν πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἔκαστοι· καὶ οὖς άδικοῦσι δέ, οἴονται δικαίως ταῦτα ποιεῖνchai γαρ άξίους. Ούται καλόν έστιν ανθρωπος ποίημα, δσον δύναται καλόν είναι, καὶ συνυφανθεν 30 είς το πάν μοίραν έχει τών άλλων ζώων όσα έπί

I (c2) Boutler.

1 See note on previous chapter.

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their prayers, nor, furthermore, to require gods to direct their affairs in detail, laving aside their own life, or, for that matter, good men, who live another life better than human rule, to be their rulers; for they themselves have never taken any trouble to see that there should be good rulers of the rest of mankind, who would care that it should be well with them, but they are envious if anyone naturally becomes good by himself; for more people would have become good if they had made the good their leaders.2 Since, then, men are not the best of living creat tres but the human species occupies a middle position, and has chosen it, yet all the same is not allowed by providence to perish in the place where it is set but is always being lifted up to the higher regions by alsorts of devices which the divine uses to give virtue the greater power, mankind has not lost its character of being rational but is a participant, even if not to the highest degree, in wisdom and intellect and skill, and righteousness-each and all have a share at least in the righteousness that governs their dealings with each other; and those whom they wrong, they think that they wrong rightly because they deserve it In this way man is a noble creation, as far as he can' be noble, and, being woven into the All, has a part which is better than that of other living shings, of

the ideal state, where they have been carefully trained precisely in order to be its rulers, that they have the obligation to rule. Plotinus does not advert here to the possibility of an ideal state but otherwise his thought here is quite in accordance with Plato's and he probably has this passage of the Republic in mind (cp. 1 14-15, with 520E4-5, and perhaps 18, έαν τις αγαθός παρ' αύνοῦ φύηται, with 520B2, αὐνόματοι γὰρ ἐμάθονται.

² This may seem at first sight to contradict Plato's teaching about the duty of the philosopher to "go down again into the cave" and rule the city (Republic VII. 5190-521A). But, in fact, Plato makes it quite clear that philosophers in ordinary unreformed states have no such duty (520A B). It is only in

γης βελτίονα. Έπεὶ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὅυα ἐλάττω ζῷα αὐτοῦ κόσμον γῆ φέροντα μέμφεται οὐδεὶς νοῦν ἔχων. Γελοῖον γάρ, κἴ τις μέμφοντο, ὅτι τοῦς ἀνθρώπους δάκνοι, ὡς δέον αὐτοὺς ζῆν κοιμωμέ-35 νους. ᾿Ανάγκη δὲ καὶ ταῦτα κίναι· καὶ αἱ μὲν πρόδηλοι παρ' αὐτῶν ὡφέλειαι, τὰς δὲ οὐ φανερὰς ἀνεῦρε πολλὰς ὁ χρόνος· ὥστε μηδὲν αὐτῶν ¹ μάττην μηδὲ ἀνθρώποις εἶναι. Γελοῖον δὲ καὶ ὅτι ἄγρια πολλὰ αὐτῶν μέμφεσθαι γινομένων καὶ ἀνθρώπων ἀγρίων εἰ δὲ μὴ πεπίστευκεν ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλὰ 40 ἀπιστοῦντα ἀμίνεται, τί θανμαστόν ἐστιν;

10. 'Αλλ' εἰ ἄνθρωποι ἄκοντές εἰσι κακοὶ καὶ τοιοῦτοι οὐχ ἐκόντες, οὕτ' ἄν τις τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας αἰτιάσαιτο, οὕτε τοὺς πάσχοντας ὡς δι' αὐτοὺς ταῦτα πάσχοντας. Εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ ἀνάγκη οὕτω 5 κακοὺς γίνεσθαι εἴτε ὑπὸ τῆς φορᾶς εἴτε τῆς ἀρχῆς διδούσης τὸ ἀκολυνθον ἐντεῦθεν, φυσικῶς οὕτως. Εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ ὁ λόγος αὐτός ἐστιν ὁ ποιῶν, πῶς οὐκ ἄδικο οὕτως: 'Αλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἄκοντες, ὅτι ἀμαρτία ἀκούσιον' τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ ἀναιρεῖ τὸ αὐτοὺς τοὺς πράττοντας παρ' αὐτῶν εἶναι, ἀλλ'

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al, that is, which live on the earth. And besides, no one of any intelligence complans of all the other creatures, lower than himself, which ornament the earth. It would be ridiculous if someone complained of their biting men, as if men ought to pass their lives asleep. No, it is necessary that these, too, should exist; and some of the benefits which come from them are obvious, and those which are not evident, many of them time discovers; so that none of them exist without good purpose, even for men. But it is absurd, too, to complain that many of them are savage, when there are savage men as well; and if they do not trust men but in their distrust altack to keep them off what is there surprising in that?

10. But if men are unwillingly wicked. and are the sort of people they are, not by their own free will, one could neither blame the wrongdoers nor those who suffer wrong because they suffer it by their agency. But if there is a necessity that they should become wicked in this way, brought about either by the heavenly circuit or by the first principle determining the consequences that necessarily follow it, then their being wicked in this way is natural. But then surely, if it is the rational forming principle itself which makes them wicked, things are unjust in this way? But "unwilling means that the error is unwilling; and this does not do away with the fact that it is men themselves who act of themselves

part, the soul. Plotinus, no doubt, has the Platome formula in mind here but what he is really concerned with is not to maintain that wrongdoing is error but that the centrel and ordering of all things by Providence still leaves room for human moral responsibility.

 $^{^{1}}$ abrûr Theodoretus Graec affect cur vi. 71, H–S $^{\circ}$: abrûs godd

¹ The reference to Plato, Laws V. 731C, given by Henry-Schwyzer, Bréhier, and Beutler-Theiler can be miskeading here. The Laws passage is stating the familiar Secratic-Platonic doctrine, πω δ άδωνος οὐχ δωόν άδωνος C2-3): wrongdomg is error because nobody who knew what he was doing would deliberately choose the worst of evils for his most valuable

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD HI 2

10 ὅτι αὐτοὶ ποιοῦσι, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ αὐτοὶ ὁμαρτάνου
σιν· ἢ οὐδὶ ἃν ὅλως ἢμαρτον μὴ αὐτοὶ οἱ ποιούντες
ὅντες. Τὸ δὲ τῆς ἀνάγκης οὐκ ἔξωθεν, ἀλλὶ ὅτι
πάντως. Το δὲ τῆς φορᾶς οὐχ ὥστε μηδὲν ἐφὶ
ἡμῦν εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ εἰ ἔξωθεν τὸ πᾶν, οὕτως ᾶν
ἢν, ὡς αὐτοὶ οἱ ποιοῦντες ἐβούλοντο· ῶστε ουκ
15 ἄν αὐτοῖς ἐναντία ἐτίθεντο ἄνθρωποι οὐδὶ ᾶν
ἀσεβεῖς, εἰ θεοὶ ἐποίουν. Νῶν δὲ παρὶ αὐτῶν
τοῦτο. ᾿Αρχῆς δὲ δοθείσης τὸ ἐφεξῆς περαίνεται
συμπαραλαμβανομένων εἰς τὴν ἀκολουθίαν καὶ τῶν
ὅσαι εἰσὶν ἀρχαί· ἀρχαὶ δὲ καὶ ἄνθρωποι. Κινοῦνται γουν πρὸς τὰ καλὰ οἰκεία φύσει καὶ ἀρχὴ αὕτη
αὐτεξούσιος.

11. Πότερα δὲ φυσικαῖς ἀνάγκαις οῦτως ἔκαστα καὶ ἀκολουθίαις καὶ ὅπη δυνατὸν καλῶς, "Η οῦ, ἀλλ' ὁ λόγος ταῦτα πάντα ποιεῖ ἄρχωι καὶ οῦτω βούλεται καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα κακὰ αὐτὸς κατὰ λόγον τοιεῖ οῦ βουλόμενος πάντα ἀγαθὰ εἶτιι, ὥσπερ ἄν εἴ τις τεχνίτης οὐ πάντα τὰ ἐν τῷ ζώω ὀφθαλμοὺς ποιεῖ οῦτως οὐδ' ὁ λόγος πάντα θεοὺς εἰργάζετο, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν θεούς, τὰ δὲ δαίμονας, δευτίρων φύσην, εἶτα ἀνθρώπους καὶ ζῷα ἐφεξῆς, οὐ φθόνω, ἀλλὰ λόγω ποικιλίαν νοερὰν ἔχοντι. Ἡμεῖς δέ, ὥσπερ 10 οἱ ἄπειροι γραφικῆς τέχνης αἰτιῶνται, ώς οὐ καλὰ τὰ χρώματα πανταχοῦ, ὁ δὲ ἄρα τὰ προσήκοντα

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but it is because they themselves do the deed that they themselves err; if they were not themselves the doers, they would not have erred at all. But as for the necessity, this does not mean that it comes in from outside but only that it is universally so. And as for the heavenly circuit, it does not work so that nothing is in our power; for if the All was external to us, it would be just as its makers wished, so that, if it was gods who made it, men, even impious ones, would do nothing opposed to them But as it is, this [the power of free action] originates in men. Given a first principle, it accomplishes what follows with the inclusion in the chain of causation of all the principles there are; but men too, are principles; at any rate, they are moved to noble actions by their own nature, and this is an independent principe.

11. But are all individual things as they are by natural necessities and causal sequences, and excellently disposed in every way that can be? No. but the rational forming principle makes all these things as their sovereign, and wishes them to be as they are, and makes the things which are called bad according to reason, because it does not wish that al. should be good, just like a craftsman who does not make everything eves in his picture; in the same way the formative principle did not make everything gods but some gods, some spirits (a nature of the second rank), then men and animals after them in order, not cut of grudging meanness but by a reason containing all the rich variety of the intelligible world. But we are like people who know nothing about the art of painting and criticise the painter because the colours are not beautiful everywhere, though he has

απέδωκεν έκαστω τόπω και αι πόλεις δε ούκ έξ ἴσων, καὶ αῗ εὐνομία 1 χρώνται· ἢ εἴ τις δράμα μέμφοιτο, ότι μὴ πάντες ήρωες έν αὐτῷ, άλλὰ καὶ 15 οἰκέτης καί τις ἀγροῖκος καὶ φαίλως φθεγγόμενος. το δέ οὐ καλόν ἐστιν, εἴ τις τοὺς χείρους ἐξέλοι, καὶ ἐκ τούτων συμπληρούμενον.

12. Εὶ μὲν οὖν αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος ἐναρμόσας ἐαυτὸν είς ύλην ταθτα είργάσατο τοθτο ών οίος έστιν, ανόμοιος τοῦς μέρεσων, ἐκ τοῦ πρό αὐτοῦ τοῦτο ών, και τούτο τὸ γενόμενον ούτω γενόμενον μή 5 αν έσχε κάλλιον έσυτοῦ άλλο. 'Ο δὲ λόγος ἐκ πάντων δροίων και παραπλησίων οδικ δυ έγένετο καὶ ούτος ὁ τρόπος μεμπτός πάντα όντος κατὰ μέρος εκαυτών άλλος. Εί δὲ έξω έαυτοῦ άλλα ελσήγαγεν, οξον ψυχάς, καὶ εβιάσατο παρά τὴν αθτών φύσιν έναρμόσαι τώ ποιήματι πρύς τὸ 10 χειρον πολλάς, πῶς ὀρθώς; 'Αλλὰ φατέον κοὶ τὰς ψυχὰς οἶον μέρη αὐτοῦ εἶναι καὶ μὴ χείρους ποιούντα έναρμόττειν, άλλ' όποι προσήκον αὐταίς καταχωρίζειν κατ' άξίαν.

13. Έπει οὐδε ἐκείνον ἀποβλητέοι τον λόγον, δς οὐ πρὸς τὸ παρὸν ἐκάστοτέ φησι βλέπειν, άλλὰ

1 και αι εθνομία Theder, Η S2: και αι εθνομίαι ΑκΕκΥQ. rais ebroulais Apr.

really distributed the appropriate colours to every place; 1 and cities are not composed of citizens with equal rights, even those which have good laws and constitutions; or we are like someone who censures a play because all the characters in it are not heroes but there is a servant and a yokel who speaks in a vulgar way: but the play is not a good one if one expels the inferior characters, because they too help

to complete it.

12. If, then, the rational formative principle itself has, by fitting itself into matter, done these works, being the thing that it is, unlike in its parts, and deriving its being this from the principle before it, then this that has come into existence, since it has come into existence in this way, would have nothing else nobler than itself. If the rational formative principle had been composed of parts which were all alike and equal, it would not have come into existence and [if it had] this manner of construction would be worthy of blame, since it is all things, it is different in every part. But if it brought in other things outside itself, souls for instance, and forced them. against their own nature, to fit into its creation. making many of them worse in doing so, how is this rightly done? But we must say that the souls, too. are in a way parts of it) and it does not fit them in by making them worse but puts them in places appropriate to them according to their worth.

13. Then we must not discard that argument, either, which says that the rational principle does not

¹ Cp. Plato, Republic IV. 420C-D. The ignorant critic in Plato does not plame the painter for not making " everything

eyes" but for painting the eyes ugly black instead of beautiful crimson. So the reference is better placed here than where Henry Schwyzer placed it at I, 5-6.

τρός τὰς πρόσθεν περιόδους καὶ αὖ τὸ μέλλον, ώστε έκειθεν τάττειν την άξίαν και μετατιθέναι ο έκ δεσποτών των τρόσθεν δούλους ποιοθντα, εί έγενοντο κακοί δεσπόται, καὶ ὅτι σύμφορον αὐτοῖς ούτω, και εί κακώς έγρήσαντο πλούτω, πένηταςκαὶ άγαθοῖς οὐκ ἀσύμφορου 1 πένησιν είναι—καὶ φονεύσαντας άδίκως φονευθήναι άδίκως μέν τῷ ποιήσαντι, αὐτῷ δὲ δικαίως τῷ παθόντι, καὶ τὸ 10 πεισόμενον συναγαγείν είς τὸ αὐτὸ τῶ ἐπιτηδείω ποιήσαι, α παθείν έχρην έκείνου. Μή γάρ δή κατά συντυχίαν δούλον μηδέ αίγμαλωτον ώς έτυχε μηδε δβρισθήναι είς σώμα είκή, άλλ' ήν ποτε ταυτα ποιήσας, α νυν έστι πασχων· καὶ μητέρα τις ανελάν ύπο παιδός αναιρεθήσεται γενόμενος 15 γυνή, καὶ βιασάμενος γυναϊκα έσται, ΐνα βιασθή. "Όθεν καὶ θεία φήμη 'Αδράστεια αντη γάρ ή διάταξως 'Αδράστεια όντας καὶ όντως Δίκη καὶ σοφία θανμαστή. Τεκμαίρεσθαι δὲ δεῖ τοιαύτην τινα είναι την τάξιν αξί των όλων έκ των όρωμένων 20 ἐν τῷ παντί, ὡς εἰς ἄπαν χωρεῖ καὶ ὅ τι μικρότατον, καὶ ή τέχνη θαυμαστή οὐ μόνον ἐν τοῖς θείοις, άλλα και ών αν τις ύπενόησε καταφροιήσαι ώς μικρώι τήν πρόνοιαν, οία και έν τοῖς τυχοῦσι

1 ἀσύμφοροι Δος, Η S: ἀσύμφοροι codd.

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look only at the present on each occasion but at the cycles of time before, and also at the future, so as to determine men's worth from these, and to change their positions, making slaves out of those who were masters before, if they were bad masters (and also because it is good for them this way), and, if men have used wealth badly, maxing them poor (and for the good, too, it is not without advantage to be poor); and causing those who have killed unjustly to be killed in their turn, unjustly as far as the doer of the deed is concerned, but justly as far as concerns the victim; and it brings that which is to suffer together to the same point with that which is fit and ready to execute what that unjust killer is fated to endure. There is certainly no accident in a man's becoming a slave. nor is he taken prisoner in war by chance, nor is outrage done on his body without due cause, but he was once the doer of that which he now suffers; and a man who made away with his mother will be made away with by a son when he has become a woman, and one who has raped a woman will be a woman in order to be raped. Hence comes, by divine declaration, the name Adrasteia: for this world order is truly Adrasteia [the Inescapable] and truly Justice and wonderful wisdom.1 We must conclude that the universal order is for ever something of this kind from the evidence of what we see in the All, how this order extends to everything, even to the smallest, and the art is wonderful which appears, not only in the divine beings but also in the things which one might have supposed providence would have despised for their smallness, for example, the workmanship which produces wonders in rich variety in ordinary animals,

¹ The thought here follows Plato closely. For the remcarnation of the matricide op. Laws IX. 872E, for the "law of Adrasteta" applied to remove mation, op. Phaedrus 248C2

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 2

ζώοις ή τοικίλη θαυματουργία καὶ τὸ μέχρι τῶν ἐμφύτων καρποῖς καὶ ἔτι φύλλοις τὸ εὐειδὲς καὶ 26 το βῷοτα εὐανθὲς καὶ βαδινόν καὶ ποικίλον, καὶ ὅτι οὐ πεποίηται ἄπαξ καὶ ἐπαύσατο, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ ποιεῖται τῶν ὑπεράνω φερομένων κατὰ ταῦτα οὐχ ώσαὐτως. Μετατιθέμενα οὐδ' ἄλλα σχήματα λαμβάνοντα, ἀλλ' ὡς καλόν, καὶ ὡς πρέποι ἄν δυνάμεσι 30 θείαις ποιεῖν. Ποιεῖ γὰρ πῶν τὸ θεῖον ὡς πέφυκεν πέφυκε δὲ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ οὐσίαν οὐσία δὲ αὐτῷ, ἡ τὸ καλὸν ἐν ταῖς ἐνεργείαις αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ δικαιον συνεκφέρει Εὶ γιαρ μὴ ἐκεῖ ταῦτα, ποῦ ἄν εἴη;

14. "Εχει τοίνυν ή διαταξις οὔτω κατὰ νοῦν, ὡς ἄνευ λογισμοῦ εἶναι, οὕτω δὲ εἶναι, ὡς, εἴ τις ἄριστα δύναιτο λογισμῷ χρῆσθαι, θαυμάσαι, ὅπι μὴ ἄν ἄλλως εὖρε λογισμὸς ποιῆσαι, ὁποῖόν τι ὁ γινώσκεται καὶ ἐν ταῖς καθ' ἔκαστα φύσεσι, γινομένων εἰς ἀεὶ νοερώτερον ἢ κατὰ λογισμοῦ διάταξιν. "Εφ' ἔκάστοι μὲν οῦν τῶν γινομένων ἀεὶ γενῶν οὐκ ἔστιν αἰτιᾶσθαι τὰν ποιοῦντα λόγοι, εἴ τις μὴ ἀξιοῖ ἔκαστον οὕτω γενονέναι χρῆναι, ὡς τα μὴ γεγονότα, ἀίδια δέ, ἔν τε νοητοῖς ἔι τε 10 αἰσθητοῦς ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ¹ ὅντα, προοθήκην αἰτῶν

1 κατά ταὐτά Dodds, H-S2; καὶ αὐτά codd

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and the beauty of appearance which extends to the fruits and even the leaves of plants, and their beauty of flower which comes so effortlessly, and their delicacy and variety, and that all this has not been made once and come to an end but is always being made as the powers above move in different ways over this world. So the things which are changing change, not changing and taking new shapes without due cause but in a way which is excellent and appropriate to their making by divine powers. For all that is divine makes according to its nature; but its nature corresponds to its substance, and its substance is that which brings forth together beauty and justice in its workings; for if beauty and justice are not in it, where could they be?

14. The ordering of the universe, then, corresponds with Intellect in such a way that it exists without rational planning, but exists so that if anyone could plan rationally as well as possible, he would wonder at it because planning could not have found out another way to make it: something of this is observed even in individual natures, which come into being continually more conformed to Intellect than they could be by an ordering which depended on rational planning. With each, therefore, of the kinds of things which continually come into existence it is not possible to blame the rational principle which makes them, unless someone should demand that they ought to have come into existence just like the things which have not come into existence, but are eternal, existing always in the same way both in the intelligible world and in the world of sense, asking for a further

¹ Cp. note on ch. 1. 1. 20-21.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III, 2.

άγαθοῦ πλείονα, άλλ' οὐ τὸ δοθέν ἐκάστω είδος αθταρκες ήγούμενος, οδον τώδε, ότι μή καλ κέρατα, οὐ σκοπούμενος ότι άδύνατον ήν λόγον μή οὐκ ἐπὶ πάντα ἐλθεῖν, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἔδει ἐν τῷ μείζονι τὰ ἐλάττω καὶ ἐι τῷ ὅλῳ τὰ μέρη καὶ οὐκ ἴσα 15 δυνατον είναι η ούκ αν ην μέρη. Το μέν γάρ άνω πάν πάντα, τὰ δὲ κάτω οὐ πάντα ἔκαστον. Καὶ ἄνθρωπος δή, καθ' ὅσον μέρος, ἔκαστος, 1 οὐ πâs. Εί δέ που ἐν μέρεσι τισι καὶ ἄλλο τι, ὅ οὐ μέρος, τούτω κάκεινο παν. 'Ο δὲ καθ' ἔκαστα, ή τυθτο, οὺκ ἀπαιτητέος τέλεος είναι εἰς ἀρετής 20 άκρον ήδη γὰρ οὐκέτ' ἄν μέρος. Οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ τῷ ὅλῳ τὸ μέρος κοσμηθὲν εἰς μείζονα ἀξίαν έφθόνηται καί γὰρ κάλλιον τὸ ὅλον ποιεῖ κοσμηθὲν άξία μείζονι. Και γάρ γίνεται τοιούτον άφομοιωθέν τῷ ὅλω καὶ οίον συγχωρηθέν τοιοῦτον είναι καὶ συνταχθέν ούτως, ένα καὶ κατά τον άνθρώπου 25 τόπον ἐκλάμτη τι ἐν αὐτῷ, οἶον καὶ κατὰ τὸν θεῖον οθρανόν τὰ ἄστρα, καὶ η ε ἐντεῦθεν ἀντίληψις οξον αγάλμωτος μεγάλου καὶ καλοῦ εἴτε ἐμψύχου είτε καὶ τέχνη 'Ηφαίστου γενομένου, ω (εί)σι3 μέν και κατά το πρόσωπον επιστίλβοντες άστέρες

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addition of good, but not thinking the form given to each thing sufficient, for instance, thinking that the form given to this particular animal is insufficient because it has not horns as well, and not considering that it was impossible for the formative principle not to reach to all things, but that there must be lesser things in the greater and parts in the whole and that they cannot be equal to the whole or they would not be parts. In the world above every thing is all things, but the things below are not each of them all things. Even man, in so far as he is a part, is an individual, not all. But if somewhere among parts there is something else which is not a part, in virtue of this that thing below, too is all. But man in his individuality, in so far as he is an individual being, cannot be required to be perfect to the point of reaching the summit of virtue; for if he did he would no longer be a part. But there would certainly not be any gradging by the whole if the part did gain in beauty and order so as to make it of greater worth; for it makes the whole more beautiful when it has become of greater value by its gain in beauty and order. For it becomes of this kind by being made like the whole and, so to speak, being allowed to be like this and given such a place that in the region of man, too, something may shine in him as the stars shine in the heaven of the gods; a place from which there may be a perception of something like a great and beautiful image of a god whether a living one or one made by the art of Hephaestus-in which there are stars flashing on the face, and in the

^{*} $\vec{\phi}$ $\langle \epsilon i \rangle \sigma_i$ Theller, H-S: $\vec{\phi} \sigma_i$ codd.

καὶ ἐν τοῖς στήθεσι δὲ ἄλλοι καὶ ἢ ἱ ἔμελλεν

30 επιπρέψειν άστρων θέσις κειμένων.

15. Τὰ μεν οὖν εκαστα αὐτὰ ἐφ' ἐαντῶν θεωρούμενα ούτως ή συμπλοκή δὲ ή τούτων γεννηθέντων και άει γεννωμένων έχοι αν την επίστασιν καὶ ἀπορίαν κατά τε τὴν ἀλληλοφαγίαν 5 των άλλων ζώων και τας άνθρώπων είς άλλήλους επιθέσεις, και ότι πόλεμος αεί και ου μήποτε παθλαν οδδ' αν άνοχην λάβοι, και μάλιστα εί λόγος πεποίηκεν ούτως έχειν, και επιτια λέγεται καλώς έχειν. Οὐ γὰρ ἔτι τοῖς οὕτω λέγουσιν έκείνος ο λόγος βοηθεί, ώς καλώς κατά το δυνατόν 10 έχειν, αιτία ύλης ούτως έχόντων ώς έλαττόνως έχειν, καὶ ώς οῦ δυνατόν τὰ κακὰ ἀπολέσθαι είπερ ούτως έχρην έχειν, και καλώς ούτω, και ούχ ή ύλη παρελθούσα κρατεί, άλλά παμήχθη, ίνα ούτω, μάλλον δε ήν και αυτή αίτια λόγου ούτως. 'Αρχή οὖν λόγος καὶ πάντα λόγος καὶ τὰ γινόμενα 16 κατ' αὐτὸν καὶ συνταττόμενα ἐπὶ τῆ γενέσει πάντως ούτως. Τίς οδυ ή του πολέμου του άκηρύκτου εν ζάσις και εν ανθρώποις ανάγκη: "Η άλληλοφαγίαι μεν άναγκαΐαι, άμοιβαί ζώων ούσαι ου δυναμένων, ουδ' εί τις μή κτιννύοι αυτά,

* & Forms - Promue), H St. . codd

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breast others, and a setting of stars placed where it

will be clearly seen.1

15 So it is, then, with individual things when they are considered separately. But the weaving together into a pattern of these things which have been and are always being produced might hold obstacles and difficulties, because the other animals eat each other, and men at ack each other, and there is always war with never a pause or armistice; and this is particularly difficult if it is the rational forming principle of the world which has brought it about that this is so, and if it is said to be well that it is so. That argument is no longer any help to the people who say this which maintains that al' is as well as it can be, and that it is the fault of matter when things are so disposed as to be less than good, and that "evils cannot be done away with "; 2" if, that is, it is really true that things had to be so, and that it is well that they should be so, and matter does not come along and dominate but was brought along so that things should be in this state, or rather is itself, too, caused to be as it is by the rational principle. The rational principle, then, is the origin, and all things are reason, both those which are brought .nto being according to the principle and those which, in their coming to birth, are altogether ranged in this common order. What, then, is the necessity of the undeclared war among animals and among men? It is necessary that animals should eat each other; these eatings are transformations into each other of animas which could not stay as they are for ever, even if no one

¹ The thought seems to be: the physical universe is the great star-decked image of the intelligible divinity (cp. Plato. Timaeus 37C 6-7); and because man can contemplate it he gains in hearty and order; he is conformed by his contempletion to the starry heaven, and something of its splendour shines in him.

² The familiar quotation, repeated again and again by Plotinus, from Plato, Theaetetus 176A5.

ούτω μένειν είς ἀεί. Εί δὲ ἐν ῷ χρόνω δεί 2) ἀπελθείν οὖτως ἀπελθείν ἔδει, ώς ἄλλοις γενέσθαι χρείαν παρ' αὐτῶν, τί φθυνεῖν έδει, Τί δ' εί βρωθέντα άλλα εφύετο; Οΐον εί έπὶ σκηνή, τῶν ύποκριτών ο πεφονευμένος άλλαζάμενος το σχη με αναλαβών πάλιν είσιοι άλλου πρόσωπον. 'Αλλά τέθνηκεν άληθώς ούτος. Εὶ οὖν καὶ τὸ ἀποθανείν 25 άλλαγή εστι σώματος, ώσπερ εσθήτος εκεί, η καί ποιν ἀποθέσεις σώματος, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ ἔξοδος ἐκ της σκηνής παντελής τότε, ελούστερου πύλω ηξοντος εναγωνίσασθαι, τί αν δεινον εξη ή τοιπήτη των ζώων είς άλληλα μεταβολή πολί βελτίων οδισα τοῦ μηδέ την άρχην αὐτά γενέσθαι: Ἐκείνως 30 μεν γάρ ερημία ζωής και τής εν άλλω ούσης άδιναμία· νῦν δὲ πολλή οὖσα ἐν τῷ παντὶ ζωή πάντα ποιεί και ποικιλλει έν τῷ ζῆι και οὐκ άνέγεται μὴ ποιουσα ἀεὶ καλὰ καὶ εὐειδή ζωντα παίγνια. 'Ανθρώπων δε ἐπ' ἀλλήλους ὅπλα θνητῶν όντων ἐι τάξει εὐσχήμοιι μαχομένων, οία ἐν 35 πυρρίχαις παίζουτες έργάζουται, δηλούσι τάς τε

¹ The comparison of life to a play was a commonplace of Cynic, Store and Stoic-influenced moralists from Bion of Borvethenes and Teles onwards (op. Teles 16, 4 Hense). The finest example is Marcus Aurelius A11. 36

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killed them. And if, at the time when they had to depart, they had to depart in such a way that they were useful to others, why do we have to make a grievance out of their usefulness? And what does it matter if, when they are eaten, they come alive again as different animals? It is like on the stage, when the actor who has been murdered changes his costume and comes on again in another character.1 But [in real life, not on the stage,] the man is really dead. If, then, death is a changing of body, like changing of clothes on the stage, or, for some of us, a putting off of body, like in the theatre the final exit, in that performance, of an actor who will on a later occasion come in again to play, what would there be that is terrible in a change of this kind, of living beings into each other? It is far better than if they had never come into existence at all. For that way there would be a barren absence of life and no possibility of a life which exists in something else; but as it is a manifold life exists in the All and makes all things, and in its living embroiders a rich variety and does not rest from ceaselessly making beautiful and shapely hving toys X* And when men, mortal as they are, direct their weapons against each other, fighting in orderly ranks, doing what they do in sport in their

God is mánys uakapuv anovohys áftor (C2-3). For Plotints, as the rest of this thapver shows thereby, it is only man's lower, external life which is "play". His true inner self is serious and important. For Plato man's best game is the religious dance, at once play, worship and education, in which he attains all the seriousness he is capable of. For Plotinus man's game is the grim me of killing and being killed, which the wise man will not take seriously and cry over like a child, because it only affects his unimportant lower self.

² Plotinus, here and in what follows, probably has Plate's description of man as God's toy, playing to please him, in mind (Laws VII. 803C-D. θεοῦ τι ποίγνιον (G4-5)). But there is an important inference in the thought. For Plato, in this passage at least, man is wholly and entirely God's toy, and his "play" is the most serious and important thing in his life—though he is not really worth saking seriously at all, only

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 2.

άνθρωπίνας σπουδάς άπάσας παιδιας ούσας τούς τε θανάτους μηνύουσιν ούδεν δεινόν είναι, αποθνήσκαν δ' εν πολέμοις και εν μάχαις όλίγον προλαβόντας τοῦ γινομένου ἐν γήρα θᾶττον ἀπιόντας καὶ πάλιν 40 ζώντας. Εί δ' άφαιροίντο ζώντες χρημάτων, γινώσκοιεν αν μηδέ πρότερον αὐτῶν είναι καὶ τοῖς άρπάζουσιν αὐτοῖς γελοίαν είναι την κτήσιν άφαιρουμένων αὐτοὺς ἄλλων· ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῖς μὴ έφαιρεθείσι χείρον γίνεσθαι της άφαιρέσεως την κτήσιν. "Ωσπερ δ' έπὶ τῶν θεάτρων τοις σκηνοις, 45 ούτω χρη καὶ τοὺς ψόνους θεᾶσθαι καὶ πάντας θανάτους καὶ πόλεων άλώσεις καὶ άρπαγάς, μεταθέσεις πάντα καὶ μετωσχηματίσεις καὶ θρήνων καὶ οἰμωγῶν ὑποκρίσεις. Καὶ γὰρ ἐνταθθα ἐπὶ των έν τω βίω έκαστων σύχ ή ένδον ψυχή, άλλ' ή έξω ανθρώπου σκιά και οιμώζει και δδύρεται 50 καὶ πάντα ποιεῖ ἐν σκηνή τῆ ὅλη γῆ πολλαχοῦ ςκηνάς ποιησαμένων. Τοιαθτα γάρ έργα άνθρώπου τὰ κάτω καὶ τὰ ἔξω μόνα ζῆν είδότος καὶ ἐν δακρύοις και σπουδαίοις ότι παίζων έστιν ήγνοηκότος. Μόνω γάρ τῷ σπουδαίω σπουδαστέον έν σπουδαίοις τοις έργοις, δ δ' άλλος άνθρωπος 55 παίγνων. Σπουδάζεται δέ και τά παίγνια τοίς *επουδάζεω* οἰκ εἰδόσι καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς οὖσι παιγνίοις. Εί δέ τις στμπαίζων αὐτοῖς τὰ τοιαθτα πάθοι, Ισται παραπεσών παίδων παιδιά το περί αὐτὸν ἀποθεμενος παίγνιον. Εί δὲ δὴ καὶ παίζηι

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war-dances, their battles show that all human concerns are children's games, and tell us that deaths are nothing terrible, and that those who die in wars and battles anticipate only a little the death which comes in old age-they go away and come back quicker. But if their property is taken away while they are still alive, they may recognise that it was not theirs hefore either, and that its possession is a mockery to the robbers themselves when others take it away from them; for even to those who do not have it taken away, to have it is worse than being deprived of it. We should be spectators of murders, and all deaths, and takings and sackings of cities, as if they were on the stages of theatres, all changes of scenery and costame and acted wailings and weepings. For really here in the events of our ute it is not the soul within but the outside shadow of man which cries and moans and carries on in every sort of way on a stage which is the whole earth where men have in many places set up their stages. Doings like these belong to a man who knows how to live only the lower and external life and is not aware that he is playing in his tears, even when they are serious tears. For only the seriously good part of man is capable of taking serious doings seriously; the rest of man is a toy. But toys, too, are taken seriously by those who do not know how to be serious and are toys themselves. But if anyone joins in their play and suffers their sort of safferings, he must know that he has tumbled into a children's game and put off the play-costume in which he was dressed.1 And even if Socrates, too,

¹ Le. if he is killed it is all part of the game, and the body which he puts off is only a toy.

PLOTINUS ENNEAD III. 2

Σωκράτης, παίζει τῷ ἔξω Σωκράτει. Δεῖ δὲ 80 κάκεῖνο ἐνθυμεῖσθαι, ώς οὐ δεῖ τεκμήρια τοῦ κακὰ είναι το δακρύει και θρηνείν τίθεσθαι, ότι δή και παίδες έπὶ οὐ κανοῖς καὶ δακρίουσι καὶ δδύρουται. 16. 'Αλλ' εὶ καλῶς ταθτα λέγεται, πῶς ἄν ἔτι πονηρία; Ποῦ δ' ἀδικία; 'Αμαρτία δὲ ποῦ; Πώς γάρ έστι καλώς γινομένων άπάντων άδικείν η άμαρτάνειν τους ποιούντας; Κακοδαίμονες δέ 5 πῶς, εἰ μὴ άμαρτάνοιεν μηδὲ άδικοῖει; Πῶς δὲ τὰ μέν κατά φύσιν, τὰ δὲ παρά φύσιν φήσομεν είναι, των γινομένων άπάντων και δρωμένων κατά φύσιν ὄντων; Πως δ' αν και πρός το θείον ασέβειά τις εξη τοιούτου όντος τοῦ ποιουμένου; Οίον εξ τις έν δράμασι λοιδορούμενον ποιητής ύποκριτήν 10 ποιήσαιτο καὶ κατατρέχοντα τοῦ ποιητοῦ τοῦ δράματος. Πάλω οὖν σαφέστερον λέγωμεν τίς δ λόγος και ώς εικότως τοιούτος έστη. Έστι τοίνυν ούτος δ λόγος-τετολμήσθω γάρ τάχα δ' αν και τύχοιμεν-έστι τοίνυν ούτος ούκ ακρατος νους ούδ' αὐτονούς οὐδέ γε ψυχής καθαράς τὸ 15 γένος, ήρτημένος δε έκείνης και οίον έκλαμψις έξ άμφοίν, νού και ψυγής και ψυγής κατά νουν διακειμένης γεννησάντων τον λόγον τοθτον ζωήν λόγον τικά ήσιχη έχουσαν. Πάσα δε ζωή ενέργεια, και ή φαύλη- ἐνέργειι. δὲ σύχ ώς τὸ πῦρ ἐνεργεῦ, άλλ' ή ενέργεια αθτής, καν μή αισθησίς τις παρή, 20 κίνησίς τις οὐκ εἰκῆ. Οἶς γοῖν ἐαν μή παρῆ καὶ μετάσχη όπωσοῦν ότωῦν, εὐθὺς λελόγωται, τοῦτο

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may play sometimes, it is by the outer Socrates that he plays. But we must consider this further point, too, that one must not take weeping and lamenting as evidence of the presence of evils, for children, too, weep and wail over things that are not evils

16. But if this is well said, how can there still be wickedness? Where is injustice? Where is error? For how, if all things are well done, can the doers act unjustly or err? And how can they be ill-fated, if they do not err or act unjustly? And how can we assert that some things are according to nature, but others against nature, if all things that happen and are done are according to nature? And how could there be any blasphemy against the divine when that which is made is made like this? It is just as if a poet in his plays wrote a part for an actor insulting and depreciating the author of the play. Let us, then, again, and more clearly, explain what the rational forming principle of our universe is and that it is reasonable for it to be like this. This rational principle, then, is—let us take the risk! We might even, perhaps succeed [in describing it]—it is not pure intellect or absolute intellect; it is not even of the kind of pure soul but depends on soul, and is a sort of outshining of both; intellect and soul (that is, soul disposed according to intellect) generated this rational principle as a life which quietly contains a rationality. All life, even worthless life, is activity; activity not in the way that fire acts; but its activity, even if there is no perception there, is a movement which is not random. For with hving things when there is no perception present and any one of them has any share in life, it is immediately enreasoned, that

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III 2

δέ έστι μεμόρφωται, ώς της ένεργείας της κατά την ζωήν μορφούν δυναμένης και κινούσης ούτως ώς μορφούν. Η τοίνυν ενέργεια αυτής τεχνική, ωσπερ αν δ όρχούμενος κινούμενος είη. δ γάρ 25 ορχηστής τῆ ούτω τεχνική ζωή ἔσικεν αὐτός καὶ η τέχνη αὐτὸν κινεί καὶ ούτω κινει, ώς της ζωης αὐτης τοιαύτης πως οὔτης. Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ελρήσθω τοῦ οΐαν δεί καὶ τὴν ἡντινοῦν ζωὴν ηγεισθαι ένεκα. ή Ηκων τοίνυν οΰτος ό λόγος ζκ νοθ ένδς και ζωής μιας πλήρους όντος έκατέρου 30 οὐκ ἔστιν οὕτε ζωὴ μία οῦτε νοθς τις εἶς οὔτε έκασταχού πλήρης οὐδε διδούς ξαυτόν οξς δίδωσιν όλον τε καὶ πάντα. 'Αντιθεὶς δὲ ἀλλήλοις τα μέρη καὶ ποιήσας ἐνδεᾶ πολέμου καὶ μάγης σύστασιν και γένεσιν είργάσατο και ούτως έστιν είς πώς, εί μή έν είη. Γενόμενον γάρ έαυτώ τοις μέρεσι 35 πολέμιον οῦτως ἔν ἐστι καὶ φίλον, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ δράματος λύγος εξς δ τοῦ δράματος έχου έν αὐτῶ πολλάς μάχας. Τὸ μὲν οὖν δράμα τὰ μεμαχημένα οίον είς μίαν άρμονίαν άγει σύμφωνον οξοι διήγησαν την πάσαν των μαχομένων ποιούμε νος εκεί δε εξ ενός λόγου ή των διαστατών μάχη. 40 ώστε μαλλον άν τις τη άρμονία τη έκ μαχομένων είκάσεις, καὶ ζητήσει διὰ τί τὰ μαχόμενα ἐν τοῖς λόγοις. Εἰ οὖν καὶ ἐνταῦθα ὀξὺ καὶ βαρὺ ποιοῦσι

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is informed, since the activity which is proper to life is able to form it and moves it in such way that its movement is a forming So the activity of life is an artistic activity, like the way in which one who is dancing is moved; for the dancer himself is like the life which is artistic in this way and his art moves him. and moves in such a way that the actual life is somehow of this [artistic] kind. This, then, should be enough to show how we should think of any sort of life. Now the rational forming principle of this universe, which comes from a single Intellect and a single life, both of them complete, s not a single life nor any sind of single intellect, and is not at every point complete, nor does it at every point give itself whole and entire to the things to which it does give itself. But by setting the parts against each other and making them deficient it generates and maintains war and battle, and so it is one as a whole even if it is not one single thing. For though it is at war with itself in its parts it is one thing and on good terms with itself in the same way that the plot of a play might be; the plot of the play is one though it contains in itself many battles. Of course, the play brings the conflicting elements into a kind of harmonious concordance, by composing the complete story of the persons in conflict; but in the universe the battle of conflicting elements springs from a single rational principle; so that it would be better for one to compare it to the melody which results from conflicting sounds, and one will then enquire why there are the conflicting sounds in the rational proportions [of musical scales]. If, then, in music the laws of rational proportion make high and low notes

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λόγοι καὶ συνίασιν εἰς ἔν, ὅντες ἀρμονίας λόγοι, είς αὐτὴν τὴν άρμονίαν, ἄλλον λόγον μείζονα, 45 άντες έλάττους αυτοι καὶ μέρη, όρωμεν δὲ καὶ ἐν τῶ παντὶ τὰ ἐναντία, οἶοι λευκὸν μέλαν, θερμὸν ψυχρόν, καὶ δὴ πτερωτον ἄπτερον, ἄπουν ὑπόπουν, λυγικόν άλυγον, πέντα δε ζώου ένος τοῦ σύμπαντος μέρη, καὶ τὸ πῶν ὁμολογεῖ ἐαυτῷ τῶν μερῶν τολλαχοῦ μαχομένων, κατά λόγον δὲ τὸ πῶν, 50 ανάγκη καὶ του ένα τούτου λόγου έξ εναντίων λόγον είναι ένα, την σύστασιν αὐτῷ 1 καὶ οίον οδοίαν της τοιαύτης έναντιώσεως φεροισης. Καλ γάρ εί μη πολύς ήν, οὐδ' ἄν ήν πᾶς, οὐδ' ἄν λόγος. λόγος δε ών διάφορός τε πρός αὐτόν έστι καὶ ή μάλιστα διαφορά εναντίωσίς έστιν: ώστε εί έτερον 55 όλως, τὸ δὲ ἔτερον ποιεῖ, καὶ μάλιστα ἔτεροι, ἀλλ' ούγ ήττον έτερον τοιήσει ωστε άκρως έτερον ποιών καὶ τὰ ἐναντία ποιήσει ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ τέλευς έσται, οὐκ εὶ διάφορα μόνον, άλλ' εἰ καὶ €ναντία ποιοί είναι ξαυτόν.

17. *Ων δή τοιοθτος οίος καὶ πάντως ποιεί, πολύ μαλλον τὰ ποιούμενα ποιήσει εναντία, ὅσω καὶ διέστηκε μαλλον καὶ ῆττον εν ὁ κόσμος ὁ αἰσθητὸς ἢ ὁ λόγος αὐτοῦ, ὥστε καὶ πολὺς μαλλον καὶ ἡ τοῦ ζῆν ἔφεσις μαλλον έκάστω καὶ ὁ ἔρως τοῦ cἰς εν μαλλον.

1 αὐτῷ Α³⁰, H-S³: αὐτῶν codd

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and come together into a unity being the proportiona, laws of melody they come together into the melody itself, which is another greater law of proportion, while they are lesser ones and part of it; in the universe, too, we see the opposites, for instance, white-black, hot cold, and, too, winged-wingless, footless-footed, rationa irrational, but all are parts of the single universal living being, and the All agrees with itself; the parts are in conflict in many places, but the All is in accordance with its rational formative nattern, and it is necessary that this one formative pattern should be one pattern made out of opposites, since it is opposition of this kind which gives it its structure, and, we might say, its existence. For certainly, if it was not many it would not be all, and would not therefore be rational pattern [of the universel; but, since it is rational pattern it has distinctions in itse f, and the extreme distinction is opposition; so that if in general is makes one thing different from another, it will also make them dif ferent in the extreme, and not different in a lesser degree; so by making one thing different from another in the highest degree it will necessarily make the opposites, and will be complete if it makes itself not only into different things but into opposite things.

17. Since its nature corresponds to its whole productive activity, the more it is differentiated the more opposed will it make the things it makes; and the universe perceived by the senses is less of a unity than its rational formative principle, so that it is more of a manifold and there is more opposition in it, and each individual in it has a greater urge to live, and there is a greater passion for unification.

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Φθείρει δε καὶ τὰ ερώντα τὰ ερώμενα πολλάκις είς τὸ αὐτῶν ἀγαθὸν σπεύδοντα, ὅταν φθαρτὰ ή, καὶ ή έφεσις δὲ του μέρους προς τὸ ὅλον ἔλκει εls αὐτὸ ὁ δύναται. Οὔτως οὖν καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ 10 κακοί, ώσπερ παρά της αὐτης τέχνης ορχουμένου τὰ ἐναντία· καὶ αὐτοῦ τὸ μέν τι μέρος άγαθόν, το δέ κακον φήσομεν, και ούτω καλώς έχει. Καίτοι οὐδὲ κακοί ἔτι. "Η τὸ μὲν κακούς είναι οὐκ ἀναιρεῖται, ἀλλ' ἢ μόνον ὅτι μὴ παρ' αὐτῶν τοιούτοι. 'Αλλά ίσως συγγνώμη τοῖς κακοῖς, εἰ 15 μη καὶ το της συγγνώμης καὶ μη δ λόγος ποιεί: ποιεί δε δ λόγος μηδε συγγνώμονας επί τοίς τριούτοις είναι. 'Αλλ' εί τὸ μέν μέρος αὐτοῦ άναθὸς ἀνήρ, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο πονηρός, καὶ πλείω μέρη ό πονηρός, ώσπερ έν δράμασι τὰ μὲν τάττει αὐτοῖς ό ποιητής, τοις δέ χρηται ούσιν ήδη ού γάρ αὐτός 20 πρωταγωνιστήν ουδέ δεύτερον ουδέ τρίτον ποιεί, άλλά διδούς έκάστω τούς προσήκοντας λόγους ήδη απέδωκεν εκάστω είς δ τετάχθαι δέον ούτω τοι και έστι τόπος έκαστα ό μέν τῷ ἀγαθῷ, ὁ δὲ τῷ κακῷ πρέπων. Έκάτερος οὖν κατὰ φύσιν καὶ 25 κατά λόγον εἰς ἐκάτερον καὶ τὸν πρέποντα χωρεῖ τὸν τόποι ἔχων, ὃν είλετο. Είτα φθέγγεται καὶ

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But those that love passionately often destroy the objects of their passion, when they are perishable, in the pursuit of their own good; and the urgent straining of the part towards the whole draws to itself what it can. So, then, there are good men and wicked men, like the opposed movements of a dancer inspired by one and the same art; and we shall call one part of his performance "good" and another " wicked," and in this way it is a good performance.1 But, then, the wicked are no longer wicked. No, their being wicked is not done away with, only their being like that does not originate with themselves. But there might perhaps be some sympathy for the wicked, except that it is the rational formative principle which is responsible for our sympathising or not; and the rational principle does not make us disposed to sympathise with people of this sort. But if one part of it is a good man, and another a villain and villainous humanity forms the larger class it is like in the production of a play; the author gives each actor a part, but makes use of their characteristics which are there already. He does not himself rank them as leading actor or second or third, but gives each man suitable words and so assigns him to the position which is proper to him. So there is a place for every man, one to fit the good and one to fit the bad. Each kind of man, then goes according to nature and the rational principle to the place that suits him, and holds the position he has chosen. There one speaks blasphemies and does

The dancer is a pantominus, who represents different characters, good and bad, in the course of his one man ballet or minue, as Harder saw (ep. his note ad loc.

ποιεί ό μεν ἀσεβείς λόγους καὶ έργα πυνηρών, ό δε τὰ ἐναντία: ἡυαν γὰρ καὶ πρὸ τοῦ δράματος οἱ τοιούτοι ύποκριταί διδόντες έσυτούς τη δράμπα Έν μεν οθν τοις ανθρωπίνοις δράμασιν ό μεν 30 ποιητής έδωκε τους λόγους, οι δε έχουσι παρ' αὐτῶν καὶ ἐξ αὐτῶν τό τε καλῶς καὶ τὸ κακῶς έκαστος-έστι γάρ και έργον αίτοις μετά τός ρήσεις τοῦ ποιητοῦ· ἐν δὲ τῷ ἀληθεστέρω ποιήμαπ, ο τι μιμούνται κατά μέρος ἄιθρωποι ποιητικήν έχουτες φώσιν, ψυχή μεν υποκρίνεται, α δ' υποκρί-35 νεται λαβούσα παρά τοῦ ποιητοῦ, ὤσπερ οἱ τῆδε ύποκριταί τὰ προσωπεία, τὴν ἐσθῆτα, τοὺς κροκωτοὺς καὶ τὰ ράκη, ούτα καὶ ψυχὴ αὐτὴ τὰς τύχος ου λαβούσα είκη κατά λόγον δε και αδτασ και έναρμοσαμένη ταύτας σύμφωνος γίνεται καὶ συνέ ταξεν έαυτην τῷ δράματι καὶ τῷ λόγῳ παυτί. 40 είτα οίον φθέγγεται τὰς πράξεις και τὰ ἄλλα, ὅσα αν ψυχή κατά τρόπον του έαυτης ποιήσειεν, ώσπερ πινα ώδήν. Και ός δ φθόγγος και το σχήμα παρ' αὐτοῦ καλὸν ή αἰοχρὸν καὶ ή κόσμον προσέθηκεν, ώς δόξειεν αν, είς το ποίημα η προσθείς την αθτοῦ της φωι ης κάκην οὐκ ἐποίησε μεν το δρομα ἔτερον 45 ή οίον ήν, αὐτός δὲ ἀσχήμων ἐφάνη, δ δὲ ποιητής τοῦ δράματος ἀπέπεμψε κατ' αξίαν ἀτιμάσας καὶ τούτο ξργον ποιων άγαθου κριτου, τον δε ήγωνεν είς μείζους τιμάς καί, εί έχοι, έπὶ τὰ καλλίω δράματα, τὸν δ' ἔτερον, εἴ που είχε χείρονα, τοῦτον 50 του τρόπου εἰσελθυτοα εἰς τόδε τὸ πῶν ποίημα καὶ μέμος έαυτην ποιησαμένη τοῦ δράματος εἰς

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crimes, the other speaks and acts the opposite; for the actors, good and bad, existed before the play and bring their own selves to it. Now in human plays the author provides the words, but the actors, each and every one of them, are responsible by themselves and from themselves for the good or bad acting of their parts-for there is action, too, which is their business, following from the speeches written by the author; but in the truer poetic creation, which men who have a poetic nature imitate in part, the soul acts, receiving the part which it acts from the paet creator just as the actors here get their parts and their costumes, the saffron robes and the rags, so the soul, too, itself gets its fortunes, and not by random chance; these fortunes, too, are according to the rational principle; and by fitting these into the pattern it becomes in tune itself and puts itself into its proper place in the play and the universal rational pattern; then it makes its actions sound out, we may say, and everything else that a soul might produce according to its character, like a song. And as the sound of the voice and the gestures of the actor are beautiful or ugly as he makes them, and either adorn the poet's creation further, as one might think, or by adding the badness of the actor's own voice, do not make the play other than what it was, but the actor makes a grotesque exhibition of himself, and the author of the play sends him off in deserved disgrace behaving in this like a good judge of acting, but promotes the good actor to higher rank, and, if he has any, to finer playe, but pute the had actor into any werse play that he has, in this way the soul, coming on the stage in this universal poetic creation and

ύπόκρισιν τὸ εῦ ἢ τὸ κακῶς εἰσενεγκαμένη παρ αθτής καὶ έν τή εἰσόδω συνταχθείσα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα χωρίς έαυτής και των έργων αὐτή; λαβοῦσα δίκας τε καὶ τιμάς αὖ έχει. Πρόσεστι δέ τι τοῦς ύποκριταις άτε εν μείζονι τόπω ή κατά σκηνής 55 μέτρον ύποκρινομένοις, καὶ τοῦ ποιητοθ παντός τούτους τοιούντος κυρίους, καὶ δυνάμεως ούσης μείζονος έπι πολλά ιέναι είδη τόπων τιμάς καί άτιμίας δρίζουσι, κατά 1 το υσεπιλαμβάνειν καί αὐτοὺς ταῖς τιμαῖς καὶ ἀτιμίαις, άρμόζοντος 60 έκάστου τόπου τοῖς ἤθεσιν, ώς συμφωνεῖν τῷ τοῦ παντός λόγω, εναρμοζομένου κατά δίκην εκάπτου τοις μέμεσι τοις δεξομένοις, ώσπερ χορδής έκάστης είς του οίκεῖου καὶ προσήκοντα τότου ταττομένης κατα λόγον τὸν τοθ φθέγγεσθαι, ὑποῖόν ἐστιν αὐτῆ τὸ τῆς δυνάμεως εἰς τοῦτο. Καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ ὅλω 65 τὸ πρέπον καὶ τὸ καλόν, εἰ ἔκαστος οδ δεῖ τετάξεται φθεγγόμενος κακά ει τῷ σκότῳ καὶ τῷ ταρτάρῳ. ένταῦθα γὰρ καλὸν τὸ οὕ-ω φθέγγεσθαι· καὶ τὸ όλον τοῦτο καλόν, οὐκ εἰ Λίνος εἰη ἔκαστος, ἀλλ' εί τὸν φθόγγοι τὸν αὐτοῦ εἰσφερόμενος συντελεῖ είς μίαν άρμοτίαν ζωήν καὶ αύτὸς φωνων, ελάττω

κατά Harder, H S²· καὶ codd
 Λίνος Sieeman, H S λίθος codd

1 I accept, with Henry-Schwyzer and Beutler Theiler, the brilliant emendation of Electron (C. Q. 20, 1926, 153) Airos

ON PROVIDENCE (I)

making itself a part of the play, supplies of itself the good or the bad in its acting; it is put in its proper place on its entrance and receives everything except itself and its own works, and so is given punishments or rewards. But the actors [in the universal drama] have something extra, in that they act in a greater space than that within the limits of a stage, and the author makes them masters of the All, and they have a greater possibility of going to many kinds of places and determining honours and dishonours, as they contribute themselves to their honours and dis honours; for each place is fitted to their characters, so as to be in tune with the rational principle of the universe, since each individual is fitted in, according to justice, in the parts of the universe designed to receive him; just as each string is set in its own proper place according to the rational proportion which governs the sounding of notes, of whatever quality its power of producing a note is. For there is fitness and beauty in the whole only if each individual is stationed where he ought to be-the one who utters evil sounds in darkness and Tartarus: for there to make these sounds is beautiful; and this whole is beautiful, not if each is Linus 1 but if each by contributing his own sound helps towards the perfection of a single melody, himself, too, sounding the note of

for $\lambda \ell \theta_{05}$ because it seems to fit the context better. The idea is, clearly, that the universal melody needs had singers who make normble noises, as well as good ones, like the mythical Lit us, for its completion (contrast I. 6 [1] I, 26–30) But, as Cliento points out (see his rote ad loc), Plotinus is fond of the image of the 'dead stone' (cp. VI. 2 [48] 6, 8, VI. 5 [23] 11, 5–14) and $\lambda \ell \theta_{05}$ (all MSS and cp. Aeneas of Gaza, Theophrastus, p. 23, Boiss,) may be right.

70 δε και χείρω και άτελεστέραν. ώσπερ οὐδ' έν στριγγι φωνή μία, άλλα και έλάττων τις οδσα και αμυδρά πρός άρμονίαν της πάσης σύριγγος συντελεί, ότι μεμέρισται ή άρμοιία είς οὐκ ίσα μέρη κα. άνισοι μέν οι φθόγγοι πάντες, ο δε τέλεος είς έκ 75 πάντιου Καὶ δή καὶ δ λόγος ὁ πῶς είς, μεμέρωτα. δε ούκ είς ίσαι όθεν και του παντύς διάφοροι τοποι, βελτίους καὶ χείρους, καὶ ψυχαὶ οὐκ ἴσαι εναρμόττουσιν σύτω τοις ούκ ίσοις, και ούτω καί ένταθθα συμβαίνει καὶ τοὺς τόπους ἀνομοίους καὶ τως ψυχάς οὐ τὰς αὐτάς, ἀλλ' ἀνίσους ούσας καὶ 80 άνομοίους τους τόπους έχούσας, οίον κατά σύριγγος ή τωσε άλλου λργόνου αυσμοιότητας, έν τόποις [τε] 1 πρός άλληλα διαφέρουσω είναι καθ εκαστον τόπον τὰ αύτων συμφωνως καὶ τοῦς τόποις και τῷ ὅλω ὁθεγγομένας. Και τὸ κακῶς αθταίς εν καλώ κατά το πάν κείσεται και το παρά 85 φύσιν τῶ παντὶ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐδὲν ήττον φθόγγος ελάττων. 'Αλλ' οὐ χείρον πεποίηκε τὸ όλον ούτω φθεγγομένη, ωσπερ ούδε ο δήμιος πονηρός ών χείρω πεποιηκε την εύνομουμένην πόλω, εί δεί και άλλη χιήσθαι είκόνι. Δεί γάο

18. Χειρους δε καὶ βελτίους ψυχαὶ οἱ μεν καὶ δι' άλλας αἰτίας, αἱ δε οἱον εξ ἀρχῆς οὐ πᾶσαι ἴσαι τὰ λόγοι γὰρ καὶ αῦται τῷ λόγοι μέρη οὐκ ἴσα,

καί τούτου εν πόλει-δεί δε και άνθρώπου τοιούτου

πολλάκις-καὶ καλώς καὶ ούτος κείται.

1 76 cel Theder

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life, but a lesser, worse, and more incomplete life; just as in a pan pipe there is not one note only but a note which is weaker and duller contributes to the melody of the whole pan-pipe, because the melody is divided into parts which are not equal, and all the notes of the pipe are unequal, but the melody is complete, made up of all. So, too, the universal rational principle is one, but is divided into parts which are not equal; for this reason there are different regions of the universe, better and worse ones, and souls which are not equal fit in this way into unequal places; and so in the universe, too, it happens that there are places which are unlike each other and souls which are not the same but are unequal and occupy the unlike places, just like the unlikenesses of a pan-pipe or any other instrument, and are in places which differ from each other and in each place utter their own sounds in harmony with the places and with the whole. And their evil sounding singing will be beautifully disposed from the point of view of the All and their unnatural sounds will be for the All according to nature, and none the less, the sound itself will be worse. But it does not make the whole worse by making a sound like this, just as (if we should use another image as well) the public executioner, who is a scoundrel, does not make his well governed city worse For the executioner is needed in a cityand a man of his kind is often needed [for other purposes] and so he, too, is well placed.

18. But souls are better or worse, some from other causes and some because they were not all equal, as we may say, from the beginning; for they, too, in the same way as the rational principle, are unequal parts

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 2

ἐπείπερ διέστησαν. Χρὴ δὲ ἐνθυμεῖσθοι καὶ τὰ 5 δεύτερα καὶ τὰ τρίτα καὶ τὸ μὴ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ενεργεών ακί μέρεσι ψυχήν. 'Αλλά πάλω σπ καί ώδε λεκτέον πολλά γάρ επιποθεί είς σαφήνειαν δ λόγος. Μή γαρ οδδεν δεί επεισάγειν τοιούτους ύποκριτάς, οι άλλο τι φθέγγονται ή τὰ τοῦ ποιητοῦ, ὤσπερ ἀτελοῦς παρ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ δράματος 10 όντος αὐτοὶ ἀποπληροῦντες τὸ ἐλλεῖπον καὶ τοῦ ποιήσαντος δια μέσου κενούς ποιήσαντος [τούς] 1 τόπους, ώς των υποκριτών ούχ υποκριτών έσομένων, άλλα μέρος του τοιητού, και τροειδότος α φθέγξονται, εν' ούτω τὰ λοιπά συνείρων καὶ τὰ έφεξης οίος τε ή. Και γάρ τὰ έφεξης εν τῷ παντί 15 καὶ ἐπόμενα τοῖς κακοῖς τῶν ἔργων οἱ λόγοι καὶ κατά λόγον οξον έκ μοιχείας καὶ αἰχμαλώτου άγωγης παίδες κατά φύσιν καὶ βελτίους ἄνδρες, εἰ τόχοι, και πύλεις άλλαι άμείνους των πεπορθημένων ύπο άνδρων πονηρών. Εί οὖν ἄτοπος ή εισαγωγή τῶν ψυχῶι, αι δή 2 τὰ πονηρά, αι δὲ τὰ 20 χρηστά εργάσονται-άποστερήσομεν γάρ τον λόγον καὶ τῶν χρηστῶν ἀφαιροῦντες αὐτοῦ τὰ πονηρά τί κωλύει καὶ τὰ τῶν ὑποκριτῶν ἔργα μέρη ποιεῖν, ώσπερ του δραματος έκει, ούτω και του έν τψ παντί λόγου, καὶ ἐνταῦθα καὶ ιὸ καλῶς καὶ τὸ εναντίον, ώστε είς έκαστοι των ύποκριτών σύτω 25 παρ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ λόγου, ὄυψ τελειότερον τοῦτο τὸ

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as a consequence of their separation. But one must consider, too, the second and third parts of the soul, and the fact that soul is not always active in the same parts. But, again, on the other side we must say this too-the argument still needs a great deal more before it attains clearness. We ought certainly not to introduce actors of a kind who say something clse besides the words of the author, as if the play was incomplete in itself and they filled in what was wanting, and the writer had left blank spaces in the middle; the actors, then, would not be just actors but a part of the author, and an author who foreknew what they were going to say, so that he might in this way be able to bring the rest of the play and the consequences of their interventions into a coherent whole. For certainly in the All the rational principles bring into a connected whole the consequences and results which follow upon those deeds which are evil, and do so rationally; for instance, from adultery, or the carrying off of a captive, children may come according to nature and better men, it may happen, and other better cities than those sacked by wicked men. If, then, it is absurd to bring in souls, some of which do the wicked deeds in the world, and some the goodfor we shall deprive the rational principle of the good deeds too, if we take the wicked ones away from itwhat prevents us from making the deeds of the actors parts, as they are of the play in our example, so also of the rational principle in the universe, and attributing good performance and the opposite to it, so that in this way it comes to each individual actor from the rational principe itself—and all the more in proportion as this play is more perfect, and every-

¹ τούς in A expunctum dei. Volkmann 2 δη Kirchhoff, H-S: δε cedd

PLOTINUS FNNEAD III. 2.

δράμα καὶ πάντα παρ' αὐτοῦ; 'Αλλὰ τὸ κακὰν ποιῆσαι ἴνα τί, καὶ αὶ ψυχαὶ δὲ οὐδὲν ἔτι ἐν τῷ παντὶ αἱ θειότεραι, ἀλλὰ μέρη λόγου πῶσαι; καὶ ἢ οἱ λόγοι πάντες ψυχαί, ἢ διὰ τί οἱ μὲν ψυχαί, οἱ δὲ λόγοι μόνον παντὸς ψυχῆς τινος ὅντος;

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thing comes from it? But what is the point of doing evil? And do the diviner souls count for nothing any more in the universe, but are all of them parts of the rational principle? And are all rational principles souls, or why are some souls and some only rational principles, when every one of them belongs to some soul?

ΙΙΙ. 3. (48) ΠΕΡΙ ΠΡΟΝΟΙΑΣ ΔΕΥΤΈΡΟΝ

1. Τί τοίνυν δοκεί περί τούτων, "Η καὶ τὰ πονηρά καὶ τὰ χρηστά λόγος περιείληφεν ὁ πᾶς, οδ μέρη και ταθτα: οὐ γὰρ ὁ πᾶς λόγος γεννῦ γαθτα, άλλ' ό πᾶς έστι μετά τούτων Ψηχής γάρ 5 τινος πάσης ένέργεια οἱ λόγοι, τῶν δὲ μερῶν τὰ μέρη· μιᾶς δὲ διάφορα έχούσης μέρη ἀνὰ λόγον καὶ οἱ λόγοι, ώστε καὶ τὰ έργα έσχατα όντι γεννήματα. Σίμφωνοι δε αι τε ψυχαί πρός άλλήλας τά τε έργα· σύμφωνα δὲ ούτως, ώς εν εξ αὐτών, καὶ εἰ ἐξ ἐναντίων. Ἐκ γὰρ ἐνός τινος 10 δομηθέντα, πάντα els έν συνέρχεται φύσεως ανάγκη, ώστε και διάφορα εκφύντα και εναντία γενόμενα τῷ ἐξ ένὸς είναι συνέλκεται ὅμως εἰς σύντιξω μίαν ὤσπερ γαρ καὶ ἐφ' ἐκάστων ζώων ἐν ιππων γένος,1 καν μάχωνται καν δάκνωσιν άλλήλους καν φιλονεικώσι καν ζήλω θιμώνται, και τα άλλα 15 καθ' εν γένη ώσαύτως καὶ δὴ οῦτα καὶ ἀνθρώπους θετέου. Συναπτέου τοίνυι αὖ πάλιν πάντα τὰ είδη ταθτα είς εν «τὸ ζώον» γένος· είτα καὶ τὰ

ι έν ἴνπων γένος MacKenna, Cilento, Η S³. ἐι ἴνπων γένει codd

III 3. ON PROVIDENCE (II)

1 What, then, do we think about these questions? Now the universal rational principle includes both good and evil things; evil things are parts of it too It is not that the universal rational principle produces them but that it is the universal principle with them included. The rational principles are an activity of an universal soul, and their parts of soulparts; but, as the one soul has differing parts, so correspondingly do the rational principles differ, with the result that the works also differ which are their ultimate products. The souls and the works are in harmony with each other; in harmony in such a way that a unity comes from them, even if it is a unity produced from opposites. For all things sprung from a unity come together into a unity by natura. necessity, so that, though they grow out different and come into being as opposites they are, all the same, drawn together into a single common order by the fact that they come from a unity. For, just as in the case of particular kinds of living creatures there is one genus of horses, even if they fight and nite each other, and are pugnacious and foriously jealous, and the same applies to all the other individual genera, so, certainly, men must be considered like this too. Then again, all these kinds must be brought together under the one genus 'living creature"; then also the things which are not living creatures must be μή ζῷα κατ' είδη αδ' είτα είς έν « τό μὴ ζῷον » είτα όμοῦ, εἰ βούλει, εἰς τὸ εἰναι εἰτα εἰς τὸ παρέχον το εἰναι. Καὶ τάλιν ἐπὶ τούτω ἐκδήσας 20 κατάβαινε διαιρῶν καὶ σκιδνάμενον τὸ εν ὁρῶν τῷ ἐπὶ πάντα φθάνειν καὶ ὁμοῦ περιλαμβάνειν συντάξει μιᾳ, ὡς διακεκριμένον εν εἰναι ζῷον πολὰ ἐκάστοι πράττοντος τῶν ¹ ἐι αὐτῷ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἐαυτοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ὅλῳ ὅμως ὅντος, οἶον πυρὸς μὲν καίοντος Σὅ ἔπτου τὰ ἔππου ἔργα, ἄνθρωποι δὲ τὰ αὐτῶν ἔκαστοι ἢ πεφύκασι καὶ διάφορα οἱ διάφοροι. Και ἔπεται κατὰ τὰς φύσεις καὶ τὰ ἔργα καὶ τὸ ζῆν τὸ εὖ καὶ τὸ κακῶς.

λ. Αί δὲ συντυχίαι οὐ κύριαι τοῦ εὖ, ἀκολουθοῦσι δὲ καὶ αὖται συμφώνως τοῖς πρὸ αὐτῶν καὶ ἴασιν ἀκολουθίᾳ ¹ ἐμπλεκεῖσαι. Συμπλέκει δὲ πάντα το ἡγούμενον συμφερομένων τῶν ἐφ' ἐκάτερα κατὰ ὁ φἰσιν, οἰον ἐν στρατηγίαις ἡγουμένου μὲν τοῦ στρατηγοῦ, συμπνεόντων δὲ τῶν συντεταγμένων. Ἐπάχθη δὲ τὸ πῶν προνοίᾳ στρατηγικῆ ὁρώση καὶ τὰς πράξεις καὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ ἃ δεῖ παρεῖναι, σιτία καὶ ποτὰ καὶ δὴ καὶ ὅπλα πάντα καὶ μηχανήματα, καὶ ὅσα ἐξ αὐτῶν συμπλεκομένων προεώρα-10 ται, ἴνα τὸ ἐκ τούτων συμβαῖνον ἔχη χώραν τοῦ

classed by their kinds, and then included in the one genus "non-living"; then both together, if you like, must be included in being; and then in that which makes being possible. Then, having attached everything to this, go down again, dividing and seeing the one dispersed by reaching to al. things and including them together in a single common order, so that it is a single multiplex hving thing with distinct parts, and each of the things in it acts according to its own nature while being all the same in the whole, for instance, fire burns, a horse does the things which belong to a horse, and individual men do their own things in the way in which they have been disposed by nature, and different men different things. And what is done, and hving well or badly, follows according to their natures.

2. Chance circumstances are not responsible for the good life, but they, too, follow harmoniously on the causes before them, and proceed woven into the chain of causation by so following. The ruling principle weaves all things together, while individual things co-operate on one side or the other according to their nature, as in military commands the general gives the lead and his subordinates work in unity with him. The universe is ordered by the general-ship of providence which sees the actions and experiences and what must be ready to hand, food and drink, and all weapons and devices as well; everything which results from their interweaving is foreseen, in order that this result may have room to be

¹ των Creuzer· την cold 2 άκολουθία Kirchhoff, Η -52: ἀκολουθία cold.

The source of this inditary analogy for the cosmic order is Aristotle, Metaphysics A 1075a, 13 ff.; op the pseudo-Aristotelian De Mundo 399b, 3 ff., for a rhetorical elaboration of it.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 3

τεθή αι εδ, καὶ ἐλήλιθε πάντα τρόπον τινὰ εδμήχανον παρὰ τοῦ στρατηγοί, καιτοι ἔξωθεν ην ὅσα ἔμελλον δράσειν οἱ ἐναντίοι Εἰ δὲ οἰόν τε ην κἀκείνου ἄρχειν τοῦ στρατοπέδου, εἰ δὲ δη ὁ μέγας ἡγεμῶν εἴη, δφ' ῷ ποντα, τὶ αν ἀσύντακ-

15 τον, τί δε ούκ αν συνηρμοσμένον είη;

3. Καὶ γὰρ « εἰ ἐγω κύριος τοῦ τάδε ἐλέσθαι ἢ τάδε »; ᾿Αλλ' ἃ ¹ αἰρήσει συντέτακται, ὅτι μὴ ἐπεισόδιον τὸ σὸν τῷ παιτί, ἀλλ' ἠρίθμησαι ὁ τοιόσδε. ᾿Αλλὰ πόθεν ὁ τοιόσδε; Ἔστι δὴ δύο, α 5 ὁ λόγος ζητεῖ, το μέν, εἰ ἐπὶ τὸν ποιήσαντα, εἴ τις ἐστίν, ἀνενεγκεῖν δεῖ τοῦ ποιοῦ τοῦ ἐν τοῖς ἤθεσιν ἐκάστου τὴν πὶτίαι ἢ ἐπὶ τὸ γειόμενον αὐτό· ἢ ὅλως οὐκ αὐτιατέον, ὤσπερ οὐδὲ ἐπὶ φυτῶν γενέσεως, ὅτι μὴ αἰσθάνεται, ἢ ἐπὶ ζώων τῶν ἄλλων, ὅτι μὴ ώς ἄνθρωποι ἔχουσι· ταὶτὸν γὰρ τούτω « διὰ τί ἄνθρωποι οὐχ ὅπερ θεοι; » Διὰ τί θ γὰρ ἐνταῦθα οὕτε αὐτὰ οῦτε τὸν ποιήσαντα εὐλόγως αἰτιώμεθα, ἐπὶ δὲ ἀνθρώπων, ὅτι μὴ κρειττον ἢ τοῦτο; Εἰ μὲν γάρ, ὅτι ἐδινατο τουτο κάλλιον εἶναι, εἶ μὲν παρ' αὐτοῦ προστιθέντος τι

¹ ἀλλ' α Harder, H-S: ἀλλα codd.

ON PROVIDENCE (II)

well placed, and all things come in a well planned way from the general though what his enemies planned to do is out of his control. But if it was possible for him to command the enemy force as well, if he was really "the great leader" to whom all things are subject, what would be unordered, what

would not be fitted into his plan?

3. Suppose you say " I have power to choose this or that '? But the things that you will choose are included in the universal order, because your part is not a mere casual interlude in the All but you are counted in as just the person you are. But for what reason is a man the sort of person he is? There are two questions which the argument seeks to settle here, one, whether the blame should rest on the maker, if there is one, who determined the moral character of the in dividual, or on the being which has come into existence itself: 2 rather, we should not attribute blame at all, just as there is no blame attaching to the production of plants because they have no sense-perception, nor in the case of the other animals because they are not like men; to blame anvone for this would be the same as asking, "Why are men not what gods are?" Why then, where plants and animals are concerned, is it unreasonable for us to blame them or their creator, but reasonable in the case of mer, because man is not a better thing than he is? For if it is because he was able to be something nobler than he is, if he was able to add

raised by the presence of had men in a divinely ordered universe what Place is, this is no doubt because of the containes of debate about Providence which came between him and his master

² Plato, Phaedrus 246E4.

² Cp. Plate's treatment of the same question in Laws X. 904B-C. Plotinus here, at the end of the enapter gives the same answer as Plato, that the harm should fall upon individual men, not on their Maker; but he shows himself, here as elsewhere, a good deal more conscious of the lifficulties

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III 3.

eis τὸ κρείττοι, αὐτὸς αἴτως έαιτῷ ὁ μὴ ποιήσας. ει δὲ μὴ παρ' αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ ἔδει ἔξωθεν προσείναι 15 παρά του γεννητού, άτοπος ο τὸ πλέον άπαιτων τοῦ δοθέντος, ώσπερ εί και έπι τῶν ἄλλων ζώων άπαιτοι καὶ τῶν φυτῶν. Δει γὰρ οὐ ζητείν, εἰ έλαττον άλλου, άλλ' εί ώς αὐτό αὐτάρκως οὐ γὰρ πάντα ἴσα ἔδει. *Αρ' οὖν μετρήσαντος αὐτοῦ 20 προαιρέσει του μή δείν πάντα ίσα; Ουδαμώς. άλλ' ούτω κατά φύσω είχε γενέσθαι. 'Ακόλουθος γάρ οδτος δ λόγος ψυχή άλλη, ἀκόλυυθος δὲ ψυχή αύτη νω, νους δέ οι τουτων τι έν, άλλα πάντα. τὰ δὲ πάντα πολλά· πολλά δὲ ὄντα καὶ οὐ ταὐτὰ τὰ μέν πρώτα, τὰ δὲ δεύτερα, τὰ δὲ ἐφεξής καὶ 25 τη άξια εμελλεν είναι. Και τοίνυν και τὰ γενόμενα ζωα οὐ ψυχαὶ μόνον, ἀλλὰ ψυχῶν ἐλαττώσεις, οἶον εξίτηλον ήδη προιόντων. 'Ο γάρ τοῦ ζώου λόγος. καν εμψυγος ή, ετέρα ψυχή, οὐκ εκείνη, ἀφ' ής δ λόγος, καὶ ὁ σύμπας οὖτος ἐλάττων δὴ γίνεται σπεύδων είς ύλην, και το γειόμενον εξ αύτο? 30 ενδεέστερον. Σκόπει δη δσον αφέστηκε το γενόμενον και όμως έστι θαθμα. Οὐ τοίνυν, εἰ τοιούτον τὸ γενόμενον, καὶ τὸ πρὸ αὐτοῦ τοιούτον

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something to make himself better, he is responsible to himself for not doing it; but if it was not from himself that the addition had to come but it was necessary for it to come from outside, from his producer, then it is absurd to ask for more than was given, as it would be in the case of the other animals and of plants. For one ought not to enquire whether one thing is less than another but whether it s, as itself, sufficient; for all things ought not to have been equal. Is this then so, because the creator measured them out with the deliberate intention that all things ought not to be equal? Not at all; but it was according to nature for things to come about so. For the rational forming principle of this universe follows upon another soul and this soul follows upon Intellect, and Intellect is not some one of the things here but all things; but all things means many things; but if there are many things, and not the same, some of them were going to be first, some second, and some of successive lower ranks, in value too. Then, again, the living creatures which have come into being are not only souls but diminutions of souls, a kind of fading away as the living things move on further from their origins. For the formative principle of the living thing, even if it is ensouled, is another soul, not that from which the formative principle comes, and this whole principle becomes less as it hastens to marter, and that which comes into being from it is more deficient. See how far what has come into being stands from its origin, and yet, it is a wonder! If, then, that which has come into being is of a particular kind, it does not follow that what is before it is also of that kind. for

έστι γάρ παντος κρείττον τοῦ γενομένου καὶ έξω αίτίας και μάλλοι θαυμάσαι, ότι έδωκέ τι μετ' αὐτό καὶ τὰ ἔχνη αὐτοῦ τοιαῦτα. Εί δὲ δή καὶ 35 τλέον έδωκεν η όσον έχουσι κτήσασθαι, έτι μάλλον αποδεκτέον. ώστε κινδυνεύεις την αιτίαν έπι τους γενομένους λέναι, τὸ δὲ τῆς πρανοιας μειζόνως $\tilde{\epsilon}_{\chi} \in \omega$.

4. Απλού μεν ναο όντος του ανθρώπου λέγω δὲ ἀπλοθ ώς τοθτο δ πεποίηται μόνον ὅντος καὶ κατά ταθτα ποιούντος και πάσχοντος-άπην αίτία ή κατά την επιτίμησιν, ώσπερ επί των ζώων των 5 άλλων. Νύν δε άνθρωτος μόνον εν ψόγω ό κακος καὶ τοῦτο ἴσως εὐλόγως. Οὐ γαρ μόνον ὁ πεποίηταί ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ἔχει ἀρχην ἄλλην ἐλευθέραν οἰκ έξω της προνοίας ούσαν ούδε του λόγου του όλου. ου γάρ απήρτηται έκεινα τούτων, άλλ' έπιλάμπει τὰ κρείττω τοῖς χείροσι καὶ ή τελεία πρόνοια 10 τουτο· καὶ λόγος ὁ μὰν ποιητικός, ὁ δὲ συνάπτων τὰ κρείττω τοῖς γενομένοις, κάκεῖνα πρόνοια ή άνωθεν, ή δε άπὸ της άνω, ὁ έτερος λόγος συνημμένος ἐκείνω, καὶ γίνεται ἐξ ἀμφοῖν πῶν πλέγμα καὶ πρόνοια ἡ πᾶσα. ᾿Αρχὴν μὲν οὐν ἔχουσιν άλλην άνθρωποι, οὐ πάντες δε πάσιν οἷς έχουσι 15 γρώνται, άλλ' οἱ μέν τῆ έτέρα, οἱ δὲ τῆ ἐτέρα ἢ ταις έτέραις ταις χείροσι χράνται. Πάρεισι δέ

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it is better than all that has come into being, and beyond blame; one should rather wonder at it be cause it has given something [to what comes] after it and its traces are of such a quality. But if indeed it has given more than they are able to appropriate, it ought to be approved still more; so that it seems likely that blame should fall upon the men who have come into being, and that what belongs to providence is on a higher level.

4. For if man was simple I mean, simple in the some that he was nothing but what he was made and his actions and experiences corresponded to this there would be no blame in the sense of moral reproach, just as there is none in the case of other living creacures. But, as it is, man, the bad man, is un iquely subject to blame, perhaps reasonably. For he is not only what he was made but has another free principle, which is not outside providence or the rational principle of the whole; for those higher principles are not separated from these here but the better ill inninate the worse, and this is perfect providence: and here is one rational principle which is creative, and anothe which connects the better principles with the things which have come into being, and those higher principles are providence which acts from above, but there is another providence derived from that which is above, the other rational principle connected with that higher one, and the whole interweaving and total providence results from both. So then, men have another principle, but not all men use all that they have but some use one principle, some the other, or rather a number of others, the worse ones. But those higher

κάκειναι ούκ ένεργοθσαι είς αὐτούς, οὔ τι γε αὐταὶ άργδύσαι τραττει γὰρ ἔκαστον τὸ ἐαυτοῦ. 'Αλλ' είς τούτους οὐκ ένεργοισιν αιτια τίνος, είποι τις αν, παρούσαι; "Η οὐ πάρεισι; Καιτοι πάντη 20 φαμέν παρείναι καὶ οὐδέν ἔρημον. "Η οὐ τούτοις, έν οίς μή είς αυτούς ένεργει. Διά τί ούν ούκ ένεργεί είς πάντας, είπερ μέρη και ταθτα αὐτῶν; Λέγω δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν τὴν τοιαύτην. Ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ των άλλων ζώων ούκ αὐτων ή άρχη αὕτη, ἐπὶ δὲ 25 ανθρώπων ούκ έπὶ πανταν. "Αρ' ούν ούκ έπὶ πάντων οὐ μόνον ἥδε; 'Αλλὰ διὰ τί οὐ μόνη; 'Εφ' ὧν δὲ μόνη, καὶ κατὰ ταύτην τὸ ζῆν, τὰ δ' άλλα οσοι άνάγκη. Είτε γάρ ή συσπασις τοιαύτη, ώς οίον είς θολερον εμβάλλεν, είτε επιθυμίαι κρατούσιν, όμως ανάγκη λέγειν έν τῷ ὑποκειμένω 30 τὸ αἴτιον εἶναι. ᾿Λλλὰ πρῶτον μέν δόξει οὐκέτι έν τῷ λόγω, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἐν τῆ ἔλη, καὶ ἡ ὅλη, ούχ ο λόγος κρατήσει, είτα το ύποκείμενον ώς πέπλασται. "Η το ύποκείμενον τῆ ἀρχῆ ὁ λόγος έστι και τὸ έκ τοῦ λόγου γενόμενον και ον κατά τον λόγον άστε ούχ ή ύλη κρατήσει, είτα ή πλάσις. Καὶ τὸ τοιόνδε είναι ἐπὶ τὴν προτέραν

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principles are there, but not acting upon them, though certainly not inactive in themselves; for each one of them does its own work But, someone might say, what is to blame for their not working on these men when they are present? Or are they not present? But we assert that they are present everywhere and nothing is deprived of them. Surely they are not present in those people on whom they do not act. Why, then, do they not act upon all, if these, too, are parts of them?—I mean the principle of this higher kind. As far as the other living creatures are concerned, this principle is not their own; as for men, it does not act on all of them. Is this then not the only principle which does not act on all? But why should it not be the only one? But in those in whom it is the only one, their life is conformed to it, and the other forces only enter into it as far as necessity requires. For whether the man's constitution is of a kind to plunge him, so to speak, into troubled waters, or his lusts dominate him, it is alike mecessary to say that the cause lies in the sub stratum. But at first this would appear to mean that the cause is no more in the rational principle, but rather in the matter, and the matter, not the rational principle will be dominant, and the substrate in so far as it is formed will come second to it. In fact, the substrate to the free principle is the rational form, and that which has come into existence from the rational form and exists according to it; so that the matter will not be deminant and the formation come second. Further, one might refer the being

of and dominated by the order of the physical universe; ep II 3 [52] 15, 17 f.

¹ This brings out clearly an important point in the psychology of Plotinus, that the duality or cleavage in man is for him not between matter and spirit, or even body and soul, bit between higher and lower self cp. I 1 [53] 10, II. 9 [33] 2, IV. 4 [28] 18, VI. 4 [22] 14-15 Free will can only be exercised by the true, higher self in so far as it transcends and makes itself independent of the lower "temposite" self, which is part

30 βιστήν ἀνάγοι τις, οἶον γινομένου ἐκ τῶν προτέρων άμυδροῦ ὡς πρὸς τὸν πρὸ αὐτοῦ τοῦ λόγου, οἶον ψυχης ασθενεστέρας γενομένης υστερον δε καί έκλάμψει. Καὶ ὁ λόγος δε λεγέσθω έγειν καὶ τον λόγον αὖ ἐν αὐτῷ τῆς ὕλης, ἡν αὐτῷ ἐργάσεται 40 ποιώσας καθ' αδιδν ιήν ύλην ή ούμφωνον εδρών. Οὐ γὰρ ὁ τοῦ βοὸς λόγος ἐπ' ἄλλης η βοὸς ὕλης. όθει καὶ εἰς τὰ ἄλλα ζῶά φησι εἰσκρίνεσθαι οἶον άλλης της ψυχής γενομένης και έτεροιωθέντος του λόγου, ΐνα γένηται ψιχή βρός, ή πρότερου ήν αιθρωτος ωστε κατά δίκην ό χείρων. 'Αλλ' έξ 45 άρχης δια τί ο χείρων εγένετο και πως εσφάλη: Πολλάκις είρηται, ώς οὐ πρώτα πάντα, άλλ' ὅσα δεύτερα καὶ τρίτα έλάττω τὴν φύσιν τῶι πρὸ αὐτῶν ἔχει, κοὶ σμικρὰ ροπή ἀρκεῖ εἰς ἔκβασιν τοῦ ὀρθοῦ. Καὶ ἡ συμπλοκὴ δὲ ἡ πρὸς ἄλλο άλλου ώσπερ τις σύγκρασίς έστιν, έτέρου έξ 50 αμφοῦν γενομένου, καὶ οὐκ ὄντος ἡλάττωσεν άλλὶ έγένετο έξ άρχης έλαττον το έλαττον και έστιν δ έγένετο κατά φύσιν την αὐτοῦ ἔλαττον, καί, εἰ τὸ ἀκόλουθοι πάσχει, πάσχει τὸ κατ' ἀξιαν. Καὶ εἰς τὰ προβεβιωμένα δὲ ἀναπέμπειν δεί τὸν λογισμὸν ώς κάκειθεν ήρτημένων των έφεξης.

5. Ι΄νεται τοίνυν ή πρόνοια έξ άρχης εἰς τέλος κατιοῦσα ἄνωθεν οὐκ ἔση οἷον κατ' ἀριθμόι, ἀλλὰ

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this or that kind of man to the previous life, as if the rational principle became dim in comparison to that prior to it as the result of previous happenings, as if the soul had become weaker; but it will shine out again later. And the rational principle must be said to contain within itself the rational principle of the matter as well, the matter which it will make suitable for itself, either giving it qualities corresponding to itself or finding it already consonant. For the rational principle of an ox does not impose itself on any other matter than that of an ox. Hence, Plato says 1 that the soul enters into other living beings, in the sense that the soul becomes different and the rational principle is altered, in order that what was formerly the soul of a man may become the soul of an ox; so that the worse being is justly dealt with. But how did he originally become worse, and how did he fall? It has often been said that all things are not of the first rank but all things which are second and third class have a lesser nature than those before them, and a light tilting of the balance is enough to turn them out of the right way. And the interweaving of one thing with another is like a sort of mixture; another thing results from both, and the interweaving does not diminish a thing's being; but the inferior became inferior from its beginning, and is what it became, inferior by its nature, and, if it suffers the consequences of its inferiority, it suffers what it deserves. And one must carry back the reckoning to what happened in previous lives, because what happens afterwards depends on that too.

5. Providence, then, which in its descent from above reaches from the beginning to the end, is not

κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἄλλη ἐν ἄλλω τόπω, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ ζώου ένος είς έσχατον είζ άρχης ηρτημένου, 5 έκαστου το οίκειον έχοντος, του μέν βελτίονος το βέλτιον της ένεργείας, τοῦ δέ πρός το κάτω ήδη ένεργούντος τε του αὐτού και πάσχοντος τὰ όσα αὐτῷ οἰκεῖα παθήματα πρὸς αὐτό τε καὶ προς τὴν σύνταξιν την προς άλλο. Και δη και ούτωσι πληγέντα ούτως εφθέγξατο τὰ φιννήεντα, τὰ δὲ 10 σιωπή πάσχει καὶ κινείται τὰ ἀκόλουθα, καὶ ἐκ των φθύγγων άπαντων και έκ των παθημάτων και ενεργημάτων μία τοῦ ζώου οδον φωνή και ζωή καὶ βίος καὶ γὰρ καὶ τὰ μόρια διάφορα ὅντα καὶ διάφορον την ενέργειαν έχοντα: άλλο γάρ ποιούσι πόδες, ἀφθαλμοί δ' ἄλλο, διάνοια δὲ ἄλλο καὶ νοῦς 15 άλλο. Εν δὲ ἐκ πάντων καὶ πρόνοια μία: είμαρμένη δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ χείρονος ἀρξαμένη, τὸ δὲ ὑπεράνω πρόνοια μόνον. Τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ τῷ νοητώ πάντα λόγος καὶ ὑπὲρ λόγον νοῦς γάρ καὶ ψυχή καθαρά το δε εντείθεν ήδη όσον μεν έρχεται έκείθεν, πρόνοια, καὶ όσον έν ψυχή καθερά 20 καὶ δσον ἐντεῦθεν εἰς τὰ ζῶα. Έρχεται δὲ μεριζόμενος δ λόγος οὐκ ἴσα· ὅθεν οὐδ' ἴσα ποιεῖ, ώσπερ καὶ ἐν ζώω ἐκάστω. Τὸ δὲ ἐντεῦθεν ήδη ακόλουθα μέν τα δρώμενα και προνοιά επόμενα, εί τις δρώη θεοις φίλα. ήν γὰρ θεοφιλής ὁ λόγος

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equal as in a numerical distribution but differs in different places according to a law of correspondence, just as in a single living creature, which is dependent on its principle down to its last and lowest part, each part having its own, the better part having the better part of the activity, and that which is at the lower imit still active in its own way and undergoing the experiences which are proper to it as regards its own rature and its co-ordination with anything else. Yes, and if the parts are struck in a particular way, the speaking parts give out a corresponding sound, and others receive the blow in silence and make the movements which result from it; and from all the sounds and passive experiences and activities come a kind of single voice of the living creature, a single life and way of living, for the organs are different and have activities which are different; for the feet do one thing, the eyes another, the discursive reason one thing and the intuitive intellect another. But one thing results from all, and there is one providence; but it is " fate " beginning from the lower level; the upper is providence alone.1 For in the intelligible world all things are rational principle and above rational principle; for all are intellect and pure soul; what comes from there, all that comes from intellect, is providence, both all that is in pure soul and all that comes from it to hving things. But the rational principle as it comes is divided into unequal parts; hence the things it does are not equal either. as also in each individual living creature. From this point the things which are done are consequences. and follow upon providence if a man does things which are pleasing to the gods; for the rational forming

This distinction between higher providence and lower fate is common in Middle Platonism, op. Pseudo-Platonih, De Fato 9, 572F-573B; Apuleius, De Platone I. 12, and C de Vogel, Greek Philosophy III. 1279d (p. 343)

1 τομής Creuzer, H-S: τόλμης codd

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principle of providence is dear to the gods. Then, too, these kind of actions [the kind which cause our difficulties about providence, i.e. evil actions] are linked up with the good ones, but they are not done by providence but the things which have happened, whether they have happened as a result of human action or of the action of anything else, living or lifeless, if anything which follows from them is good, are taken up again by providence, so that virtue has everywhere the mastery, and the things which have gone wrong are charged and corrected, as in a single body, where health is given by the providence of the living thing, when a cut or injury of any kind occurs, the directing rational principle again afterwards joins it and closes the wound and heals and sets right the suffering part. So the evil deeds are consequences, but follow from necessity; they come from us (i.e. we cause them), and we are not compelled by providence but we connect them, of our own accord, with the works of providence or works derived from providence, but are not able to link up what follows according to the will of providence but do so according to the will of the people who art or according to something else in the universe, which itself is acting or producing some effect in us in a way not according to the will of providence For everything does not always produce the same effect when it encounters everything else, but it produces the same effect when it encounters one thing and a different effect when it encounters another; as, for instance, the beauty of Helen produced one effect on Pans, but Idomeneus was not affected in the same way; and when one thoroughly dissolute man happens upon

¹ For Idomeneus, a frequent visitor to the house of Menelaus who did not seduce Helen, see Inad III. 230 233

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καλός καλῷ συμπεσων ἄλλο, ὁ δὲ σωφρων καλὸς 45 ἄλλο πρὸς σώφρονα τοιοῦτον ἢ τρὸς ἀκόλαστον ἄλλο ὁ αὐτός, ὁ δ΄ ἀκόλαστον πρὸς αὐτὸι ἄλλο. Καὶ παρὰ μὲν τοῦ ἀκολάστου τὸ πραχθὲν οὔτε ὑπὸ προνοίας οὔτε κατὰ πρόνοιαν, τὸ δ΄ ὑτὸ τοῦ σώφρονος ἔργον οὐχ ὑπὸ προνοίας μέν, ὅτι ὑπὰ αὐτοῦ, κατὰ πρόνοιαν δέ σύμφωνον γὰρ τῷ λόγῳ, 50 ἄσπερ καὶ ὁ ὑγιεινῶς πράξειεν ἄν τις αὐτὸς πραξας κατὰ λόγον τὸν τοῦ ἰατροῦ. Τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ ὁ ἰατρὸς παρὰ τῆς τέχνης ἐδίδου εἴς τε τὸ ὑγιαῖνον εἴς τε τὸ κάμνον 'Ο δ' ἄν τις μὴ ὑγιαῖνον ποιῆ, αὐτός τε ποιεῖ καὶ παρὰ τὴν πρόνοιαν τοῦ ἰατροῦ εἰργάσατο.

6. Πόθεν οὖν καὶ τὰ χειρω μάντεις προλέγουσι καὶ εἰς τὴν τοῦ παντὸς φορὰν ὁρῶντες πρὸς ταῖς ἄλλαις μαντείαις προλέγουσι ταῦτα; "Η δῆλον ὅπ τῷ συμπεπλέχθαι πάντα τὰ ἐναντία, οῖον τὴν τ μορφὴν καὶ τὴν ὕλην οἶον ἐπὶ ζώου συνθετον ὅντος ὅ τι τὴν μορφὴν καὶ τὸν λόγον θεωρῶν καὶ τὸ μεμορφωμένον θεωρεῖ. Οὐ γὰρ ώσαὐτως ζῷον νοητὸν καὶ ζῷον σίνθετον θεωρεῖ, ἀλλὰ λόγον ζῷοι ἐν τῷ συνθέτω μορφοῦντα τὰ χείρω. Ζῷον δὴ ὄντος τοῦ παντὸς ὁ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ γινόμενα

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another, and both are beautiful, the effect is different from what follows when one chaste beauty meets another; and something different again happens to the chaste beauty when he meets the dissolute man, and again something different to the dissolute one when he meets the chaste. And the action which proceeds from the dissolute man is done neither by providence nor according to providence, but what is done by the chaste man is not done by providence, because it is done by the man himself, but is done according to providence: for it is in tune with the rational principle, just as, too, what a man might do to promote his health would be his own action according to the rational plan of his doctor. For this is what the doctor prescribed, from the resources of his skill, both in health and sickness. But whatever anyone does that is unhealthy, he does it himself and it is an act which goes against the providence of the doctor.

6. What is the reason, then, that diviners foretell the worse sort of actions, and by looking at the circuit of the heavens foretell these as well as their other prophecies? Obviously because all opposites are entwined together, form and matter, for instance; as, for example, in the case of a living thing which is composite, one who in any way contemplates the form and the rational principle also contemplates the formed thing. For he does not contemplate an intelligible living thing and a composite living thing in the same way, but in the composite he contemplates the rational principle of the bying thing forming what is worse. Now, since the universe is a living thing one who contemplates the things which come to be

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10 θεωρών θεωρεί άμα καὶ έξ ών έστι καὶ την πρόνοιαν την επ' αὐτώ: τέταται δη επι πάντα καὶ τὰ γινόμενα τὰ δ' ἐστὶ καὶ ζῷα καὶ πράξεις αὐτῶν καὶ διαθέσεις κραθείσα, λόγφ καὶ ἀνάγκη μεμιγμέναι μεμιγμένα οδυ θεωρεί και διηνεκώς μιννύμενα καὶ διακρίνειν μεν αὐτός οὐ δύναται 15 πρόνοιαν και το κατά πρόνοιων χωρίς και αδ το ύποκείμενον όσα δίδωσιν είς τὸ [ὑποκείμενον] 1 παρ' αὐτοῦ. 'Αλλ' οὐδὲ ἀνδρὸς τοῦτο ποιεῖν ἢ σοφοῦ τινος καὶ θείου ή θεός αν έγοι, φαίη τις αν, τοθτο τὸ γέρας. Καὶ γάρ οὐ τοῦ μάντεως τὸ διοτι, άλλα το ότι μόνον είπειν, και ή τέχνη άνάγνωσις φυσικών γραμμώτων και τάξι δηλούν-20 των και ούδαμού πρός το άτακτον αποκλινόντων, μάλλοι δὲ κατομαρτυρούσης τῆς φοράς καὶ είς φως άγούσης και πρίν παρ' αύτων φανήναι, οίος έκαστος καὶ όσα. Συμφέρεται γάρ καὶ ταῦτα έκείνοις κάκεινα τούτοις συντελουντα αμα πρός σύστασιν καὶ ἀιδιότητα κόσμου, ἀναλογία δὲ 25 σημαίνοντα τὰ ἄλλα τῶ τετηρηκότι· ἐπεὶ καὶ αἰ άλλαι μαντικαί τῷ ἀναλόγω. Οὐ γὰρ ἔδει ἀπηρτησθαι άλληλων τὰ πάντα, ώμοιῶσθαι δὲ πρός άλληλα άμηγέπη. Καὶ τοῦτ' αν ίσως είη τὸ λεγόμενον ώς συνέχει τὰ πάντα ἀναλογία. "Εστι

1 prokeinevov del Brehier, H-S2.

ON PROVIDENCE (II)

in it contemplates at the same time its origins and the providence which watches over it; this certainly extends over all things, including the things which come to be; and these are both living things and their actions and mixed dispositions, "compounded of reason and necessity": 1 so he contemplates things which are mixed and continually go on being mixed; and he cannot himself distinguish providence and what is according to providence clearly on the one side, and on the other the substrate and all that it gives to what results from it. This discrimination is not for a man, except a wise and godlike man: or one might say that "a god alone could have this privilege." 2 In fact, it is not for the diviner to tell the "because" but only the "that"; his art is a reading of letters written in nature,3 declaring an order and never deviating into disorder, or rather of the heavenly circuit which proclaims and brings to light what each individual is like and all his characteristics even before they appear in the people themselves. For these things here below are carned along with those things in heaven, and those in heaven with these on earth, and both together contribute to the consistency and everlastingness of the universe, and by correspondence indicate the others to the observer; for other forms of divination, too, work by correspondence For it would not have been right for all things to be cut off from each other but they had to be made like each other, in some way at least. Perhaps this might be the meaning of the saving that correspondence holds all things together 4 And

mathematical proportion. As usual, Plotinus pays attle attention to the mathematical side of Plato's thought.

¹ Plato. Temaeus 47F5-48Al.

² Simonides, quoted by Plato Protagoras 341F2

³ Cp. II. 3 [52] 7. 4 6

[•] Cp. Timaeus 31C3 and 32C2. But Pisto's avaloyía is

δε τοιούτον ή ἀναλογία, ὥστε καὶ τὸ χεὶρον πρὸς 30 το χεἰρον ὡς τὸ βέλτιον πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον, οἶον ὡς ομμα προς όμμα καὶ ποὺς πρὸς πόδα, θάτερον πρὸς θάτερον, καὶ, εἰ βούλει, ὡς ἀρετὴ πρὸς δικαιοσύνην καὶ κακία προς ἀδικίαν. Εἰ τοίνυν ἀναλογία ἐν τῷ παντί, καὶ προειπειν ἔνι καὶ εἰ ποιεῖ δὲ ἐκεῖνα εἰς ταῦτα, οὕτω ποιεῖ, ὡς καὶ τὰ θάτερον—ἄμα γὰρ γενιᾶται—ἀλλ' ὡς, ἡ πέφυκεν ἔκαοτον, οὕτω και πάσχει το πρόσφορον εἰς τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν, καὶ ὅτι τοῦτο τοιοῦτον, καὶ τὸ

τοιοῦτον τοῦτο· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ λόγος εἶς.

7. Καὶ ὅτι δὲ τα βελτιω, καὶ τα χείρω. Ἐπεπῶς ἂν εἴη τι χείρον ἐν πολυειδεῖ μὴ ὅντος βελτίονος, ἢ πῶς τὸ βέλτιον μὴ χείρονος; "Ωστε οὐκ αἰτιατέον τὸ χείρον ἐν τῷ βελτίον, ἀλλὰ ἀποδεκτέον το βέλτιον, ὅτι ἔδωκεν ἐαυτοῦ τῷ χείρονι. "Ολως δε οἱ ἀναιρεῦν ἀξιοῦντες τὸ χείρον ἐν τῷ παντὶ ἀναιροῦσι πρόνοιαι αὐτήν. Ἱίνος γὰρ ἔσται; Οὐ γὰρ δὴ αὐτῆς οὐδε τοῦ βελτίονος· ἐπει καὶ τὴν ἄτω πρόνοιαν ὀνομάζοντες πρὸς τὸ κάτω λέγομεν. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ εἰς ἕν πάντα ἀρχή, ἐν ἡ ὁμοῦ πάντα 10 καὶ ὅλον πάντα. Πρόεισι δὲ ἡὸη ἐκ ταῦτης

) καί όλον πάντα. Προεισι σε ηση εκ ταυτης Εκαστα μενούσης έκείνης ένδον οἶοι ἐκ ῥίζης μιᾶς Εστώσης αὐτῆς ἐν αὐτῆ· τὰ δὲ ἐξήνθησεν εἰς

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correspondence is of this kind, that the worse is related to the worse as the better is to the better, for instance as eye is to eye, so is foot to foot, the one to the other; or, if you like, as virtue is to justice, so is vice to injustice. If, then, there is correspondence in the All, prediction is possible; and if the heavenly bodies act on the things here below, they act in the way in which the parts in every living thing work on each other, not that one thing produces another—they are produced together—but that each thing in accordance with what it naturally is experiences what is suitable to its own nature; because this thing is of this kind, this experience is of this kind too; for so the formative pattern remains one.

7 And because there are better things, there must be worse as well. Or how could there be anything worse in a mult form thing if there was not something better, and how could there be anything better if there was not something worse? So one should not blame the worse when one finds it in the better but approve the better because it has given something of itself to the worse. And altogether, those who make the demand to abolish evil in the All are abolishing providence itself. For what would it be providence of? Certainly not of itself or of the better; for when we speak of providence above, we are using the term of its relation to what is below. For the gathering together of all things into one is the principle, in which all are together and all make a whole. And individual things proceed from this principle while it remains within; they come from it as from a single root which remains static in itself,1 but they flower out into a divided multiplicity, each

¹ For the plant mage applied to the physical universe; ep. IV. 4 [28] 11. 9-11

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πλήθος μεμερισμένον είδωλον εκαστοι έκείνου φέρον, άλλο δε εν άλλω ενταθθα ήδη εγύγνετο καί ην τὰ μὲν πλησίου τῆς ρίζης, τὰ δὲ προιόντα εἰς τὸ 15 πόρρω ἐσχίζετο καὶ μέχρις οἶον κλάδων καὶ ἄκρων καὶ καρπών και φύλλων καὶ τὰ μὲν ἔμενεν ἀεί, τὰ δὲ ἐγίνετο ἀεί, οἱ καρποὶ καὶ τὰ φύλλα. και τὰ γινόμενα del είχε τους των επάνω λόγους έν αὐτοῖς οἶον μικρά δένδρα βουληθέντα εἶναι, καὶ εἰ 20 έγέννησε πρίν φθαρήναι, τὸ έγγὺς έγέννα μόνον. Τὰ δὲ διάκενα οΐον τῶν κλάδων ἐπληροῦτο ἐκ τῶν αδ έκ της ρίζης καὶ αὐτων άλλον τρόποι πεφυκότων, έξ ών καὶ έπασχε τὰ ᾶκρα των κλάδων, ώς έκ τοῦ πλησίον οἴεσθαι τὸ πάθος ἰέναι μόνον· τὸ δε κατά την άρχην αδ το μεν έπασχε, το δε έποίει, ή δε άρχη ανήρτητο καὶ αὐτή. Πόρρωθεν 25 μεν γὰρ ελθόντα ἄλλα τὰ ποιούντα εἰς ἄλληλα, έξ άρχης δὲ ἀπό τοῦ αὐτοῦ, οίον εἰ ἀδελφοὶ δρῷέν π άλλήλους όμοιοι γενόμενοι έκ των αὐτων όρμηθέντες των πεποιηκότων.

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one bearing an image of that higher reality, but when they reach this lower world one comes to be in one place and one in another and some are close to the root and others advance farther and split up to the point of becoming, so to speak, branches and twigs and fruits and leaves; and those that are closer to the root remain for ever, and the others come into being for ever, the fruits and the leaves; and those which come into being for ever have in them the rational forming principles of those above them, as if they wanted to be little trees; and if they produce before they pass away, they only produce what is near to them. And what are like empty spaces between the branches are filled with shoots which also grow from the root, these, too, in a different way ' and the twigs on the branches are also affected by these, so that they think the effect on them is only produced by what is close to them; but in fact the acting and being acted upon are in the principle, and the principle itself, too, is dependent.1 The principles which act on each other are different because they come from a far-off origin, but in the beginning they come from the same source, as if brothers were to do something to each other who are alike because they originate from the same parents.

¹ The imagery in this sentence is remarkably obscure, but perhaps Plotinus is thinking of apparently disorderly and unplanned shoots which grow between the spaced branches of a well-pruned fruit tree and affect them adverse.y; these, too, grow from the root and are produced by the growth-principle of the whole tree.

III, 4. ON OUR ALLOTTED GUARDIAN SPIRIT

Introductory Note

This treatise is No 15 in the chronological order: it was written, therefore, before Porphyry came to Rome (Life ch. 4). Porphyry seems to think that its writing was connected (his language is, perhaps deliberately, vague) with an incident which he records in ch. 10 of the Life. An Egyptian priest offered to conjure up the guardian spirit of Plotinus; when the conjuration took place in the temple of Isis at Rome, a god appeared instead of a spirit (on this episode see E. R. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational, Appendix II, in, pp. 289-291). But, whatever the connection between this and the writing of the treatise may have been, the doctrine which Plotinus expounds here has little to do with the superstitions of his time or even with the theology of sprits which is to be found in his Platonist predecessors and successors (Proclas criticises Plotinue's interpresation of Plato in his Commentary on the Alci biales, pp. 383-385 Cousin, paras 75-76 Westerink). Plotinus is concerned to reconcile the various statements which Plato makes about guardian sprits in the myths of the Phaedo. Republic X and Timaeus, and to interpret them in a way which fits his own version of Platonism. He does this by means of his dectrine that each soul is a "universe" (chs. 3 and 6) containing many different levels of reality, on any one of which we may choose to live: the principle, then, on the level above that on which we choose to live, next above the principle which is dominant in us in any particular life, is our " guardian spirit ": if we live

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well we may use to its level in our next life, and so have an even higher being for our "spirit." So the perfectly good and wise man, who lives entirely on the level of intellect, will have shad which is above Intellect, the Good, for his guardian ch. 6).

Synopsis

Soul has the power of growth, present in us too, but dom.nant, because isolated, in plants; it gives form to body, its last expression in the world below (ch. 1). The human soul has all powers down to the lowest, and can live on the level of any one of them; its life in its next meannation, plant, animal or man, will depend on the level it chooses to live on in this one (ch. 2). Man's spirit is the principle on the level above that on which he lives; each of us is an "intelligible universe" (ch. 3). Universal soul and body: the universe has no perceptions or sensations (ch. 4). The "choice of lives" in Republic X; the individual is responsible for choosing: the guardian spirit is "ours and not ours": explanation of Timaeus 90A (ch. 5). The good man, who lives on the level of Intellect, has the God beyond Intellect for his guardian spirit. Spirits stay with their souls during the intervals between incarnations; at their next incarnation the souls get a new spirit, bad or good according to their deserts. Some souls may ascend to the stars, and these have star-gods for their guardian spirits; we are not only an intelligible universe but have powers in as akir to those of the world soul, and go to the star appropriate to the power which worked in us. Some go cutside the visitie world altogether, taking with them the lower soul which desires birth, in what sense this lower soul is divisible. When the soul comes again to the lower world it embarks in it with its spirit as in a ship, and the circuit of the universe carries it on the voyage of life; what happens to it then depends partly on the motion of the universe, partly on itself (ch. 6).

HI. 4. (15) ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΕΙΛΗΧΟΤΟΣ ΗΜΑΣ ΔΑΙΜΟΝΟΣ

1. Τῶν μέν αἱ ὑποστάσεις γίνονται μενόνταν εκείνων, ή δε ψυχή κινουμένη ελέγετο γεννάν καί αίσθησιν τηι εν υποστάσει και φύσων και μέχρι φυτών. Καὶ γὰρ ἔχει αὐτὴν καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν οὖσα, 5 κρατεί δὲ μέρος οὖσαν· 1 όταν δὲ ἐν φυτοῖς γένηται, αύτη κρατεί οΐου μόνη γενομένη. Αύτη μέν οὖν ούδεν γεννά; Γεννά πάντη έτερον αύτης οὐκέτι γάρ ζωή μετά ταύτην, άλλά το γεννώμενον άζων. Τί οδν; "Η, ωσπερ παν, όσον πρό τούτου έγεινατε, άμορφωτον έγεννατο, είδοποιείτο δε τῷ ἐπωιρέ-10 φεσθαι πρός το γεννήσαν οίοι έκτρεφόμενον, ούτω δή καὶ ἐνταιθα τὸ γεννηθεν οὐ ψυχῆς ἔτι είδοςου γάρ έτι ζη-άλλ' ἀοριστίαν είναι παντελή. Εί μέν γὰρ κάι τοῖς προτέροις ἡ ἀοριστία, ἀλλ' ἐν είδει οὐ γὰρ πάντη ἄόριστον, άλλ' ὡς πρὸς τὴν τελείωσιν αὐτοῦ· τὸ δὲ νῦν πάντη. Τελειούμενον 15 δὲ γενεται σωμα μορφήν λαβόν τὴν τῆ δυνώμει

1 obaar K renhoff obaa codd

III. 4, ON OUR ALLOTTED GUARDIAN SPIRIT¹

1. The expressions of some realities come into existence while the realities themselves remain unmoved, but soul has been already said to be in motion when it generates the sense-perception which is its expressed form and the power of growth which extends also to plants. For soul has the power of growth when it exists in us, too, but it dominates it because it is only a part; but when it comes to be in plants, this power of growth dominates because it has, so to speak, become isolated. Does this power of growth, then, produce nothing? It produces a thing altogether different from itself; for after it there is no more life but what is produced is lifeless. What is it then? Just as everything which was produced before this was produced shapeless, but was formed by turning towards its producer and being, so to speak, reared to maturity by it, so here, too, that which is produced is not any more a form of soul-for it is not alive-but absolute indefiniteness. For even if there is indefiniteness in the things before it, it is nevertheless indefiniteness within form; the thing is not absolutely indefinite but only in relation to its perfection; but what we are dealing with now is absolutely indefinite. When it is perfected it becomes a body, receiving the form appropriate to its

¹ Cp. Plato, Phaedo 101D0-" . τελευτήσαντα ξκαστον δ ξκάστον δαίμων, δοπερ ζώντα ελλήχει, ούτος άγειν έπιχειρεί . . . 2 The reference is to V. 2 [11] 1. 18-21

πρόσφορον, ὑποδοχή 1 τοῦ γεννήσαν~ος καὶ ἐκθρέψαντος· καὶ μόνον τοῦτο ἐν σώματι ἔσχατον τῶν ανω ἐν ἐσχάτω τοῦ κάτω.

2. Καὶ τὸ αψυχὴ πάσα ἐπιμελεῖται τοῦ άψύχου» επὶ ταύτης μάλιστα α' δ' άλλαι άλλως. Πάντα δε ούρανον περιπολεί άλλοτε έν άλλοις είδεσιν, η έν αίσθητικώ είδει η έν λογικώ ή εν αὐτώ τώ φυτικώ. Το γάρ κρατοῦν αὐτης μόριου τὸ έαντώ πρόσφορου ποιεί, τὰ δ΄ 5 άλλα άργει έξω γάρ. Έν δε απθρώπω οὐ κρατεί τὰ γείρω, άλλὰ σύνεστιν οὐδέ γε τὸ κρείττοι ἀεί έστι γὰρ καὶ ταθτα χώραν τινὰ έχοντα. Διὸ καὶ ώς αἰσθητικοί· ἔστι γὰρ καὶ ὄργανα αἰσθήσεως καὶ πολλά ώς φυτά: έστι γάρ σωμα αυξόμενου 10 καὶ γεννών ωστε πάντα συνεργεῖ, κατὰ δὲ τὸ κρείττον το όλον είδος ανθρωτος. Έξελθουσα δέ, ό τι περ επλεόνασε, τοῦτο γίνεται. Διό φεύγειν δεί πρός το άνω, ίνα μή είς την αίσθητικήν επακολιυθούντες τοίς αίσθητοίς είδωλοις, μηδέ είς την φυτικήν επακολουθούντες τη εφέσει του γεννάτ 10 καὶ ἐδωδῶν λιχιείαις, ἀλλί εἰς τὸ νοερον και νοῦν καὶ θεόν. "Οσοι μεν οὖν τὸν ἄνθρωπον ετήρησαν, πάλιν ανθρωποι. "Οσοι δε αλοθήσει μονον έξησαν, ζώα άλλ' εί μεν αίσθήσεις μετά

¹ ὑποδοχή Kirchhoff: ὑποδοχήν codd.

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potentiality, a receiver for the principle which produced it and brought it to maturity. And only this form in body is the last representative of the powers above in the last depth of the world below.

2. And the text " All soul cares for that which is without soul "applies to this [the power of growth] in particular; other kinds of soul [care for the inanimate] in other ways. 'It traverses the whole universe in different forms at different times," 1 either in the perceptive form or the rational or in this very growth-form. For the dominant part of it makes the thing appropriate to itself, but the other parts do nothing, for they are outside. In man, however, the inferior parts are not dominant but they are also present: and in fact the better part does not always dominate; the other parts exist and have a certain place. Therefore we also live like beings characterised by sense-perception, for we, too, have sense-organs; and in many ways we live like plants. for we have a body which grows and produces; so that all things work together, but the whole form is man in virtue of its better part. But when it goes out of the body it becomes what there was most of in it. Therefore one must "escape" 2 to the upper world, that we may not sink to the level of senseperception by pursuing the images of sense, or to the level of the growth-principle by following the urge for generation and the "gluttonous love of good eating," 3 but may rise to the intelligible and intellect and God. Those, then, who guarded the man in them, become men again. Those who lived by sense alone become animals; but if their sense perceptions have been accompanied by passionate

These two quotations are from Plato, Phaedrus 246B6-7.
Again the favourite passage from Plato, Theaetetus,

^{*} The phrase is taken from Republic VII. 519B1 2.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III 4.

θυμοῦ, τὰ ἄγρια, καὶ ἡ διαφορὰ ἡ ἐν τούτοις τὸ διάφορον τῶν τοιούτων ποιεῖ· ὅσοι δὲ μετ' 20 ἐπιθυμώς καὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς τοῦ ἐπιθυμοῦιτος, τὰ ἀκολαστα τῶν ζώων καὶ γαστρίμεργα. Εἰ δὲ μηδ' αἰσθήσει μετὰ τούτων, ἀλλὰ νωθεία αἰσθήσεως μετ' πὶτῶν, καὶ ἡντά· μώνον γὰρ τοῦτο ἡ μάλιστα ἐνήργει τὸ φυτ.κόν, καὶ ἡν αὐτοῖς μελέτη δενδρωθῆναι. Τοὺς δὲ φιλομούσους μέν, καθαρίους δὲ τὰ 25 ἄλλα, εἰς τὰ ἀδικά· τοὺς δὲ ἀλόγως βασιλέας αἰετούς, εἰ μὴ ἄλλη κακία παρείη· μετεωρολόγους δὲ ἄνευ φρονήσεως εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀεὶ αἰρομένους εἰς ὅρνεις μετεώρους ταῖς πτήσεσιν. 'Ο δὲ την πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν ἄνθρωπος· ὁ δ΄ ήττον ἀρετῆς 30 πολιτικῆς μετέχων πολιτικὸν ζῷον, μέλιττα ἡ τὰ τοιαῦτα.

Τίς οῦν δαίμων; ὁ καὶ ἐνταθθα. Τίς δὲ θεός,
 ἢ ὁ ἐνταῦθα. Τὸ γὰρ ἐνεργῆσαν τοῦτο ἔκαστον ¹
 ἄγει, ἄτε καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἡγούμενον. ⁴Αρ' οὖν τοῦτό

1 έκαστον AB Harder: ἐκάστου ERJ y Q.

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temper they become wild animals, and the difference in temper in them makes the differences between the animals of this kind; those whose sense perceptions went with desires of the flesh and the delight of the desiring part of the soul become listful and gluttonous animals. But if they did not even hive by sense along with their desires but coupled them with duliness of perception, they even turn into plants; for it was this, the growth principle which worked in them, alone or predominantly, and they were taking care to turn themselves into trees. Those who loved music but were in other ways respectable turn into song birds; kings who ruled stupidly into cagles, if they had no other vices; astronomers who were always raising themselves to the sky without philosophic reflection turn into birds which fly high. The man who practised community virtue becomes a man again; but one who has a lesser share of it a creature that lives in community, a bee or something of the

3. Who, then, becomes a spirit, He who was one here too. And who a god, Certainly he who was one here. For what worked in a man leads him? [after death], since it was his ruler and guide here

astronomers, there is no doubt that he took Plato's statements about animal reincarnation interally and seriously; cp. e.g., VI 7[38] 6-20 ff Porphyry disagreed with his master or this point (Augustine De Civ. Dei X. 30. On the differing opinions held by Platonists on animal reincarnation see H. Dorrie Kontroverse um die Seelenvanderung im kauserseillichen Platonismus. Hermes 85. 4 (Dec. 1957), pp. 414-435.

* dedotto printed by Herry-Schwyzer here seems to me impossible. I adopt deaotor which appears in the MSS A and

B and which Dr Schwyzer now considers necessary

¹ For remearnation in appropriate animal forms see Plato, Pheado 81 E-82B, Republic X 620, and Timaeus 91-92. The lowest form of life to which a human soul can sink in Plato is that of an oyster (Immeus 92B6-7), but remearnation as a plant appears in Empedoeles (Frs. 117, 127 Dies-Kranz). In spite of the somewhat light-hearted way in which Plotinus (following Plato) touches on the future of stupid kings (is there perhaps a disrespectful allusion here to the formality of releasing an eagle from the imperial pyre) and amphilosophic

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έστιν ό δαίμων, όσπερ ζωντα είλήχει; "Η ού, 5 άλλα τὸ πρὸ αὐτοῦ· τοῦτο γὰρ ἐφέστηκεν ἀργοῦν, ένεργεί δε τό μετ' αὐτόν. Καί εί μεν τό ενεργούν η αίσθητικοί, καὶ ὁ δαίμων τὸ λογικόν εἰ δὲ κατά το λογικόν ζώτμεν, ο δαίμων το ύπερ τοθτο έφεστως άργος συγχωρών τῷ έργαζομένω. 'Ορθώς οδυ λέγεται ήμας αίρήσε σθαι. Του γάρ ύπερ-10 κείμενον κατά την ζωήν αίρούμεθα. Διὰ τί οδυ αθτος άγει; "Η τον βιοτεύσαντα ουκ έστιν άγειν, άλλα τρό του μέν άγειν, ότε έζη, παυσάμενον δέ τοῦ ζῶν ἄλλω παραγωρείν τὴν ἐνέργειαν τεθνηκότα την αὐτοῦ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ζωήν. 'Ο μεν οδν εθέλει άγειν καὶ κρατήσας ζή αὐτὸς άλλοι καὶ Ι5 αὐτὸς ἔχων δαίμονα: εἰ δὲ βαρύνοιτο τῆ ῥώσει τοῦ χείρονος ήθους, έχει έκεῖνο την δίκην. Ταύτη καὶ ό κακός ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον βρίσαντος πρὸς τὴν ὁμοιότητα τοῦ ἐνεργήσαντος ἐν τῆ ζωῆ εἰς βίον θήρειον. Εἰ δὲ ἐπεσθαι δύναιτο τῶ δαίμονι τῷ ἄνω αὐτοῦ, ἄνω γίνεται έκεῖνον ζώι καὶ ἐφ' δ ἄγεται κρεῖττον 20 μέρος αὐ-οῦ ἐν προστασίο θέμενος καὶ μετ' ἐκεῖνον άλλον έως όνω. "Εστι γὰρ καὶ πολλά ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ πάντα καὶ τὰ ἄνω καὶ τὰ κάτω αὖ μέχρι πάσης

¹ See note on title of this treatise.
² Republic X. 617E1.
³ Phaeas 107D7.

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too. Is this, then, "the spirit to whom he was allotted while he fived "?1" No. but that which is hefore the working principle; for this presides inactive over the man, but that which comes after it acts. If the working principle is that by which we have sense-perception, the spirit is the rational principle; but if we live by the rational principle, the spirit is what is above this, presiding inactive and giving its consent to the principle which works, So it is rightly said that 'we shall choose." 2 For we choose the principle which stands above us according to our choice of life. Why, then, does the spirit "lead" s us? It is not possible for the principle which led the man in life to lead [after death], but only before, when the man lived; when he coases to live the principle must hand over its activity to another, since he has died in the life which corresponded to that spirit's activity. This [other principle], then, wants to lead and when it has become dominant lives itself and has itself, too, a different spirit; but if it is weighed down by the force of its bad character, this weighing down contains in itself the penalty. In this way, too, the wicked man, since the principle which worked in him during his life has pressed him down to the worse, towards what is like itself, enters into the life of a beast. But if a man is able to follow the spirit which is above him, he comes to be himself above, living that spirit's life, and giving the pre-eminence to that better part of himself to which he is being led; and after that spirit he rises to another, until he reaches the heights. For the soul is many things, and all things, both the things above and the things below down to the limits

ζωῆς, καὶ ἐσμὲν ἔκαστος κόσμος νοητός, τοῖς μὲν κάτω συνάπτοντες τῷδε, τοῖς δὲ ἄνω καὶ τοῖς κόσμου τῷ νοητῷ, καὶ μένομεν τῷ μὲν ἀλλῷ παντὶ 25 νοητῷ ἄνω, τῷ δὲ ἐσχάτῷ αὐτοῦ πεπεδήμεθα τῷ κάτω οἷοι ἀπόρροιαν ἀπ' ἐκείνου διδόντες εἰς τὸ κάτω, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐνέργειαν, ἐκείνου οὐκ ἐλαπτουμέ-

4. *Αρ' οδν ἀεὶ ἐν σώματι τοῦτο; *Ἡ οῦ· ἐὰν γὰρ στραφῶμεν. συνεπιστρέφεται καὶ τοῦτο. Τί οῦν ἡ τοῦ παντός; 'Αποστήσεται καὶ τὸ αὐτῆς μέρος στραφείσης; "Ἡ οὐδὲ συνένευσε τῷ μέρα ὁ αὐτῆς τῷ ἐσχάτῳ· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡλθεν οὐδὲ κατῆλθεν, ἀλλὰ μενούσης προσάπτεται τὸ σῶμα του κοσμον καὶ οἷον καταλάμπεται, οὐκ ἐνοχλοῦν οὐδὲ ¹ παρέχον μερίμνας, ἐν ἀσφαλεῖ τοῦ κόσμου κειμένου. Τί οδι, Οὐκ αἰσθάνεταί τωνα αἴσθησιν; "Ορασιν οὐκ ἔχει, φησίν, ὅτι μηδὲ ὀφθαλμούς οὐδὲ ὧτα οὐδὲ ρίνας δηλονότι οὐδὲ γλῶτταν. Τί οδυ; Συναίσθησιν ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς τῶν ἐντὸς ἡμῶν; "Ἡ ὁμοίως κατὰ φύσιν ἐχόντων ἡρέμησις. Οὐδὲ ἡδονή. Πάρεστιν οῦν καὶ τὸ ἀυτικὸι οὐ παρὸν καὶ το αἰσθητικὸν ώσαὐτως. 'Αλλὰ περὶ μὲν τοῦ

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of all life, and we are each one of us an intelligible universe, making contact with this lower world by the powers of soul below, but with the intelligible world by its powers above and the powers of the universe, and we remain with all the rest of our intelligible part above, but by its ultimate fringe we are tied to the world below, giving a kind of outflow from it to what is below, or rather an activity, by which that intelligible part is not itself essented.

4 Is this lower part, then, always in body? No; if we turn, this, too, turns with us to the upper world, What, then, about the soul of the universe? Will its [lower] part leave the body when it turns? No; it has not even inclined with its lower part to the ast depth; for it did not come or come down but as it abides the body of the universe attaches itself to it and is, as it were, illumined, not annoying the soul or causing it any worries, for the universe lies in safety. What, has it then no kind of perception? Plate says that it has no sight, because it has no eyes either; nor ears nor nostrils either, obviously, nor tongue.2 Well, then, has it an immanent sensation as we have of what goes on inside us? No, for things which are uniformly in accord with nature are quiet. It has no pleasure either. So the principle of growth is present in it without being present, and the principle of sense in the same way. But we deal with the universe in

passion for sharp distinction and separation, and desire to put and keep man in his proper place low down in the enhancement of being. Procus sharply criticises this passage of Plotinus in his Commentary on Princewaler 13th (V, p. 948, 14-20, ed. Cousin 1864); see P. Henry Etats du Texte de Plotin, pp. 220-221

¹ οὖκ ενοχλοῦν οὐδὲ Müller, Η S:: οὖκ ἐνοχλουμένου δὲ codd

This sentence shows very clearly how Pictinus thinks of coul as a rioh, complex unity capable of existing on many levels and operating in many ways, which can be detinguished but must not be separated. This was a way of thinking which was quite unacceptable to the later Neoplatonists, with their

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κόσμοι ἐν ἄλλοις· νῦν δὲ ὅσον ἐφήπτετο ἡ ἀπορία

αὐτοῦ εἴρηται.

5. 'Αλλ' εί έκει αιρειται τον δαίμονα και εί τὸν βίου, πως έτι τινός κύριοι; "Η καὶ ή αίρεσις έκει ή λεγομένη την της ψυχης προαίρεσω καὶ διάθεσιν καθόλου και πανταχοθ αινίττεται. 'Αλλ' εί ή 5 προαίρεσις τής ψυχής κυρία και τοθτο κρατεί, δ ον πρόχερον έχη μέρος έκ των προβεβιωμένων, οὐκέτι το σώμα αίτιον οὐδενος κακοῦ αὐτῷ, εἰ γαρ προτερεί το της ψυχής ήθω, ιού σώματος καί τοῦτ' έχει, ὁ είλετο, καὶ τὸν δαίμονα, φησίν, οὐκ άλλάττεται, οὐδὲ ὁ σπουδαίος ἐνταίθα γίγνεται 10 οὐδ' ὁ φαῦλος. "Αρ' οὖν δυνάμει ἐστὶν ἐκάτερος, ένεργεία δε γίγνεται; Τί οδι, εί φαύλου σώματος ό τὸ ήθος σπουδαίος τύχοι, ὁ δὲ τάναντία; "Η δύναται μαλλοι καὶ ήττον τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς έκατέρος ένατερα τα σώματα παρέχεσθαι, έπει και αι άλλαι έξωθεν τύχαι την όλην προαίρεσιν οὐκ ἐκβιβάζου-15 σιν. "Όταν δὲ λέγηται, ώς πρώτον οἱ κλῆροι, είτα τὰ τῶν βίων παμαδείγματα, † ἔπειτα ταις τύχαις † ι και ώς έκ των παρόντων τούς βίους,

1 ξπειτα (τὰ ἐν) ταῖς τέχαις Creuzer, sed locus nondum sanatus.

² Op. Republic X. 620D8-E1.

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other treatises; now we have said as much about .t as is relevant to our problem.

5. But if the soul chooses its guardian spirit and chooses its life there in the other world, how have we still [in this world] any power of decision? The choice in the other world which Plato speaks of is really a riddling representation of the soul's universal and permanent purpose and disposition. But if the soul's purpose is decisive, and that part of it dominates which lies ready to hand as the result of its previous lives, the body is no longer responsible for any evil which may affect the man. For if the soul's character exists before the body, and has what it chose, and, Plato says, does not change its guardian spirit, then the good man does not come into existence here below, and neither does the worthless one. Is man, then, one or the other potentially [in the other world] and does he become actually good or bad [in this world]? What, then, if a man who is good in character happens to get a bad body, and a bad man meets the opposite fortune? The powers of either kind of soul, can, more or less, make their bodies of either kind, since other external chances, too, cannot turn aside the whole purpose of the soul. But when it is said that first come the "lots," then " the examples of ives, ' then what lies in the fortunes of the lives,2 then that they choose their lives from those

mistakes in choosing made by the inexperienced and unintelligently virtuous: there does seem here a distinction implicit in Plato's text between the "examples of lives" and "what lies in the fortunes of the lives," between the general type of life and the particular fortunes or misfortunes contained in it. I have translated Creuzer's text on this assumption, but am not at all certain that this is the right solution.

² The text here is clearly corrupt. Plotinus is commenting on the description of the choice of lives in Republic X 617E—620D. If Creuzer's insertion ἐπειτα ⟨τὰ ἐν⟩ ταῖς τάχαις is accepted, it is just possible to see in these words an obscure allusion to 019D-C, the case of the man who choes the biggest tyranny he could find, neglecting to observe that there was contained in it the fate that he should eat his children and suffer many other evils, and the remarks that follow on the

κατὰ τὰ ἤθη τὸ κύριον μαλλον δίδωσι ταῖς ψυχαῖς διατιθεισαις τὰ δοθέντα πρὸς τὰ αὐτῶν ἤθη. "Οτι γαρ ὁ δαίμων οὐτος οῦ παντάπασιν ἔξω—ἀλλ' 20 οὖτως ὡς μὴ συνδεδεμένος—οὐδ' ἐνεργῶν, ἡμέτερος δέ, ὡς ψιχῆς πέρι εἰπεῖν, οὐχ ὁ ἡμέτερος δέ, εἰ ὡ, ἄνθρωποι τοιοίδε τὴν ὑπ' αὐτὸν ζωὴν ἔχοντςς, μαρτυρεῖ τὰ ἐν τῷ Τιμαίω ἃ εἰ μὲν οὕτω ληφθείη, ουδεμίαν ἔξει μάχην σχόντα ἄν τινα ἀσυμφωνίαν, εἰ ἄλλως ὁ δαίμων ληφθείη Τὸ λὲ ἀποπληρω-25 τὴν ὧν τις εἴλετο καὶ αὐτὸ σύμφωνον. Οὕτε γὰρ πολὺ κατωτέρω ἐᾳ ἐλθεῖν εἰς τὸ χεῖρον ὑπερκαθήμενος, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο ἐνεργεῖ μόνον τὸ ὑπ' αὐτόν, οὕτε ὑπεράνω αὐτοῦ οὕτε εἰς ἴσον οὐ γὰρ δύναται ἄλλο γενέσθαι ἢ ἢ ἐστι

6. Τι οῦν ὁ σπουδαῖος; "Η ὁ τῷ βελτίονι ἐνεργῶν. "Η οὐκ ἄν ἡν σπουδαῖος συνεργοῦντα ἑαυτῷ τὸν δαίμονα ἔχων. Νοῦς γὰρ ἐνεργεῖ ἐν τούτῳ. "Η οὖν δαίμων αὐτὸς ἢ κατὰ δαίμονα καὶ δαίμων τούτῳ θεός. 'Αμ' οὐν καὶ ὑπὲρ νουν; Εἰ 5 τὸ ὑπὲρ νοῦι δαίμων αὐτῷ, διὰ τί οὐκ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, "Η διὰ τὸι θόρυβοι τὸν ἐκ τῆς γενέσεως. 'Υπάρχει δε ὅμως καὶ πρὸ λόγου ἡ κίνησις ἡ ἔνδοθεν ὀρεγομένη τῶν αὐτῆς. Πάντας οὖν κατορθοῖ;

presented to them according to their characters, Plato gives the power of decision rather to the souls, which adapt what is given to them to their own characters. For that this guardian spirit is not entirely outside but only in the sense that he is not bound to us, and is not active in us but is ours, to speak in terms of soul, but not ours if we are considered as men of a particular kind who have a life which is subject to him, is shown by what is said in the Timaeus; 1 if the passage is taken in this way it will contain no contradiction, but it would have some disaccord if the spirit was understood otherwise. And the "fulfiller of what one has chosen ' 2 is also in accord. For the spirit sits above us, and does not let us go down much lower into evil, but that alone acts in us which is under the spirit, not above him or on a level with him; for it is impossible for the spirit to become something else than a being appropriate to the place] where he is.

6. What, then, is the nobly good man? He is the man who acts by his better part. He would not have been a good man if he had the guardian spirit as a partner in his own activity. For intellect is active in the good man. He is, then, himself a spirit or on the level of a spirit, and his guardian spirit is God. Is it, then, even above intellect? If that which is above intellect is his guardian spirit, why, then, is he not a man of noble goodness from the beginning? It is because of the "disturbance" which comes from birth. But all the same, even before reason there is in him the inward movement which reaches out towards its own. Does the spirit, then, always and in every way accomplish its task successfully? Not

Transeur 90A, the passage where the δαίμων is identified with the highest part of our soul, the immortal reason.

Republic X 620E1.
 Cp. Timueus 43A6-44B7.

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"Η οὐ πάντως, είπερ οΰτως ή ψυχή διαθέσεως έχει, ώς έν τούτοις τοῖς τοιοῖσδε τοιάδε οὖσα 10 τούτου έχειν βίου κα' ταντην προαίρεσιν 'Ο μέντοι δαίμων οδτος, δι λέγομεν, άγαγων λέγεται είς "Αιδου οὐκέτι ὁ αὐτὸς μένεω, ἐάν μὴ τὰ αὐτὰ έληται πάλιι. Πρό δέ του πώς; Το δή άγαγείν είς την κρίσιν το είς το αυτό σχημα ελθείν μετά την ἀπογένεσαν, ὁ είχε πρὸ της γενέσεως είτα 15 άσπερ ἀτ' ἀρχῆς ἄλλης τὸν μεταξύ τῆς ὕστερον γενέσεως χρόνον ταις κολοζομέναις πάρεστιν. "Η οὐδὲ βίος αὐταῖς, άλλὰ δίκη. Τί δὲ ταῖς εἰς θήρεια σώματα είσιούσαις; έλαττον ή δαίμων; "Η πονηρός γε η εθήθης. Ταις δε άνω; "Η των άνω αί μεν εν αίσθητώ, αί δε έξω. Λί μεν οδι εν 20 αἰσθητῷ ή ἐν ἡλίω ἢ ἐν ἄλλω τῶν πλαναμένων, αί δ' έν τη ἀπλανεί, εκάστη καθό λογικώς ἐνήργησεν ένταθθα. χρή γάρ οιεσθαι και κόσμον είναι έν τη ψηχή ήμιων μή μόνον νοητόν, άλλά κοί ψυχής τής κόσμου όμοειδή, διάθεσιν νενεμημένης οδν κάκείνης είς τε την άπλανη και τάς πλανωμένας 25 κατά δινώμεις διαφόρους δμοριδείς ταύταις ταίς δυνάμεσι και τὰς παρ' ἡμῖν είναι και ἐνέργειαν είναι παρ' ἐκάστης και ἀπαλλαγείσας ἐκεί γίνεσθαι

² Up. Phaedo 107D7-E4.

³ Cp. Timacus 1, D4 7.

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altogether, since the soul is of such a disposition that it is of a particular kind in particular circumstances and so has a life and a purpose corresponding to its kind and circumstances. Now this spirit of whom we are speaking is said, when it has led the soul to Hades,1 no longer to remain the same, unless the soul chooses again the same type of life. But what happens before [the choice of lives? The leading to judgement means that the spirit comes to the same form after the soul's departure from this life as it had pefore the soul's birth; then, as if from a different starting point, it is present to the souls which are being punished during the time which intervenes before their next birth—this is not a life for them, but an expiation. But what about the sous which enter into the bodies of brutes? Is their guardian something less than a spirit? It is a spirit, a wicked or stupid one. And what about those in the upper world. Of those in the upper world, some are in the visible region and some outside. Those, then, in the visible region are in the sun or in another of the moving stars, and some of them in the sphere of the fixed stars, each according to his rational activity here: 2 for one must think that there is a universe in our soul, not only an intelligible one but an arrange ment like in form to that of the soul of the world. 3 so, as that, too, is distributed according to its diverse powers into the sphere of the fixed stars and those of the moving stars,4 the powers in our soul also are of like form to these powers, and there is an activity proceeding from each power, and when the souls are

4 Cp. Timaeus 380-40B.

⁹ Here, and m what follows, Plotanus is basing his thought on Timaeus 41D6-42Dl, where the Demiurge at his original making of souls which are to be born into this word allots each of them to a star, and promises them that they will each return to their appropriate star if they overcome the disturbances and temptations of mortal life.

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πρός ἄστρον τὸ σύμφωνον τῷ ἐνεργήσαντι καὶ ζήσαντι ήθε, καὶ δυνάμει καὶ τοιούτω θεώ καὶ δαίμοτί γε ή αὐτῷ τούτφ χρήσεται ή τῷ ὑπέρ 30 ταύτην την δύναμιν: σκεπτέον δε τοῦτο βέλτιον. Τάς δ' έξω γενομένας την δαιμονίαν φύσιν ύπερβεβηκέναι και πάσαν είμαρμένην γενέσεως και όλως (τό) 1 ἐν τῷδε τῷ ὁρατῷ, ἔως ἐσταν ἐκεί, συνανενεχθείσης καὶ τῆς ἐν αὐτῆ φιλογενέσεως 35 οδσίας, ήν εί τις λέγοι ταύτην είναι την περί τά σώματα γινομένην μεριστήν συμπληθύουσαν έαυτην καὶ συμμερίζουσαν τοῖς σώμασιν, ὀρθώς λέξει. Μερίζεται δε οὐ μεγέθει το γορ αὐτο ἐν παυιν όλον και πάλων έν και εξ ένος ζώου άει πολλά γεννάται ταύτης μεριζομένης ούτως, ώσπερ 40 καὶ ἐκ τῶν φυτῶν περί τὰ σώματα γὰρ καὶ αὕτη μεριστή. Καὶ ότε μεν μένουσα επί τοῦ αὐτοῦ δίδωσιν, οξον ή εν τοις φυτοις. όπου δε άπελθυθοα πρίν ἀπελθεῖν ἔδωκεν, οίον καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀνηρημένοις φυτοῖς ἢ ἐν ζώοις ἀποθανοῦσιν ἐκ σήψεως πολλών έξ ένδς γεννηθέντων. Συνεργείι δε καί [τήν] 2 εκ 45 τοῦ παντός τὴν τοιαύτην δύναμιν ἐνταθθα τὴν αὐτὴν οδσαν.

Πάλων δὲ ἐὰν τη ή ψυχή ἐνταῦθα, ἢ τόν αὐτὸν ἢ

¹ ⟨τὸ⟩ Kirchhoff, H-S. ² τὴν del. Kirchhoff, H S². set free they come there to the star which is in harmony with the character and power which lived and worked in them; and each will have a god of this kind as its guardian spirit, either the star itself or the god set above this power; but this requires more accurate investigation. But those which have come to be outside have transcended the nature of spirits and the whole destiny of birth, and altogether what is in this visible world; as long as the soul is there, the substance in it which desires birth is taken up with it; if anyone should say that this substance is "the soul which has come to be among bodies and is divisible," 2 multiplying and dividing itself with its bodies, he will speak correctly. But it is not divided quantitatively, for it is the same thing in all, a whole and again one; and since this soul is in process of division in this way, many animals are always produced from one, as happens also with plants, for this [the plant-soul], too, is also divisible among bodies. And sometimes the soul remains in the same living thing and gives [life to others], like the soul in plants; but sometimes when it goes away it gives before it goes, as with plants which have been pulled up or dead animals, when from their corruption many are generated from And the soul-power from the All co operates. the particular power which is the same here too.

But if the soul comes here again it has either the same or another guardian spirit according to the life

governs the sun is related to it as our soul is to our body, or directs it in some quite different way

¹ Plotinus may be thinking here of Plato, Luns X 898E-809A, where Plato leaves it open whether the soul which

^{*} Transcas 95 A 2-5, up. the fuller discussions of the 'divisbility' of the soul, with reference to this passage of the Transcas of IV 9[8] and IV 3[27] 19

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άλλον έχει δαίμονα κατά την ζωήν, ην ποιήσεται. *Επιβαίνει οθν μετά τούτου τοθ δαίμονος ώσπερ υκάφους τούδε τού παιτός πρώτον, είτα παραλα 50 βούσα ή του ἀτράκτου λεγομένη φύσις κατέταξεν ώσπερ εν νηὶ είς τινα έδραν τύχης. Περιαγούσης δε της περιφοράς ώσπερ πνεύματος τον επί της νεώς καθήμενον ή καὶ φερόμενον πολλαὶ καὶ ποικίλαι γίνονται καὶ θέαι καὶ μεταθέσεις καὶ συμπτώματα, καὶ ώσπερ εν αὐτῆ τῆ νηὶ ἡ παρὰ 55 τοῦ σάλου της νεώς η ταρ' αὐτοῦ κινηθέντος όρμη οίκεία, ην αν σχοίη τω έπὶ νεώς είναι παρά τον έαυτοῦ τρόπον. Οὐ γάρ δμοίως ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς πας κινείται ή βούλεται ή ένεργεί. Γίνεται οὐν διάφορα διαφόροις ή έκ των αθτών ή διαψύριιν προσπεσόντων, ή τὰ αὐτὰ ἄλλοις, κᾶν διάφορα τὰ 60 προσπεσόντα τοιοθτον γάρ ή είμαρμένη.

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which it is going to make for itself. It embarks, then, with this spirit first of all in this universe as if in a hoat, then the nature which has the name of the "Spindle" takes it over and sets it, just as in a ship, in some seat of fortune. And as the circuit of heaven, like a wind, carries round the man sitting, or even moving about, on the ship, there occur many and various sights and changes and incidents, and, just as in the actual ship, [they occur because] he is moved either by the tossing of the snip or by himself, of his own impulse, whatever it may be, which he has because he is on the ship precisely in his own way. For everyone is not moved and does not will or act alike in the same circumstances. So different things happen to different people as a result of the same or different occurrences, or the same things to others even if the circumstances they encounter are different; for that is what destiny is lke.

· Cp. Republic X 616C4 ff.

as a god. Is he born from or with Aphrodite? The two Aphrodites, the heavenly one and the goddess of marriage: the heavenly Aphrodite is the most divine kind of soul and produces the appropriate Lave (ch. 2). Love s a substantial reality; how he comes into existence from the sou's seeing. The lower Aphrodite is he soul of the universe, and produces her own Love 'ch. 3). Each individual soul has its own love, related to the universal Love as individual souls are to universal Soul: the higher Love is a god, the lower a sprit ch 4) The Love who is a spirit is not the physical universe, as some think (ch. 5). Interpretation of the myth of the buth of Love in the Symposium first, how spirits (daimones) differ from gods, being subject to affections and passions through participating in intelligible matter (ch. 6). The parents of Love: Plenty is an intelligible reality, Poverty is intelligible mantel, indefinite and so giving unbounded desire to Love All spirits have this double origin: perverse loves, like false thoughts, are not substantial realities but passive affections of the soul (ch. 7). Zeus and Aphrodite are Intellect and Soul (ch. 8). Plenty, his drunkenness with nectar and the "garden," all represent in different ways the glorifying outflow of Logoi from Intellect into Soul. Principles for the interpretation of myths: their application to this one (ck. 9)

ON LOVE

III 5 ON LOVE

Introductory Note

Tes late treatise (No. 50 in Porphyry's chronological order) is concerned more than any other in the Enneads with the allegorical interpretation of myth, though with Platonic rather than traditional myth: the story to which Plotinus devotes most of his attention is that of the birth of Eros in the Symposium (203B ff). Plotinus often al ludes to details of the Platonic myths and interprets them to suit his own philosophical purposes. He explains the principles to be applied in the arterpretation of mythe in the last chapter of this treatise (9 24-29). But he does not seem to consider this kind of intellectual activity very interesting or important, and is extremely casual about the details of his interpretation. He does not really care whether Aphrodite is to be represented as the daughter of Ouranos, Kronos or Zeus (chs. 2 and 8), or identified with Zeus's wife Hera (8, 22-23). He obviously finds it dif ficult to give an allegorical interpretation of the Symposium myth which will fit his own system, and his explanation of it ch 6 ff.) is sometimes obscure and confusing. Ploti nus's teaching about the nature of Love in this treatise follows Plato closely in essentials (with an important variation mentioned in the notes to ch. 1). The Phaedrus and the Sumposium are reconciled by distinguishing the Love who is a god from the Love who is a daimon (ch. 4, 23 25).

Symmynaia

Is love a god, a spirit, or an affection of the soul? Discussion of love as an affection of the soul (ch. 1). Love 164

III. 5. (50) HEPI EP Ω TO Σ

1 Περί έρωτος, πότερα θεός τις η δαίμων ή πάθος τι της ψυχης, η ό μεν θεός τις η δαίμων, το δέ τι καὶ πάθος, καὶ ποῖόν τι ἔκαστον, ἐπισκέψασθαι άζων τώς τε των άλλων ανθρώπων επινοίας 5 επιόντας, καὶ όσαι εν φιλοσοφία εγένοντο περί τούτων, καὶ μάλιστα όσα υπολαμβάνει ο θείος Πλάτων, ός δή και πολλά πολλαχή των έαυτοῦ περί έρωτος έγραψεν ος δή ου μόνον έν ταις ψυχαις εγγυγνόμενόν τι πάθος είρηκεν είναι, άλλά καὶ δαίμονά φησιν αὐτὸν καὶ περὶ γενέσεως αὐτοῦ 10 διεξήλθεν, όπως καὶ όθει έστὶ γεγενημένος. Περί μέν οθν του πάθους οθ τον έρωτα αἰτιώμεθα, ότι έγγίνεται εν ψυχαις έφιεμέναις καλώ τινι συμπλακήναι, καὶ ώς ή ἔφεσις αὕτη ή μέν ἐστι παρὰ σωφρόνων αὐτῷ τῷ κάλλει οἰκειωθέντων, ή δὲ καὶ τελευτάν εθέλει είς αισχρού τινος πράξιν, ούδεις 15 άγνοει δήπου· όθεν δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχει ἐκάτερος, τὸ ένπεθθεν έπισκοπείν διά φιλοσοφίας προσήκοι. 'Αρχὴν δὲ εἴ τις θεῖτο τὴν αὐτοῦ κάλλους πρότερον 166

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1. Our enquiry concerns love, whether it is a god or a spirit or an affection of the soul, or whether one kind is a god or spirit and another also an affection, and what sort of god or spirit or affection each of these is; it is worth while considering the ideas about it which have occurred to the rest of mankind and all the teachings of philosophy on this subject, and in particular all the opinions of that godlike man Plato, who has, of course, written much about love in many places in his works. He has said that love is not only an affect on occurring in souls but asserts that it is also a spirit, and has described its origin, how and from what cource it came to be. Now about the affection of soul for which we make love responsible,1 there is no one, I suppose, who does not know that it occurs in souls which desire to embrace some beauty, and that this desire has two forms, one which comes from the chaste who are akin to absolute beauty, and one which wants to find its fulfilment in the doing of some ugly act; but it is appropriate to go on from there to a philosophical consideration of the source from which each of them originates. And if someone assumed that the origin of love was the longing for beauty itself which was there before in men's souls, and their recog-

¹ That is Love as a substantial superhuman reality, a god or a spirit, who is responsible for producing the affection of love in the human soul.

30 ἐν καλῷ· ἐτείπερ ἄτοπον βουλομένην τὴν φύσι καλὰ ποιεῖν ἐν αἰσχρῷ γενιᾶν βούλεσθαι. 'Αλλὰ γὰρ τοῖς μὲν τῆδε γενιᾶν κινουμένοις ἀρκεῖ τὸ τῆδε καλὸι ἔχειν, ὅπερ πάρεστιν ἐν εἰκόσι καὶ σάμασιν, ἐπεὶ μὴ τὸ ἀρχέτυπον αὐτοῖς πάρεστιν, ὅ ἐστιν αἴτιον αὐτοῖς τοῦ καὶ τοῦδε ἐρᾶν. Καὶ εἰς ἀνάμνησιν μὲν ἐκείνου ἀπὸ τοῦδε ἐλθοῦσιν ἀγαπᾶ ται τοῦτο ὡς εἰκών, μὴ ἀναμνησθεῖσι δὲ ὑπ'

άγνοίας τοῦ πάθους άληθὲς τοῦτο φαντάζεται.

1 έρώντων Ποτάς, έρώντων σολά,

¹ For this theroughly Hellenic notion of the natural affinity of the soul to beauty and its natural repulsion from ugliness; cp. I. 6 [1] 2. 1-6. Both passages derive from Plato, Symposium 206D 1-2.

2 The phrase is taken, with a slight but significant alteration (τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ singular for τῶν ἀγαθῶν plural) from Aristotle,

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nition of it and kinship with it and unreasoned awareness that it is something of their own, he would hit. I think, on the truth about its cause. For the ugly is opposed to nature and to God. For nature when it creates looks towards beauty, and it looks towards the definite, which is " in the column of the good "; " but the indefinite is ugly and belongs to the other column. And nature has its origin from above, from the Good and, obviously, from Beauty. But if anyone delights in something and is akin to it, he has an affinity also with its images. But if anyone rejects this cause, he will be unable to say how and for what reasons the emotion of love occurs even in these lovers who aim at sexual intercourse. For these certainly want to "bring forth in beauty". 8 for it would be absurd for nature, when it wants to create beautiful things, to want to generate in ug iness. It is true, certainly, that those who are moved to generation here helow are content to have the beauty here below the beauty which is present in images and bodies, since the archetype is not present to them which is responsible for their loving even this beauty here below And if they come from this beauty here to the recotlection of that archetype, this earthly beauty still satisfies them as an image; but if they do not recollect, then, because they do not know what is happening to them, they fancy this is the true

Nicomachean Ethics A6 1096b6; cp. Metaphysics A5. 986a22-26. The reference is to the columns or tables of ten pairs of basic opposites which some Pythagoreans, according to Aristotle drew up. which included πέρας καὶ ἄπειρου and ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν. ἀόριστον (for ἄπειρου is a Platonio rather than a Pythagorean term.

^a Symposium 206C 4-5.

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Καὶ σώφροσι μὲν οὖσιν ἀναμάρτητος ἡ πρὸς τὸ τηδε καλόν οἰκείωσις, ή δε πρός μιζιν έκπτωσις έμωρτία. Και ότο μέν καθαρός ό τοθ καλοθ έρως, άγαπητόν το κάλλος μόνον είτε άνα-40 μνησθέντι είτε καὶ μή, ότω δὲ μέμικται καὶ ἄλλη τοι άθάνατον είναι ώς έν θνητώ επιθυμία, ούτος εν τῷ ἀειγενεί καὶ ἀιδίω τὸ καλὸν ζητεί και κατά φύσιν μέν ίων σπείρει και γενιά έν καλώ, σπείρων μέν είς τὸ ἀεί, ἐν καλῷ δὲ διὰ συγγένειαν τοῦ καλοῦ. Καὶ γὰρ καὶ τό ἀίδιον συγγενες τῷ 45 καλώ καὶ ή ἀίδιος φύσις τὸ πρώτως τοιούτον καὶ τὰ ἀπ' αὐτῆς τοιαῦτα πάντα. Τὸ μὲν οἶν μὴ γεννάν έθέλον μάλλον αὐταρκέστερον τῷ καλῷ, τὸ δε εφιέμενον ποιησαι καλόν τε εθέλει ποιειν ύπ ένδείας και ούκ αύταρκες καί, είπερ τοιουτον 50 ποιήσει, οἴεται, εἶ ἐν καλῷ γεννήσεται. Οἶ δ' ἂν έν παρανόμφ και παρα την φύσιν εθέλωσι γεννάν, έκ τῆς κατὰ ψύσιν πορείας ποιησώμενοι τας ἄρχὸς γενόμενοι παράφοροι έκ ταίτης οδον όδοῦ όλισθή σαντές κείνται πεσοντές ούτε έρωτα γνόντες έφ' δ ηγεν αθτούς ούτε έφεσα γεννήσεως ούτε χμησιν 55 κάλλους εἰκόνος οὖτε ὅ τι ἐστὶ κάλλος αὐτό. ᾿Αλλ' οὖν οἴ τε σωμάτων καλῶν καὶ διὰ μῖξιν ἐρώντες, ότι καλά έστιν έρωσιν, οἱ τε τὸν λεγόμενον μικτὸν

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beauty. If they remain chaste there is no error in their intimacy with the beauty here below, but it is error to fall away into sexual intercourse. And the man whose love of the beautiful is pure will be satisfied with beauty alone, if he recollects the archetype or even if he does not, but the man whose love is mixed with another desire of 'being immortal as far as a mortal may, 'seeks the beautiful in that which is everlasting and eternal; and as he goes the way of nature he sows and generates in beauty, sowing for perpetuity, and in beauty because of the kinship of perpetuity and beauty. The eternal is certainly akin to the beautiful, and the eternal nature is that which is primarily beautiful and the things which spring from it are all beautiful too. That, therefore, which does not want to generate suffices more to itself in beauty, but that which desires to create wants to create beauty because of a lack and is not self-sufficient; and, if it does create something of the sort, it thinks it is self-sufficient if it generates in beauty.1 But those who want to generate unlawfully and against nature take their starting point from the course which accords with nature but diverge from it and shp, as we may say, out of the way and he fallen, having failed to recognise where love was leading them, or the impulse of generating, or the right use of an image of beauty, or what absolute beauty is But to return to the main point; those who love beautiful bodies, also with a view to sexual intercourse, love them because they are beautiful, and so do those who love with the mixed love of which

Plato all love up to the highest is essentially productive lep. Symposium 212A). In Plotinus it is not

¹ Throughout this passage Plotinus is trying to follow closely the doctrine of Plato ($Symposium\ 200C\ ft.$), but he has, in fact, introduced an important classife by casangursling, so sharply between the pure love of beauty which does not desire to generate and that which is mixed with desire for perpetuity and so seeks to generate, which he regards as inferior. In

Καὶ ταθτα μέν της ψυχής τα παθήματα.

2. Περὶ δὲ τοῦ δν θεὸν τίθενται οὐ μόνον οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι, ἀλλὰ καὶ θεολόγοι καὶ Πλάτων πολλαχοῦ ᾿Α φροδίτης ¨Ερωτα λέγων καὶ ἔργον αὐτῷ εἰναι καλῶν τε ἔφορον παίδων καὶ δ κινητικὸν τῶν ψυχῶν πρὸς τὸ ἐκεῖ κάλλος, ἢ καὶ ἔπούζειν τὴν ἤδη γενομένην πρὸς τὸ ἐκεῖ ὁρμήν, περὶ τούτοι μάλιστα φιλοσοφητέον καὶ δὴ καὶ ὅσα ἐν Συμποσίῳ εἴρηται παραληπτέον, ἐν οἰς οἰκ (᾿Αφροδίτης φησὶν αὐτὸν γενέσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν〉 ᾿ ᾿Αφροδίτης γενεθλίοις ἐκ τῆς Πενίας καὶ τοῦ 10 Πόρου. Ἔοικε δὲ ὁ λόγος καὶ περὶ τῆς ᾿Αφροδίτης ἀπαιτήσειν τι εἰπεῖν, εἴτ᾽ οῦν ἐξ ἐκεινης εἴτε μετ᾽ ἐκείνης γεγονέναι λέγεται ὁ Ἑρως. Πρωτον

' (Appoblings . . . d) Kirchhoff.

we have spoken; they love women in order to perpctuate themselves, but if the women are not beauti ful they fail in their purpose [of "generating in beauty"]; but the first group [those who love without thought of self-perpetuation, with a pure love of beauty are better; both are claste. But some lovers even worship earthly beauty, and it is enough. for them, but others, those who have recollected the archetype, venerate that higher beauty too, and do not treat this earthly beauty, either, with disrespect, since they see in it the creation and plaything of that other. These lovers, then, are concerned about beauty without any ugliness, but there are others who fall into ugliness and they too do so because of beauty; for in fact the desire of good often involves the fall into evil. So much, then, for the affections of the soul [produced by love].

2. But the Love whom we ought to make the main object of our philosophical discourse is the one whom not only the rest of mankind but those also who give accounts of the gods, and especially Plato make a god; Plato in many places speaks of "Love son of Aphrodite," and says that his work is to be "guardian of beautiful boys" and mover of the soul towards the beauty of the higher world, or also to increase the impulse towards that world which is already there; we must also take into account all that is said in the Banquet, in which he says that Love is not born of Aphrodite but "from Poverty and Plenty at Aphrodite's birthday party." But our discussion seems to require us to say something about Aphrodite, whether Love is said to have been born from her or with her. First, then, who is Aphrodite?

Phaedrus 242D9.

² Phaedrus 265C2-3. ⁰ Symposium 203B-C.

οὖν τίς ἡ ἀφροδίτη; Εἶτα πῶς ἢ ἐξ αὐτῆς ἢ σὺν αὐτῆ ἢ τίνα τρόπον ἔχει τὸν αὐτὸν τὸ ἐξ αὐτῆς 15 τε άμα και σύν αὐτή. Λέγομεν δή τήν Αρροδίτην είναι διττήν, την μενούρανίαν Ούρανοῦ λέγοντες είναι, την δέ έκ Διός και Διώνης, την των τηδε έφαπτομένην έφορον γάμων άμήτορα δε εκείνην καὶ ἐπέκεινα γάμων, ὅτι μηδ' ἐν ούρανῳ γάμοι. Τὴν δὲ οὐρανίαν λεγομένην ἐκ Κρόνου νοῦ ὅντος 20 εκείνου ανάγκη ψυχην βειστάτην είναι εὐθὺς έξ αὐτοῦ ἀκήρατου ἀκηράτου μείνασαν ἄνω. ώς μηδέ είς τὰ τῆδε έλθεῦ μήτε έθελησασαν μήτε δυναμένην [ότι ἡν φύσεως] 1 μὴ κατὰ τὰ κάτω φῦσαν βαίνειν χωριστήν οδσάν τινα υπόστασιν καὶ ἀμέτοχον ύλης 25 οὐσίαν-οθεν αὐτην τούτω ἡνίττοντο, ιῷ ἀμήτορα είναι-ήι δή καὶ θεὸν ἄν τις δικαίως, οὐ δαίμονα είποι άμικτοι οδουν καὶ καθαρὰι ἐφ' ἐαντῆς μένουσαν. Το γάρ εὐθὺς ἐκ νοῦ πεφυκός καθαρον και αὐτό, ἄτε ἰσχύον καθ' έαυτο τῷ έγγυθεν, ἄτε και της επιθυμίας ούσης αυτή και της ιδρύσεως 30 πρός το γεννήσαν ίκανοι ον κατέχειν άνω. όθεν υδδ' τι εππέσοι ψυχή νου εξηρτημένη πολυ μάλλου η ήλιος αν έχοι εξ έαυτοῦ όσον αὐτὸν περιλάμπει φως το έξ αὐτοῦ εἰς αὐτον συνηρτημένοι. Ἐφεπο

1 Sre fr proces del Volkmann, H S

¹ This allegerisation of the cult-titles Copavia and Hárδημοs and the different mythical accounts of the birth of Aphrodite (which has no basis in actual Greek religious practice), appears in the speech of Pausanias in the Symposium (186D) and in Xenophon's Symposium viii, 9–10 Plato himself does not appear to take it very seriously and it plays no important part

Next, we must ask how Love is either born from her or with her, or in what way it applies to the same Love that he is at the same time from her and with her Now we say that Aphrodite is double; one, the heavenly, we say is the "daighter of Heaven," and the other, the one 'bern of Zeus and Dione," takes charge of earthly marriages as their guardian; but that other is "motherless" and above marriages, because there are no marriages in heaven. The heavenly one, since she is said to be the child of Kronos, and he is Intellect, must be the most divine kind of soul springing directly from him, pure from the pure, remaining above, as neither wanting nor being able to descend to the world here below, since it is not according to her nature to come down, since she is a separate reality and a substance without part in matter—for which reason they spoke of her riddlingly in this way, that she was "motherless"; one would be right in speaking of her as a goddess, not as a spirit, since she is unmixed and remains pure by herself. For that which derives its nature immediately from Intellect is itself, too, pure, since it is strong in itself by its nearness, since, too, Soul's desire and its abiding place are close to its parent principle which is strong enough to hold it above; for which reason Soul which is immediately dependent on Intellect could not fall away; it is much more firmly held than the sun holds the light which shines out from himself around him, which comes from him and is closely joined to him. Now since Aphrodite follows upon Kronos-

in the development of his thought about Love in the Symposium. Plotinus finds it useful because it can be made to fit his distinction between higher and lower Soul

μένη δή τῷ Κρόνῳ ἥ, εἰ βούλει, τῷ πατρὶ τοῦ Κρόνου Ουρανῷ ἐνήργησέ τε πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ 35 ῷκειάθη καὶ ἐρασθεῖυα "Ερωτα ἐγέννησε καὶ μετὰ τουτου πρὸς αὐτὸν βλέπει, καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια αὐτῆς ὁπόστασιν καὶ οὐσίαν εἰργάσατο, καὶ ἄμφω ἐκεῖ βλέπει, καὶ ἡ γειναμένη καὶ ὁ καλὸς "Ερας ὁ γεγενημένος ὑπόστασις πρὸς ἄλλο καλὸι ἀεὶ τεταγμένη καὶ τὸ εἶναι ἐν τούτᾳ ἔχουσα μεταξύ 40 ὥσπερ ποθοῦντος καὶ ποθουμένου, ὀφθαλμὸς ὁ τοῦ μοβοῦντος παρέγων μὰν τῶ ἐρῶντι δι' αὐτοῦ τὸ μοβοῦντος παρέγων μὰν τῶ ἐρῶντι δι' αὐτοῦ τὸ

ποθούντος παρέχων μέν τῷ ἐρῶντι δι' αὐτοῦ τὸ όρῶν τὸ ποθούμενον, προτρέχων δὲ αὐτὸς καὶ πρὶν ἐκείνῳ παρασχεῖν τὴν τοῦ όρῶν δι' ὀργάνου δύναμιν αὐτὸς πιμπλάμενος τοῦ θεάματος, πρότερος μέν, οὐ μὴν ὁμοίως ὁρῶν τῷ ἐνστηρίζειν μὲν ἐκείνῳ τὸ ὅρομα, αὐτὸν δὲ κορποῦσθαι τὴν θέαν τοῦ καλοῦ

αύτον παραθέουσαν.

3 Υπόσταπου δε είναι και οὐσίων εξ οὐσίας ελάττω μεν τῆς ποιησυμένης, οὖσαν δε όμως, ἀπιστεῖν οὐ προσήκει. Και γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ ἐκείνη οὐσία ἦν γενομένη εξ ἐνεργείας τῆς πρὸ αὐτῆς [και 6 ζωσα] και τῆς των ὅντων οὐσίας και πρὸς ἐκεῖνο ὁρῶσα, ὅ πρώτη ἦν οὐπία, και σφόδρα ὁρῶσα.¹

1 καὶ ζώσα (glossa) del. Theiler όρώσα Brehier: όρώσης

or, if you like, the father of Kronos, Heaven 1-she directed her activity towards him and fest affinity with him, and filled with passionate love for him brought forth Love, and with this child of hers she looks towards him; her activity has made a real substance, and the two of them look on high, the mother who bore him and the beautiful Love who has come into existence as a reality always ordered towards something else beautiful, and having its being in this, that it is a kind of intermediary between desiring and desired, the eye of the desiring which through its power gives to the lover the sight of the object desired; but Love himself runs on ahead and, before he gives the lover the power of seeing through the organ [of bodily sight], he fills himself with gazing, seeing before the lover but certainly not in the same way, because he fixes the sight firmly in the lover, but himself plucks the fruit of the vision of beauty as it speeds past him

3. We ought not to disbelieve that Love is a reality and a substance sprung from a substance, less than that which made it, but all the same substantially existent. For that higher soul was, certainly, a substance, which came into being from the activity which existed before it, and from the substance of the world of real beings, which also looks towards that which was the first substance, and looks towards it with great intensity. This was its first vision, and

Euthyphro 6A B), which may be one teason why Plotinus shifts the parentage of Aphrod to here—his main reason, however, is that Krones is his normal mythical equivalent for Intellect (ep. V. 1 [10] 4., on which Aphrodite as divine Soul must follow immediately

¹ This shows clearly how little real importance Plotinus attached to myths and their allegorical interpretation. According to Hesiod (*Theogony* 188 ff., Aphrodite sprang from the foam round the severed genitals of Ouranos when they fell into the sea after his castration by Kronos—a story which Plato particularly disliked (cp. Republic II 377E-378A, and

Καὶ πρώτον ήν όραμα αὐτη τοῦτο καὶ ξώρα ώς πρός αγαθόν αὐτῆς καὶ ἔχαιρεν ὁρῶσα, καὶ τὸ δραμα τοιοθτον ήτ, ώς μη πάρεργον ποιείσθαι την θέων το όρων, ώς τή οδον ήδονή και τάσει τή 10 πρός αὐτὸ καὶ σφοδρότητι τῆς θέας γεννήσαι τι παρ' αὐτης ἄξιον αὐτης καὶ τοῦ ὁράματος. Ἐξ οὖι τοῦ ἐνεργοῦντος συντόνοις περί το ὁρώμενον και έκ τοῦ οίον ἀπορρέοντος ἀπὸ τοῦ ὁρωμένου όμμα πληρωθέν, οΐον μετ' είδώλου όρασις, "Ερως έγενετο τάχα που και της προσηγορίος έντειιθεν 15 μᾶλλον αὐτῷ γεγενημένης, ὅτι ἐξ ὁράσεως τὴν υπόστασιν έχει έπεὶ τό γε πάθος άπο τούτου έχοι αν την επωνυμίαν, είπερ πρότερον οὐσία μή ούσιας-καιτοι τό γε πάθος « έραν » λέγεται -καί είπερ « ἔρως αὐτὸν ἔχει τοῦδε », άπλῶς δὲ οὐκ αν λέγοιτο έρως. 'Ο μέν δη της άνω ψυχής "Ερως 20 τοιούτος αν είη, ύρων καὶ αὐτός ἄνω, ἄτε όπαδός ων έκείνης και έξ έκείνης και παρ' έκείνης γεγενημένος καὶ θεῶν ἀρκούμενος θέα. Χωριστήν δὲ έκείνην την ψυχήν λέγοντες την πρώτως έλλαμπουυων του υδρανή, χωριστόν και τον "Ερωτα τούτον θησόμεθα—εὶ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα οὐρανίαν τὴν ψυχὴν 25 είπομεν έπεὶ καὶ ἐν ἡμιν λέγοντες τὸ ἐν ἡμιν αριστον είναι γωριστόν όμως τιθέμεθα αὐτό είναι—

1 επωνυμίαν Crouzer, Η S επιθυμίαν codd

¹ Έρως from δρασις.

The higher soul is called "Heavenly" because it 'II.umnates '(ie. is the immediate source of the forms .u) the visible heaven, but it is not immanent in heaven but trans

it looked towards it as to its own good, and rejoiced in its looking, and the vision was of a kind which made it impossible for the visionary to make its gaze a secondary activity; so that the soul by a kind of delight and intense concentration on the vision and by the passion of its gazing generates something from itself which is worthy of itself and of the vision. So from the power which is intensely active about the object of vision, and from a kind of outflow from that object, Love came to be as an eye filled with its vision, like a seeing that has its image with it; and, I suppose, his name most likely came to him from this, because he derives his real existence from sec ing; 1 for the emotion of love must take its name from him, on the assumption that substance is prior to non-substance—after all it is an emotion that is called 'falling in love"-and if we say "love for this particular person possesses him," but love would not be spoken of without any particular qualification. The Love which belongs to the higher soul, then, would be of this kind, himself, too, looking on high, since he is that soul's follower and has come into being from her and by her, and satisfies himself with the contemplation of the gods. But since we say that that higher soul which primarily illuminates heaven is separate, we shall also make this Love sepa rate-however much we call this soul "heavenly": for, though we say, too, that the best in us men is " in "us, all the same we give it a separate existence."

cends the material universe altogether. In the same way the highest, intellectual, element in us is not really 'we' but separate and transcendent; ep. the nearly contemporary treatuse V 3 [49] 3

4. "Αρ' οῦν καὶ ἐκάστη ψυχὴ ἔχει ἔρωτα τοιοῦτον ἐν οὐσία καὶ ὑποστάσει, "Η διὰ τί ἡ μὲν ὅλη ἔζει καὶ ἡ τοῦ παντὸς ὑποσταπον ἔρωτα, ἡ δὲ ἐκαστον ἡμῶι οῦ, πρὸς δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐν τοῦς ἄλλοις δ ζώρις ἄπασι; Καὶ ἄρα ὁ ἔρως οὖτός ἐστιν ὁ δαμιο ν, ὄν φασιν ἐκάστω σινέπεσθαι, ὁ αὐτοῦ ἐκάστου ἄρως: Οὖτος γὰρ ὰι εῖη καὶ ὁ ἐμποιῶν τὰς ἐπιθυμίας κατὰ φύσιν ἐκάστης τῆς ψυχῆς δριγνωμένης ἀνάλογον ἐκάστης πρὸς τὴν αὐτῆς φύσιν καὶ τὸι ἔρωτα γεννώσης εἴς τε ἀξίαν καὶ 10 πρὸς οὐσίαν. Ἐχέτω δὴ ἡ μὲν ὅλη ὅλον, αὶ δ' ἐν μέρει τὸν αὐτῆς ἐκάστη. Καθ' ὅσον δὲ ἐκάστη πρὸς τὴν ὅλην ἔχει οὐκ ἀποτετμημένη, ἐμπεριεχομένη δὲ, ὡς εἶναι πάσας μίαν, καὶ ὁ ἔρως ἕκαστος

1 abròs Creuzer: abrñs codd

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So he must exist only there above, where the soul which is pure abides. But since this universe, too, had to have a soul, the other Love came to be at once along with it, and is also the eye of this soul, himself, too, produced from desire. And because this Aphrodite belongs to the universe and is not only soul or simply soul, she produced the Love in this universe, who himself, too, immediately takes charge of marriages and, in so far as he, too, possesses the desire for what is above, in the same degree moves the souls of the young, and turns the soul with which he is ranked to higher things, in so far as it, too, is naturally able to come to remembrance of them. For every soul seeks the good, the mixed soul, too, and the individual soul: since it, too, fol lows upon that higher soul and derives from it.

4. Does, then, each individual soul have a love like .tse.f which has a real substantial existence? Now why should the universal soul and the soul of the All have a real love, but not the soul of each of us, and the soul in all other living things as well? And is this love the spirit which, they say, accompanies each of us, the love, that is, that belongs to each of us? For this would be the love which implants the desires appropriate to the nature of each individual soul; the individual soul longs for what corresponds to its own nature, and produces a love which accords with its value and is proportioned to its being. Let us grant, then, that the universal soul has a universal love, and each of the partial sous its own particular love. But in so far as each individual soul in its relation to the whole is not ir a state of being com pletely cut off, but of inclusion in it so that all souls

φαινόμενον πανταχοῦ τοῦ παντὸς οὖ ἄν θέλη, σχηματιζόμενον μέρεσω έαυτοῦ καὶ φανταζόμενον, εἰ θέλοι. Οἴευθαι δὲ χρὴ καὶ ᾿Αψροδίτας ἐν τῷ ὅλω πολλάς, δαίμονας ἐν αὐτῷ γενομένας μετ'

20 "Ερωτος, ρυεισας έξ 'Αφροδίτης τινός όλης, εν μέρει πολλάς έκείνης έξηστημένας μετὰ ίδιων ερώτων, εἴπερ ψυχη μήτηρ έρωτος, 'Αφροδίτη δὲ ψυχή, ἔρως δὲ ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς ἀγαθοῦ ὀριγνωμένης. "Ανων τοίνυν έκάστην οὖτος ὁ ἔρως πρὸς τὴν

25 άγαθοῦ φύσιν ὁ μὰν τῆς ἄνω θεὸς ἃν εἴη, δε ἀεὶ ψυχὴν ἐκείνω συνάπτει, δαίμων δ' ὁ τῆς μεμιγμένης.

5. 'Αλλὰ τίς ἡ δαίμονος καὶ ὅλως ἡ δαιμόνων φιίσις, περὶ ῆς καὶ ἐν Συμποσίφ λέγεται, ἥ τε τῶν ἄλλων καὶ ἡ αὐτου τοὶ "Ερωτος, ὡς ἐκ Πενίας καὶ Πόρου Μήτιδός ἐστι γεγενημένος ἐν τοῖς 'Αφροδίτης γενεθλίοις; Τὸ μὲν οὖν τὸν κόσμον ὑπονοεῖν λέγεσθαι τόνδε τῷ Πλάτωνι τὸν "Ερωτα, ἀλλὰ μὴ

³ For the unity of individual souls in the one soul, see IV. 3 [27] 8, IV. 9 [8], VI. 4 [22] 14.

 2 By this distinction Plotinus reconciles the *Phaedrus*, where Ercs is a god, with the *Sympostum*, where he is a daemon: and also keeps Plato's insight that $t\rho\omega_S$ is not just desire (which must disappear with satisfaction) but something which persists when the lover attains to full fruition and union with

The identification of the god Eros with the whole universe is found in Cornutus (*Theologiae Graecae Compendrum*, ch. 25 (p. 48, 5 9 Lang)): it may be Stoic. Plutarch applies it

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are one,1 so the individual love, too, is related to the universal love; so, then, the partial love accompanies the partial soul, and that great Love accompanies the universal soul, and the love in the All accompanies the All, and is everywhere in it; and, again, this one love becomes and is many loves, appearing everywhere that he wishes in the All, taking shape and assuming appearances in its parts if he wants to. But one must think that there are many Aphrodites in the All, which have come into being in it as spirits along with Love, flowing from an universal Aphrodite, many partial ones depending from that universal one, with their own particular loves- if one assumes, that 18, that soul is the mother of love, and Aphrodite is soul, and love is the activity of soul reaching out after good. So this love here leads each individual soul to the Good, and the love which belongs to the higher soul is a god, who always keeps the soul joined to the Good, but the love of the mixed soul is a spirit 2

5 But what is the nature of this sp.rit and of spirits in general, about which Plato speaks also in the Banquet, the nature of the other spirits, and of Love himself; how is he born of Poverty and Plenty, son of Cunning, at Aphrodite's birthday party? The interpretation that Plato means this universe by Love, but not a part of the universe, the Love that

to the interpretation of the Symposium myth in De Iside et Usinde, ch. 57, 374D-E, where he identifies the parents of Love, Plenty and Poverty, with intelligible reality and matter, which units to form the universe, and assimilates the three to the Egyptian triad (Isiris, Isis, and Hariss—Piotinus, though rejecting the identification of Love with the universe, retains something from this older allegorical interpretation of his parents.

Εἶτα ἀνάγκη, εἴπερ ὁ κόσμος ἐστὶν ἐκ ψυχῆς κοὶ σώματος, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ τοῖ κόσμου ἡ ᾿Αφροδίτη ἐστὶν αὐτῷ, μέρος τὸ κύριον τοῦ Ἔρωτος τὴν ᾿Αφροδίτην εἶναι ἡ, εἶ κόσμος ἡ ψυχή ἐστω αὐτοῦ, εὕσπερ καὶ ἄνθρωπος ἡ ἀνθρώπου ψυχη,

15 τον Έρωτα την 'Αφροδίτην είναι. Είτα δια τί ούτος μεν δαίμων ων δ κόσμος έσται, οι δ' άλλοι δαίμονες—δηλον γὰρ ὅτι ἐκ της αὐτης οὐσίας εἰσίν—οὐ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἔσονται; Καὶ ὁ κύσμος ἔσται σύστασις αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐκ δαιμόνων. 'Ο δὲ ἔψορος

20 καλων παίδων λεχθείς είναι πώς αν ο κόσμος εξη: Τό δε αστρωτον και ανυπόδητον και αστκον πώς αν εφαρμόσειε μη ου γλίσχρως και απαδόντως:

6. 'Αλλὰ τί δὴ χρὴ λέγειν περὶ τοῦ "Ερωτος καὶ τῆς λεγομένης γενέσεως αὐτοῦ; Δῆλον δὴ ὅτι δαῖ λαβεῖν τίς ἡ Πενία καὶ τίς ὁ Πόρος, καὶ πῶς ἀρμόσουσιν οὕτοι γονεῖς εἶναι αὐτῷ. Δῆλοι δὲ ὅτι δεῖ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δαίμοσι τούτους ἀρμόσαι, εἴπερ δεῖ ἀύσιν εἶναι καὶ οὐσίαν μίαν καθο δαιμονες δαιμόνων, εἰ μὴ κοιιὸν ὅνομα ἔξουσι μόνον. Λάβωμεν τούνυν πῃ ποτε διορίζομεν θεοὺς δαιμόνων, καὶ εἰ παλλάκις καὶ δαίμονας θεοὺς λέγομεν εῖναι, ἀλλ' ὅταν γε τὸ μὲν ἔτερον, τὸ δὲ ἔτερον

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grows up naturally within it, contains in itself many contradictions: Plato says that the universe is a " blessed god " and self-sufficient, but he admits that this Love is not a god and not self-sufficient, but always in need. Then again it is necessary, if the universe is composed of soul and body, and Aphrodite is for Plato the soul of the universe, that Approdite should be the most important part of Love, or, if its soul is the universe, as man's soul is man, that Love must be Aphrodite. Then again, why should he, who is a spirit, be the universe, but the other spirits—for .t is obvious that they are of the same substance—not be the universe, themselves too? And the universe then would be nothing but a conglomeration of spirits. And how could a being who is called "guardian of beautiful boys" be the universe? And how would Plato's "bcdless" and "shoeless" and "house.ess" fit this interpretation without being mean and inharmonious?

6. But what, then, are we to say about Love and the account of his birth? It is obvious that we must understand who Poverty is, and who Plenty is, and how they will be appropriate parents for him. It is obvious, too, that these must be appropriate for the other spirits, assuming that spirits as spirits have one single nature and substance—otherwise they will merely have the name in common. Let us, then, understand how we distinguish gods from spirits (even if we do often call spirits gods), at any rate on the occasions when we do speak of each kind of being as

10 λέγωμεν αὐτῶν είναι γένος. Τὸ μὲν δὴ θεῶν άπαθès λέγομεν καὶ νομίζομεν γένος, δαίμοσι δε προστίθεμαν πάθη, αιδίους λέγουτες έφεξης τοίς θεοις, ήδη πρός ήμας, μεταξύ θεών τε και τού ήμετέρου γένους. Πή δή οδυ ούκ έμειναν απαθείς ούτοι, πη δε κατέβησαν τη φίσει πρός το χείρον; 15 Καὶ δή καὶ τοῦτο σκεπτέον, πότερα δαίμων έν τω νοητῶ οὐδὲ εἶς καὶ αὖ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ τῷδε δαίμονες μόνον, θεός δέ εν τω νοητώ άφορίζεται, ή είσ. και ένταθα θεοί και ό κόσμος θεός, ώσπερ σύνηθες λέγειν, τρίτος καὶ οι μέχρι σελήνης έκαστος θεός. Βέλτιον δὲ μηδένα ἐν τῷ νοητῷ 20 δαίμονα λένειν, άλλα καὶ εὶ αὐτοδαίμων, θεὸν και τούτον είναι, και αὐ έν τῷ αἰοθητῷ τοὺς μέχρι σελήνης θεούς τούς όρατούς θεούς δευτέρους μετ' έκείνους και κατ' έκείνους τους νοητούς, έξηρτημέ νους εκείνων, ώσπερ αίγλην περί εκαστον άστρον. Τους δε δαίμονας τί; "Αρά γε ψυχής εν κόσμω 25 γενομένης το αφ' έκάστης ίχνος; Διὰ τί δὲ τῆς έν κόσμω; "Οτι ή καθαρά θεόν γεννά, καὶ θεότ έφαμεν τον ταίτης έρωτα. Πρώτον δή δια τί ου παντες οι δαίμονες έρωτες; Είτα πώς ου καθαρο.

The use of the name $bai\mu over$ for supernatural beings of inferior rank to the gods goes back to Hesiod (Works and Days 122–126). But it was Plato, and still more Xencerates and the Middle Platonists taking up and developing his ideas, who defined the characteristics of these intermediate beings and worked out a regular daemonology, whose main lines Plotinus follows in this chapter

και οὖτοι ΰλης; "Η έρωτες μέν, οι γεννώντα.

ψυγης έφιεμένης του άγαθου και καλού, και

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different from the other.1 Now we speak and think of the race of gods as without affections or passions, but we attribute affections and passions to the spirits; we say that they are eternal next after the gods, but already inclining towards us, between the gods and our race. In what way, then, did they not stay passionless, and in what way did they come down in their nature to a lower level? Then, too we must consider this question whether there is no spirit at all in the intelligible world, and, on the other hand. nothing but spirits in this universe, whether godhead is confined to the intelligible world, or "there are gods here too " and the universe is as we are used to say, a "third god," 2 and each of the beings down to the moon is a god. But it is better not to call any being in the intelligible world a spirit, but, even if there is an .dea of spirit, to call this a god, and, on the other side, to say that the gods in the universe of sense down to the moon, the visible ones, are sec ondary gods which come after and correspond to those higher intelligible gods and depend upon them, like the radiance around every star. But what are the spirits? Are they the trace left by each soul when it enters the universe? But why only of the soul in the universe? Because the pure soul produces a god, and we have affirmed already that its love is a god. Well, then, first of all why are not all spirits loves? Then how does it happen that they, too, are not undefiled by matter? Those are loves who are produced by the soul desiring the good and beautiful, and all the souls in the universe produce this

² The parase comes from Numerius (Test. 24 Leemans = Produs, In Tim. 303, 27-304, 1)

30 γεινώσι πάσαι τούτον τον δαίμονα αί εν τῷδε· οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι δαίμονες ἀπὸ ψυχῆς μεν καὶ οὐτοι τῆς τοῦ παντός, δυτάμεσι δὲ ἐτέραις γειτώμετοι κατὰ χρείαν τοῦ ὅλου συμπληρούσι καὶ συνδιοικούσι ¹ τῷ παντὶ ἔκαστα. "Εδει γὰρ ἀρκεῖν τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ παντὸς τῷ παντὶ γεννήσασαν δυνάμεις δαι

35 μόνων καὶ προσφόρους τῷ ἐαυτῆς ὅλῳ. ᾿Αλλὰ πῶς καὶ τίνος ὕλης μετεχουσω; Οὐ γὰρ δὴ τῆς σωματικῆς, ἢ ζῷα αἰσθητὰ ἔσται. Καὶ γὰρ εἰ σώματα προσλαμβανουσω αέρωνα ἢ πύριτα, ἀλλὰ δεῖ γε πρότερον διάφορον αὐτῶν τὴν φύσω εἶναι, ἵνα καὶ μετάσχωσι σώματος οὐ γὰρ εὐθὸς τὸ

40 καθαμόν πάντη σώματι μίγνυται καίτοι πολλοίς δοκεί ή οὐσία τοῦ δαίμονος καθ' ὅσον δαίμων μετά τινος σώματος ἢ ἀέρος ἢ πυρός εἶναι. 'Αλλὰ διὰ τί ἡ μὲι σώματι μίγνυται, ἡ δὲ οὔ. εἰ μή τις εἵη τῆ μιγνυμένη αἰτία; Τίς οὖν ἡ αἰτία; "Υλην δεῖ

45 νοητὴν ὑποθέσθαι, ΐνα τὸ κοινωνῆσαν ἐκείνης ήκη κα. εἰς ταύτην τὴν των σωμάτων δι' αὐτῆς.

7. Διὸ καὶ ἐν τῆ γενέσει τοῦ Ἑρωτος ὁ Πλάτων φησὶ τὸν Πόρον τὴν μέθην ἔχειν τοῦ νέκταρος οἴνου οὕπω ὄντος, ὡς πρὸ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ

ουμπληρούσε καὶ συνδιοικούσε Kreihoff συμπληρούσει καὶ συνδιοικούσει codd

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spirit. But the other spirits come, they, too, from the soul of the All, but are produced by other powers according to the need of the All; they help to complete it, and along with the All govern individual things. For the soul of the All had to provide adequately for the All by producing powers which are those of spirits and peneficial to its totality. But now do they participate in matter, of any sort at all? Obviously not in bodily matter, or they will be perceptible living creatures. Even if they do take as well bodies of air or fire,1 their nature must certainly have been different before, to give them any possibility of participating in body. For that which is altogether pure does not directly combine with body; though many people think that a body of air or fire is included in the substantial nature of a spirit in so far as it is a spirit. But why does one substance combine with body and another not, unless there is something responsible for the combination in the case of one that combines? What, then, is responsible? One must suppose an intelligible matter, in order that a being which has a share in it may come to this matter here of bodies by means of it.2

7. Therefore, too, in the story of the birth of Love Plato says that Plenty "was drunk with nectar, as wine did not yet exist," meaning that Love came

pnyry, De Abstinentia II. 39. Belief in these bodies was general among Platonists of the 2nd century A.D. and later, and may ultimately derive from Posicionius,

¹ For dammonic bedies made of the very best air, see Apulei us, De Deo Socratis, ch. 11 (the whole areatise is one of the best examples of vulgar Platonic daemonology); also Por-

² This idea that participation in "intelligible matter" is an intermediate stage between complete incorporcality and material embodiment is imparableled in Pictinis. For his normal thought on the subject see especially II. 4 [12] 3–5 and 15

τοῦ "Ερωτος νενομένου καὶ τῆς Πενίας μετεχούσης 5 φυσεως νοητοῦ, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰδώλου νοητοῦ οὐδ έμειθει εμφαντασθέντος, άλλ' έκει γενομένης και στιμμιχθείσης ώς έξ είδους καὶ ἀοριστίας, ην $\langle \hat{\eta} v \rangle^{-1}$ έχουσα ή ψυχή πρίν τυχείν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, μαντευομένη δέ τι είναι κατά άδοιστον καὶ ἄπειρον φάντασμα, την υπόστασιν του "Ερωτυς τεκούσης. Λόγος οὖν γενόμενος ἐν οὐ λογω, ἀορίστω δὲ 10 εφέσει καὶ ὑποστάσει ἀμυδρᾶ, ἐποίησε τὸ γενόμενον ου τέλεον ουδέ ίκανον, έλλιπες δε, άπε έξ εφέσεως αορίστου και λόγοι ίκανου γεγενημένον. Και έστι λόγος ούτος οὐ καθαρός, ἄτε έχων ἐν αύτῷ ἔφεσιν αοριστον καὶ άλογον καὶ άπειρον οὐ γὰρ μήποτε 18 πληρώσεται έως αν έχη έν αυτώ την του αορίστου φυσιν. Έξήρτηται δε ψυχής ώς εξ εκείνης μεν γενόμενος ως άρχης, μίγμα δὲ ων ἐκ λόγου οὐ μείναντος εν αυτώ, άλλα μιχθέντος ποριστία, ουκ αυτού ανακραθέντος έκείνη, άλλα του έξ αυτον έκείνη. Και έστιν ο έρως οίον οίστρος άπορος 20 τη ξαυτού φύσει διό καὶ τυγχάνων ἄπορος πάλιν ου γάρ έχει πληρούσθαι διά το μή έχειν

1 (fr, H S2

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into existence before the world of sense, and that Poverty had intercourse with an intelligible nature, not merely with an image of the intelligible or an imagination derived from it, but she was there in the intelligible and united with it, and bore the substance of Love made from form and indefiniteness, the indefiniteness which the soul had before it attained the Good, while it was divining that there was something there by an indefinite, unlimited imagination. Therefore, since a rational principle came to be in something which was not rational, but an indefinite impulse and an obscure expression, what it produced was something not complete or sufficient, but defective, since it came into being from an indefinite impulse and a sufficient rational principle. So Love is not a pure rational principle, since he has in himself an indefinite, irrational, unbounded impulse; for he will never be satisfied, as long as he has in him the nature of the indefinite 1. He depends on soul in such a way that he comes from it as his origin, but is a mixture of a rational principle which did not stay in itself but was mingled with indefiniteness it was not the rational principle itself which was mixed with it but that which came from it. And Love is like a "sting," without resources in his own nature; therefore, even when he attains his object he is without resources again; 3 he cannot be estisfied because

The conception of intelligible matter here is much closer to Plotinus's normal thought than that remarked on in the last chapter. The idea that the soul's Love has a radical incompleteness, a permanent incapacity to be satisfied, because of the "material" element in it goes rather beyond anything else in the Enneads (it is, of course, unavoidable if the Symposium is to be interpreted in this way). It has, however, something in common with the account of the "restless power" in soul which produces time in III. 7 [45] 11.

³ Phaedrus 240D I.

Intellect, on the other hand, 'always desires and always attains', and the One neither desires, for it has nothing to doore, nor attains (πους εξιμένι με τῷ μῷ ἡ ἔψευς και ἐψιέμενος λεί και ἀκι τηνχάνων, ἐκεῖνος δὲ οῦτε ἐψιέμενος—τίνος γάρ, οὕτε τηχάνων, ΙΤΙ. 8[30] II 23-25).

το μίγμα μόνον γὰρ πληροίται ἀληθῶς, ὅτιπερ καὶ πεπλήρωται τῇ ἐαυτοῦ φύσει ὁ δὲ διὰ τὴν συνοῦσαι ἔνδειαν ἐψιιται, κᾶι παραχρῆμα πληρωθῷ οὐ στέγει ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἀμήχανον ¹ αὐτῷ διὰ τὴν 20 ἔνδιαν, τὸ δὲ ποριστικὸι διὰ τὴν τοῦ λόγοι φύσιν.

Δεί δὲ καὶ πᾶν τὸ δαιμονιον τοιοῦτον νομίζειν καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων καὶ γὰρ ἔκαστον ἐφ' ῷ τέτακται ποριστικόν έκείνοι καὶ έφιεμενον εκείνου καί συγγενές και τούτη τω "Ερωτι και ού πληρες ούδ' 30 αὐτό, ἐφιέμενον δέ τινος τῶν ἐν μέρει ὡς ἀγαθῶν "Οθεν καὶ τοὺς ἐνταθθα ἀγαθούς, ὃν ἔγουσιν ἔρωτα, τοῦ ἀπλῶς ἀναθοῦ καὶ τοῦ ὄντως ἔχειι οὐκ ἔρωτά τινα έχοντας τούς δέ κατ' άλλους δαίμονας τεταγμένους κατ' άλλον καὶ άλλον δαίμονα τετάχθαι ου άπλως είχου άργου άφέντας, ένεργούντας δε κατ' 35 άλλοι δαίμονα, δι είλοντο κατά τὸ σύμφωνον μέρος του ένεργούντος έν αὐτοίς, ψυχής. Οἱ δέ κακών εφιέμενοι ταίς κακαίς έγγενομέναις έπιθυμίαις ἐπέδησαν πάντας τούς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔρωτας είσπερ και λόγον τον δρθόν, όστις σύμφυτος. κακαίς ταις επιγενομέναις δόξαις. Οι μέν οὖτ 40 φύσει έρωτες και κατά φύσιν καλοί: και οι μέν

1 ἀμήχανον K.rehhoff. εὐμήχανον codd, Η S.

¹ I read here ἀμήχανον with Kirchhoff and other editors, and iding Harder ² (see Theiler's note ad loc.). Henry Schwyzer rotain the MSS εὐμηχανοι and remark sollection, non inhabitem fact indigentia. But this would make both parents provide Love with essentially the same quality, ability to get what he wanted, instead of with two opposed qualities, as the sense requires; and in the allusion to the myth in III. 6 [20] 14.

the mixed thing cannot be; only that is truly satisfied which has already attained full satisfaction in its own nature; but Love because of his intimate deficiency is impelled to longing, and even if he is for the moment satisfied, he does not hold what he has received, since his powerlessness comes from his deficiency, but his ability to provide for himself from his rational nature.

But one must consider that the whole race of spirits is like this and comes from parents of this kind; for every spirit is able to provide himself with that to which he is ordered, and impelled by desire for it, and akin to Love in this way too, and is like him, too, in not being satisfied but impelled by desire for one of the partial things which he regards as goods. For this reason we must consider, too, that the love which good men in this world have is a love for that which is simply and really good, not just any kind of love. but that those who are ordered under other spirits are ordered under different ones at different times, leaving their love of the simply good moperative, but acting under the control of other spirits, whom they chose according to the corresponding part of that which is active in them, the soul. But those who are impelled by desire for evil things have fettered all the loves in them with the evil passions that have grown up in their souls just as hey have fettered their right reason, which is inborn in them, with the evil opinions which have grown upon them. So, then, the loves which are natural and according to nature are fair and good; and the

it is Pienty who is πράγμα εὐμήχανον (l. .7). (Dr. Schwyzer now agrees.)

ελάττονος ψυχης ελάττους είς άξίαν και δύναμα, οί δὲ κρείττους, πάντες ἐν οὐσία. Οί δὲ παρὰ φύσιν σφαλέντων πάθη ταθτα και οὐδαμή οὐσία οίδε ύποστάσεις οὐσιώδεις οὐ παρὰ ψυχής ἔτι 45 γεννώμενα, άλλὰ συνυφιστάμενα κακία ψιχῆς όμοια γεννώσης εν διαθεσεσι και έξεσαν ήδη. Καὶ γαρ όλως κινδυνεύει τὰ μέν ἀγαθὰ τὰ ἀληθη κατὰ φύσιν ψυχής ένεργούσης έν ώρισμένοις οὐσία είναι, τα δ' άλλα οὐκ έξ αὐτῆς ἐνεργεῖν, οὐδὲν δ' άλλο ή πάθη είναι ωσπερ ψευδή νοήματα οὐκ ἔγοντα τὰς 50 ὖτ' αὐτὰ οὐσίας, καθάπερ τὰ ἀληθή ὄντως καὶ άιδια καὶ ώρισμένα όμοῦ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ νοητὸν και τὸ είναι έχοντα οὐ μόνον έν τω απλως, άλλα καὶ ἐν ἐκάστω περὶ τὸ νοητὸι ὅντως καὶ νοῦν τὸν έν έκάστω, εί δεί 1 καὶ έν έκάστω ήμῶν τιθεσθαι καθαρώς νόησιν και νοητόν και μή δμού και 55 ήμων τούτο καὶ άπλως—δθεν καὶ τῶν ἀπλῶν ήμιν ὁ έρως καὶ γὰρ αἱ νοήσεις καὶ εἴ τινος τῶν έν μέρει, κατά συμβεβηκός, ώσπερ, εί τόδε τὸ τρίγωνον, δύο όρθας θεωρεί, καθ' όσον απλώς τρίγωνον.

8. 'Αλλά τίς δ Ζεύς, οὖ τον κῆπον λέγει, εἰς οῦν εἰσῆλη εν οἱ Πόρος, καὶ τις οἱ κῆπος οὐτος;

1 cl &cî Dodde, H-S2: eiles codd

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loves of a lesser soul are less in worth and power, but those [of a better soul] are more; both are real substantial loves. But the loves which are against nature, these are passive affections of the perverted and are not in any way substance or expressions of substantial realities, and are not any longer products of the soul but have come into existence together with the vice of a soul which now produces things like itself in its dispositions and states. For it is likely in general that the true goods, which are in accordance with the nature of a soul active among things defined and limited, are substance, but the others [evils] are not acts which the soul produces from itself but are nothing else but passive affections; they are like false thoughts which have no substantial realities as their bases, as really true thoughts which are everlasting and definite have thinking and object of thought and existence all together, not only in the act of thought taken simply and absolutely, but in each individual act concerned with the real object of thought and the mind in each individual; if, indeed, we are to assume that in each one of us thinking and object of thought exist in a pure state—and yet they are not together and this state [of unity of thought and object of thought] does not belong to us and our thinking is not simple: hence our love is of simple realities, for so are our thoughts; and if we love one of the partial things this is neidental, just as, if according to the theorem this particular triangle has the sum of its angles equal to two right angles, it is in so far as it is simply a triangle.1

8. But who is Zous, whose "garden" Plato says it is "into which Plenty came," 2 and what is this

¹ This example is taken from Aristotle, who uses it frequently, e.g. Metaphysics Δ 30, 1025a, 32
⁵ Symposium 203B 5-6.

'Η μέν γὰρ 'Αφρυδίτη ψυχὴ ἢ, ἡμῖι, λόγος δὲ ελέγετο των πάντων ὁ Πόρος. Ταῦτα δὲ τί δεῖ 5 τίθεσθαι, του Δία και του κήπου ούτου; Ούδε γάρ ψυγήν δεί τίθεσθαι τὸν Δία τὴν 'Αφροδίτην τοῦτο θέντας. Δεί δή λαβείν και ένταθθα παρά Πλάτωνος τὸν Δία ἐκ μὲν Φαίδρου ἡγεμόνα μέγαν λέγοντος αύτου τουτον τόν θεόν, έν άλλοις δέ τρίτον, οίμαι, τοῦτον σαφέστερον δὲ ἐν τῷ Φιλήβω, ἡνικ' ἂν 10 φη έν τω Διὶ είναι βασιλικήν μέν ψυχήν, βασιλικόν δέ νοῦν. Εί οὖν ὁ Ζεὺς νοῦς ἐστι μέγας καὶ ψυχὴ καὶ ἐν τοῖς αἰτίοις τάττεται, κατὰ δὲ τὸ κρεῖττον δεῖ τάττειν διά τε τὰ ἄλλα καὶ ὅτι αίτιον καὶ τὸ βασιλικὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ ἡγούμενον, ὁ μέν έυ αι κα ά τον νούι, ή δε 'Αφροδίτη αὐτού 15 οδυα καὶ εξ αὐτοῦ και οὺν αὐτῷ κατὰ τὴν ψυγὴν τετάξεται κατά τὸ καλὸν καὶ άγλαὸν και τὸ τῆς ψυχής άκακον καὶ άβρὸν 'Αφροδίτη λεχθείσα. Καὶ γὰρ εἰ κατὰ μὲν τὸι νοθν τοὺς ἄρρενας τάστομεν τῶν θεών, κατὰ δὲ τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν τας θηλείας λέγομεν, ώς ιῶ ἐκάστω ψυχῆς 20 συνούσης, είη ἄν καὶ ταύτη ή ψυχή τοῦ Διὸς ή 'Αφροδίτη πάλω μαρτυρούντων τούτω τῷ λόγω ιερέων καὶ θεολόγων, οι εἰς ταὐτὸν "Ηραν καὶ 'Αφροδίτην ἄγουσι καὶ τὸν τῆς 'Αφροδιτης ἀστέρα έν ούρανω Ήρας λέγουσιν.

garden? Now Aphrodite was for us the soul, and we said that Plenty was the rational principle of all things. But what are we to make of these, Zens and his garden? For we must not make Zeus the soul, since this is what we have made Aphrodite. Here too, certainly, we must take our understanding of Zeus from Plato, from the Phaedrus where he says that this god is a "great leader," I but elsewhere he says, I think, that Zeus is the third 2 but he is clearer in the Philebus, when he says that there is in Zeus " a royal soul and a royal intellect." 3 If, then, Zeus is a great intellect and soul and is ranked among the causes, and we must rank him on the higher level. for other reasons and particularly because the epithets "royal" and 'leading "mean "cause," he will be on the level of Intellect,4 and Aphrodite, who is his daughter and comes from him and is with him, will be ranked on the level of soul, being called Aphrodite Lecause of the beauty and brightness and innocence and delicacy of soul. And, then, if we rank the male gods on the level of Intellect, and speak of the female gods as being their souls, since each intellect is accompanied by a soul, in this way, too, Aphrodite would be the soul of Zeus; and, again, priests and theologians bear witness to this interpretation, who make Hera and Aphrod.te one and the same and call the star of Aphrodite in heaven the star of Hera.5

Phaedrus 246E4.

² Letter II. 312E4 (this passage, one of the foundations of Plotinus's interpretation of Plato, is quoted in full in the next treatise in the chronological order, i. 8 [51] 2. 28-32)

³ Philobus 30D 1 2.

⁴ In ch 2 of this treatise, and elsewhere, Kronos is Intellect. This passage shows again how little real importance Plotinus attaches to the interpretation of mythe, and also how closely, at times, he is prepared to assimilate higher Soul to Intellect.

9. 'Ο οὖν Πόρος λόγος ὧν τῶι ἐν τῷ νοητῷ καὶ νῷ καὶ μᾶλλον κεχυμένος καὶ οἶον ἀπλωθεὶς περὶ ψυχήν αν γένοιτο και εν ψυχή. Το γάρ εν νώ συνεσπειραμένον, καὶ οὐ παρὰ ἄλλου εἰς αὐτόν, 5 τούτω δὲ μεθύοντι ἐπακτὸν τὸ τῆς πληρώσεως. Τό δ' έκει πληρούμενον τοῦ νέκταρος τί αν είη η λόγος ἀπό κρειττονος ἀρχής πεσώι είς ελάττονα, *Εν οδν τῆ ψυχη ἀπὸ νοῦ ὁ λόγος οδτος, ὅτε ἡ 'Αφροδίτη λέγεται γεγονέναι, εἰσρυείς εἰς τὸν κῆπον αὐτοῦ. Κήπος δὲ πᾶς ἀγλάισμα καὶ πλυύτου 10 έγκαλλώπισμα. 'Αγλαίζεται δὲ τὰ τοῦ Διὸς λόγω, καί τὰ καλλωπίσματα αὐτοθ τὰ παρά τοῦ νοῦ αύτου είς την φυχήν ελθύνια λγλαίοματα. "Η τί αν είη ο κήπος του Διός η τα αγάλματα αὐτου καί τὰ ἀγλαίσματα; Τί δ' ᾶν εἴη τὰ ἀγλαίσματα αθτού και τὰ κοσμήματα ἢ οί λόγοι οί παρ' 15 αὐτοῦ ρυέντες; "Ομοῦ δὲ οἱ λόγοι ὁ Πόρος, ή εὐπορία καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος τῶν καλῶν, ἐν ἐκφάνσει ήδη καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ μεθύειν τῷ νέκταρι. Τί γὰρ θεοῖς νέκταρ ἢ ὁ τὸ θεῖον κομίζεται; Κομίζεται δὲ τὸ ὑποβεβηκὸς νοῦ λόγον νοῦς δὲ ἐαυτὸν ἔχει

ι πληρούμενου K.rchhoff: πληρούν codd H S.

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9. Plenty, then, since he is a rational principle in the intelligible world and in Intellect, and since he is more diffused and, as it were, spread out, would be concerned with soul and in soul. For that which is in Intellect is contracted together, and nothing comes to it from anything else, but when Plenty was drunk his state of being filled was brought about from outside But what could that which is flled 2 with nectar in the higher world be except a rational principle which has fallen from a higher origin to a lesser one? So this principle is in Soul and comes from Intellect, flowing into his garden when Aphrodite is said to have been born. And every garden is a glory and devoration of wealth; and the property of Zeus is glorified by rational principle, and his decorations are the glories that come from Intellect itself into the soul. Or what could the garden of Zeus be but his images in which he takes delight and his glories? And what could his glories and adornments be but the rational principles which flow from him? The rational principles all together are Plenty, the plenitude and wealth of beauties, already manifested; and this is the being drunk with nectar For what is nectar for the gods but that which the divinity acquires? And that which is on the level below Intellect acquires rational principle; but Intellect

² I read here Kirchhoff's πληρούμενον (adopted by Cilento and Harder ²) which the sense plainly seems to require. Henry Schwyzor retain the MSS πληροῦν which the free paraphrase in Ambrose (De Bono Mortis 5, 19, dividis horti in quo repletus potu sacaret Porus qui nectar effunderat), on the whole seems to support. It is just possible that πληροῦν may have been a slip by Plotinus nimself.

¹ For the 'contraction' or concentrated unity of Intellect as contrasted with the relative diffusion of Soul or the λόγος in Soul op III 7 [45] 11 23 ff and III 2[47] 2 17 ff. In this passage Protinus shows the same care to distinguish between pure Intellect and the intellectual in Soul that he does in the nearly contemporary treatise V 3 [49].

1 prévios Kirchhoff, H S2: prévies codd

επληρώθη βεβαρημένος. Ζωής δε φανείσης καί

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possesses itself in satiety and is not drank with the possession. For it does not possess anything from outside. But the rational principle, the product and expression of Intellect, coming after Intellect and no longer belonging to it, but being in something else, is said to he in the garden of Zeus, lying there at the time when it is said that Aphrodite came into existence in the realm of being.

But myths, if they are really going to be myths, must separate in time the things of which they tell. and set apart from each other many realities which are together, but distinct in rank or powers at points where rational discussions, also, make generations of things ungenerated, and themselves, too, separate things which are together; 1 the myths, when they have taught us as well as they can, allow the man who has understood them to put together again that which they have separated. Here is the putting together [of the myth of Eros]. Soul, which is with Intellect and has come into existence from Intellect, and then again been filled with rational principles and, .tself beautiful. adorned with beauties and filled with plenitude, so that there are in 't many glories and images of all beautiful things, is as a whole Aphrodite, and the rational principles in it are all plenitude and Plenty, as the nectar there flows from the regions shove; and the glories in it, since they are set in life, are called the "garden of Zeus," and it is said 2 that Plenty "sleeps" there, "weighed down" by the principles with which he was filled,

(λόγοι and μέθοι) to each other to his own metaphysical discussions: cp. VI 7[38] 35, 27 30

* Symposium 203B 5-7.

¹ Plotinus is prepared to apply this penetrating observation of the closeness of metaphysical and mythical discourses

ούσης ἀεὶ ἐν τοῖς ούσιν ἐστιασθαι οἱ θεοὶ λένονται ώς αν έν τοιούτη μακαριότητι όντες. 40 'Αεί δε ούτως υπέστη όδε εξ άναγκης έκ τῆς ψυχης έφέσεως τρός το κρείττον καὶ άγαθόν, καὶ ην αεί, εξ ούπερ καὶ ψυχή, "Ερως. "Εστι δ' ούτος μικτόν τι χρημα μετέχου μέν ένδείας, ή πληροϊσθαι θέλει, οὐκ ἄμοιρον δὲ εὐπορίας, ή οὖ ἔχει τὸ έλλειπον ζητεί οὐ γὰρ δη τὸ πάμπαν άμοιρον τοῦ 45 άγαθοῦ τὸ άγαθὸν ἄν ποτε ζητήσειει. Ἐκ Πόρου οδι καὶ Πενίας λέγεται είναι, ή ή έλλειψις καὶ ή έφεσις καὶ τῶν λόγων ἡ μνήμη όμου συνελθόντα έν ψυχή έγευνησε την ενέργειαν την προς το άγαθόν, ἔρωτα τοῦτον ὅντα. Ἡ δὲ μήτηρ αὐτῷ Πενία, ὅτι ἀεὶ ἡ ἔφεσις ἐιδεοῦς. "Υλη δὲ ἡ Πενία, 50 ότι και ή ύλη ένδεης τὰ πάντα, και τὸ ἀόριστον τῆς τος άγαθος επιθυμίας—οὐ γάρ μορφή τις οὐδὲ λόγος εν τω εφιεμένω τούτου-ύλικωτερον τὸ έφιέμενον καθ' όσον εφίεται ποιεί. Τό δε πρός αθοδ είδος έστι μύνον έν αθτώ μένον καὶ δέξασθαι 55 δε εφιέμενον ύλην τῷ ἐπιόντι τὸ δεζίμενον παρασκευάζει. Οθτω τοι δ "Ερως ύλικός τίς έστι, και δαίμων οδτός έστιν έκ ψυχής, καθ' ὅσον έλλείπει τῷ ἀγαθῷ, ἐφίεται δέ, γεγενημένος.

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And since life has appeared, and is always there, in the world of realities, the gods are said to "feast "1 since they are in a state of blessedness appropriate to the word. And so this being, Love, has from everlasting come into existence from the soul's aspiration towards the higher and the good, and he was there always, as long as Soul, too, existed. And he is a mixed thing, having a part of need, in that he wishes to be filled, but not without a share of plenitude, in that he seeks what is wanting to that which he al ready has: for certainly that which is altogether without a share in the good would not ever seek the good. So he is said to be born of Plenty and Poverty, in that the lack and the aspiration and the memory of the rational principles coming together in the soul, produced the activity directed towards the good, and this is Love. But his mother is Poverty, because aspiration belongs to that which is in need. And Poverty is matter, because matter, too, is in every way in need, and because the indefiniteness of the desire for the good for there is no shape or rational forming principle in that which desires .t-makes the aspiring thing more like matter in so far as it aspires. But the good, in relation to that which aspires to it, is form only, remaining in itself and that which aspires to receive it prepares its receptive capacity as matter for the form which is to come upon it So Love is a material kind of being, and he is a spirit produced from soul in so far as soul falls short of the good but aspires to it.

¹ Symposium 203B 2.

III. 6. ON THE IMPASSIBILITY OF THINGS WITHOUT BODY

Introductory Note

This treatise is No. 26 in Porphyry's chronological order, and so comes immediately before the great treatise On The Problems of the Soul (divided by Porphyry into two, IV. 3 [27] and IV. 4 28].) Plotmus was, it seems, at this time much concerned with questions of psychology, and in the first part of the treatise (chs 1-5) he sets out to show that the soul is not subject to affections or modifications. In the second part (chs. 6-19), he turns to consider a very different kind of impassibility, that of matter. The two parts of the treatise appear at first sight to have little connection with each other. But there is no doubt that Plotinus himself composed them as parts of a single work, as no refers back to the first part in the second (9.6). And there is more connection between them than may appear at first sight. What Plotinus is primarily concerned with in this treadse is to work out and display the implications of meorpareality, to exclude from philosophy ways of speaking and thinking about incorporeal things as subject to impressions, modifications or contaminations which really imply that they are corporcal (like the Stoic God and soul). And matter, for both Platonists and Aristotel ians, is, of course, incorporeal. In the first part, where Plotinus is concerned to snow that soul is impassible because incorporeal, he is able to use Aristotelian ideas in combating Store corporealism. But in the second part he quiters sharply from Aristotle and goes, as far as we con tell, well beyond any earlier Platonists (and certainly beyond his own earlier discussion of matter in II. 4 [12]) in

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his assertion that matter is absolutely impassible in the sense that it is not affected, modified or changed in any way by the forms which enter it, which are themselves he maintains, mere ghosts of form, powerless to act on it. Here again there is a connection of thought with the first part of the treatise Plotinus's assertion of the im passibility of incorporeal soul is an essential part of his general assertion of the primacy and radical independence of soul, his insistence that it is solely responsible for such reality as there is in this world, and is always active in and never passive to and affected by bodies; this is fundamental to his whole way of thinking about man and how he ought to live. And the presentation of matter as radically impassible, totally unaffected by form, carries with it the converse, that matter is utterly powerless in any way to affect or capture form. And the picture of the physical world as a world of ghosts in a vacuum, where phantoms of form flit in and out like reflections in a non-existent mirror serves to emphasise its mability to affect soul in any way. (Soul and matter are several times compared and contrasted in the second part of the treatise). Some readers may feel, by the time they reach the end of the treatise. that Plotinus has made matter not only impassible but impossible: that is, that his elimination of even the idea of positive potency has left the concept without any content at all, has made "matter' only a meaningless word. But not only in this treatise but to the end of his life (see the treatise On What are and Whence Come Evils I. 8 [51]) he insists on the necessity of postulating matter, mainly m order that, by its utter negativity and total mespacity to receive any degree of good, it may provide an explanation of evil.

Synopsis

A. The impassibility of soul. General statement of the position to be maintained, soul, being incorporeal, cannot

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be affected or modified like a body, though difficulties arise about vice and error ich. 1). Discussion of vice. rejection of the theory that virtue and vice are just harmony and disharmony of the different parts of the soul: each part must have its own virtue, which is, essentially, seeing reason: the passage from virtue to vice and vice to virtue involves no intrinsic alteration in the soul parts (ch. 2). Discussion of emotions: distinction between the body-element and the soul element; the soul moves itself, but is not moved or affected by the emotions (ch. 3). The part of the soul subject to affections relation between opmions, mental images and bodily disturbances: soul is form, and form is not affected or disturbed by what goes on in that which it informs (ch. 4). What, then, is meant by philosophical purification, freeing the soul from affections? Waking up the soul from its bad dreams, freemg it from distracting mental pictures and turning from the things below to those above (ch. 5).

B. The impossibility of matter Matter too, is somehing incorporeal. Real being is immaterial, eternal, mchanging, living intellect. Resistance, obstruction, hardness, aggressive corporeality are signs of lack of being and life: and the more a thing is a body, the more it is affected. To think that bodies are real s an illusion, a dream from which we should wake up (ch. 6). Matter is truly non-being, nothing but a ghost; and the forms which pass through it are ghosts too; they cannot act and it is not acted on (cn. 7). Things which are affected are affected by their opposites, and affection is the way to destruction: but matter is indestructible (.h. 8) If a thing is present in or to something else it does not necessardy affect it: matter has no opposite, and is therefore not affected by anything (ch. 9). If matter was altered or affected it would no longer be able to receive all forms (ch. 10). Exegesis of Timacus 50 B-C. How the forms are in matter without altering it and making it beautiful and

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good instead of ugly and bad (ch. 11). Plate's real thought. rather cursorily expressed, is that matter is not affected by form in any way at all, receives neither shape nor size nor anything else, because it is not a body (ch. 12). What is meant by saying that matter "tries to escape" from form, and that it is "the receptacle and nurse of all becoming." The ghostly forms in the falsity of matter are like reflections in an invisible and formless mirror (ch 13 Matter is the medium in which images of real being quasi-exist, the "Poverty" of the Symposium, always begging for what it can never really have, like a reflecting surface which concentrates rays on its outside (ch. 14). Analogies, and differences, between the mental pictures in soul and the phantoms in matter; soul is something, and has its own power to deal with its images, matter is nothing and has no power (ch. 15). Matter and size. size comes with form and is form, matter has only false size, not true size (chs. 16-18). Matter like soul contains all forms, but not all together, like soul, but divided 'ch. 18). The forms do matter neither harm nor good. Matter is only a "mother" in a manner of speaking, for it brings forth nothing and is only a passive receptacle (as the mother is according to one theory. The ithyphallic Hermes is a symbol of the generative power of the logos; the sunuchs who accompany the Great Mother symbolise the sterility of matter (ch. 19)

III. 6. (26) ΠΕΡΙ ΤΗΣ ΑΠΑΘΕΊΑΣ ΤΩΝ $\mathbf{A}\mathbf{\Sigma}\mathbf{\Omega}\mathbf{M}\mathbf{A}\mathbf{T}\mathbf{\Omega}\mathbf{N}$

1. Τάς αλοθήσεις οὐ πάθη λέγοντες είναι, ένεργείας δε περί παθήματα καὶ κρίσεις, τῶν μέν παθων περί άλλο γινομένων, οδον τό σώμα φέρε τὸ τοιόνδε, τῆς δὲ κρίσεως περί τὴν ψυχήν, οὐ τῆς 5 κρισεως πάθους ούσης—έδει γάρ αδ άλλην κρίπιν γίνεσθαι καὶ ἐπαναβαίνειι κεὶ εἰς ἄπειρου-εἴχομεν οὐδὲν ήττον καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἀπορίαν, εἰ ἡ κρίσις ή κρισις οὐδέν ἔχει τοῦ κρινομένου. "Η, εἰ τύπου έχοι, πέπονθεν. "Ην δ' δμως λέγειν καὶ περὶ τών καλουμένων τυπώσεων, ώς δ τρόπος όλως έτερος 10 ή ώς υπείληπται, όποῖος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν νοήσεων ένεργειών και τούτων οὐσών γινώσκειν ἄνευ τοῦ παθείν τι δυναμένων· καὶ όλως ὁ λόγος ήμιν καὶ τὸ βούλημα μὴ ὑποβαλεῖ 1 τροπαῖς καὶ ἀλλοιώσεσι την ψυχην τοιαύταις, όποῖαι αἱ θερμάνσεις καὶ 16 ψύζεις σωμάτων. Καὶ τὸ παθητικου δὲ λεγήμενου αὐτῆς ἔδει ίδεῖν καὶ ἐπισκέψασθαι, πότερα καὶ

1 ψποβαλείν Ficinus, Η-S· ψπολαβείν codd.

III. 6. ON THE IMPASSIBILITY OF THINGS WITHOUT BODY

1. We say that sense-perceptions are not affections but activities and judgements concerned with affections; affections belong to something else, say, for instance, to the body qualified in a particular way, but the judgement belongs to the soul, and the judgement is not an affection—for if it was, there would have to be yet another judgement, and we should have to go back for ever to infinity. None the less we had a problem at this point, whether the judgement in so far as it is a judgement has nothing in it of what is judged. If it has an impression of it, then it has been affected. But it would, all the same, be possible to say also about what are called the impressions, that their character is quite different from what has been supposed,1 and is like that which is also found in acts of thought, these, too, are activities which are able to know without being affected in any way; and in general our reasoned intention is not to subject the soul to changes and al terations of the same kind as heatings and coolings of bodies.2 And we ought to survey the part of the soul which is said to be subject to affections, and consider whether we shall grant this, too, to be unchangeable,

¹ By the Stoics. cp., e.g., Stoicorum Veterum Fragmento I 141 and 494, II 55

 $^{^2}$ This again is an allusion to the Stoic view: cp. Stoic. Vet. Fr I 234 and III 459

τοῦτο ἄτρεπτον δώσομεν, ἢ τούτω μύνω τὸ πάσχειν συγχωρήσομεν. 'Αλλά τοῦτο μέν υστερον, περί δέ ιων προτέρων τὰς ἀπορίας ἐπιακεπτέοι. Πώς γάρ ἄτμεπτον και το πρό τοῦ παθητικοῦ και τὸ 20 προ αισθήσεως και άλως ψυχής όπιοθν κακίας περί αὐτήν έγγινομένης και δοξών ψευδών και ανοίας; Οἰκειώσεις δὲ καὶ ἀλλοτριώσεις ήδομένης καὶ λυπουμένης, δργιζομένης, φθονοίσης, ζηλούσης, επιθυμούσης, όλως οὐδαμή ήσυχίου άγούσης, άλλ' εφ' έκάστω των προυπυπιών ων κινουμένης καί μεταβαλλούσης. 'Αλλ' εὶ μὲν σῶμά ἐστιν ἡ 25 ψυχή καὶ μέγεθος έχει, οι ράδιον, μάλλον δὲ όλως άδώνατον, άπαθή αὐτὴν καὶ ἄτρεπτον δεικνύναι έν ότωοῦν τῶν λεγομένων γίγνεσθαι περί αὐτήν εί δέ έστιν οὐσία ἀμεγέθης καὶ δεῖ καὶ τὸ ἄφθαρτον αὐτῆ παρείναι, εὐλαβητέον αὐτῆ πάθη διδόναι 30 τοιαυτα, μη και λάθωμεν αθτήν φθαρτήν είναι διδόντες. Καὶ δή είτε ἀριθμος είτε λόγος, ώς φαμεν, ή οὐσία αὐτῆς, πῶς ἄν πάθος ἐγγένοιτο εν ἀριθμώ ἡ λόγω; 'Αλλά μαλλον λόγους ἀλόγους καὶ ἀπαθη πάθη δεῖ ἐπιγίγνεσθαι αὐτῆ οἴεσθαι, καί ταῦτα τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν σωμάτων μετενηνεγμένα

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or whether we shall admit that this alone can be affected. But we will discuss this later; now we must consider the difficulties which arise about the higher parts of the soul. For how can the part which comes before that subject to affections, and the part before sense-perception, and in general any part of the soul, be unchangeable when vice and false opinions and stupidity occur in the soul? And the soul accepts things as its own or rejects them as alien when it feels pleasure and pain, anger, envy, jealousy, bust, and in general is never quiet but always moved and changed by every casual contact.1 But if the sou, is a body and has magnitude, it is not easy but rather altogether impossible, to show it as unaffected and unchangeable in any one of the occurrences which are said to take place in it. But if it is a substance without magnitude and must necessarily possess incorruptibility, we must be careful not to give it affections of this kind, so as to avoid making it corruptible without noticing that we have done so.2 Then again, whether its substance is a number 3 or whether it is a rational formative principle, as we say it is, how can an affection occur in a number or a rational principle? But we must rather think that irrational reasons and unaffected affections come upon it; and it must be understood that these, which are transferred from bodies, are each and all of them there

² The view of Plotinus on the alleged "movements" and "changes" in the soul is very close to that of Aristotle, on whom he depends very much in this section of the treatise; cp. De Anima A.4. 408bi ff. and B 5. 417b5 ff

² That the soul is not a body, which would prevent it from soing immortal and incorruptible, is argued at length in IV 7 [2].

⁹ For the history of the doctrine that the soul is a number, which goes back to Xenocrates (Aristotic, De Anima I. 2, 404b27, cp. de Vogel, Greek Philosophy II. 759), see P. Merlan, From Plannism to Neoplan nism that I and II. It does not play an important part in the thought of Plotanus, but he recognises it as orthodox Platonism. cp. V. 1 [10] 5. 9, VI. 7 [23] 9. 13-14.

38 ἀντικειμένως ληπτέον ἕκαστα και κατ' ἀναλογίαν μετενηνεγμένα, καὶ ἔχουσαν οὐκ ἔχειν καὶ πάσχου σαν οὐ πάσχειν. Καὶ ὅσιις ὁ τρόπος τῶν τοιούτων, ἐπισκεπτέον.

2. Πρώτον δε περί κακίας και άρετης λεκτέον, τί γίγνεται τότε, δταν κακία λέγηται παρείναι. και γάρ άφαιρεῖν δεῖν φαμεν ώς τινος ὄντος ἐν αὐτῆ κακοῦ καὶ ἐνθεῖναι ἀρετὴν καὶ κοσμῆσαι καὶ 5 κάλλος έμποιήσαι αντί αἴσχους τοῦ πρόσθεν. *Αρ' ούν λέγοντες άρετην άρμονίαν είναι, άναρμοστίαν δὲ τὴν κακίαν, λέγοιμεν αν δόξαν δοκοθσαν τοῖς παλαιοῖς καί τι πρός τὸ ζητοίμενον οὺ μικρον ὁ λόγος ἀνύσειεν; Εί γὰρ συναρμοσθέντα μεν φύσιν τὰ μέρη της ψυχής πρός άλληλα άρετή 10 έστι, μή συναρμοσθέντα δε κακία, επακτόν οὐδεν αν οιδε ετέρωθεν γίγνοιτο, άλλ' εκαστον ήκοι αν οίου έστιν είς την άρμογην και ούκ αν ήκοι έν τη άναρμοστία τοιούτον όν, οίον καὶ χορευταὶ χορεύοντες και συνάδοντες άλληλοις, εί και μή οί αὐτοί είσι, και μόνος τις ἄδων των ἄλλων μη ἀδόντων, 15 καὶ έκάστου καθ' έαυτὸν ἄδοντος· οὐ γὰρ μόνοι δεί συνώδειν, άλλά και εκαστου καλώς το αὐτοί άδοντα οίκεία μουσική: ώστε κάκει έπι τής ψυχής άρμονίαν είναι έκάστου μέρους το αὐτῷ προσημού ποιούντος. Δεί δή πρό τής άμμονίας

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in an opposed sense and are transferred in so far as something corresponds to them in the soul, and that in possessing them it does not possess and in being affected by them it is not affected. And we must consider how happenings of this sort come about.

2. First we must explain about virtue and vice, what happens at any time when vice is said to be present; for we assert that one must "take away," as if there was some evil in the soul, and "put in" virtue, and set the soul in order and produce beauty in it instead of the ugliness which was there before. Now if we say that "virtue is harmony" and vice lack of harmony, should we be expressing an opinion that accords with the views of the ancients,1 and would the statement contribute something of no small value to our investigation? For if the natural harmony of the parts of the soul with each other is virtue, and their disharmony, vice, then there would be nothing brought in from outside, or from another source, but each part would enter into the harmony just as it is or would not enter in, and remain in disharmony, because it was the sort of thing it was; just as dancers dance, and sing in accord with each other, even if it is not [always] the same ones who sing, and [sometimes] one sings when the others do not, and each sings in his own way, for they must not only sing together but each one, as they sing together, must also sing his own part beautifully by his own personal art of music; 2 so there, too, in the soul there is a harmony when each part does what is proper to it. It is certainly necessary that before

² The Pythagoreans, cp. Plato, Phacde 93C.

² The thought here is the same as in I. 6[1] I 26 30. Contrast II., 2[47] I7. 64 ff. (see notes ad loca).

½ Vitringa, H S²: ην codd
 την ονοίαν del. Theiler, H S².

this harmony there should be another virtue of each part, and a vice of each before their disharmony with each other. What is it then, by the presence of which each part is evil? Vice. And, again, by the presence of what is it good? Virtue. Now perhaps one might say that the vice of the reasoning part was unintelligence, and unintelligence in the negative sense, and would not be asserting the presence of anything. But when false opinions are there in the sou, (and this is what most of all produces vice), how will one be able to assert that they have not come in and that this part of the soul has not in this way become different? And is not the spirited part in one state when it is cowardly and in another when it is brave? And is not the desiring part when it is unrestrainedly lustful in one state, and in another when it is under control? Well, then, it has been affected. Now we shall say in answer that when each part is in a state of virtue, it is active according to its real substantial being, by which each part listens to reason; 1 and the reasoning part receives its reason from Intellect and the other parts from the reason ng part. Now listening to reason is like seeing, not receiving a shape but seeing and existing actually when seeing takes place. For just as sight, which has both a potential and an actual existence, remains essentially the same [when it is potential and when it is actuall, and its actuality is not an alteration but it simultaneously approaches what it has, and is it in knowing it and knows without being affected; in the same way, too, the reasoning part is related to Intellect and sees, and this is the power of intellection; there is no stamp impressed on it

¹ Herachtus may well be in Plotinus's mind here: τρ fragments, DK, Bl and 112.

40 γενομένης, άλλ' έχει ὁ είδε καὶ αὖ οὐκ ἔχει ἔχει μὲν τῷ γινώσκειν, οὐκ ἔχει δὲ τῷ μὴ ἀποκείσθαί τι ἐκ τοῦ ὁράματος, ὤσπερ ἐν κημῷ μορφήν. Μεμνὴσθαι δὲ δεὶ, ὅτι καὶ τὰς μνήμας οὐκ ἐναποκειμένων τινῶν ἐλέγετο είναι, ἀλλὰ τῆς ψυχῆς οὕτω τὴν δύναμιν ἐγειράσης, ιἵστε καὶ ὁ μὴ ἔχει

45 ἔχει. Τί οδυ; Οὐκ ἄλλη ἦν πρὶν οὕτω μνημονεύειν καὶ ὕστερον, ὅτε μνημονεύει; ἢ βούλει ἄλλην; οὕκουν ἀλλοιωθεῖσά γε, πλὴν εἰ μή τις τὸ ἐκ δυνάμεως εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἐλθεῖν ἀλλοίωσιν λέγοι, ἀλλ' ἔστιν οὐδεν προσγενόμενον, ἀλλ' ἤπερ ἦν πεφυκυῖα τοῦτο ποιοῦσα. "Ολως γαρ αἱ ἐνέργεια.

50 ταν ἀύλωι οὐ συναλλοιουμενων γινονται ἢ φθαρεῖεν ἄν· ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον μενόν-ων, τὸ δε
πάσχειν τὸ ἐνεργοῦν τοῦτο τῶν μεθ' ὕλης. Εἰ δε
ἄυλον ὂν πείσεται, οἰκ ἔχει ῷ μένει· ἔμσπερ ἐπ.
τῆς ὅψεως τῆς ὁράσεως ἐνεργούσης τὸ πάσχον ο
ὀφθαλμός ἐστιν, αἱ δὲ δόξαι ὥσπερ ὁράματα. Τὸ

55 δε θημοειδες τώς δειλόν; πως δε καὶ ἀνδρείον
"Η δειλόν μεν τῷ ἢ μὰ ὁρᾶν πρὸς τὸν λόγον ἢ πρὸς φαῦλον ὅντα τὸν λόγον ὁρᾶν ἢ ὀργάνων ἐλλείψει, οἱον ἀπορία ἢ σαθρότητι ὅπλων σωματι-

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internally, but it has what it sees and in another way does not have it; it has it by knowing it, but does not have it in that something is not put away in it from the seeing, like a shape in wax.1 And we must remember that memones too, in our account of them, do not exist because things are put away in our minds but the soul awakes the power of memory in such a way as to have what it does not have.2 Well, then, is not the soul different before it remembers in this way, and afterwards, when it remembers? Would you like to call it different? Very well, then, as long as you do not say that it is intrinsically altered, unless one is to call the passage from potentiality to actuality alteration, but nothing is added to it but it simply does what it is by nature.8 For in general the actualisations of immaterial things take place without any accompany ing alteration, otherwise they would perish; it is much truer to say that they remain unaltered when they become actual, and that being affected in actualisation belongs to things which have matter. But if a thing which is immaterial is going to be affected, it has no ground of permanence; just as in the case of sight, when the seeing faculty is active it is the eye which is affected, and opinions are like acts of seeing. But how is the spirited part cowardly and then again brave? It is cowardly either by not looking to the reason, or by looking to the reason when it is in a bad state, or else there will be a failure in its Instruments, as when it is without its bodily weapons or they are decayed, or it is hindered from action,

S Cp. Ar etot.e, De Anima B.5 417b5-9.

¹ Plotinus seems to be tunking here of a famous Stoic dispute about "impressions." Chrysippus had corrected the too simple-minded view of Cleanthes that a mental image was a stamp like that made by a sea, in wax, and had pointed out that this would make memory impossible: ep. Stoic. Vet. Fragm. II. 55-56

² For Plotmus's doctrine of memory, see IV 3 [27]. 26 31

κών, ἢ ἐνεργεῖι κωλυόμενον ἢ μὴ κινηθὲν οἷον ἐρεβισθέν· ἀνδρεῖον δέ, εἰ τὰ ἐναντια. Ἐν οἷε το οὐδεμίω ἀλλοίωσις οὐδὲ πάθος Τὰ δὲ ἐπιθυμοῦν ἐνεργοῦν μὲν μόνον τὴν λεγοιιένην ἀκολασίαν παρέχεαθα. πάντα γὰρ μόνον πράττει καὶ οὐ πάρεστι τὰ ἄλλα, οἷε ἀν ἢ ἐν μέρει τὸ κρατεῖν παροῦσι καὶ δεικνύναι αὐτψ. Τὸ δ᾽ ὁρῶν ἢν ἀν ἄλλο, πράττον οὐ πάντα, ἀλλά ποι καὶ σχολαζον τῷ ὁρῶν ώς οἶόν τε τὰ ἄλλα. Τάχα δὲ το πολὺ καὶ σώπατος καχεξία ἡ τούτοι λεγομένη κακία, ἀρετὴ δὲ τἀναντία· ὥστ᾽ οὐδεμία ἐφ᾽ ἐκάτερα προσθήκη τῆ ψυχῆ.

3. Τας δ΄ οἰκειώσεις καὶ ἀλλοτριώσεις πῶς; Καὶ λύπαι καὶ ἀργαὶ καὶ ἡδυναὶ ἐπιθυμίαι τε καὶ φόβοι πῶς οὐ τροπαὶ καὶ πάθη ἐνόντα καὶ κινούμενα; Δεῖ δὴ καὶ περὶ τούτων Ϫδε διαλαβεῖι. "Ότι γὰρ ἐγγίγνονται ἀλλοιώσεις καὶ σφοδραὶ τούτων αἰσθήσεις μὴ οὐ λέγειν ἐναντία λέγοντός ἐστι τοῖς ἐναργέσιν. 'Αλλὰ χρὴ συγχωροῦντας ζητεῖν ὅ τι ἐστὶ τὸ τρεπόμενον. Κινδυνεύομεν γὰρ περὶ ψυχὴν ταῦτα λέγοντος ὅμοιόν τι ὑπολημβάνειν, ὡς εἰ τὴν ψυχὴν λέγομεν ἐρυθριῶν ἢ αὖ ἐν ὡχριάσει τὰ πάθη, περὶ δὲ τὴν ἄλλην σύστασίν ἐστι γιγνό-

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or it is not really stirred to action, but as if it was only lightly touched; and it is brave when the opposite happens. In these circumstances there is no intrinsic alteration or affection. And the desiring part when it acts by itself produces what is called unrestrained lust, for it does everything by itself and the other parts of the soul are not present to it, whose function it would be, if they were present, to master and direct it. If it saw the other parts it would be different, and would not do everything but might perhaps take a rest by looking, as far as it could, at the other parts. But perhaps most often what we call the vice of this part is a bad state of the body, and virtue the opposite, so that in either case nothing is added to the soul.

3. But what about the soul's accepting things as its own or rejecting them as ahen? And, surely, feelings of grief and anger, pleasures, desires and fears, are changes and affections present in the soul and moving there. About these, too, one must certainly make a distinction, in this way. To deny that alterations in the soul, and intense perceptions of them, do occur is to contradict the obvious facts. But when we accept this we ought to enquire what it is that is changed. For we run the risk, when we say this of the soul, of understanding it in the same sort of way as if we say that the soul blushes or turns pale again, not taking into account that these affections are brought about by the soul but occur in the other structure [the body]. But the shame is in

accepts the first, but wil not admit that any feeling or affection can pass from body to soul, so he makes διάχυσε something entirely bodily

¹ The thought and language here and in what follows show some Stoic influence; or, especially Posidonius quoted by Plutarch in De Librdine et Aegyrindine 6 (p. 5, 14-23 Bernsdakus) Posidonius here speaks of περί σῶμα ψυχικά of which he gives ἀχριάσεις as an exemple, and περί ψυχὴν σωματικά υί which one example is διαχύσεις (cp. 1-17 helow). Plotinus

μενα. 'Αλλ' ή μεν αλοχύνη εν ψυχη δόξης αλσχρού γενομένης. το δέ σώμα έκείνης τούτο οΐου σχούσης, ίνα μη τοῖς δνόμασι πλανώμεθα, ύτο τη ψυχή οι και οὐ ταὐτον ἀψύχω ἐτράπη κατὰ 15 το αίμα εὐκίνητον ον. Τά τε τοῦ λεγομένον φόβου ἐν μὲν τῆ ψυχῆ ἡ ἀρχή, τὸ δ' ἀχρὸν άναχωρήσαντος τοι αίματος είσω. Και τῆς ήδυνῆς δέ τὸ της διαχύσεως τοῦτο καὶ εἰς αἴσθησιν ήκον περί το σώμα, το δέ περί την ψυχήν οθκέτι πάθος. Καὶ τὸ τῆς λύτης ώπτώτως Ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ τῆς 20 ἐπιθυμίας ἐπὶ μὲν τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς ἀρχῆς οὔσης τοῦ έπιθυμείν λανθάνοι έστίν, έκείθεν δε τὸ προελθό ή αισθησις έγνω. Καὶ γὰρ ὅταν λέγωμεν κινεῖσθαι αύτην έν έπιθυμίαις, έν λογισμοις, έν δόξαις, οὺ σαλευομένην αὐτην λέγομεν ταῦτα ποιείν, άλλ' έξ 25 αὐτῆς γίγνεσθαι τας κινήσεις. Έπεὶ καὶ τὸ ζῆν κώτησω λέγοντες οὐκ άλλοίου μέν, ἐκάπτου δὲ μορίου ή ἐνέργεια ή κατὰ φύσιν ζωή οὐκ ἐξιστᾶσα. Κεφάλαιον δε ίκανόν εί τὰς ἐνεργείας καὶ τὰς ζωάς και τάς ορέξεις ούκ άλλοιώσεις συγχωροθμεν καὶ μνήμας οἰ τύπους ἐναποσφραγιζομένους οὐδὲ 30 τὰς φαντασίας ὡς ἐν κηρῷ τυπώσεις, συγχαρητέον πανταχού εν πάσι τοις λεγομένοις πάθεσι καί κωήσεσι την ψυχήν ώσαυτως έχειν τῷ ὑποκε μένοι καί τη υδυία και την άρετην και την κακίαν μή ώς το μέλου και το λευκου περί σώμα γίγνεσθαι η το θερμόν και το ψυχρόν, άλλ' ον είρηται τρόπον 35 έπ' άμφω περί πάνθ' όλως τὰ έναντία γίγνεσθαι.

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the soul, when the idea of something disgraceful arises in it; but the body, which the soul in a way possesses—not to be led astray by words—being subject to the soul and not the same thing as a lifeless body, is changed by way of the blood, which is easy to move. As for what is called fear, the beginning is in the soul, but the paleness comes from the blood withdrawing within. So with pleasure, the happy, relaxed feeling, which penetrates to sense-perception, belongs to the body, but the part of pleasure which belongs to the soul is no longer an affection. And the same is true of pain. For with lust, too, as long as its starting-point remains in the soul, it is unperceived; it is what comes out from there that sense perception knows. In fact, when we say that the soul moves itself in lusts or reasonings or opinions, we are not saying that it does this because it is being shaken about by them, but that the movements originate from itself. For when we say that its life is movement, we do not mean that it is movement of some thing different, but the activity of each part is its natural life which does not go outside it. The sufficient conclusion is: if we agree that activities and lives and impulses are not alterations, and that memories are not stamps imprinted on the soul or mental pictures like impressions on wax, we must agree that everywhere, in all affections and movements, as they are called, the soul remains the same in substrate and essence, and that virtue and vice do not come into being like black and white or hot and co.d. in the body, but in the way which has been described, in both directions and in all respects what happens in the soul is the opposite of what happens in the body.

4. Περί δὲ τοῦ λεγομένου παθητικοί τῆς ψυχῆς έπισκεπτέον. "Ήδη μέν οὖν εἴρηται τρόπον τινά καὶ περὶ τουτου ἐν οἶς περὶ τῶν παθων ἀπάντων έλέγετο τῶν περί τὸ θυμοειδές καὶ τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν 5 γινομένων όπως έκαστα· οὐ μὴν άλλ' έτι λεκτέον περί αθτοθ πρώτον λαβύντας, δ το ποτέ το παθητο κου της ψυχης λέγεται είναι. Λέγεται δη πάντως περί δι τὰ πάθη δοκεί συνίστασθαι ταῦτα δ' έστὶν οίς ξπεται ήδονή και λύκη. Των δέ παθών τὰ μέν ¿πὶ δόξαις σειίσταται, ώς όταν δοξάσας τις 10 μέλλειν τελευτάν ίσχη φόβου, η οἰηθεὶς ἀγαθὸν αὐτῷ τι ἔσισθαι ήσθη, τῆς μέν δόξης ἐν άλλφ, τοῦ δε πάθους κινηθέντος εν άλλω. τὰ δέ έστιν ώς ήγησάμενα αὐτὰ ἀπροαιρέτως ἐμποιεῖν ἐν τῷ πεφυκότι δοξάζειν την δόξαν. Ἡ μὲν δή δόξα ότι άτρεπτον έα τὸ δοξάζεω είρηται ό δ' έκ τῆς 15 δόξης φόβος ελθών ἄνωθεν αὖ ἀπὸ τῆς δόξης οἶον σύνεσεν τινα παρασχών τω λεγομένω της ψυχής φοβείσθαι. Τί ποτε ποιεί τοῦτο το φοβείσθαι. Ταραχήν καὶ ἔκπληξίν, φασιν, ἐπὶ προσδοκωμένω κακώ. "Ότι μεν οδν ή φαντασία εν ψυχή, ή τε

contained with his own ideas about the nature of the soul which derive from Plate and Aristotic. He accepts the Stoic idea that emotions arise from opmons tep. Stoic Vet Fragm.

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4. But we must now investigate that past of the soul which is said to be subject to affections. We have, of course, already discussed this, in a way, in what we have said about al. the affections that occur in the spirited and desiring parts and how each of them arises: 1 but al. the same there is something still to say about it, and we must first grasp whatever sort of thing it is that the part of the soul subject to affections is said to be. It is said in any case to be that about which affections appear to gather; the affections, that is, on which pleasure and pain follow. Some of the affections arise as the result of opinions, as when someone, being of the opinion that he will die, feels fear, or, thinking that some good is going to come to him, is pleased; the opinion is in one part, and the affection is started up in another: but some of them are of a sort to take the lead and, without any act of choice, to produce the opinion n the part of the soul whose natural function it is to have opinions. Now it has been said that the opinion leaves the opining part] unmoved; but the fear which originates from the opinion, coming down from above in its turn, from the opinion in a way gives a kind of understanding to the part of the soul which is said to fear. What does this fear produce ' Disturbance and shock, they say,2 over the evil which is expected. It should then, be obvious to anyone that the mental picture is in the soul, both the first

III. 385). But he insists on keeping the opinions and the emittions in watertight compartments; the disturbance and apset which accompanies certain opinions in the soul is strictly confined to the body; for the Store it was a diseased affection of the scul

¹ At the end of ch. 2 2 The Stores; cp. More. Vet. Fragm. III. 386. In this chapter Plotanus is critically revising Store doctrine in accordance with his own ideas about the nature of the soul

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one, which we call opinion, and that which derives from it, which is no longer opinion, but an obscure quasi opinion and an uncriticised mental picture, like the activity inherent in what is called nature in so far as it produces individual thirgs, as they say,1 without a mental image. That which results from these mental images is the disturbance in the body which has already reached the level of perception. the trembling and shaking of the body and the pallor and inability to speak. These are certainly not in the part of soul [which we are discussing]; otherwise we shall say that it is corporeal, if it was really it which was affected in these ways, and these affections would not have reached the body if that which sent them no longer worked the sending because it was in the grip of the affection and beside itself. But this part of the soul which is subject to affections is not a body but a form. Certainly the desiring part is in matter, and so, too, is the part which governs nutrition, growth and generation,4 which is the root and principle of the desiring and affective form. But it is not proper to any form to be disturbed or in any way affected, but it remains static itself, and its matter enters into the state of being affected, when it does so enter, and the form stirs up the affection by its presence. For, of course, the growth-principle does not grow when it causes growth, nor increase when it causes increase, nor in genera., when it causes motion, is it moved by that particular kind of motion which it causes, but either it is not moved at all, or it is a

¹ παθόν K.rchhoff (pateretus Ficinus), Η S: παθοντα codd.

¹ The Stoics again. Plants are called d\(\phi\)arraora in Stori. \(\mathbf{V}\)at. \(\mathbf{F}\)rugm. II. 458 (p. 150, 12)

 $^{^2}$ Plotages is here combining the Flatonia design pair of the soul and the Aristotelian growth-principle: cp. IV, 3 [27] 23 40-42

5. Τ΄ οὖν χρὴ ζητεῖν ἀπαθῆ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας ποιεῖν μηδὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν πάσχουσαν;
"Η ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὸ εἰς ωὐ, ὴν ἐπὶ τοῦ λεγομένου παθητικοῦ οἷον φάντασμα τὸ ἐφεξῆς πάθημα ποιεῖ,
5 τὴν ταραχήν, καὶ συνέζευκται τῆ ταραχῆ ἡ τοῦ προσδοκωμένου κακοῦ εἰκιών, παθος τὸ τοιοῦτον λεγόμενον ἤξιον ὁ λόγος ὅλας ἀφαιρεῖν καὶ μὴ

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different kind of motion and activity.1 So, then, the actual nature of the form must be an activity, and produce by its presence, as if the melody proceeding from it placked the strings. The part subject to affections, then, wil be the cause of the affection. either because the movement starts from it, from the mental picture produced by sense impressions, or even without a mental picture (we have to consider the question whether the affection is produced by the opinion starting from a higher level); but the part itself stays still in the manner of a melody. The causes of the movement are like the player, and the parts on which the affection makes its impact might correspond to the strings. For in the case of playing an instrument, too, it is not the tune which is affeeted, but the string; the string, however, would not be plucked [in tune] even if the player wished it, unless the tune said that it should be.

5. Why, then, ought we to seek to make the soul free from affections by means of philosophy when it is not affected to begin with ² Now, since the mental image (so to call it) which penetrates it at the part which is said to be subject to affections produces the consequent affection, disturbance, and the likeness of the expected evil is coupled with the disturbance, this kind of situation was called an affection and reason thought it right to do away with it altogether

anthropology. Why should we be obliged to strive to attain $d\pi a\theta\epsilon a$ when the soul is $d\pi a\theta is$ by nature already (a problem which did not arise for the Stores, or for Plato himself)? His solution, sketched in this chapter, is that the attainment of $d\pi a\theta\epsilon a$ involves no real change in the soul. It is simply a matter of 'waking p' from illusion turning one's attention from the lower and concentrating it on the higher.

¹ Plotmus is here using against the Stoics the Aristoteban doctrino that the soul is a form and as such course had by movement and changes while remaining itself unmoved. He does not advert to the fact that Aristotle worked out his own doctrine in conscious opposition to Plato's conception of soul as, not unmoved, but self-moved. Cp. the long discussion in De Anima A.3 4, 105b 31 ff

^{*} This sentence shows clearly how conscious Plotinus was of the central moral problem presented by his philosophical

έῶν ἐγγίγνεσθαι ώς γιγνομένου μέν οὖπω τῆς ψυχής έχούσης εθ, μη γυγνομένου δε απαθώς 1 λαχωίσης τοῦ αίτίου τοῦ πάθους τοῦ περὶ αὐτὴν 10 δράματος οἰκέτι ἐγγιγνομένου, οἶον εἴ τις τὰς τῶν ονειράτων φαντασίας αναιρείν εθέλων εν έγρηγόρσει την ψυχήν - ην φανταζομένην ποιοίη, εί 2 τα πάθη λέγοι πεποιηκέναι, τὰ ἔξωθεν οδον δράματα παθήματα λέγων της ψυχης είναι. 'Αλλά τις ή κάθαρας αν της ψυχης είη μηδαμή μεμολυσμένης 15 η τί το χωρίζειν αὐτὴν ἀπό τοῦ σώματος; "Η η μεν κάθαρσις αν είη καταλιπείν μόνην και μή μετ' άλλων η μη πρός άλλο βλέπουσαν μηδ' αδ δόξας άλλοτρίας έχουσαν, δοτις ό τρόπος των δοξων, ή των παθών, ώς εξρηταν, μήτε δράι τά είδωλα μήτε έξ αὐτῶν ἐργάζεσθαι πάθη. Εἰ δὲ έπὶ θάτερα τὰ ἄνω ἀπὸ τῶν κάτω, πῶς οὐ 20 κάθαρσις καὶ γωρισμός γε πρὸς τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς μηκέτι εν σώματι γυγνομένης ώς εκείνου είναι, καί το ώσπερ φως μή εν θολερώ; Καιτοι απαθές όμως δ καὶ ἐν θολερῶ. Τοῦ δὲ παθητικοῦ ἡ μὲν κάθαροις ή έγεροις έκ των απόπων είδωλων καί 25 μη δρασις, το δε χωρίζεσθαι τῆ μη πολλη νεύσει καὶ τῆ περὶ τὰ κάτω μὴ φαντασία. Εἴη δ' ἄν καὶ τὸ χωρίζειν αὐτὸ τὸ ἐκείνα ἀφαιρείν ὧν τούτο γωρίζεται, όταν μή επί πνεύματος θολεμού έκ γαστριμαργίας και πλήθους οὐ καθαρών ή σαρκών,

and not to allow it to occur in the soul, on the ground that if it does occur the soul is not yet in a good state, but if it does not the soul is in a state of free lom from affections since the cause of the affection, the seeing in the soul, is no onger present in it; it is as if someone who wanted to take away the mental pictures seen in dreams were to bring the soul which was picturing them to wakefulness, if he said that the soul had caused the affections, meaning that the visions as if from outside were the affections of the soul. But what could the "purification" of the sou be, if it had not been stained at all, or what its " separaion "1 from the body? The purification would be leaving it alone, and not with others, or not looking at something else or, again, having opinions which do not belong to it—whatever is the character of the opinions, or the affections, as has been said-and not seeing the images ror constructing affections out of them. But if there is turning in the other direction. to the things above, away from hose below, it is surely (is it not?) purification, and separation too, when it is the act of a soul which is no longer in body as if it belonged to it, and is being like a light which is not in turbid obscurity. And yet even the light which is in obscurity remains unaffected. But the purification of the part subject to affectious is the waking up from inappropriate images and not seeing them, and its separation is effected by not inclining much downwards and not having a mental met ire of the things below. But separating it could also mean taking away the things from which it is separated when it is not standing over a vital breath turbid from gluttony and sated with impure meats,

ἀπαθώς Κικεhhoff, H.-S: ἀπαθούς codd
 ποιοίη εἰ H.-S²: ποιοί ἢ εἰ κ.Υ: ποιοί ἢ εἰ w. ποιοί ἢ εἰ Q.

¹ Plato, Phaedo 67C, 5-6

 $\dot{\eta}\sigma v \chi \eta$.

C. Την μέν δη οδοίαν την νοτιτήν την κατά το είδος άπασαν τεταγμένην ώς άπαθή δεί είναι δοκείν είρηται. Έπει δε και ή ύλη έν τι των άσωμάτων, εί και άλλον τρόπον, σκεπτέον και 5 περί ταύτης τίνα τρόπου έχει, πότερα παθητή, ώς λέγεται, καὶ κατὰ πάντα τρεπτή, ἢ καὶ ταύτην δεί άπαθη είναι οἴεσθαι, καὶ τίς ὁ τρόπος της ἀπαθείας. Πρώτον δέ ληπτέου επί τούτο στελλημένους καί περί της φύσεως αὐτης λέγουσιν όποία τις, ώς ή τοῦ όντος φύσις καὶ ἡ οὐσία καὶ τὸ είναι οὐ ταύτη 10 έχει, ώς οἱ πολλοὶ νομίζουσω. "Εστι γὰρ τὸ ὄν, ο και κατ άληθειον άν τις είποι δν, δντίος δν τοῦτο δέ ἐστω, δ πάντη ἐστὶν ὄν· τοῦτο δέ, ὧ μηδέν άποστατεί τοῦ είναι. Τελέως δὲ ον οιίδενος δείται ίνα σώζοιτο και ή, άλλα και τοίς άλλοις μίτιον τοῦς δοκοθσιν είναι τοῦ δοκείν είναι. 15 Εί δή ταθτα δρθώς λέγεται, ανάγκη αὐτό ἐι ζωῆ

¹ This is one of the few passages in which Plotinus refers to the ''pneumatic' or ''astral'' body, in the existence of which he believed, but which he found of little philosophical importance or interest op. IV. 3 [27] 15.14, II. 2 [14] 2.212. For the history of the belief in astral bodies before and after Plotinus, see E. R. Dodds, Proclus, The Elemens of I Reology, Appendix II.

That matter is bodiless was contemporary Perinatetic doctrine, clearly stated by Alexander of Aphrodusas in the attroductory section of his De Anima (op. especially p. 5; 19−22 Bruns). Pre-Plotanian Platonists preferred the formula "neither body nor bodiless, but potentially body" (Albinus, Eusagoge VIII, p. 163, 6-7 Hermana; Apuleius,

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but that in which it resides is so fine that it can ride

on it in peace.1

6. It has already been said that the intelligible reality, which is all of the order of form, must be thought to be free from affections. But since matter, too, is one of the things without body,2 even if it is so in a different sense, we must enquire about this too, and see what character it has, whether it is, as it is said to be, subject to affections and pliable in every way, or whether one must think that this, too, is free from affections, and what kind of freedom from affection it has. But first, as we address ourselves to this and state what sort of a nature it has, we must grasp that the nature of being and substance and existence are not as most people think they are. For being, what one could truly call being, is real being; 3 and this is that which has nothing lacking to its existence. Since it is completely it has no need of anything for its preservation and existence but is cause to the other things, which seem to exist of their seeming existence. If this is a correct statement, it must necessarily be in life, and in perfect life; or,

De Platone I. V, p. 87, 11 15 Thomas). The Store doctrine is stated mimediately below: matter for them was a body without qualities "subject to affections and pliable in every

way"; ep. Store Vet. Fragm. 11 309, 482.

The real being which Platinus briefly describes here is of course his Second Hypostasis, Nov. For the description of it as at once being, intelligence and life ep. V 1 [10] 4; V. 5 [32] 1. Brehier, perhaps rightly, sees this part of the chapter as a commentary on Plato, Sophist 248E, the famous passage, whose meaning is still much disputed, in which Plato insicte that motion and life and soul and intelligence must be present to absolute being: the word anormate occurs in Plato Farmenides 144B2 but the context is different.

και έν τελεία ζωή είναι. ή έλλειπον ου μαλλον ον η μη ον έσται Τούτο δε νούς και πάντη φρόνησις. Καὶ αρισμένου άρα καὶ πεπεριωμένου καὶ τῆ δυνάμει οιδέν ο τι μή, ουδέ τοσήδε επιλείποι γὰρ ἄν. Διὸ καὶ τὸ ἀεὶ καὶ τὸ ώσαύτως καὶ τὸ 20 άδεκτου παυτός καὶ οὐδέν εἰς μὐτό εἰ γάρ τι δέχοιτο, παρ' αὐτὸ ἄν τι δέχοιτο· τοθτο δὲ μὴ ὄν. Δεῖ δ' αὐτὸ πάντη ον είναι ήκειν οδν δεῖ παρ' αὐτοῦ πάντα ἔχον εἰς τὸ εἰναι· καὶ ὁμοῦ πάντα καὶ ἐν πάντα. Εἰ δὴ τούτοις όριζομεν τὸ ὄν-δεῖ δέ, η οὐκ ἂν ἐκ τοῦ ὅντος ήκοι νοῦς, καὶ ζωή. 25 ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ἐπακτὰ ταῦτα καὶ οὐκ (ἐξ οὐκ όντος) έσται, και το μέν ου άζων και άνουν έσται ο δε μή ον εστιν άληθώς ταθτα έξει, ώς εν τοίς χείροσι δέον ταῦτα είναι καὶ τοῖς ύστέροις τοῦ οντος το γαρ τρο του οντος χορηγον μέν τούτων 30 εἰς τὸ ὄν, οὐ λεόμενον δὲ αὐτὸ τούτωι εἰ οῦν τοιούτον τὸ ὄν, ἀνάγκη μήτε τι σώμα αὐτό μήτε το ύτοκείμενον τοις σώμασιν είναι, άλλ' είναι τού-οις γι είναι το μή οδον είναι.

Καὶ πῶς ἡ τῶν σωματων φύσις μὴ οὖσα, πῶς δὲ ἡ ἔλη ἐφ' ἡς ταῦτα, ὅρη καὶ πέτραι καὶ πᾶσα 35 γῆ στερεά: Καὶ πάντα ἀντίτυπα καὶ ταῖς πληγαῖς

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if it falls short of this, it will be no more existent than non-existent. But this means that it must be intellect, and wisdom in its fullness. And it must therefore be defined and limited, and there must be nothing to which its power does not extend, nor must its power be quantitatively limited; otherwise it would be defective.1 And so, too, it must be eternal and always the same, and unreceptive of anything, and nothing must come into it, for if it received anything, it would have to receive something different from itself; but this would be non-existent. But real being must be being in every way; it must therefore come having everything for existence from itself: and it must be all things together, and all of them one. Now if we define being in these ways and we must do so, or intellect and life would not come from being, but would be external additions to it and (as coming from the non-existent) will not exist, and being will be lifeless and devoid of intellect, and that which is not really being will have these [life and intellect] as if these ought to exist in inferior things and those posterior to being, for that which is prior to being conducts these into being but has no need of them itself; if then being is of this kind, it necessarily cannot be a body or what underhes bodies but the being of these is the being of things which do not exist.

And how can the nature of bodies, and the matter on which they are founded, be non-existent mountains and rocks and all the earth in its solidity? All things that offer resistance, and compel by their

¹ Real Being or Intellect is limited for Plotinus in the sense that the number of Forms in .t is fin.te, but unlimited in that it is eternal, its power a infinite and it has nothing outside to bound or measure it but is all-inclusive and so unincluded and is itself the absolute standard of measurement: cp. V. 7 [18] 1, VI. 5 [23] 12; VI. 6 [34] 18.

² Plotinus may possibly be thinking here of Plato's materialists in Sophist 240A B.

βιαζόμενα τὰ πληττόμενα όμολογεῖν αὐτῶν τὴν οὐσίαν. Εἰ οὖν τις λέγοι· πῶς δὲ τὰ μὴ θλίβοντα και μή βιαζόμενα μηδέ αντίτυπα μηδ' ύλως όρωμενα, ψυχή και νούς, όντα καὶ όντως όντα; καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων μᾶλλον γῆς ἐστώσης 40 το μάλλον κινούμενον και εμβρίθες ήττοι, και τούτου τὸ ἄνω; καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ πῖρ φεῦγον ἤδη την σώματος φύσιν; 'Αλλ' οίμαι, τὰ μὲν αὐταρκέστερα αὐτοῖς ἦττον ἐνοχλεῖ τὰ ἄλλα και άλυπότερα τοις άλλοις, τὰ δὲ βαρύτερα καὶ γεωδέστερα, δσω ελλιπή και πίπτοντα και αίρει αὐτά οὐ δυνά-45 μωα, ταθτα πίπτοντα ύπὸ ἀσθενείας τῆ καταφορό καὶ νωθεία πληγάς έχει. Έπεὶ καὶ τὰ νεκρά των σωμάτων ἀηδέστερα προσπεσείν, και τὸ σφόδρα της πληγης και το βλάπτειν έχει τὰ δ εμψυχα μετέχοντα τοῦ ὅντος, ὅσφ τούτου μέτεστιν αὐτοῖς, εὐχαριτώτερα τοῖς πέλας. Ἡ δὲ κίνησις 50 ώσπερ τις ζωή ούσα εν τοῖς σώμασιν ήν· καὶ μίμησω έχουσα ταύτης μαλλύν έστι τοις ήττος σώματος έχουσιν, ώς της απολείψεως του όντος δ καταλείπει μάλλον τούτο σώμα ποιούσης. Καὶ έκ των δέ λεγομένων παθημάτων μαλλον αν τις ίδοι το μάλλον σώμα μάλλον παθητόν όν, γην ή 55 τὰ ἄλλα, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα κατὰ τὸι αὐτὸν λόγου· τὰ

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impacts the things struck by them, attest their existence. Suppose someone were to say: ' How can things which exercise no pressure or force and offer no resistance, and are not even visible, be existent, and really existent? And among bodies, how can the element which moves more and has less weight be more existent than the stable earth, and the element above be more real than this? And how can fire [be the most real of all the elements] which is now at the point of escaping from bodily nature? '1 But, I think, the bodies which are more sufficient to themselves get less in the way of the other things and cause them less pain, but the heavier, more earthy bodies, in proportion as they are defective and fall and are unable to lift themselves up, when they fall because of their weakness, by their downward movement and heavy slowness cause collisions. Then, too, it is the dead ones among bodies which are more unpleasant to fall against, and are responsible for extremely hard blows and for hurting; but ensouled bodies, which have a share in being, are more agreeable to their neighbours the more of it they have. And movement is like a kind of life in bodies, and keeps an image of it, and there is more of it in the things which have less of body, as if it was the deficiency of being which made the thing which is deficient in it more a body. And one could see this more clearly from what are called the affections; the more a thing is a body the more it is affected, earth more than other things, and the other elements in the same proportion, for the other

relation to the other elements "(op Aristotle, De Generatione et Corruptione 8, 335a18-20) and to be 'near to the hydress."

² For the special status of fire among other bodies, see I. 8 [1] 3. 19-26, where it is said to "hold the rank of form in

μέν γάρ άλλα σύνεισι διαιρούμενα μή κωλύοντος μηδενός είς εν πάλιν, τμηθέν δέ γεηρόν άπαν χωρίς έκατερον αεί ωσπερ τα απαγορεύουτα τή φύσει, α δή μικράς πληγής γενομένης ούτως έχει

60 ώς πέπληκται καὶ ἐφθάρη, οὕτω καὶ τὸ μάλιστα σώμα γενόμενον ώς μάλιστα είς το μη ον ήκοι άναλαβείν αύτὸ εἰς τὸ εν ἀσθενεί. Πτώμα οὖν αί βαρείαι καὶ σφοδραὶ πληγαί, άλλὰ ποιείν εἰς άλληλα ασθενές δε ασθενεί προσπίπτον Ισχυρόι

έστι πρός έκεινο καί μὴ ον μὶ, ὅντι.

65 Ταθτα μεν οθν εξρηται πρός τους έν τοις σώμασι τιθεμένους τὰ ὅντα τῆ τῶν ἀθισμῶν μαρτυρία και τοις διά της αίνθήσεως φαντάσμασι πίστην τής άληθείας λαμβάνοντας, οι παραπλήσων τοις όνειρώττουσι ποιούσι ταθτα ένεργείν νομίζουσιν, δ όρωσω είναι ενύπνια όντα. Καὶ γὰρ τὸ τῆς 70 αἰσθήσεως ψυχης έστιν εύδούσης. ὅσοι γὰρ έν σώματι ψυχής, τοῦτο εύδει ή δ' άληθωή έγρήγορσις άληθινή ἀτὸ σώματος, οὐ μετὰ σώματος, άνάστασις. ή μέν γάρ μετά σώματος μετώστασίς έστιν εξ άλλου είς άλλον ύπνον, οδον εξ έτέρων δεμνίων ή δ' άληθής όλως άπό των σωμάτων, 75 ά της φύσεως βντα της έναντίας ψυχη το έναν-lor είς οὐσίαν έχει. Μαρτυρεί δὲ και ή γένεσις αὐτῶν καὶ ή ροή καὶ ή φθορὰ οὐ τῆς τοῦ ὅντος φύσεως ούσα.

7. 'Αλλ' ἐπανιτέον ἐπί τε τὴν ὅλην τὴν ὑποκειμέ-

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elements come together into one again when they are parted, if there is no obstacle in the way, but when every kind of earthy body is out, each part stays separate for ever: just as with things of which the natural powers are failing, which if they receive a small blow stay in the state to which the blow has reduced them and perish, so the thing which has most completely become body, since it has approached most nearly to non being, is too weak to co.lcct itself again into a unity. So heavy and severe blows bring about the mutual rum of bodies; a weak body falling against [another] weak one is strong against it, and a non-existent thing against [another] non-existent thing.

This, then, is our argument against those who place real beings in the class of hodies and find their guarantee of truth in the evidence of pushings and strikings and the apparitions which come by way of sense perception; they act like people dreaming, who think that the dings they see as real actually exist, when they are only dreams. For the activity of sense perception is that of the soul asleep; for it is the part of the soul that is in the body that sleeps; but the true wakening is a true getting up from the body, not with the body. Getting up with the body is only getting out of one sleep into another, like getting out of one bed into another; but the true ricing is a rising altogether away from bodies, which are of the opposite nature to soul and opposed in respect of reality. Their coming into being and flux and perishing which does not belong to the nature of reality, are evidence of this.

7 But we must come back to matter, the underly-

νηι η τὰ ι ἐπὶ τη ύλη είναι λεγόμενα, ἐξ ὧν τό τε μή είναι αὐτὴν καὶ τὸ τῆς ὕλης ἀπαθές γνωσθήσεται. Έστι μεν ούι ασώματος, έπείπερ το υώμα 5 υστερον και σύνθετον καὶ αὐτὴ μετ' ἄλλου ποιεῖ σώμα. Ούτω γάρ του ονόματος τετύχηκε του αὐτοῦ κατά τὸ ἀσωματου, ὅτι ἐκάτερου τό τε ὂυ η τε ύλη έτερα των σωμάτων. Ούτε δὲ ψιχή οὖσα οὔτε νοῦς οὔτε ζωὴ οὔτε εἶδος οὔτε λόγος οὖτε πέρας-ἀπειρία γάρ-οὖτε δύναμις-τί γὰρ 10 και ποιεί; -άλλὰ ταῦτα ὑπερεκπεσούσα πάντα οὐδὲ τὴν τοῦ ὄντος προσηγορίαν ὀρθώς ἂν δέχοιτο, μη ου δ' αν εικότως λέγοιτο, καὶ οὐχ ώσπερ κίνησις μη ον η στάσις μη όν, αλλ άληθινώς μη όν, είδωλοι καὶ φάντασμα όγκου καὶ ίποστάσεως έφεσις καὶ έστηκὸς οὐκ ἐν στάσει καὶ ἀόρατον 15 καθ' αύτο καὶ φείγον το βουλόμενου ίδεῦν, καὶ όταν τις μή ίδη γιγνόμενον, άτενισαντι δέ ούχ δρώμενου, καὶ τὰ ἐναντία ἀεὶ ἐφ' ἐαυτοῦ φανταζόμενον, μικρόν καὶ μέγα καὶ ήττοι καὶ μᾶλλον, έλλεῖπόν τε καὶ ὑπερεχον, εἴδωλον οὐ μένον οὐδ αθ φεύνειν δινάμενον οὐδε γάρ οὐδε τοθτο ισχύει 20 ατε μη Ισχύν παρά νοῦ λαβόι, άλλ' ἐν ἐλλεύψει τοῦ ουτος παυτός γενόμενου. Διὰ τῶν ὁ ἄν ἐπαγνέλληται ψεύδεται, καν μέγα φαντασθή, μικρόν ι ή τὰ Jrpme: είτα codd.

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ing substrate and the things which are said to be based upon matter,1 from which we shall acquire a knowledge of matter's non-existence and freedom from affections. Matter, then, is incorporeal, since body is posterior and a composite, and matter with something else produces body. In this way it has acquired the same name [as being] in respect of its incorporeality, because both being and matter are other than bodies. It is not soul or intellect or life or form or rational formative principle or limit—for it is unlimitedness 2-or power for what does it make but, falling outside all these, it could not properly receive the title of being but would appropriately be called non-being, not in the sense in which motion is not being or rest not being 3 but truly not being; it is a ghostly image of bulk, a tendency towards substantial existence; it is static without being stable; it is invisible in itself and escapes any aftempt to see it, and occurs when one is not looking, but even if you look closely you cannot see it. It always presents opposite appearances on its surface, small and great,4 less and more, deficient and superabundant, a phantom which does not remain and cannot get away either, for it has no strength for this, since it has not received strength from intellect but is lacking in all being. Whatever annonmement it makes, therefore, is a lie, and if it

the same 'as Volkmann's $\kappa a i \tau a$. I translate, with some slight doubt, on this assumption.

² The $\epsilon i \tau a$ of most MSS will not do here, as a τa is required Henry and Schwyzer think that the $\tilde{\eta}$ τa of a marginal note in J may represent a genuine tradition and "means practically 240

² On matter as the un united ep. II 4 [12] 15 ³ Op. Sophist 250D E.

^{*} Cp. II. 4 [12] II 33 f., for this Platonic way of describing matter.

έστι, καν μαλλον, ήττον έστι, και το ον αύτου έν φαντάσει ούκ ον έστιν, οίον παίγνιον φεύγον όθεν καί τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ ἐγγηνικοθαι δοκούντα παίγνια, 25 είδωλα εν είδώλω άτεχνως, ώς εν κατόπτρα το άλλαχοῦ ίδρυμένον άλλαχοῦ φανταζόμενον καὶ πιμπλάμενον, ώς δοκεί, και έχον οὐδεν και δοκούν τὰ πάντα. Τὰ δὲ εἰσιοντα καὶ ἐξιόντα των ον-ων μιμήματα καὶ είδωλα εἰς είδωλον ἄμορφον καὶ διὰ τὸ ἄμορφον αὐτῆς ἐνορώμενα ποιείν μὲν 30 δοικεί είς αὐτήν, ποιεί δὲ οὐδέν άμενηνὰ γάρ καί ασθενή και αντερείδον ούκ έχοντα: αλλ' οὐδέ έκείνης έχούσης δίεισιν οὐ τέμνοντα οἱον δι' ύδατος η εί τις έν τω λεγομένω κενώ μορφάς οίον είσπέμποι. Και γάρ αδ, εί μέν τοιαθτο ήν τά ένορώμενα, οία τὰ ἀφ' ὧι ήλθεν εἰς αὐτήν, τάχ' 35 αν τις διδούς αὐτοῖς δύναμίν τινα τῶν πεμψάντων την είς αὐτην γενομένην πάσχειν ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἂν δπέλαβε νῦν δ' ἄλλων μεν ὅντων τῶν ἐμφανταζομένων, άλλοίων δὲ τῶν ἐνορωμένων, κάκ τουτων μαθείν έστι το της πείσεως ψεύδος Δευδούς όντος του ενορωμένου και ουδαμή έχοντος 40 ομοιότητα πρός το ποιήσαν. 'Ασθενές δή καί ψεύδος ον και είς ψεύδος έμπιπτον, οία έν ονείρω η ύδατι η κατόπτρω, ἀπαθή αὐτὴν εἴασεν έξ άνάγκης είναι καιτοι έν γε τοις προειρημένοις δμοίωσις τοῖς ἐνορωμένοις ἐστὶ πρὸς τὰ ἐνορώντα. 8. "Ολως δέ τὸ πάσχον δεῖ τοιοῦτον είναι οίον εν ταξς εναντίμις είναι δυνάμεσι καὶ ποιότησι τῶν

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appears great, it is small, if more, it is less; its apparent being is not real, but a sort of fleeting frivolity; hence the things which seem to come to be in it are frivolities, nothing but phantoms in a phantom, like something in a mirror which really exists in one place but is reflected in another; it seems to be filled and holds nothing; it is all seeming. "Imitations of real beings pass into and out of it," 1 ghosts into a formless ghost, visible because of its formlessness. They seem to act on it, but do nothing, for they are wraith like and feeple and have no thrust: nor does matter thrust against them, but they go through without making a cut, as if through water, or as if someone in a way projected shapes in the void people talk about. And again, if the things seen in matter were of the same kind as those from which they came to it, perhaps one might give them a power derived from those which sent them and, as this power reached matter, one might assume that it was affected by them; but, as it is, the producers of the appearances are different from the things seen in matter, and we can learn from this the falsity of the affection, since what is seen in matter is false and has no sort of likeness to what produced it. Certainly, then, since it is weak and false, and falling into falsity, like things in a dream or water or a mirror, it necessarily leaves matter unaffected; though in the examples just mentioned there is a likeness between the things seen [in water, etc.], and the things which are the causes of the appearances.

8. But in general that which is affected must be of such a kind that it is possessed of powers and qualities opposed to those of the things which come upon it

¹ Timaeus 50C 4-5.

επεισιόντων και το πάσχειν έμποιούντων. Τώ γαρ ενώντι θερμώ ή άλλοίωσις ή παρά του ψύχοντος 5 καὶ τῷ ἐνόντι ὑγρῷ ἡ ἀλλοίωσις ἡ παρὰ τοῦ ξηραίνοντος, και ήλλοιωσθαι λέγομεν τὸ ὑποκείμενον, έταν έκ θερμού ψυχρόν η έκ ξηρού ύγρον γίγνηται. Μαρτυρεί δέ και ή λεγομένη πυρός φθορά μεταβολης γενομένης είς στοιχείον άλλο. τὸ γὰρ πῦρ ἐφθάρη, φαμέν, οὐχ ἡ ὕλη· ώστε καὶ τὰ πάθη περί τοῦτο, περί ο καὶ ή φθορά δόδος 10 γαρ είς φθοράν ή παραδοχή τοῦ πάθοις. καί τούτω τὸ φθείρεσθαι, ὧ καὶ τὸ πάσχειν. Τὴν δὲ έλην φθείρεσθαι ούχ οδόν τε είς τί γάρ καὶ πώς; Πῶς οὖν λαβοῦσα ἐν αὐτῆ θερμότητας, ψυχρότητας, μυρίας και άπείρους όλως ποιότητας και ταύταις 15 διαληφθείσα καὶ είοι συμφύτους αὐτὰς έχουσα καὶ συγκεκραμένας άλλήλαις, ου γάρ εκαστα χωρίς, αὐτή δέ ἐν μέσω ἀποληφθείσα πασχουσών τών ποιοτήτων έν τῆ πρὸς ἀλλήλας ὑπ' ἀλλήλων μίξει ούχι συμπάσχει και αὐτή; Εί μη άρα έξω τις αὐτὴν θήσεται αὐτῶν παντάπασιν. ἐν ὑποκειμένω 20 δὲ πῶν οὖτω πάρεστι τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ, ὡς αὐτῷ τι παρ' αὐτοῦ διδόναι.

9 Ληπτέον δή τὸ παρείναι ἔτερον ἐτέρῳ καὶ τὸ εἶνω ἄλλω ἐν ἄλλῳ πρώτον ώς οὐ κωθ' ἔνα τρόπον ὑπάρχει, ἀλλὰ τὸ μέν ἐυτιν υἷον μετὰ τοῦ παρείναι ἢ χεῖρον ἢ βέλτιον ποιείν ἐκείνο μετὰ τοῦ τρέπειν,

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and produce affections in it. For it is from that which cools it that the change comes to the heat in a thing, and from that which dries it that the change comes to the moistness in it, and we say that the substrate is changed when it becomes cold instead of hot or moist instead of dry. And what is called the destruction of fire is evidence of this, there is a change into another element, for, we assert, the fire is destroyed, not the matter; so that the affections belong to that which it belongs to be destroyed. for receiving affections is the way to destruction: and being destroyed is brought about by that which is also the cause of being affected. But it is impossible for matter to be destroyed, for into what could it [be changed when it is] destroyed, and how? How then, when matter receives in itself heats and coldnesses, and thousands, in fact, an infinite number, of qualities, and is divided by them and holds them, so to speak, grown together and mixed up with each other (for individual qualities are not separate in it), can it, set apart in the middle of them, not be itself affected along with them when the qualities are affected by their interaction on each other in their mixture with each other? Unless, of course, one is to put it quite outside the qualities; but everything which is present in a substrate is present in such a way as to give something from itself to the substrate.

9. One must, of course, understand first of all that there is not only one way in which one thing is present to another or in another; but there is one way in which the presence of the thing goes with an improvement or deterioration in the other which

¹ This is Aristotchan doctrine: op. De Generations et Corruptions A.7. 323h6 ff.

5 οδον επὶ τῶν σωμάτων ὁρῶται ἐτί γε τῶν ζώων, τὸ δ' οδον ποιεῖν βέλτιον ἡ χεῖρον ἄνευ τοῦ πάσχειν ἐκεῖνο, ἄσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ψηχῆς ἐλέγετο, τὸ δ' οδον ὅταν τις σχῆμα κηρῷ προσαγάγη, ἔνθα οὖτε τι πάθος, ὡς ἄλλο τι ποιῆσαι τὸν κηρὸν εἶναι, ὅταν παρῆ τὸ σχῆμα, οὖτε ἐλλευψεις [ἐκεῖνο] ¹ ἀπεληλυθό-

10 τος ἐκείνου. Τὸ δὲ δὴ φῶς οὐδὲ σχήματος ἀλλοίωσιν περὶ τὸ φωτιζόμενου ποιεῖ. 'Ο δὲ δὴ λίθος ψηχρὸς γενόμενος τί παρὰ τῆς ψυχρότητος μένων λίθος ἔχει, Τί δ' ἄν γραμμὴ ποθοι ὑπὸ χρώματος; Οὐδὲ δὴ τὸ ἐπίπεδου, οἷμαι 'Αλλὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενου ἵσως σῶμα; Καίτοι ὑπο χρώματος

16 τί ἄν πάθοι: Οὐ γὰρ δεῖ τὸ παθεῖν λέγειν τὸ παρεῖναι οὐδὲ τὸ μορφὴν περιθεῖναι. Εἰ δέ τις και τὰ κάτοπτρα λέγοι καὶ ὅλως τὰ διαφανῆ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐνορωμένων εἰδώλων μηδὲν πάσχειν, οὐκ ἀνόμοιοι ἄν τὸ παράδειγμα φέροι. Εἴδωλα γὰρ καὶ τὰ ἐν τῆ ΰλη, καὶ αὕτη ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀπαθέστερον

20 ἢ τὰ κάτοπτρα. Ἐγγίγνονται μὲν δὴ ἐν αὐτἢ θερμάτητες καὶ ψυχράτητες, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτἢν θερμαίνουσαι· τὸ γὰρ θερμαίνεσθαί ἐστι καὶ τὸ ψύχεσθαι ποιότητος ἐξ ἄλλης εἰς ἄλλην τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἀγούσης. Ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ περὶ τῆς ψυχρότητος μήποτε ἀπουσία καὶ στέρησις. Συνελθουσαι

25 δε είς αὐτὴν αἱ ποιότητες εἰς ἀλλήλας μεν αἰ πολλαὶ αὐτῶν ποιήσουσι, μᾶλλον δε αἱ εναντίως

1 έλλεμμες $H-S^2$: ἔλλεμμεν εἰς ἐκεῖνο ExC, $H-S^1$: ἔλλεμμεν ἐκεῖνο US^* εἰς ἔλλεμμεν εἰς ἐκεῖνο A ἀλείμειν εἰς ἐκεῖνο Q.

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involves change; this is the kind of presence which is observed in bodies, living ones at any rate; and there is another which brings about improvement or deterioration without the other being affected; this is what we have said happens in the case of the soul. There is another way, too, which is like what happens when someone impresses a shape on wax, where there is no affection, so as to make the wax into something else when the shape is there, and there are no deficiencies when the shape is gone. And light, certainly, does not even produce an alteration of shape in the thing illuminated. And when a stone becomes cold, what does it get from the coldness, since it remains a stone? And in what way could a line be affected by colour? . I do not think that even a surface could be. But, perhaps, the body underlying it could? Yet how could it be affected by colour? For one must not call presence or putting on a shape " being affected.' If one said that mirrors and transparent things generally were in no way affected by the images seen in them, he would be giving a not inappropriate example. For the things in matter are images too, and matter is still less liable to affections than are mirrors. For certainly heats and coldnesses occur in it, but they do not heat it; for heating and cooling belong to quality, which brings the substrate from one state to another. (But we should consider whether coldness is not an absence and a privation.) But when the qualities come together in matter most of them will act upon each other, or, rather, those will which are opposed to

¹ Cp. Aristotle, De Gen. et Corr. A." 323b25-6

η χρώμα σχήμα η το έξ άλλου γένοις άλλο; "Οθεν άι τις και μάλιστα πιστεύσειεν ώς έστιν έν τφ

30 αὐτῷ εἰναι ἄλλο ἄλλῳ ἡ ἔτερον ἐν ἐτέρῳ ἄλυπον ον τῆ αὐτοῦ παρουσία ῷ ἡ ἐν ῷ πάρεστιν. "Ωσπερ οὖν καὶ τὸ βλαπτόμενον οὐχ ὑπὸ τοῦ τυχόντος, οὕτως οὐδὲ τὸ τρεπόμενον καὶ πάσχον ὑφὸ ὁτουοῦν ἂν πάθοι, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἐναντίοις ὑπὸ τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ πεῖσις, τὰ δ' ἄλλα ὑπὸ ἄλλων ἄτρεπτα.

35 Ols δή μηδεμία εναντιότης υπάρχει, ταῦτα υπ' οὐδενὸς ἄν ἐναντίου πάθοι. 'Ανάγκη τοίνυν, εἴ τι πάσχοι, μὴ ὕληι, ἀλλά τι συναμφότερον ἡ ὅλως πολλὰ όμοῦ εἶται. Τὸ δὲ μόνον καὶ ἔρημον τῶν ἄλλων καὶ παντάπασιι ἀπλουν ἀπαθὲς ἄν εἴη πάντων καὶ ἐν μέσοις ἄπασιι ἀπειλημμένον [ຖ] 1

40 τοις είς άλληλα ποιούσιν οίον εν οίκω τω αυτώ άλλήλους παιόντων ὁ οίκος ἀπαθής καὶ ὁ ἐν αὐτώ ἀήρ. Συνιόντα δὲ τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς ὕλης ἄλληλα ποιείτω, ὅνα ποιείι πέφικεν, αὐτὴ δ' ἀπαθής ἔστω πολὸ μάλλον, ἢ ὅσαι ποιότητες ἐν αὐτῆ τῷ μὴ ἐναντίαι είναι ἀπαθείς ὑπ' ἀλλήλων εἰνίν.

10. Επειτα, εἰ πάσχει ἡ ὕλη, δεῖ τι ἔχειν αὐτὴν ἐκ τοῦ πάθους ἡ αὐτὸ τὸ πάθος ἡ ἐτέρως διακεῖσθαι ἡ πρὶν εἰσελθεῖν εἰς αὐτὴν τὸ πάθος. Ἐπιούσης τοίνυν ἄλλης μετ' ἐκείνην ποιότητος οἰκέτι ὕλη 5 ἔσται τὸ δεχόμενον, ἀλλὰ ποιὰ ὕλη. Εἰ δὲ καὶ

¹ † del Kirchhoff.

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each other. For what could fragrance do to sweetness or colour to shape, or a thing which belongs to one kind to a thing of another kmd? This would very much confirm one s belief that it is possible for one thing to be in the same place as another, or in another, without troubling by its presence that with which or in which it is. So then, just as a thing does not suffer injury from any and every chance encounter. so that which is changed and affected is not af fected by anything and everything, but it is opposites which affect opposites, and other things remain un changed by each other. Those, then, in which there is no opposition could not be affected by any opposite. So that, if anything is affected, it cannot be matter but must be a composite or in general a multiplicity of things all together. But that which is "single and set apart " 1 from all other things and in every way simple would be unaffected by everything and set apart in the midst of all the things which act on each other; just as when people are hitting each other in the same house the house is unaffected, and so is the air in it. So let the things which have matter as their substrate act on each other as it is their nature to do, but let matter itself be unaffected, much more so than those qualities in it which are unaffected by each other because they are not opposed,

10. Then further if matter is affected, it must retain something from the affection, either the affection itself, or the being in a different state from that in which it was before the affection came to it. Now, if ano her quality comes to it after that [first one which affected it], what receives it will no longer be matter but qualified matter. But if this quality,

¹ The phrase comes from Plato, *Philebus* 63B6-7, but the context there is quite different.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III 6

αθτη 1 ή ποιότης ἀποσταίη καταλιποθοά τι αθτής τῷ ποιῆσαι, ἄλλο ἄν ἔτι μᾶλλοι γύγνοιτο τὸ ύποκείμενον. Καὶ προιούσα τούτον τον τρόποι άλλο τι η ύλη έσται τὸ ύποκείμενον, πολύτροπον δέ και πολυειδές. ώστε ουδ' αν έτι πανδεχές 10 γένοιτο έμπόδιον πολλοίς τοις έπειπιούσι γυγνόμενον, ή τε ύλη οὐκέτι μένει οὐδὲ ἄφθαρτος τοίνυν: ωστε, εί δει ύλην είναι, ωσπερ έξ άρχης ήν, ούτως άει δεί αὐτην είναι την αὐτην : ώς τό γε άλλοιοῦσθαι λέγειν ούκ έστιν αύτην ύλην τηρούντων "Επειτα δέ, εἰ ὅλως τὸ ἀλλοιούμενον πῶν δεῖ μένον ἐπὶ 15 τοῦ αὐτοῦ εἴδους ἀλλοιοῦσθαι, καὶ κατὰ συμβεβηκότα άλλ' οὐ καθ' αὐτά: εἰ δεῖ μένειν τὸ άλλοιούμενον καὶ οὐ το μένον ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ τὸ πάσχον, δυοίν βάτερον ἀνάγκη, η ἀλλοιουμένην την ύλην αύτης εξίστασθαι, η μη εξισταμένην αύτης μη 20 άλλοιοῦσθα.. Εί δέ τις λέγοι μή καθ' δσον ύλη άλλοιοῦσθα, πρώτον μέν κατά τι άλλοιώσεται ούν έξει λέγειν, έπειτα όμολογήσει και ούτω την ύλην αὐτὴν μη ἀλλοιοῦσθαι. "Ωσπερ γάρ τοῖς άλλοις είδεσεν οδσεν οδκ έστεν άλλοιοθσβαι κατά την οὐσίαν της οὐσίας αὐτοῖς ἐν τούτω οὕσης, 25 ούτως, επειδή το είναι τη ύλη έστι το είναι ή ύλη, οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτὴν ἀλλοιοῦσθαι καθ' ὅ τι ὕλη έστίν, άλλα μένειν, καὶ ώσπερ έκεῖ άναλλοίωτον αὐ-ὸ τὸ είδος, οὖτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἀνακλοίωτον αθτήν την ίλην.

¹ αὖτη Kirchhoff, Η δ²: αὐτή codd

¹ Cp. Timaeus 50B7 8.

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too, goes away leaving something of itself behind as the result of its action, the substrate will become still more different. And if it went on in this way the substrate would become something other than matter, something existing in many modes and many shapes; so that it would not be able to receive everything but would obstruct the entry of many of the things which came to it—and then there is no more matter, so it is not indestructible; so, if there must be mat ter, as there was from the beginning, it must consequently always be the same, so that it is not possible to keep matter and speak of it as being altered. Then again, if, speaking generally, everything which is altered must retain the same essential form in the alteration, and be altered only accidentally, not intrinsically; if that which is altered must really remain, and it is not that of it which remains which is affected, then one of two consequences must necessanty follow: either matter will be attered and pass out of its own nature, or it will not pass out of its own nature and will not be altered. But if anyone should say that it is not altered in so far as it is matter, first of all he will not be able to say in what respect it is going to be altered, and then he will admit, this way too, that matter itself is not altered. For, just as other things, which are forms, cannot be altered in their essential being, since their essential being consists in this, since existing, for matter, is existing precisely as matter, it is not possible for it to be a tered in so far as it is matter, but it must stay as it is, and, just as in the case of things which are forms the form itself must remain unaltered, so here too matter itself must remain unaltered.

11. "Οθει δή καὶ τὸν Πλάτωνα οὖτω διανοού μενον όρθως είρηκέναι νομιζω, τὰ δ' είσιόντα και έξιόντα των όντων μιμήματα μη μάτην είσιέναι καὶ εξιέναι είρηκέναι, άλλά βουλόμενον 5 ήμας συνείναι ἐπιστήσαντας τῷ τρόπω τῆς μεταλήψεως, καὶ κινδυνεύει το άπορον έκεινο το όπως ή ύλη των είδων μεταλαμβάνει μή έκεῖνο είναι δ οί πολλοί ιδήθησαν τῶι πρὸ ἡμών, τὸ πῶς έρχεται είς αὐτήν, άλλὰ μᾶλλοι πῶς ἔστιν ἐν αὐτῆ. "Όντως γὰρ θαυμαστόν είναι δοκεί, πῶς -0 τούτων τῶν εἰδῶν παρόντων αὐτῆ μένει ἡ αὐτὴ άπεθής αὐτών οδοα καὶ προσέτι αὐτών τών ελσιόντων πασχόντων ύπ' άλληλων, 'Αλλά καί αὐτὰ τὰ εἰσιόντα ἐξωθεῖι τὰ πρότερα ἔκαστα, καὶ είναι το παθείν έν τῷ συνθέτω καὶ οὐδὲ ἐν παντί συνθέτω, άλλ' δι χρεία τού προσελθύντος ή 15 ἀπελθόντος και δ έλλιπες μεν τῆ συστάσει ἀπουσία τινος, τέλειον δε τή παρουσία. Τή δε ίλη ούτε τι πλέον είς την αύτης σύστασω προσελθόντος ότουοῦν οὐ γὰρ χίγνεται τότε ὅ ἐστι προσελθόντος, ούτε έλαττον ἀπελθόντος: μένει γὰρ ὁ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ήν. Του δε κεκραμήσθαι τοῦς μεν κόσμου καὶ 20 πίζεως δεομένοις εξη αν χρεία, καὶ δ'πύσμος δὲ γένοιτο αν άνευ μεταλλοιώσεως, οίον οίς περιτίθεμεν εί δε ούτω τις κοσμηθείη ώς σύμφυτον είναι, δεήσει άλλοιωθεν δ πρότερον ολοχρόν ήν καὶ έτερον

¹ Timaeus 50C4-5. cp. ch. 7.

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11. This I think was Plato's opinion, which led him to say, correctly, "The things that enter and leave it are copies of the real things "; 1 he spoke of entering and leaving with deliberate purpose, wishing us to understand and apply our minds to the manner of the participation; and it seems that the well-known difficulty about how matter participates in forms is rot what most of our predecessors thought it was, how the forms come into matter, but rather how they are in matter. For it really does appear remarkable how, when these forms are present to it, matter remains the same and is unaffected by them, and still more so since the very forms which enter it are affected by each other. But it is remarkable, too, that the things which enter push out on each occasion the things which were there before them, and that being affected occurs in the composite thing, and not in every composite but only in that which has a need for something to come to it or go away from it, and which has a defect in its composition if something is not there, but is complete if it is present. But matter gains nothing towards its composition if anything whatever comes to it, for it does not become what it is at the time when something comes, or become less when it goes away. for it remains what it was from the beginning. But as for being beautified and set in order, there could be a need for it in those things which need decoration and ordering, and the beautifying and ordering could take place without alteration, as when we dress people up; but if someone is to be so beautified and set in order that the beauty and order are a part of his nature, there will be need of an alteration in what

γενόμενον έκεινο το κεκοσμημένον ούτω καλόν έξ αίσχροῦ είναι. Εἰ τοίνον αίσχρὰ οίδσα ἡ ὕλη καλὸ 25 έγένετο, ο ήν πρότερον τω 1 αλοχρά είναι οὐκέτ έστίν· ωστε έν τῷ οὕτω κεκοσμήσθαι ἀπολεῖ τὸ ύλην είναι καὶ μάλιστα, εἰ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αίσχρά· εί δ' ούτως αίσχρὰ ώς αίσχος είναι, οὐδ' αν μεταλάβοι κοσμου, και εί ούτω κακή ώς κακόν είναι, οὐδ' ἄν μεταλάβοι ἀγαθοῦ· ὥστε οὐχ οὕτως 30 ή μετάληψις ώς οιονται 2 παθούσης, άλλ' έτερος τρόπος οίον δοκείν. "Ισως δέ και τούτον τον τρόπου λύοιτο αν τὸ απορου, πώς οὖσα κακη εψίσετο ἄν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ώς μὴ μεταλήψει ἀπολλυμένης δ ήν εί γὸρ τοῦτον τὸν τρότον ή λεγομένη μετάληψης, ώς την αντήν μένειν μη άλλοιουμένην, 25 ώς λέγομεν, άλλ' είναι άει ο έστιν, οὐκέτι θαυμαστόν γίνεται τὸ πῶς οὖσα κακὴ μεταλαμβάνει. Οὐ γὰρ έξισταται έαυτης, άλλ' ότι μεν αναγκαϊόν έστι μεταλαμβάνειν άμηγέπη μεταλαμβάνει έως αν ή, τῷ δ' είναι ὅ ἐστι τρόπω μεταλήψεως τηροῦντι 40 αὐτὴν οὐ βλάπτεται είς τὸ είναι παρὰ τοῦ οὕτω διδόντος, καὶ κ.νδυνεύει διὰ τοῦτο οὐχ ήττον είνα. κακή, ὅτι ἀεὶ μένει τοῦτο ὅ ἐστι. Μεταλαμ-Βάνουσα νὰρ ὄντως καὶ ἀλλοιουμένη ὄντως ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀναθοῦ οὐκ ἄν ἢν τὴν φύσιν κακή. "Ωστε εί τις την ύλην λέγει κακήν, ούνως αν άληθεύοι, εί

τῷ Kirchhoff; τὸ codd, H. S.
 οἴοντα, Cizensis e corr, νἔόν τε codd.

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was ugly before, and what is beautified and ordered must become different and so be beautiful instead of ugly. Now, if matter was ugly and became beautiful, it is no longer what it was before by the fact of being ugly; 1 so that by being beautified and set in order in this way it will stop being matter, particularly if it is not only accidentally ugly; but if it is ugly in such a way that it is ugliness, it could have no part in beauty and order, and if it is bad in such a way that it is badness, it could have no part in good; so that its participation would not be, as people think, by being affected, but of another kind, so that it only seems to be affected. Perhaps in this way the difficulty can be resolved how, though it is evil, it can reach towards the good, in that it does not by its participation lose what it was before, for if, as we say, its so-called participation is of this kind, so that it remains the same and is not altered but is always what it is, it becomes no longer remarkable how it participates in the good] though it is evil. For it does not aban don itself but, smee it must participate, it participates in a kind of way as long as it is there; but, as the manner of participation keeps it what it is, it receives no damage which extends to its being from that which gives it [form] in this way, and because of this it is, so it seems, no less evil, because it always remams what it is. For if it really participated and was really altered by the good it would not be evil by nature. So that if someone calls matter evil. he would speak the truth if he meant that it was

not mean the same as aI_{UXOS} ϵI_{UAL} below, which in any case should not be anticipated here). I therefore print and translate Kirchhoff's correction $\tau \hat{\omega}$.

^{&#}x27;Henry-Schwyzer retain the MSS of tere and explain that το αίσχρὰ είναι is in αρχωνίτιο to δ ήν πρότερον. But what matter was before was αίσχρά, not το αισχρὰ είναι (this does

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 6.

46 τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀπαθῆ λέγοι τοῦτο δὲ ταὐτόν ἐστι τῷ ολως ἀπαθῆ εໂναι.

19 ' δέ γι Πλάτων τοθτο νοών περί αντής και την μετάληψιν ούχ ώς έν δποκειμένω είδους γενομένου και μορφήν διδόντος ώστε έν σύνθετον γενέσθαι συντραπέντων καὶ οἶον συγκραθέντων 5 και συμπαθόντων τιθέμενος, ότι μὴ οὕτω λέγει παραστήσαι βουλόμενος, και πώς αν αὐτη ἀπαθής μένουτα έχοι τὰ είδη ἀπαθοῦς μεταλήψεως ζητών 1 παράδειγμα άλλον τρόπον οὐ ράδιον διδάξαι ἃ μάλιστα παρόντα σώζει τὸ ὑποκείμενον ταὐτὸν είναι ύπέστη πολλάς ἀπορίας σπεύδων ἐφ' δ 10 βούλεται καὶ προσέτι παραστήσαι θέλων το έν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς κενὸν τῆς ὑποστάσεως καὶ τὴν χώραν τοῦ εἰκότος οὖσαν πολλήν. Τὴν οὖν ὕλην τχήμασιν ύποθέμενος τὰ πάθη ποιείν τοῖς ἐμψύχοις ιώμασω οδδέν αδτην έχουσαν τούτων τῶν παθημάτων τὸ μένον ταύτης [ταύτην] 2 ἐνδείκνυται 15 διδούς συλλογίζεσθαι, ώς οὐδὲ παρὰ τῶι σχημάτων έχει το πάσχειν αὐτή καὶ άλλοιοῦσθαι. Τοῖς μέν γάρ σώμασι τούτοις έξ έτέρου σχήματος έτερον σχήμα δεχομένοις τάχα ἄν τις άλλοίωσιν λέγοι γίγνεσθαι την του σχήματος μεταβολήν δμώνυμον

ζητών Cizensis e corr , Kirchhoff - ζηταῦσα codd., Η S.
 ταντην del. H.-S.

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unaffected by the good; but this is the same as being totally incapable of being affected.

12. This is Plato's thought about matter; 1 he does not suppose that its participation was like that in which a form becomes present in a substrate and gives it shape so that one composite thing comes into existence, with form and substrate combined, and so to speak mixed up and mutually affected; he wants to show that he does not mean this, and how matter could remain unaffected and receive the forms. looking for an example of participation without affection 2-in any other way it would not be easy to explain what things precisely when they are present, keep the substrate analtered, so he raised many difficulties in hurrying on to express what he wants, and, further, wishing to show the emptiness of substantial being in the things of sense and the great area which there is of mere appearance. So when he makes it his initial supposition that matter by its shapes produces the affections in ensouled bodies, he demonstrates its persistence, and enables us to conclude that it does not itself experience any affection or alteration even from the shapes. For one might perhaps say that alteration occurs in these bodies which receive one shape after another, meaning that the equivocal term "alteration"

* Henry-Schwyzer here keep the MSS $\zeta\eta\tau\sigma\sigma\sigma\alpha$. But it does not seem to make any sort of reasonable sense to say that matter looks for an example of unafected participation, whereas it makes excellent sense to say that Plato does; and it is easy to see how a scribe could have written $\zeta\tau\tau\sigma\sigma\sigma$ for $\zeta\eta\tau\sigma\sigma$ under the influence of the immediate y preceding $\mu\epsilon\tau\sigma\sigma\sigma$. I therefore, with Kirchholl and other editors (including Beutler-Theiler), print and translate $\zeta\eta\tau\omega\nu$. (Dr. Schwyzer now agrees)

¹ Plotings sooms to be considering here the whose passage dealing with the "third kind" in the Timesus (47E-53C) rather than any particular part of it.

την αλλοίωσαν είναι λέγων· της δὲ ὅλης οὐδὲν
20 σχήμα ἐχούσης οὐδὲ μέγεθος πῶς ἄν τις την τοῦ
σχήματος ὁπωσοῦν παρουσίαν ἀλλοίωσω εἶναι κᾶν
δμωνύμως λέγοι; Εἴ τις οὖν ἐνταῦθα τὸ νάμμω
χροι η καὶ τὰ ἄλλα νόμω λέγοι τῷ την φύσω την
ὑποκειμένην μηδὲν οὕτως ἔχειν, ὡς νομίζεται, οὐκ
25 ἄν ἄτοπος εἴη τοῦ λόγου. ᾿Αλλὰ πῶς ἔχει, εἰ
μηδὲ τὸ ὡς σχήματα ἀρέσκει; ᾿Αλλ᾽ ἔχει ἔνδειξιν
η ὑπόθεσις ὡς οἰόν τε τῆς ἀπαθείας καὶ τῆς οἶον
εἰδώλων οὐ παρόντων δοκούσης παρουσίας.

"Η πρότερον έτι περὶ τῆς ἀπαθείας αὐτῆς λεκτέον διδάσκοντας ώς χρὴ ταῖς συνηθείαις τῶν 30 ὀνομάτων ἐπὶ τὸ πάσχειν αὐτὴν φέρεσθαι, οἷον ὅταν [ξηραινομένην ¹ τὴν αὐτὴν πιρουμένην καὶ ὑγραινομένην ἐνθυμουμένους καὶ τὰ ἐξῆς «καὶ τὰς ἀέρος καὶ ὕδατος μορφὰς δεχομένην». Τὸ γὰρ «καὶ τὰς ἀέρος καὶ ὕδατος μορφὰς δεχομένην» ἀπαμβλύνει μὲν τὸ «πυρουμένην καὶ ὑγραινομένην», 35 δηλοῖ τε ἐν τῷ «μορφὰς δεχομένην» οὐ τὸ μεμορφῶσθαι αὐτήν, ἀλλ' εἶναι τὰς μορφὰς ὡς εἰσῆλθον, τό τε «πυρουμένην» οὐ κυρίως εἰρῆσθαι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πῦρ γινομένην οὐ γὰρ τὸ αὐτο πῦρ γίνεσθαι καὶ πυροῦσθαι. ὑπ' ἄλλου μὲν γὰρ τὸ πυροῦσθαι, 40 ἐν ῷ καὶ τὸ πάσχειν. ὅ δ' αὐτὸ μέρος ἐστὶ πυρὸς

1 ξηραινομένην del. Page, H-S2.

includes the sense of "change of shape"; but, since matter has not shape or size, how could one say that any sort of presence of shape in it was alteration, even using the word in this equivocal sense! If, then, anyone at this point should quote "colour by convention and other things by convention," because the underlying nature has nothing in the way in which it is conventionally supposed to, his quotation would not be out of place. But how does it have the forms, if not even the statement that it has them as shapes satisfies us? But Plato's supposition does at least indicate as clearly as possible the impassibility of matter and the seeming presence in it of a kind of phantasms which are not really present.

We must still make another preliminary point about its impassibility, that it is inevitable that we should be led by our customary way of speaking to suppose that it is affected, as, for instance, when we think of the same matter as being [as Plato says] set on fire and moistened, and, what follows this "receiving the shapes of air and water." 2 This phrase too, "receiving the shapes of air and water," takes away the force of the "being set on fire" and "moistened," and makes clear that in the phrase "receiving shapes "Plato is not speaking of matter itself having been shaped but that the shapes are there in the way in which they entered it, and that "being set on fire "is not used in its proper sense, but means that matter has become fire, for it is not the same thing to become fire and to be set on fire; being set on fire is due to the agency of another thing, and this also implies being affected; but how could that which is itself a part of fire be set on fire? It

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Democritus, fr. DK, D9

^{*} Timaeus 52D5 6 [$\xi\eta\rho\mu\nu\nu\mu\epsilon\nu\gamma\nu$] 'drying up '' is a gloss on $\pi\nu\rho\nu\nu\mu\epsilon\nu\gamma\nu$.

πως αν πυροίτο; Τοιούτου γάρ αν είη, οίου εί τις διά τοῦ χαλκοῦ τὸν ἀνδριάντα λέγοι πεφοιτηκένοι, εί τὸ πῦρ διὰ τῆς ὅλης λέγοι κεχωρηκέναι καὶ προσέτι πυρώσαι. "Ετι, εί λόγος ο προσιών, πώς αν πυρώσειεν; "Η εί σχήμα; 'Αλλά τὸ πιρού-45 μενον ύπ' ἀμφοῖν ήδη. Πώς οὖν ύπ' ἀμφοῖν μή ένος εξ άμφοῦν γενομένου; "Η, καν εν ή γενόμενον, οὐκ ἐν ἀλλήλοις τὰ πάθη ἐχόντων, ἀλλὰ πρός άλλα ποιούντων. "Αρ' οδι άμφοτέρων ποιούντων; "Η θατέρου θάτερον παρέχοντος μη φυγείν. 'Αλλ' όταν διαιρεθή τι σώμα, πώς οὐ καί αὐτή διήρηται; 50 Καὶ πεπονθότος ἐκείνου τῷ διηρῆσθαι πῶς οὐ καὶ αὐτή τῷ αὐτῷ τούτω παθήματι πέπονθεν; "Η τί καλύει τη αθτή λόγη τούτη και φθείραι λέγουτας πῶς φθαρέντος τοῦ σώματος οὐκ ἔφθαρται; "Επι λεκτέον τοσόνδε γάρ είναι καὶ μένεθος είναι, τῷ δε μη μεγέθει οὐδε τὰ μεγέθους πάθη εγγύρνεσθαι 55 καὶ όλως δή τῷ μη σώματι μηδὲ τὰ σώματος πάθη γίγνεσθαι. ώστε όσοι παθητήν ποιούσι καὶ σωμα συνγωρείτωσαν αὐτὴν είναι.

13. "Ετι δὲ κἀκεῖνο ἐπιστῆσαι αὐτοὺς προσήκει, πῶς λέγουσι φεύγειν αὐτὴν τὸ είδος: πῶς γὰρ ἂν λίθους—τὰ περιλαβόντα αὐτήν—καὶ πέτρας φύγοι;

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would be the same sort of thing as saying that the statue took regular walks through the bronze, if one said that the fire passed through the matter and. besides that, set it on fire! Besides, if what comes to matter is a rational forming principe, how could it set it on fire? Or if it is a shape? But that which is set on fire is kindled by what is already a composite of both [matter and form] How, then, is it kindled by both if one thing has not come into existence from both? Even if one thing has come into existence, its two components do not have reciprocal affections but a common action on other things. Do they then both act? Rather, one prevents the other from get ting away. But when a body is divided, how is the matter not divided too? And when the body is affected by being divided, how is the matter, too, not affected with the very same affection? Now, what prevents us by this very same line of argument from asserting its destruction, asking how when the body is destroyed the matter is not destroyed too? Besides, it must be pointed out that body is quantitatively determined and is size, but that which is not size is not subject to the affections of size, and in general what is not body is not subject to the affections of body, so that all those who make matter subject to affections must admit also that it is a body.2

13. But there is this further question which they ought to give their minds to, what they mean by saying that it tries to escape from form, for how could it escape from stones and rocks—things which

their view that matter is subject to affections, not against Stoics, who were quite certain that matter was a body (cp. note to ch 6 above).

¹ The bronze and the statue provide an example which Aristotle frequently uses in his discussions of matter and its formation: op., e.g., Physics B.3 194b2 ff. The point which Piotinus is making here is the absurdity of thinking of the relationship of form and matter in terms of one body entering and seting on another.

^{*} Plotains is clearly arguing here and in the next chapter against Platonists who quote the Timaeus as an authority for

Οὐ γὰρ δη ποτέ μέν φεύγειν, ποτέ δέ μη φεύγειν 5 φήσουσαν. Εί γὰρ βουλήσει αὐτής φεύγει, διὰ τί οδκ άει, Εί δε ανάγκη μένει, οδι έστιν ότε οδκ εν είδει τινί έστιν. 'Αλλά του μή το αυτό είδος άεὶ ἴσχειν έκάστην ὔλην ζητητέον τὴι αἰτίαν, καὶ άν τοῖς είσιοῦσι μάλλον. Πώς οὖν λέγεται φεύγειν; η τη αὐτης φίσει καὶ ἀεί τοῦτο δὲ τί 10 αν είη η μηδέποτε αὐτης έξισταμένην οὕτως έχειν τὸ είδος ώς μηδέποτε έχειν: η ο τι γρήσονται τω ύφ' αύτῶν λεγομένα οὐχ ἔξουσιν ἡ δὲ ὑποδοχὴ καὶ τιθήνη γενέσεως άπάσης: εί γὰρ ὑποδοχή καὶ τιθήνη, ή δὲ γένεσις ἄλλο αὐτῆς, τὸ δὲ ἀλλοιού-15 μενον εν τη γενέσει, προ γενέσεως ούσα είη αν καὶ πρὸ άλλοιώσεως ή τε «ύποδοχή» καὶ ἔτι «ή τιθήνη » τηρείν εν ώ έστιν άπαθή ούσαν, καὶ τὸ εν ώ έγγινό, μενον έκαστον φανταζεται και πάλιν έκείθεν έξεισι και χώραν είναι και έδραν. Και το λεγόμενον δε και είθυνομενον ώς τόπον 20 είδων λέγοντος οθ πάθος λέγει περί έκεθιο, άλλά τρόπον έτερον ζητεί. Τ΄ς ούν ούτος; Ἐπειδή την λεγομένην ταύτην φισιι ούδεν δεί είναι των όντων, άλλ' απασαν εππεφευγέναι την των όντων

1 Cp. Timiteus 49E2.

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encompass and contain it? They will not, certainly, assert that it tries to escape at some times and not at others. For if it tries to escape by its own wish, why does it not always do it? But if it remains by necessity, there is never a time when it is not in some form. But, then, we must try to find the reason why each matter does not always have the same form but is rather in the [always different] forms which enter into it. In what way, then is it said to "try to escape "?1 By its own nature, and always. But what can this mean except that it never departs from itself and has the form in such a way that it never has it? On any other interpretation they will be able to do nothing with the phrase which they themselves use, "The receptace and nurse of all becoming.' 2 For if it is receptacle and nurse, becoming is other than it, but that which is altered is in becoming, so matter would be existent before becoming, and before alteration; and the words "receptacle" and also "nurse" imply its maintenance in the state in which it is free from affections, and so does "that in which each thing appears on its entrance, and again goes out from it " and the statements that it is "space" and "seat." 4 And the statement which has been criticised as speaking of a 'place of the forms" does not mean an affection of the substrate, but is trying to find another way [of participation]. What is this way, then? Since this nature of which we are speaking must not be any real thing, but must have escaped altogether from the reality of real beings, and be altogether

² Cp. Timaeus 49A5-6. I punctuate here as Beutler-Tholor, not as Houry Schwyzor

Trimueus 49E7 8 but the last word in Plato is ἀπόλλυται, not ξεισι.

⁴ Cp. Timaeus 52A8-B1.

Cp. Timaeus 52B4—5.

οὐσιαν καὶ πάντη έτέραν-λόγοι γὰρ ἐκεῖνα καὶ οντως όντες-, ανάγκη δη αιτήν τω έτέρω τούτω 25 φυλόστουσου σύτης ην είληχε σωτηρίου - ανάγιες αὐτήν μή μόνον τῶι ὄντων ἄδεκτον είναι, άλλά καί, εί τι μιμημα αὐτῶν, καὶ τούτου άμοιρον είς οἰκείωσιν είναι. Οὕτω γὰρ ἂν έτέρα πάντη ἡ είδός τι είσοικισαμένη μετ' εκείνοι άλλο γενομένη άπώλεσε τὸ έτέρα είναι και χώρα πάντων, καὶ 30 οὐδενὸς ὅτου οἰχ 1 ὑτοδοχή. ᾿Αλλα δεῖ καὶ εἰσιόντων την αθτην μένει και έξιόντων άπαθη, ίνα και είσιη τι ἀεὶ εἰς αὐτὴν καὶ ἐξίη. Εἴσε.σι δη τὸ είσιον είδωλον ον και είς ουκ άληθωοι ουκ άληθές. *Αρ' οὖν ἀληθῶς; Καὶ πῶς, ῷ μηδαμῶς θέμις άληθείας με έχειν δια το ψεύδος είναι, *Αρα οδν ψευδώς els ψεύδος έρχεται και παραπλήσιον 35 γίνεται οίον και είς το κάτοπτρον, εί ορώτο 2 τα ε δωλα των ειτορωμένων καί έως ενορά εκείνα; Καὶ γὰρ εί ένταθθα ἀνέλοις τὰ ὅντα, οὐδὲν ἄν οὐδενα χρόνον φανείη τῶν νῦν ἐν αἰσθητῷ ὅρωμένων. Τὸ μέν οὖν κάτοπτρον ἐνταῦθα καὶ αὐτὸ [ἐν] 3 Αράται: ἔατι γιάρ καὶ αὐτο είλός τι: ἐκεί δὲ 4) οὐδεν είδος ον αὐτό μεν οὐχ δρᾶται έδει γάρ αὐτο πρότερον καθ' αὐτὸ δράσθαι άλλὰ τοιοθτόν

1 Stor ovy Kirchhoff, H.S2: Storage codd

² εὶ ὁρῷτο H-S ενορῶτο codd

3 όραται V.tringa, H-S. ἐνοράται codd

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different—for those real beings are rational principles and really real it is necessary for it by this difference to guard its own proper self-preservation: it is necessary for it not only to be irreceptive of real beings but as well, if there is [in it] some imitation of them, to have no share in it which will really make it its Jwn. In this way it would be altogether different; otherwise, if it took any form to itself it would in conjunction with it become something else and would cease to be different and space for all things, and the receptacle of absolutely everything. But it must remain the same when the forms come into it and stay unaffected when they leave it, so that something may always be coming into it and leaving it. So certainly what comes into it comes as a phantsom, untrue into the intrue. Does it, then, truly come? How could it, to that which is utterly forbidden to have any part in truth because it is falsehood? Does it, then, come falsely into falsehood and is what happens very much like the way in which the images of the faces seen in a mirror are perceived there as long as people look into it? For if here below you took away the real beings, none of the things which we now see in the world perceived by the senses would ever at any time appear. Here, certainly, the mirror itself is seen, for it, too, is a form; but in the case of matter, since it is in no way a form, it is not itself seen, for [if it was] it would have to be seen by itself, before the forms come to it; but what happens to it is like the way in which

to read evopularious for evopulation these corrections would make the text rather easier to understand, but cannot be regarded as certain.

¹ The English here is intended to represent the probable general sense—the text is obscure and ancertain. Theiler wishes to detete the MSS $i\nu\rho\rho\dot{\omega}$ of $(H-S \epsilon i) \delta\rho\dot{\omega}$ and, (following B. R. Doddz, Select Passages Illustrating Neoplatonism 39)

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τι πάσχει, οίον καὶ ὁ ἀηρ φωτισθεὶς ἀφανής ἐστι και τότε, ότι καὶ ἄνευ τοῦ φωτισθήναι οὐχ έωρατο. Ι αύτη οδν τὰ μεν έν τοῖς κατόπτροις οὐ πιστεύεται είναι η ήττον, ότι όραται τὸ ἐν ῷ ἐστι καὶ μένει 45 μεν αὐτό, τὰ δε ἀπέρχετα. ἐν δὲ τῆ ύλη οὐχ όραται αὐτή οΰτε έχουσα οὖτε άνευ ἐκείνων. Εἰ δέ γε ην μένειν τὰ ἀφ' ὧν πληρούται τὰ κάτοπτρα και αὐτὰ μὴ ἐωρᾶτο, οὐκ ἂι μὴ εἶναι ἀληθινὰ ηπιστήθη τὰ ἐνορώμενα. Εὶ μὲι οὖν ἔστι τι ἐν τοις κατόπτροις, καὶ έν τῆ ύλη ούτα τὰ αἰσθητὰ 50 έστω: εί δε μη έστι, φαινεται δε είναι, κάκεῖ φατέον φαινεσθαι έπὶ τῆς έλης αἰτιωμένους τῆς φαντάσεως την των όντων ύπόστασιν, ής τὰ μέν όντα όντως ἀεὶ μεταλαμβάνει, τὰ δὲ μὴ όντα μὴ οντως, επείπερ ου δεί ουτως έχειν αυτά ώς είχεν 55 αν τοῦ ὄντως μὴ ὄντος, εὶ ἦν αὐτά.

14. Τί οδυ; Μὴ οὐσης οὐδὲν ὑπέστη ἄν; *Η υὐδὲ εἴδωλον κατύπ-ρου μὴ ὅντος ἤ τινος τοιούτου. Τὸ γὰρ ἐν ἐτέρῳ πεφικὸς γίνεσθαι ἐκείνου μὴ ὅντος ούκ ἀν γένοιτο· τουτο γὰρ φύσις εἰκόνος τὸ δ ἐν ἐτέρῳ. Εἰ μὲν γάρ τι ἀπήει ἀπὸ τῶν ποιούντων, καὶ ἄνευ τοῦ ἐν ἐτέρῳ ἢι ἄν. Ἐπεὶ δὲ μένει ἐκεῖνα, cỉ ἐμφαντασθήσεται ἐν ἄλλῳ, δεῖ τὸ ἄλλο

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the air is invisible even when it is illuminated, because it was upseen without the illumination. So in this way the images in mirrors are not believed or are less believed to be real, because that in which they are is seen, and it remains but they go away; but in matter, it itself is not seen either when it has the images or without them. But if it was possible for the images with which the mirrors are filled to remain, and the mirrors themselves were not seen, we should not disbelieve that the reflections seen in mirrors were real. If, then, there really is something in mirrors, let there really be objects of sense in matter in the same way; but if there is not, but only appears to be something, then we must admit, too, that things only appear on matter, and make the reason for their appearance the existence of the real beings, an existence in which the real beings always really participate, but the beings which are not real, not really; since they cannot be in the same state as they would be if real beings did not really exist and they did.

14. Well, then, if matter did not exist, would nothing come into existence? No, and there would be no image, either, if a mirror or something of the sort did not exist. For that whose nature is to come into existence in something else would not come into existence if that something else did not exist, for this is the nature of an image, being in something else. If, of course, something came away from the productive powers, it would exist without being in something else. But since these remain unmoved, if an image of them is going to appear in another thing, the other thing must exist, offering a base to

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είναι έδραν παρέχον τῷ οὐκ ἐλθόντι, τῆ δ' αὐτοῦ παρουσία και τη τόλμη και οίον προσαιτήσει και πευία οίου βιασάμευου λαβείν και αποτηθέν τη οὐ 10 λήψει, ΐνα μένη ή πενία καὶ ἀεὶ προσαιτή. Ἐπεὶ γαρ άρπαξ 1 υπέστη, δ μεν μύθος αὐτὴν ποιεί προσαιτούσαν ένδεικνύμενος αὐτης την φύσιν, ότι dyaθού έρημος. Αίτει τε ο προσωπών σόχ & έχει ό διδούς, άλλ' άγαπᾶ ὅ τι αν λάβη. ὥστε καὶ τοῦτο ένδείκνυσθαι, ώς έτερον τὸ έν αὐτῆ φανταζόμενον. 15 Τό τε ὄνομα ώς οὐ πληρουμένης. Τὸ δὲ τῷ Πόρω συγγίνεσθαι οὐ τῷ ὅντι δηλοῦντός ἐστι συγγίνεσθαι οὐδὲ τῷ κόρω, ἀλλά τινι πράγματι εθμηγάνω τυθτο δέ έστι τη σοφία του φαν τάσματος. Έπει γάρ ούχ οίου τε του όντος πάντη μή μετέχειν ο τι περ όπωσοῦν έξω ον αὐτοῦ έστιν 20 - αύτη γάρ όντος φύσις (είς) 2 τὰ όντα ποιείν-τὸ δε πάντη μη ον άμικτον τω όντι, θαθμα το χρήμα γίγνεται, πως μή μετέχον μετέχει, και πως οίον παρά της γειτνιάσεως έχει τι καίπερ τη αύτοῦ φύσει μεν οίον κολλασθαι άδυνατούν. 'Απολισθά-25 νει οθν ώς αν από φύσεως άλλοτρίας δ έλαβεν αν, οξον ήχω από τόπων λείων και όμαλων. ὅτι μὴ μένει ἐκεῖ, τούτω καὶ ἐφαντάσθη ἐκεὶ κακεῖθεν

- årvaf Harder, H S: åvaf codd 2 $\langle \mathit{els} \rangle$ Harder, H S 2

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that which does not come to it; this other thing by its presence and its self-assertion and a kind of hegging and its poverty makes a sort of violent attempt to grasp, and is cheated by not grasping, so that its poverty may remain and it may be always begging. For since it is a rapacious thing, the myth makes it a beggar woman to show its nature, that it is destitute of the good. And the beggar does not ask for what the giver has but is satisfied with what he gets, so that this, too, shows that what is imaged in matter is other [than real being]. And the name [Poverty] shows that malter is not satisfied. And by its union with "Resource" Plato makes clear that it is not united with real being or with plenitude but with a resourceful thing, that is, with the eleverness of the apparition.1 For, since it is impossible for anything whatever, which in any sort of way exists outside it, to have altogether no share in being-for this is the nature of being, to work on beings-and since, on the other hand, the altogether non-existent cannot combine with being, what happens is a wonder; how does the non-participant participate, and now does it have something as if from being next door, although by its own Lature it is incapable of being, so to speak, stuck on to it? What it might have grasped, then, slips away from it as if from an alien nature, like an echo from smooth flat surfaces; because it does not stay there, by this very fact the illusion is created that

myth in III 5 8-9, Poverty is intelligible matter. Here, and in the verbs. allusion (apocarre?) to the myth at I 8 [5.] 14 35, she is the matter of the sense world. The dea that the name Hépos (Resource) indicates something tricky, illusory, phantasmal, occurs only here.

¹ The interpretation of the beggar-woman Peverty in Plato's myth of the birth of Love (Symposium 203B ff) as matter is pre-Pletiman (see note to ch 5 of III. 5 [50]). Protinus uses it differently in different places to suit his philosophical purposes. In his full-length interpretation of the

είναι. Εί δ' ήν μετασχούσα και ούτω δεξαμένη, ώσπερ τις άξιοι, καταποθέν αν cis αθτήν τὸ προσελθου έδυ. Νου δε φαίνεται, ότι μη κατεπόθη. 30 άλλ' έμενεν ή αὐτή οὐδεν δεξαμένη, άλλ' ἐπισχοῦσα την πρόσοδον 1 ώς έδρα άπωθουμένη και είς το αύτο των προσιόντων κάκει μιγνημένων ύποδοχή, οίον όσα πρός ήλιον πθρ ζητοθντές λαβείν ίστασι λεια, τά δέ και πληρούντες ύδατος, ίνα μη διέλθη κωλυομένη ύπο τοῦ ἔνδοι ἐναντίου ἡ φλόξ, ἔξω δὲ 25 συνίσταιτο. Γίνεται οδυ αλτία τής γενέσεως οιπω

καί τὰ ἐν αὐτῆ συνιστάμενα τοιοθτον συνίσταται

τρόπον.

15. Έπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν τὸ πῦρ ἐξ ἡλίου περὶ αύτα συναγόντων ατε παρα αίσθητοῦ πυρὸς λαμβανόντων την περί αὐτὰ γινομένην έξαψιν τὸ αίσθητοις είναι και αυτοις υπάρχει διο και Φαίνεται, ότι έξω τὰ συνιστάμενα καὶ ἐφεξῆς καὶ 5 πλησίον και άπτεται και πέρατα δύο δ δ' έπι της ύλης λόγος άλλον έχει τρότον τὸ έξω. 'Η γάρ έτερότης της φύσεως άρκει οιδέν πέρατος διπλού δεομένη, άλλα πολύ μαλλον παντός πέρατος άλλοτρία 2 τη έτερότητι τής ούσίας καὶ ούδαμή 10 συγγενεία το άμιγες έχουσα και το αίτιον του μένειν έπ' αὐιῆς τοθτο, ὅτι μή τι τὸ εἰσιὸν

1 πρόσοδον Creuzer, H-S2: πρόσδον codd.

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it is there and comes from there. But if matter really was participant and received being in the way one thinks it does, what came to it would be swallowed and sink into it. But as things are, it is apparent that it is not swallowed but matter remains the same and receives nothing, but checks the approach as a repellent base and a receptacle for the things which come to the same point and there mingle; it is like the polished objects which people set against the sun when they want to get fire (and they fill some of them with water), so that the ray, being hindered by the resistance within, may not pass through, but be concentrated on the outside. So matter becomes in this way the cause of coming into being, and the things that are constructed in it are constructed in this way

15. In the case of the things which collect around them the fire from the sun, since they receive the lighting up which occurs around them from a perceptible fire, they themselves have the property of being perceptible: therefore it is clear, too, that the rays which come together on them are outside them and next and close to them, and touch them, and there are two edges: but the formative principle on matter is outside in a different way. The difference of its nature is enough, with no need of a pair of edges: but it is, rather, completely incompatible with any sort of edge,1 and owes its freedom from mixture with matter to the difference of its being and its having no sort of kinship with it; and this is the reason why matter remains by itself, that neither does that which

by taking an analogy from the material world and "dematerialising" it; cp. the remarkable use of this method to describe spiritual omnipresence in VI. 4 [22] 7,

² άλλοτρία Kirchhoff, Η δ: αλλοτρίου wxy: άλλοτριουμένη Q

¹ This is a striking example of the way in which Plotinus suggests the true nature and relationship of immaterial real ties

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 6.

ἀπολαύει αὐτῆς, οὐδ' αὐτὴ τοῦ εἰσιόντος ἀλλ' ώσπερ αὶ δόξαι καὶ αἱ φαντασίαι ἐν ψυχῆ οὐ κέκρανται, άλλ' ἄπεισι πάλιν ἐκάστη ὧς ούσα ό έστι μόνη οιδέν εφέλκουσα οιδέ καταλείπουσα, ότι 15 μη εμέμικτο καὶ τὸ έξω, οὐχ ὅτι ἐπέκειτο, καὶ έφ' & έστιν ούχ δράσει έτερον, άλλ' ὁ λόγος φησίν. Ένταθθα μέν οθν είδωλον όν ή φαντασία οθκ είδώλου την φύσιν ούσης της ψυχής, καίπερ πολλά δοκούσα ἄγειν καὶ ὅπη θέλει ἄγειν, χρῆται μὲν αὐτη οὐδὲν ήττον ώς ὕλη η ἀνάλογον, οὐ μέντοι 20 έκρυψε ταις πορ' αὐτης ενεργείαις πολλάκις έξαθουμένη οὐδε ἐποίησεν αὐτήν, οὐδ' εἰ μετὰ πάσης έλθοι, κεκρύφθαι καί τι αὐτὴν φαντάζεσθαι. eye, yap ev avril exervelus Ka. hóyovs evarrlous, οξε άπωθείται τὰ προσιόντα. Ἡ δὲ ἀσθενεστέρα γάρ έστιν [ή] 1 ώς πρός δύναμιν πολλώ ψυχής καί 25 έχει οὐδὲν τῶν ὅντων οῦτ' ἀληθὲς οὕτ' αὖ οἰκεῖον ψεύδος οὐκ έχει δὲ δι' ὅτοι φανή ἐρημία πάντων ούσα, άλλα γίνεται μεν αίτία άλλοις τοῦ φαίνεοθαι, οὐ δύναται δὲ εἰπεῖν οὐδὲ τοῦτο, ὡς «ἐγὼ ένταθθα », άλλ' εί ποτε έξεύροι αὐτὴν λόγος βαθύς τις έξ άλλων όντων, ώς άρα έστί τι ἀπολελειμμένον 30 πάντων των όντων και των ύστερον δοξάντων 1 % del Kirchhoff, H-S2.

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enters it get anything from it, nor does it get anything from what comes into it; but it is like what happens with opinions and mental pictures in the soul, which are not blended with it, but each one goes away again, as being what it is alone, carrying nothing off with it and leaving nothing behind, because it was not mixed with soul, and being outside does not mean that the form rests upon the matter, and that upon which it is, is not visibly other, but reason declares that it is. Now in the soul the menta, picture is a phantasm, while the nature of the soul is not phantasmal; and although the mental picture in many ways seems to lead the soul and take it wherever it wants to, the soul none the less uses it as if it was matter or something like it, and certainly the mental picture does not conceal it, since it is often expelled by the activities springing from it, and it does not, even if it comes with all its pictorial power, make the soul to be completely concealed and to appear in any way to be the picture itself, for the soul has in it activities and rational principles which are in opposition, with which it repels the things which attack it. But matter-for it is much weaker, as far as any exercise of power goes, than soul, and has none of the things that exist, neither a true one nor a falsity which is really its own has nothing by means of which it can appear since it is destitution of everything, but it becomes the cause for other things of their appearing but is not even able to say "Here I am "; but if some deep research should discover it and distinguish it from other existing things [it would appear] that it is something abandoned by all existing things and by the things which come after

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είναι, έλκόμενον είς πάντα καὶ ἀκολουθοῦν ώς δόξαι καὶ αδ οὐκ ἀκολουθοῦν.

16. Καὶ μέν τις έλθων λόγος άγαγων εἰς δουν αθτός ήθελεν εποίησεν αθτήν μέγα παρ' οθτού τό μέγα περιθείς αὐτή οὐκ οὕση, τοῦτο δὲ οὐδὲ γενομένη το γάρ έπ' αὐτῆ μέγα μέγεθος ήν. 'Εάν οθν τις τοθτο άφέλη το είδος, σύκετ' εστίν οδδέ φαίνεται το δποκείμενον μέγα, άλλ' εί ήν 5 τὸ γενόμενον μέγα ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἵππος καὶ μετὰ τοῦ ἴππου τὸ μέγα τοῦ ἴππου ἐπελθόν, ἀπελθόντος του ίππου και το μέγα αὐτου ἀπέρχεται. Εί δέ τις λέγοι ώς δ ιππος έπι μεγάλου τινός όγκου καί τυυυθδε γίνεται καὶ μένει το μέγα, φήσομεν μή το 10 τοῦ ἵππου μέγα, ἀλλὰ τὸ τοῦ ὄγκου μέγα μένειν έκει. Εὶ μέντοι ὁ ὄγκος οὖτος πῦρ ἐστιν ἢ γῆ, απελβάντος τοῦ πυρός τὸ τοῦ πυρός ἀπέρχεται ἢ τὸ τῆς γῆς μέγα. Οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ τοῦ σχήματος οὐδὲ τοῦ μεγέθους ἀπολαύσειεν ἄν ἢ οὐκ ἐκ πυρός άλλο τι έσται, άλλὰ μένουσα πῦρ οὐ πῦρ 15 γενήσεται. Έπει καὶ νῦν τοσαύτη γενομένη, ώς δοκεὶ, ὅσον τόδε τὸ πᾶν, εὶ παύσαιτο ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ τὰ έντος πάντα, σὺν πᾶσι 1 τούτοις καὶ τὸ μέρεθος παν ολγήσεται απ' αὐτῆς καὶ ωὶ ἄλλωι δηλονότι όμοῦ ποιότητες, καὶ καταλειφθήσεται όπερ ήν σώζουσα οὐδεν των πρότερον περί αὐτὴν 20 ούτως όντων Καίτοι εν οίς δπάρχει το πεπουθέναι

ι σεν πάσι Creuzer ούμπασι codd.

ON IMPASSIBILITY

them that seem to exist, dragged into all things and corresponding to them as far as seeming goes, and

again not [really] corresponding,

16. And further, when some rational formative principle comes upon it and brings it to the size which the principle itself wishes, is makes it a size by imposing the size from itself on matter, which is not the size and does not in this way become it; for [if it did the size imposed on it would be [real] magnitude. If, then, one were to take away this form, what under hes it neither is any longer nor appears a thing of size, but if the thing of size which came to be was a man or a horse, and with the horse the size of the horse came upon the matter, when the horse goes away its size goes too. But if someone were to say that the basis of the horse is a mass of a certain size. and the size remains, our answer is that what remains in the matter is not the size of the horse but the size of the mass. If, then, this mass is fire or earth, when the fire goes away the size of fire (or of earth) goes away too. So, then, matter will not profit by either shape or size; otherwise it will not be something else after being fire, but will remain fire while becoming something which is not fire. Since, even now, when matter, as it seems, has become so great that it is the size of this universe, if the heaven and all within it had a stop, with all these the magnitude, all of it. would go away from matter and, obviously, all the other qualities as well, and matter would be left what it was and keep none of the qualifications which previously existed in it. Certainly, in the things which have the property of being affected by the presence of certain other things, even when those

παρουσία τινῶν, καὶ ἀπελθόντων ἔστι τι ἔτι ἐν τοῖς λαβοῦσων ἐν δὲ τοῖς μὴ παθοῦσων οὐκέτι, ὅσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀέρος φωτὸς περὶ πὐτὸν ὅν-ος καὶ ἀπελθόντος τούτου. Ἐὰν δέ τις θαιμάζη, πῶς οὐκ ἔχον μέγεθος μέγα ἔσται, πῶς δὶ οὐκ ἔχον 25 θερμότητα θερμὸν ἔσται; οὐ γὰρ δὴ τὸ αὐτὸ τὸ είναι αὐτη καὶ μεγέθει είναι, είπερ καὶ ἄυλον μέγεθος ἐστω, ἄσπερ καὶ ἄυλον σχῆμα. Καὶ εἰ τηροῦμεν τὴν ὕλην, μεταλήψει πάντα· ἐν δὲ τῶν πάντων καὶ τὸ μέγεθος Ἐν μὲν οῦν τοῖς σώμασι 30 συνθέτοις οὖσιν ἔστι καὶ μέγεθος μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων, οὐ μὴν ἀφωρισμένον, ἐπειδὴ ἐν σωματος λόγω ἔγκειται καὶ μέγεθος ἐν δὲ τῆ ὕλη οὐδὲ τὸ οὐκ άφωρισμένον οὐ γὰρ σωμα.

17. Οὐδ' αὖ μέγεθος αὐτὸ ἔσται. Είδος γὰρ τὸ μέγεθος, ἀλλ' οὐ δεκτικόν καὶ καθ' αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ μέγεθος [ἀλλὰ καὶ εἴ τι μίμημα αὐτῶν καὶ τούτου ἄμοιρον εἰς οἰκείωσιν εἶναι],¹ οὐχ οὐτω μέγεθος. 5 ᾿Αλλ' ἐπεὶ βούλεται ἐν νῷ ἢ ἐν ψυχῷ κείμενον μέγα εἶναι, ἔδωκε τοῖς οἷον ἐθέλουσι μιμεῦσθαι ἐφέσει αὐτοί ἢ κινήσει τῷ πρις αὐτο τὸ αιτων πάθος ἐνσείσαυθαι εἰς ἄλλο. Τὸ οὖν μέγα ἐν προόδω ψαντάσεως θέον εἰς αὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο τὸ μέγα συνθεῦν ποιῆσαν τὸ μικρὸν τῆς ὕλης, πεποίη-

¹ ἀλλὰ . . . εἰναι del. Kirchnoff, H S.

other things have gone away there is something still remaining in the things which have received them; but in things which are not affected there is nothing any more, in the air, for instance, when light has been in it and gone away. But suppose someone wondered how, without having magnitude, matter could be a size well, how, without having heat, will it be hot? For certainly it is not the same thing for it to exist and to exist in magnitude, granted that magnitude is immaterial just as shape is immaterial. And if we are to keep matter as matter, it will be all things [only] by participation; but magnitude, too, is one of all the things it will be. So, then, in composite bodies magnitude is present along with their other determinations (certainly not separated from them), since magnitude, too, is included in the definition of body; but in matter not even this non-separated magnitude is present, for it is not a body.

17. Nor, again, will it be absolute magnitude For magnitude is a form but not something receptive, and magnitude is something which is by itself, and not magnitude in this particular relation. But since, while it is at rest in intellect or in soul, it wants to be large, it gives to the things which, in a way, want to imitate it by an aspiration for it or a movement towards it the ability to insert their affection into something else. So, then, size, running or in its image making progression, and making the littleness of matter run with it towards this very size, has made

¹ The words bracketed here in the Greek text are a repetition of ch. 12. 26 27; they do not fit here, and are omitted in the translation.

² Cp the account of the origin of time in III. 7 [45] 11. 20 ff. These two chapters show very wel. Plotnus's dynamic conceptum of form. Even so a stract (to our way of thinking) a form as that of size is for him a living active reality.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 6.

10 κεν αὐτό τῆ παρατάσει οὐ πληρούμενον δοκείν είναι μέγα. Τὸ γὰρ ψευδώς μέγα τοῦτό ἐστιν, όταν τω μη έχειν το μέγα είναι έκτεινομενοι προς έκεινο παραταθή τή έκτάσει. Ποιούντων γάρ πάντων όντων ε'ς τὰ ἄλλα ή τὸ ἄλλο την αὐτών ένοπτριαιν έκαιστόν τε τών ποιούντων ώς αύτο ήν 15 μέγα, τό τε πῶν ἢι ἐκείνως μέγα. Συνήει οὖν τὸ έκάστου λόγου μετά τό τι μέγα, οίον ίππου καὶ ότουοῦν ἄλλου, καὶ τὸ μέγα 1 αὐτό· καὶ ἐγίγνετο πάσα μέν μέγα πρὸς αὐτόμεγα έλλαμπομένη, καὶ έκάστη δὲ μοῖρα μέγα τι· καὶ ὁμοῦ πάντα ἐφαίνετο έκ παντός τοῦ εἴδους, οὖ τὸ μέγα, καὶ έξ έκάστου καὶ οίον παρετέτατο καὶ πρὸς πᾶν καὶ πάντα, καὶ ἐν είδει τοῦτο ἀναγκασθεῖσα είναι καὶ 20 εν όγκω, όσον ή δύναμις πεποίηκε το μηδέν ον αὐτό πάντα είναι οίον αὐτῷ τῷ φαίνευθει καὶ τὸ χρώμα τὸ ἐξ οὐ χρώματος καὶ ἡ ποιότης ἡ ἐνταῦθα ή έξ οὐ ποιότητος ἔσχε τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν τὴν ἀπ' έκείνων, καὶ τὸ μέγεθος έξ οὐ μεγέθους η όμωνύμου 25 μεταξύ θεωρουμένων εκείνων και αὐτης της ύλης καὶ τοῦ είδους αὐτοῦ. Καὶ φαίνεται μέν, ὅτι έκειθεν, ψεύδεται δέ, ότι οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἐν ῷ φαίνεται. Μεγεθύνεται δε εκαστα ελκόμενα τῆ δυνάμει τῶν

1 μέγα Vitringa, Η S2: μεν codd.

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it by extension, though it is not filled, appear to be large. For this is what false size s, when, because it does not possess real size, being stretched out to wards it, it is extended by the stretching out. For, since all real beings produce upon other things, or the other thing, a mirroring of themselves, as each one of the heings that act had size, in that way the totality of them had size. So the size of each individual forming principle which is the consequence of its distinctive character, of a borse, for instance, or anything else, came together, and also absolute size; and matter as a whole became a size, illumined by absolute size, and each part of it became a particular size; and all the sizes appeared together, from the whole form, to which the size belonged, and from each individual [partial] form; and it was as if extended to the whole form and all the forms, and was compelled to be this size in form and in bulk, in so far as the power [of form] made what was nothing in itself to be everything, as, then, by the very fact of appearing the colour which comes from that which is not colour, and the quality here which comes from that which is not quality, have a name which is the same as and derives from their intelligible principles, so also magnitude comes from that which is not magnitude, or [only] has the same name, since those [form appearances in matter] present themselves to our contemplation in the middle between matter itself and form itself. They appear because they come from the higher world, but their appearance is false because that in which they appear does not exist. Individual things acquire magnitude by being drawn out by the power of the

ένορωμένων καὶ χώραν έαυτοῖς ποιούντων, ελκεται δὲ ἐπὶ πάντα οὐ βία τῷ ὕλη τὸ πᾶν είναι. "Ελκει 30 DE ENCOTON WATER THE OFFICE STATE STATE STATE STATE δε εκείθεν. Καὶ το μεν ποιούν μέγα την ύλην, ώς δοκεί, ἀπὸ τῆς ἐμφαντάσεως τοῦ μέγα καὶ τοθτό ζοτι τὸ ἐμφαντασθέν, τὸ ἐνταθθα μέγα ή δι ύλη, εφ' ής οναγκάζεται οπνθείν, όμου πάσα καί πανταχού παρέχει έαυτήν ύλη γάρ έστι καί 35 τούτου καὶ οὐ τουτί: ὁ δὲ μή ἐστί τι παρ' αὐτοῦ, δύν αναι γενέσθαι καὶ τὸ ἐναντίου δι' ἄλλο κοὶ γενόμενον το εναντίον οὐδε εκεινό εστιν έστη γάρ αν. 18. 'Ο τοίνυν νόησιν μεγάλοι έχων, εί αὐτοῦ ἡ νόησις δύναμιι έχοι μη μόνοι ἐν αὐτῆ είναι, άλλὰ καὶ οἰον τρὸς τὸ ἔξω ὑπὸ δυνάμεως φέροιτο, λάβοι ου φύσιν ούκ ούσαν ἐν τῷ νοοῦντι, οὐδέ τι ἔχουσαν ο είδος οὐδέ τι ἴχνος τοῦ μεγάλου, ἀλλ' οὐδε οὐδενός του 1 άλλου. Τί αν ποιήσειε ταύτη τη δυτάμει; Οὐχ ἔππον, οὐ βοῦν- ταῦτα γὰρ ἄλλοι ποιήσουσι. "Η, ἐπειδή παρά μεγάλου πατρός ἔρχεται, οὐ δύναται το άλλο χωρήσαι μέγα, τοῦτο δ' έξει εμφανταζόμενου. Τῷ δή μή ουτως εὐτυχήσαντι 10 τοῦ μεγάλου ώς αὐτὸ μέγα είναι ἐι τοῖς αὐτοῦ καθ' όσοι οδόν τε μεγάλω φαίνεσθαι λοιπόν έστι. Τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ μὴ ἐλλείπειν καὶ τὸ μὴ ἐπὶ πολλά τολλαγοῦ καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ τὰ συγγενη ἔχειι μέρη καὶ απολείπεσθαι μηδενός. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡνείχετο ἐν 15 σμικρώ όνκω [τὸ] ε ἴσον ἔτ. το τοῦ μεγάλου εἴδωλον είναι μεγάλου ήν, αλλ' ήσιρ εφίετο της ελτίδος

1 790 Kirchhoff, H S: 76 codd 2 70 del Muller, H S2.

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forms which are visible in matter and make a place for themselves, and they are drawn out to everything without violence because the universe exists by matter. Each form draws out by its own power which it has; and it has it from the higher world. And that which makes matter large (as it seems) comes from the imaging in it of size, and that which is imaged in it is size in this world; and the matter on which it is imaged is compelled to keep pace with it, and submits itself to it all together and everywhere, for it is matter and belongs to this size and is not this size; but what is rothing of itself can become the opposite, too, by means of something else, and when it has become the opposite is not that either, for if it was it would be static

18. Suppose that someone had a thought of size, if his thought had power not only to exist in itself but was taken outside, so to speak, by its power, it would take hold of a nature which did not exist in the thinker, and had no form and no trace of size, or of anything else eitner. What, then would it make with this power? Not a horse or an ox; others will make these. Since it comes from a father of size. the other thing cannot attain to size but will have it imaged in it. Certainly, for a thing which has not the good fortune to be so well endowed with size as to be a size itself, what is left is to appear to have size in its parts as much as is possible for it. But this means not being deficient, and not being scattered all over the place, and having related parts in itself, and not falling short in anything. For the image of size, since it is an image of size, cannot endure to be equal still in a small mass, but in proportion as it

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εκείνου προσήλθε τε όσοι οδόν τε ήν αὐτῷ μετὰ τοῦ συνθέοντος αὐτῷ ἀπολεφθηναι οὐ δυναμένου, καὶ πεποίηκε μέγα τε έκείνο το μή μέγα μηδ' ούτω δόξαι καὶ τὸ ὁράμενον ἐν ὄγκω μέγα. Ἡ δ' 20 δρως φυλάττει την αὐτης φύσιν ἀποχρωμένη τούτω τω μεγάλα οίον αμφιέσματι, ο συνδραμούσα αθτφ ότε θέον αὐτὴν ἡγεν άμπέσχετο. ὁ εἰ ὁ άμφιέσας αφέλοιτο, μενεί πάλιν ή αὐτή, σίαπερ παρ' αὐτής ήν ή ι τοσαύτη, όσον αν τὸ παρόν είδος αὐτὴν ποιη. Ή μέν γε ψυχή τὰ τῶν ὅντων είδη ἔχουσα είδος 25 ούσα καὶ αὐτή όμου πάντα έχει καὶ του είδους έκάστοι διιού όντος αύτω, τά τε τών αἰσθητων είδη οίον άναστρέφοντα πρός αὐτὴν καὶ προσιόντα δρώσα οὐκ ἀνέχεται μετὰ πλήθους δέχεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀποθέμενα του όγκον δρά· οὐ γαρ δύναται άλλο τι η ο έστι γενέσθαι. Ἡ δέ ύλη οὐδει έχουσα τὸ αντικόπτου, οὐ γὰρ ἔχει ἐνέργειαν, οὖσα δὲ σκιά, 30 αναμένει παθείν ὅ τι ἄν ἐθέλη τὸ ποιῆσον. Τό τε οῦν προιὸι ἐκ τοῦ ἐκεῖ λόγου ἤδη ἴχνος ἔχει του μέλλουτος γενήσεσθαι· οίον γάρ ἐν φαντασία είκονική κινούμενος ὁ λόγος ή ή κίνησις ή ἀπὸ τούτου μερισμός έστιν: ή, εί ταὐτὸν εἴη ἔν, οὐδὲ ἐκινήθη, ἀλλὰ μένει· ή τε ύλη πάντα όμοῦ ικαπερ

ιη̃ CQ; ή wxUS. H-S

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aspires to the hope of reaching [real] size, it advances as far as it can with that which runs along with it and cannot be left behind, and gives size to that which has not got it and does not appear to have it, and to the size which appears in mass. But matter, all the same, keeps its own nature and makes use of this size as a kind of garment, which it put on when it ran with it as the size in its course led it along; but if what put this garment on takes it off, matter remams again the same as it is of itself, or the size which the form present to it makes it. 1 Now the soul which holds the forms of real beings and is itself, too, a form, holds them all gathered together, and each individual form is gathered together in itself; and when it sees the forms of hings perceived by the senses as it were turning back towards it and ap proaching it, it does not endure to receive them with their multiplicity, but sees them stripped of their mass; for it cannot become anything else than what it is. But matter, which has no resistance, for it has no activity, but is a shadow, waits passively to endure whatever that which acts upon it wishes. So therefore, both that which proceeds from the rational principle in the higher world has already a trace of what is going to come into being, for when the rational principle is moved in a sort of picture making imagi nation, either the movement which comes from it is a division, or, if it did remain one and the same, it would not be moved, but stay as it was; and matter. too, is not able to harbour all things gathered

 $^{^{1}}$ 1 adopt here with Beutler Theiler and other editors the reading $\hat{\eta},$ which seems to me to give a better sense: Henry-Schwyzer profer $\hat{\eta}_r$

35 ή ψυχή οὐ δύναται εἰσοικίσασθαι ἢ ἦν ἄν τι ἐκείνων αὐτήν τε ωὖ δεῖ τὰ πάντα δέξασθαι, μὴ ἀμερῶς δὲ δέζασθαι. Δεῖ τοίνον πῶσι τόπον οὖσαν ἐπὶ πάντα αὐτὴν ἐλθεῦν καὶ πῶσιν ἀπαντῆσαι καὶ πρὸς πῶν διάστημα ἀρκέσαι, ὅτι μὴ κατείληπται

40 διαστήματι αὐτή, ὀλλ' ἢν ἐκκειμένη τῷ μέλλουτι Πῶς οὖν οὐκ εἰσελθὸν ἔν τι ἐκώλυσε τὰ ἄλλα, ἃ οὐχ οἷόν τε ἢν ἐπ' ἀλλήλοις εἰναι; "Η οὐκ ἢν οὐδὲν πρῶτον" εἰ δ' ἄρα, τὸ τοῦ παντὸς εἶδος. ὧστε πάντα μὲι ἄμα, ἐν μέρει δὲ ἔκαστον" ζώου γαρ ὕλη μερισθείσα σὺν τῷ τοῦ ζώου μερισμῷ. εἰ δδὲ μή, οὐκ ἄν ἐνένετό τι παρὰ τὸν λόγον.

19. Τὰ μὲν δὴ εἰσελθόντα εἰς τὴν ὕλην ὤσπερ μητέρα ἀδικεῖ οὐδὲν οὐδ' αὖ ἀφελεῖ. Οὐδέ γε αἰ πληγαὶ αἱ τούτων πρὸς αὐτήν, πρὸς ἄλληλα δέ, ὅτι αἱ δυνάμεις πρὸς τὰ ἐναντία, οὐ πρὸς τα ὅντοκείμενα, εἰ μή τις συνειλημμένα θεωρεῖ τοῖς ἐπεισιοῦσι· θερμὸν γὰρ ἔπαυσε τὸ ψυχρὸν καὶ μέλαν τὸ λευκὸν ἢ συγκραθέντα ἄλλην ποιότητα ἐξ αὐτῶν ἐποίησε. Τὰ παθόντα οὖν τὰ κρατηθέντα,¹ τὸ δὲ παθεῖν αὐτοῖς τὸ μὴ εἶναι ὅπερ ἦσαν. Καὶ

1 κρατηθέντα Harder, Η S²: κραθέντα coud

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together, as soul is; if it could, it would belong to the higher world; it must certainly receive all things, but not receive them undivided. It must then, since it is a place for all things,2 come to all of them itself and meet them and be sufficient for every dimension, because it is not itself captured by dimension but lies open to that which is going to come to it. How, then, when one particular form enters it, does it not hinder the others, which cannot be [present in it] one upon another? The answer is that there is no first form, unless perhaps it is the form of the universe, so that all forms will be present together, and each individual one in its own part, for the matter of a living thing is divided along with the division of the living thing; 3 otherwise, there would be nothing besides the forming principle.

19. The forms which enter into matter as their "mother" do it no wrong, nor again do they do it any good. Their blows are not for it, but for each other, because their powers are directed towards their opposites, not their substrates (unless one considers these as included with the entering forms), for cold puts a stop to heat and white to black, or they are mixed together and make another quality out of themselves. The things which are affected, then, are the things which are overcome, and their being affected consists in their not being what they

* The universe is, of course, for Ploninus a single living organism, so this is not a mere analogy.

[•] For the contrast here between soul which contains all forms non-spatially and so undivided and matter, which must necessarily receive them as dimensional and divided, ep. II. 4 [12] II. 15 ff.

Cp. Timaeus 52B4.

⁴ Cp. Timaeus 50D3 and 51A4-5. Plotinus has to accept the name "nother" on the a shootly of Place, but finds it an embarrassing one, as it conflicts with his conviction of the essential barrenness of matter, and does his best to explain it away; see below

έν τοῦς ἐμψύχοις δὲ αί μὲν πείσεις περί τὰ σώματα 10 κατά τὰς τοιότητας καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις τὰς ἐνυπαρχούσας της άλλοιώσεως γινομένης, λυομένων δί τῶν συστάσεων ἢ συνιουσῶν ἢ μετατιθεμένων παρά την κατά φέσει σύστασιν τὰ μὲν πάθη ἐι τοις σώμασι, ταις δε ψυχαις αί γνώσεις συνημμέναις των σφοδροτέρων εί δε μή, ου γινωσκουσιν 15 Η δε ύλη μένει οὐδεν γάρ ἀπελθόντος μεν πέπονθε τοῦ ψυχροῦ, τοῦ δὲ θερμοῦ ἐπελθόντος: οθ γάρ ήν ούτε φίλον αθτή οθτε άλλότριον όποτε ρονούν. "Ωστε οἰκειότερον αὐτῆ ή ύποδοχή καὶ . τιθήνη ή δε μήτηρ οίον είρηται οὐδεν γάρ αΰτη γεννά. 'Αλλ' ἐοίκασι μητέρα αὐτήν λέγειν 20 δσοι καὶ τὴν μητέρα τάξιν ΰλης πρός τὰ γεννώμενα άξιοθσων έχεων, ώς υποδεχομένης μόνον, οὐδὲν δὲ είς τὰ γεννώμενα διδούσης ἐπεί καὶ ὅσον σώμα τοῦ γινομένου ἐκ τῆς τροφῆς. Εἰ δὲ δίδωσιν ἡ μήτηρ τι τῷ γεννωμένω, οὐ καθ' ὅσον ἔλη, ἀλλ' 25 ότι και είδος μόνον γαρ τὸ είδος γόνιμον, ή δ' έτέρα φύσις άγονος. "Οθει, οίμαι, καὶ οἱ πάλαι σοφοί μυστικώς και έν πελεταίς αινιττόμενοι Έρμην μέν ποιούσι τὸν άρχαῖον τὸ της γενέσεως όργανον ἀει έχοντα πρὸς έργασίαν τὸν γεννώντα τά έν αλοθήσει δηλούντες είναν τόν νοητόν λόγον,

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were And in beings endowed with soul the affections are in their bodies, when alteration takes place according to their qualities and immanent powers; and when the unions of their constituent parts are dissolved, or when they come together, or are changed against their natural constitution, it is only knowledge of the more extreme changes which reaches their associated souls; if the changes are not extreme, they know nothing of them. But matter abides, for it was affected in no way when the cold went away and the heat came to it; for neither of them was in friendly association with it or alien to it. So that "receptacle" and "nurse" are more proper terms for it; but "mother 'is only used in a manner of speaking, for matter itself brings forth nothing. But those people seem to call it "mother" who claim that the mother holds the position of matter in respect to her children, in that she only receives [the seed and contributes nothing to the chi.dren, since all the body of the child which is born, too, comes from the food. But if the mother does contribute something to the child, it is not in so far as she is matter, but because she is also form, for only form can produce offspring, but the other nature is sterile. It was for this reason, I think, that the ancient sages, speaking in riddles secretly and in the mystery rites, make the ancient Hermes always have the organ of generation ready for its work, revealing that the intelligible formative principle is the generator of the things in the sense-world, but revealing, too, the

alluded to by Plotinus in the next sentence; cp. D^{o} Gen. An. A 20 729a10 ff., with A. L. Peck's comments in the introduction to his Loeb edition, p. xi ff.

¹ This view was current in Greece in the 5th century s.c.. it was held by Anaxagoras and others (Aristotle De Gen. An. Δ 1.763b62-34). Acsoluptus makes Apollo bring it forward in defence of Orestes (Eumenides 658-661). Aristotle nimself accepted it with some refinements and modifications (perhaps

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τὸ δὲ ἄγονον τῆς ὕλης μενούσης τὸ αὐτὸ ἀεὶ διὰ τῶν περὶ αὐτὴν ἀγόνων δηλοῦντες. Μητέρα γὰρ κατὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἀρχὴν λαβόντες καὶ ὅνομα τοῦτο θέμενοι, ἵνα δηλοῦεν ὁ βούλονται, τὸ πρὸς τὴν μητέρα οὐχ ὅμοιον πάντη ἐνδεἰενταθαι θέλοντες, τοῖς ὅστις ὁ τρόπος βουλομένοις ἀκριβέστερον ὅλαβεῖν καὶ μὴ ἐπιπολῆς ζητοῦσι πόρρωθεν μέν, ὅμως δὲ ἀς ἐδύναντο, ἐνεδεἰξαντο ὡς ἄγονός τε και οὐδὲ πάντη θηλυς, ἀλλα τοσοῦτον μὲν θῆλυς, ὅσον ὑποδέξασθαι, ὅσον δὲ γεννῶν οὐκέτι, τῷ τὸ πρὸς αὐτὴν κεχωρηκὸς πρὸς αὐτὴν μήτε θῆλυ εἶι αι, μήτε γεινῶν δύνασθαι, ἀποτετμημένον δὲ 40 πάσης τῆς τοῦ γεννῶν δινάμεως, ἢ μόνῷ ὑπάρχει τῷ μένοντι ἄρρενι.

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sterility of matter which always remains the same through the eunuchs who accompany her [the Great Mother]. For when they make matter the mother of all things, they apply this title to it taking it in the sense of the principle which has the function of substrate; they give a this name morder to declare what they wish, not wishing to make matter in every way exactly like the mother; to those who want to know more accurately in what way [it is a mother] and do not make a merely superficial investigation, they show, by a far-fetched analogy, but all the same as best they could, that matter is sterile and not in every way female but only female as far as receiving goes, but no longer when it comes to generation; they snow this by making that which approaches it neither female nor able to generate, but cut off from all power of generation, which only that which remains male has.

rourd the Great Mother given here seems to have no parallel (Cp. Lucretius II. 614-617 and Augustine De Civitate Der VII. chs. 24-25 for other interpretations). It is so far-fetched (as Plotinus admits, cp. 1. 36 below and so exactly adapted to Piotinus's own distinctive doctune of the absolute sterility of matter that it may well be his own invention.

¹ This allegorical interpretation of the ithypnallic Hermes is Stoic in origin, though, as always, Plotinus adapts it to his own philosophical system: for the original Stoic form, cp Comutus, *Theologiae Graecae Compendium*, p. 23, 16-22 Lang. The allegorical interpretation of the eunichs who sur-

III, 7. ON ETERNITY AND TIME

Introductory Note

This treatise is No. 45 in Porphyry's chronological order. It is one of the two major discussions of time in the surviving works of ancient philosophers, the other being that by Aristotle (*Physics* IV. 10-14, 217b-224a) which Plotinus criticises in clas. 9 and 12-13. There do not seem to have been any changes or developments of great importance in philosophical thought about time between Aristotle and Plotinus. Though Stoic and Epicurean views are dealt with in the critical part of the treatise (chs. 7-10), Plotinus is mainly concerned with ways of thinking about time which were already current in the early Academy, which linked time very closely with the movement of the heavens and with Aristotle's view of time as the number or measure of motion.

As a Platonist, Plotinus bases his discussion of eternity and time on the passage of the Timaeus (37D-38B) where Plato speaks of the maxing of time as a "moving image of eternity". It is this conception of time as the image of eternity which is the starting-point of his own thought about both. They are for him essentially two kinds of life, the life of the divine Intellect and the life of Soul. In the first part of the treatise ichs. 1-6) he develops his profound conception of eternity as "the life which belongs to that which exists and is in being, all together and full, completely without extension or interval." (ch. 3. 36-38), which deeply influenced Christian patristic and medieval thought: op. the classical definition of Boothius, interminabilis vitae lota simul et perjecta possessio (De Consolatione Philosophiae V. Prosa 6). And in ch. 11, one of his

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nveluest and most original passages of philosophical exposition, after criticising the views of his predecessors on time in the preceding chapters, he explains his own idea of the as the life of the stal in movement. This certainly influenced the thought of St. Augustine on time (ep. especially Confessions XI 14-28, though the two differ in accordance with their different conceptions of soil. The later Neoplaton at a refurther removed from Plotinus than the Christians are in their conceptions of eternity and time, because of their insistence on making both into substantive principles, divine beings with their own proper places in the hierarchy of reality top. Proclus, Elements of Theology Prop. 53, with the commentary of E. R. Dodds).

Synopsis

The starting-point of our thought about eternity and time is our own experience of both; but when we concentrate on this and try to arrive at full understanding of it we meet difficulties which can be cleared up by a close and discriminating study of the opinions of the ancient philosophers. We will begin with eternity of which time is the image, though it would be possible also to go the other way, from image to archetype (ch. I). What is cternity? Not the intelligible universe itself, nor the rest in it (ch. 2). It is the Lie of that which exists completely and simultaneously, without before and after (ch. 3). Eternity and the wholeness of real being, duration and movement in time are essential to the existence of things which come into being (ch. 4. We contemplate eternity by the eternal in ourselves, it is the selfmanufestation of divinity, a total life (ch. 5). Eternity and unity, it is the life of real being around the One; "always existing" really means "truly existing"; that which exists in time is deficient in existence (ch 6). We are in some way both in eternity and in time. What is time? Classification of the accourts of earlier philosophers.

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(1) time is movement, (n) it is what is moved, (iii) it is something belonging to movement (ch. 7). Refutation of (1) and (i.); time cannot be either all movement, or ordered me voment a the particular ordered movement of the sphere of heaven, nor can it be the sphere itself. Refutation of the Stoic form of (iii); time cannot be the distance covered by any movement, the movement of the universe included (ch. 8). Refutation of the Aristotelian form of (ii.); time cannot be the number or measure of movement (ch. 9). Brief refutation of the Epicurean form of (in): time cannot be an accompaniment of movement (ch. 10). Plotinus's own view of the origin and nature of time: it is the life of the soul in the restless movement from one thing to another which characterises it when it separates itself from the quiet unity of Intellect; the universe is in time because soul has put itself into time (ch. .1). If so I turned had altogether to the intelligible world and its eternity, time would have a stop. How we measure time by regular recurrences in the movements of the universe. How time and the movement of the universe in different ways measure each other (ch. 12) The universe is in time and shows time; the Aristotelians have got the relationship the wrong way round. Superiority of Plato's account. understood as meaning that time is the life of soul (ch. 13).

ΗΙ. 7. (45) ΠΕΡΙ ΑΙΏΝΟΣ ΚΑΙ ΧΡΟΝΟΥ

1. Τον αίωνα και τον χρόνον έτερον λέγοντες έκατερον είναι καὶ τὸν μὲν περί τὴν ἀίδιον είναι φύσιν, τὸν δὲ χρόνον περὶ τὸ γινόμενου καὶ τόδε τὸ πῶν, αὐτόθεν μέν καὶ ιὅσπερ ταῖς τῆς ἐννοίας ε άθροωτέροις επιβολοίς έναργές τι παρ' αὐτοίς περί αὐτῶν ἐν ταῖς ψιγαῖς ἔγειν πάθος νομίζομεν λέγοντές τε αεί και παρ' απαντα ονομάζοντες. Περάμενοι μην είς επίστασιν αὐτῶν ιέναι καὶ οίον έγγυς προσελθείν πάλω αὐ ταίς γνωμαις άπορουντες τὰς τῶν παλαιῶν ἀποφάσεις περί 10 αὐτῶν ἄλλος ἄλλας, τάχα δὲ καὶ ἄλλως τὰς αὐτὰς λαβόντες έπὶ τούτων ἀναπαυσάμενοι καὶ αὕταρκες νομίσαντες, εὶ ἔχοιμεν ἐρωτηθέντες τὸ δοκοθν έκείνοις λέγειν, άγαπήσαντες άπαλλαττόμεθα τοῦ ζητείν έτι περί αὐτῶν. Εύρηκόναι μὸν οδυ τινας τῶι ἀρχαίων καὶ μακαρίων φιλοσόφων τὸ ἀληθές 15 δεί νομίζειν τίνες δ' οἱ τιχόντες μάλιστα, καὶ πῶς αν καὶ ήμιν σύνεσις περὶ τούτων γένοιτο, ἐπισκέψασθαι προσήκει. Καὶ πρότερον περὶ τοῦ αἰώνος

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1. Eternity and time, we say, are two different things, the one belonging to the sphere of the nature which lasts for ever, the other to that of becoming and of this universe; and at once, and as if by a fairly continuous application of our concept of them, we think that we have a clear and distinct experience of them in our own souls, as we are always speaking of them and using their names on every occasion. Of course, when we try to concentrate on them and, so to speak, to get close to them, we find again that our thought runs into difficulties; we consider the statements of the ancient philosophers about them, who differ one from the other, and perhaps also different interpretations of the same statements, and we set our minds at rest about them and think it sufficient if we are able, when we are asked, to state the opinion of the ancients, and so we are satisfied to be freed from the need of further research about them. Now we must consider that some of the blessed philosophers of ancient times have found out the truth: but it is proper to investigate which of them have attained it most completely, and how we too could reach an understanding about these things,1 And first we should enquire about eternity, what sort of

further reflection leading to clearer understanding. It is, of course, Plato, here and elsewhere, who has "attained the truth most completely" (L. 15).

¹ This passage gives a clearer idea of Plotinus's way of philosoph.sing than any other in the *Enneads* He state by reflecting on his own experience and trying to clarify it. In doing this his respect for tradition loads him naturally to seek help from the ancient philosophers, but he is never satisfied simply to repeat their statements; they are for him helps to

ζητεῖν, τί ποτε νομίζουσαν εἶναι αὐτὸν οἱ ἔτερον τοῦ χρόνοι τιθέντες εἶναι· γνωσθέντος γὰρ τοῦ κατὰ τὸ παράδειγμα ἔστῶτος καὶ τὸ τῆς εἰκόνος αὐτοῦ, δν δὴ χρόνον λέγουσαν εἶναι, τάχ' ἄν σαφὲς 20 γένοιτο. Εἰ δέ τις πρὸ τοῦ τὸν αἰῶνα θεάσασθαι τὸν χρόνον ος ἐστι φαντασθείη, γένοιτ' ἄν καὶ τοῦτῳ ἐντεῦθεν ἐκεῖ κοτὰ ἀνάμνησαν ἐλθόντι ῷ ἄρα ὡμοίωτο ὁ χρόνος θεάσασθαι, εἴπερ ὁμοιότητα οῦτος πρὸς ἐκεῦνον ἔχοι.

2. Ιινα ούν ποτε χρή φάναι τὸν αἰώνα είναι, *Αρά γε την νοητήν αθτήν οθσίαν, ώσπερ αν εί τις λέγοι του χρόνου του σύμπαντα ουρανόν καί κόσμων είναι; Καὶ γὰρ αδ καὶ ταύτην την δόξαν έσχον τινές, φασι, περί τοῦ χρόνου. Ἐπεί γάρ 5 σεμνότοτόν τι τὸν αἰῶνα είναι φανταζόμεθα καὶ νοούμεν, σεμνότατον δε τὸ τῆς νοητῆς φύσεως, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ὅ τι σεμνότερον ὑποτερονοῦν τοί δ' ἐπέκεινα οὐδὲ τοῦτο κατηγορητέον—εἰς ταθτόν ἄν τις ούτω συνάγοι. Καὶ γὰρ αδ ὅ τε κόσμος ὁ νοητὸς ὅ τε αἰὼν περιεκτικὰ ἄμφω καὶ 10 των αὐτων. 'Αλλ' όταν τὰ ἔτερα ἐν θατέρω λέγωμεν-έν τῷ αἰῶνι κείσθαι, καὶ ὅταν τὸ αλώνιον κατηγορώμεν αλτών-ή μέν γάρ, φησε, τος παραδείγματος φύσις ετύγχανεν οδσα αλώνιος, – ἄλλο τὸν αἰῶνα πάλιν αδ λέγομεν, είναι μέντοι

1 Cp. Plato, Timaeus 37D7.

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thing those who make it different from time consider it to be, for when we know that which holds the position of archetype, it will perhaps become clear how it is with its image, which the philosophers say time is. But if someone, before contemplating eterraty, should form a picture in his mind of what time is, it would be possible for him, too, to go from this world to the other by recollection and contemplate that of which time is a likeness, if time really has a likeness to eternity.

2. What sort of thing, then, ought we to say that eternity is? Should we say that it is the intelligible substance itself, as if one were to say that time is the whole heaven and universal order? For, so people say some philosophers have held just this opinion about time.2 For since we picture and think of eternity as something most majestic, and the highest degree of majesty belongs to the intelligible nature, and it is impossible to mention anything at all which is more majestic-not even majesty can be predicated of that which lies beyond it-one could in this way come to the conclusion that eternity and the intelligible nature are one and the same. Then, again, the intelligible universe and eternity are both inclusive, and include the same things. But when we say that one set of things [the intelligible realities] lies in the other-in eternity and when we predicate eternal existence of the intelligible realities-for, Plate says, the nature of the archetype was eternal - we are again making eternity something

² The Pythagoreans · cp. Aristotle, Physics Δ 10, 218b1-2,

with the comment of Simplicius (In Phys. IV 10, p. 700, 19-20.)

² Tymaeus 37D3.

περί ἐκείνην ἢ ἐν ἐκείνῃ ἢ παρείναι ἐκείνῃ φαμέν. 15 Τὸ δὲ σεμνὸν ἐκάτερον εἶναι ταὐτότητα οὐ δηλοῦτοως γὰρ ὢν καὶ τῷ ἐτέρφι αὐτῶν παρὰ τοῦ ἐτέρου τὸ σεμινὸν γίνοιτο. Ἡ τε περιοχὴ τῷ μὲν ὡς μερῶν ἔσται, τῷ δὲ αἰῶνι ὁμοῦ τὸ ὅλον οὐχ ὡς μέρος, ἀλλ' ὅτι πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα οἰα αἰώνια κατὰ αὐτόι.

20 'Αλλ' άρα κατά την στάσω φατέον την έκει τον αίνωνα είναι, ώσπερ ένταθθα τον χρόνον κατά την κίνησιν φαιοίν, 'Αλλ' είκητως αν τις τον αίωνα! ζητήσειε πότερα ταὐτον τῆ στάσει λέγοντες ἡ οὐχ άπλως, άλλά τῆ στάσει τῆ περί τὴν οὐσίαν. Εί μει γάρ τη στάσει ταὐτόν, πρώτον μεν οὐκ 25 έρουμεν αλώνιον την στάσιν, ώσπερ οὐδε τον αλώνα αλωνιον· τὸ γὰρ αλώνιον τὸ μετέχον αλώνος. Έπειτα ή κίνησις πώς αἰώνιον; Οὔτω γαρ αν nat orderpor ety. Et a mas exe of ins orderes έννοια εν αὐτῆ τὸ ἀεί; Λέγω δὲ οὐ τὸ ἐν χρόνω, άλλα οδον νοοθμεν, όταν το αίδιον λέγωμεν. Εί 30 δὲ τῆ τῆς οὐσίας στάσει, ἔξω πάλιν αὖ τὰ ἄλλα γένη τοῦ αίωνος ποιήσομεν. Είτα τὸν αίωνα οὐ μόνον ἐν στάσει δεῖ νοεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ἐνί· εἶτα καὶ ἀδιάστατον, ἴνα μὴ ταύτὸν ή χρόνω ἡ δὲ στάσις ούτε την του έν ούτε την του άδιαστάτου

different, but are saying that it has something to do with the intelligible nature, or is in it, or is present to it. That both are majestic does not make their identity clear, for perhaps majesty might come to one of them from the other. And as for inclusiveness, the intelligible world has it in the way in which a whole includes its parts, but eternity includes the whole all at once, not as a part but in the sense that all things which are of such a kind as to be eternal are so by conforming to it.

But should eternity, perhaps, be said to correspond to the rest there as people say that time corresponds to motion? 1 But one might reasonably enquire whether, when people say this, they mean that eternity is the same as rest or, not simply as rest, but as the rest which belongs to substance. Now if it is the same as rest, first of all we shall not call rest eternal, just as we do not call eternity eternal, for the eternal is that which participates in eternity. Then, how is motion to be something eternal? For, on this assumption, it would also be at rest. Then again, how does the idea of rest contain in itself the "always"? I mean, not the 'always" in time, but the kind of " always ' we have in mind when we are speaking of what is eternal. But if eternity is the same as the rest which belongs to substance, then again, we shall put the other kinds of substance outside eternity. Then again we must think of eternity not only in terms of rest but of unity; then, too, it must be thought of as without extension or interval, that it may not be the same as time; but rest in so far as it is rest, does not include in itself the idea of one nor of the unextended. Then

ἔχει ἔννοιαν ἐν αὐτῆ ἡ στάσις. Είτα τοῦ μὲν ² αἰῶνα Αρο Creuzer, Η S: χρόνοι Αα ΕχγQL.

¹ Rest and motion here are the Platonic "categories of the intelligible world": ep. V. 1 [10] 4, VI. 2 [43] 8.

35 αἰωνος κατηγοροτμεν τὸ μένειν ἐν ἐνί· μετέχοι ἄν οὖν στάσεως, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτοστάσις εἴη.

3 Τί ον οθν εξε τούτο, καθ' δ έλν κόσμον πάντα τον έκει αίωνιον λέγομεν και άίδιον είναι, και τί ή αιδιότης, είτε ταὐτὸν καὶ ή αὐτη τῷ αἰῶνι, εἴτε κατ' αὐτὴν ὁ αἰών; Αρά γε¹ καθ' ἔν τι δεῖ, 5 άλλὰ, ἐκ πολλών συνηθροισμένην τινὰ νόησιν, ἢ καὶ φύσω είτ' ἐπακολουθούσαν τοῖς ἐκεῖ είτε συνούσαν εξτ' ένορωμένην, πάντα δε ταθτα έκείνην μίαν μεν ούσαν, πολλά δε δυναμένην και πολλά οδσαν; Καὶ ο γε την πολλην δύναμιν εἰσαθρήσας κατά μεν τοδί το οίον ύποκείμενον λέγει οθσίαν, είτα κίνησιν τούτο, καθ' δ ζωήν όρφ, εί α 10 στασιν τὸ πάντη ὧσαύτως, θάτερον δὲ καὶ ταιτόν, ή ταυτα όμου έν. Ούτω δή και συνθείς πάλω αδ είς εν όμου (ωστε) 2 είναι ζαήν μάνην, έν τούτοις την έτερότητα συστείλας, καὶ της ένεργείας τὸ ἄπαυστον καὶ τὸ ταυτὸν καὶ οὐδέποτε ἄλλο καὶ οὐκ ἐξ ἄλλου εἰς ἄλλο νόησιν ἢ ζωήν, ἀλλὰ τὸ 15 ωσεύτως καὶ ἀεὶ ἀδιαστάτως, ταυτα πάντα ἰδων αίωνα είδεν ίδων ζωήν μένουσαν έν τῷ αὐτῷ ἀεὶ παρον το τῶν ἔχουσαν, ἀλλ' οι νῦν μὲν τόδε, αύθις δ' έτερον, αλλ' άμα τὰ πάντα, καὶ οὐ νῦν

 1 ἀρά γε K.rehhoff, H–S²: ἀρα γὰρ codd. 2
 ἀρτε
) Thet.er.

I Timaers 37D6.

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again we predicate "abiding in one" of eternity, 1 so, then, it would participate in rest but not be absolute rest.

3. What, then, would this be by reason of which we call the whole universe There eternal and everlasting, and what is everlastingness? Is it the same thing as, and identical with eternity, or is eternity in conformity with it? Should we then think of it as an idea corresponding to some one thing, but gathered together into a unity from many sources, or even a nature either consequent upon the beings of that other world or existing along with them or perceived in them? Are all these beings that nature, which is one, but has many powers and is many things? And when one looks closely into this manifold power. then according as one sees it as a subject, a kind of substrate, one calls it "substance"; then one calls it "motion," according as one sees it as life; then "rest" in so far as it is always in every way unchangingly itself; "the other" and "the same" in that these [different] realities are all together one? So, too, one puts it all together again into one, so as to be only life, compressing the otherness in these intelligible realities, and seeing the unceasingness and self-identity of their activity, and that it is never other and is not a thinking or life that goes from one thing to another but is always the selfsame without extension or interval; seeing all this one sees eternity in seeing a life that abides in the same, and always has the all present to it, not now this, and then again that, but all things at once, and not

plains his application of them to the intelligible world more fully, see note on previous chapter.

The complete list of the "Platonic categories," taken from Sophist 254D-E. For possages in which Plotinus ex-

μεν έτερα, αδθις δ' έτερα, αλλά τέλος άμερές, οξον έν σημείω όμοθ πόντων όντων και ούποτε είς 20 ρύσιο προιόντων, άλλα μένοντος έν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐν αύτω και οὐ μη μεταβάλλοντος, όντος δ' εν τώ παρόντι ἀεί, ὅτι οὐδὲν αὐτοῦ παρῆλθεν οὐδ' αὖ γενήσεται, άλλα τούτο όπερ έστι, τούτο και όντος: ώστε είναι τον αίωνα ού το όποκείμενον, άλλα ιδ έξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου οίον ἐκλάμπον κατὰ τὴν 25 [τοί] ¹ ην έπαγγέλλεται περί του μη μέλλοντος, άλλὰ ήδη, όντος, ταυτότητα, ώς ἄρα οὕτως καὶ ούκ άλλως τί γαρ αν καὶ υστερον αυτώ γένοιτο, ο μή τῶν ἐστι; Μηδ' αδ ΰστερον ἐσομένου, δ μή έστω ήδη ούτε γὰρ ἔστιν, ἀφ' οῦ εἰς τὸ νῦν ήξει δικώνο γαρ ήν οδικ άλλο, άλλά τοῦτο Ούτε 30 μέλλοντος ἔσσοθαι, ὁ μὴ νῶι ἔχει. Ἐξ ἀνάγκης ούτε τὸ ຖω εξει περί αὐτό τι γάρ έστιν, ὁ ຖω αθτώ καὶ παρελήλιθεν; ούτε τὸ ἔστοι τί γάρ έσται αὐτω; Λείπεται δή έν τω είναι τουτο ὅπερ έστω είναι. "Ο οὖν μήτε ἦν, μήτε ἔσται, ἀλλ' 35 έστι μόνον, τοῦτο έστως έχον τὸ είναι τῷ μὴ μεταβολλειν είς τὸ ἔσται μηδ' αδ μεταβεβληκέναι έστὰν ὁ αἰών. Γίνεται τοινυν ή περί τὸ ὅι ἐν τῷ είναι ζωή όμου πάσα καὶ πλήρης άδιάστατος παν-

4. Οὐκ ἔζωθεν δὲ δεῖ συμβεβηκέναι νομίζειν τοθτον ἐκείνη τῆ ψύσει, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη καὶ ἐξ ἐκείνης καὶ σὺν ἐκείνη. Ἐνορᾶται γὰρ ἐνοθσα παρ'

ταχή τούτο, ο δή ζητούμεν, αἰών.

' την Α^{ρο} Kirchhoff, Η S: την τοῦ ΛασΕκγQL.

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now some things, and then again others, but a partless completion, as if they were all together in a point, and had not yet begun to go out and flow into lines; it is something which abides in the same in itself and does not change at all but is always in the present, because nothing of it has passed away, nor again is there anything to come into being, but that which it is, it is; so that eternity is not the substrate but something which, as it were, shines out from the substrate itself in respect of what is called its sameness, in speaking about the fact that it is not going to be but is already, that it is as it is and not otherwise, for what could come to be for it afterwards, which it is not already? Nor again will it be afterwards what it is not already. For there is nothing starting from which it will arrive at the present moment, for that could be nothing else but what is [now]. Nor is it going to be what it does not now contain in itself. Necessarily there will be no " was " about it, for what is there that was for it and has passed away? Nor any 'will be," for what will be for it? So there remains for it only to be in its being just what it is. That, then, which was not, and will not be, but is only, which has being which is static by not changing to the "will be," nor ever having changed, this is eterrity. The life, then, which belongs to that which exists and is in being, all together and full, completely without extension or interval, is that which we are looking for, eternity.

4. But one must not think that eternity has come to that [intel igible] nature accidentally, from outside, but it is that nature, and from it and with it. For the nature of eternity is contemplated in the

¹ Cp. Timaeus 37E6-38A2.

αθτής, ότι καὶ τὰ άλλα πάντα όσα λέγομεν ἐκεῖ 5 είναι ένυπάργοντα δρώντες λέγομεν έκ της οὐσίας απαντα καὶ σὸν τῆ οὐσία. Τὰ γὰρ πρώτως ὅντα συνόντα δεί τοίς πρωτοις καὶ ἐν τοίς πρώτοις είναι έπει και τὸ καλὸν ἐι αὐτοῖς και ἐξ αὐτων καὶ ή ἀλήθεια ἐν αὐτοῖς. Και τὰ μὲν ἄσπερ ἐν μέρει του παντός όντος, τὰ δ' ἐν παντί, ὥσπερ καὶ 10 τὸ ἀληθώς τοῦτο πᾶν οὐκ ἐκ τών μερῶν ἡθροισμένου, άλλα τα μέρη γεννήσαν αὐτό, ίνα και ταύτη ώς άληθως παν ή. Και ή άλήθεια δε ού συμφωνία προς άλλο έκει, άλλ' αὐτοῦ έκάστου οδπερ άλήθεια. Λεί δή το πῶν τοῦτο τὸ ἀληθινόν, εἴπερ ἔσται πῶν όντως, μὴ μόνον είναι πᾶν ή έστι τὰ πάντα, ἀλλὰ 16 και το παν έχει ούτως ώς μηδενι έλλείπει. Εί τούτο, οὐδ' ἔσται τι αὐτῷ· εί γὰρ ἔσται, ἐλλεῖπον ην τούτω· οὐκ ἄρα ην πάν. Παρὰ φύσιν δὲ τί ἄν αὐτῷ γένοιτο; Πάσχει γὰρ οὐδέν. Εἰ οὖν μηδὲν αὐτῷ γένοιτο, οὐδὲ μέλλει οὐδὲ ἔσται οὐδ' ἐγένετο. Τοις μέν οδυ γενητοις, ελ ἀφέλοις τὸ ἔσται, ἄτε έπικτωμένοις ἀει εύθθς ύπάρχει μή είναι τοίς 20 δε μή τοιούτοις, εί προσθείης το έσται, υπάργει τὸ ἔρρειν ἐκ τῆς τοῦ είναι ἔδρας. δήλου γὰρ ὅτι ην αυτοίς το είναι ου σύμφυτον, εί γίγιοιτο ει τω

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intelligible nature, existing in it as originated from it. because we see all the other things, too, which we say are There existing in it and say that they all come from its substance and are with its substance. For the things which have primary existence must have a common existence with the primaries and be among them; since beauty, too, is among them and originates from them, and truth is among them. And some of these are as if in a part of the existent whole, others in the whole, just as this which is really a whole has not been put together out of its parts, but has produced its parts itself, in order that it may truly be a whole in this way too. And There the truth is not correspondence with something else, but really belongs to each individual thing of which it is the truth. Now this true whole, if it really is a whole, must not only be whole in the sense that it is all things, but it must have its wholeness in such a way that it is deficient in nothing. If this is so, there is nothing that is going to be for it, for if something is going to be, it was lacking to it before; so it was not whole. But what could happen to it contrary to its nature? For it is not affected in any way. If, then, nothing could happen to it, there is no postponement of being, and it is not going to be, nor did it come to be. Now with things which have come to be, if you take away the "will be" what happens is that they immediately cease to exist, as they are continually acquiring being; but with things which are not of this kind, if you add to them the "will be," what happens is that they fall from the seat of being,1 for it is clear that their being was not connatural to them, if they came to be in a state of putting off

¹ There is a verbal reminiscence here of Plato, *Philabus* 24D2, but no real connection of thought.

μέλλειν και γενέσθαι και έσεσθαι είς ύστερον. Κινδυνείει γάρ τοῦς μέν γενηγοῦς ή εὐσία είναι τὸ 26 έκ του εξ άρχης είναι της γενέσεως, μέχριπερ 1ν είς έσχατον ήκη τοῦ χρόνου, εν ώ μηκέτ' εστί: τοῦτο δὴ τὸ ἔστιν είναι, καί, εἴ τις τοῦτο παρέλοιτο, ηλαττώσθαι δ βίος: ώπτε και το είναι. Και τῶ παντὶ δεῖ, εἰς ὅπερ οὕτως ἔσται. Διὸ καὶ σπεύδει πρός το μέλλον είναι και στήναι οὐ θέλει 30 έλκον τὸ είναι αύτῷ ἐν τῷ τι ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο ποιείν καὶ κινείσθαι κύκλω ἐφέσει τινὶ οὐσίας· ωστε είναι ήμιν εύρημένον καὶ τὸ αἴτιον τῆς κινήσεως τής ούτω σπευδοισης έπὶ τὸ ἀεὶ είναι τῷ μέλλοντι. Τοῖς δὲ πρώτοις καὶ μακαρίοις οὐδὲ ἔφεσίς ἐστι τοῦ μέλλοντος. ἤδη γάρ εἰσι τὸ όλον, και όπερ αὐτοῖς οἱον ὀφείλεται ζῆν ἔγουσι 35 παν ωστε ούδεν ζητούσι, διότι τὸ μέλλον αύτοις ούδεν έστιν ούδ' άρα έκείνο, εν ή το μελλον. "Η οδυ τοῦ όντος παντελής οὐσία καὶ όλη, οὐχ ή ἐν τοις μέρεσι μόνον, άλλα και ή εν τω μηδ' αν έτι 40 ελλείψειν και το μηδέν αν ική ον αυτή προσγενέσθαι οὐ γὰρ μόνα τὰ ὄντα πάντα δεῖ παρείναι τῷ παιτί και όλω, άλλά και μηδό του ποτο μή οντος-αυτή ή διάθεσες αυτού και φύσες εξή αν αλών αλών γάρ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀεὶ ὅντος.

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being and having come to be and going to be afterwards. For the substantial existence of things that have come into being seems to be their existing from their point of origin, their coming to be, until they reach the end of their time, in which they cease to exist; this is their "is," and if anyone takes this away, their life span is lessened, and so also their being And the universe, too, must have a future, in moving towards which it "will be" in this way. This is why it, too, hastens towards what is going to be, and does not want to stand still, as it draws being to itself in doing one thing after another and moving in a circle in a sort of aspiration to substance. So we have found, incidentally, the cause of the movement of the universe, which hastens in this way to everlasting existence by means of what is going to be.1 But the primal, blessed beings have not even an aspiration to what is going to be, for they are already the whole, and they have all the Life which is, so to speak, owed to them; so they seek nothing, because there is nothing which is going to be for them, nor, indeed, that in which what is going to be can develop. So, then, the complete and whole substance of reality. not that in the parts only but that which consists in the impossibility of any future diminution and the fact that nothing non-existent could be added to itfor the all and whole must not only have all real beings present in it, but must not have anything that is at any time non-existent this state and nature of complete reality would be eternity: for " eternity " [uion] is derived from "always existing" [aci on].

 $^{^1}$ For a fuller discussion of the enrollar motion of the universe and its cause, ep. II. 2 [14].

For this derivation of alder, cp. Aristotle, De Caelo A.9. 279a25-28

5. Τοῦτο δέ, όταν τινὶ προσβαλών τῆ ψιχῆ έχω λέγειν περί αὐτοῦ, μᾶλλον δὲ ὁρᾶν αὐτό τοιοῦτον ofor under meet abro oder verostrate i vap τουτο, οὐκ ἀεὶ ὄν, ἡ οὐκ ἀεί τι ὅλον ὄν—ἄρ' ο ʹν 5 ήδη αίδιον, εὶ μὴ καὶ ἐνυπάρχοι αὐτῷ τοιαύτη φύσις, ώς πίστιν έχειν περί αὐτοῦ, ώς οὖτω καὶ μή άλλως έτι, ώς, εί πάλιν προσβάλοις, εύρεῖν τοιοῦτον; Τί οὖν, εὶ μηδὲ ἀφίσταιτό τις αὐτοῦ τῆς θέας, άλλα συνών εξη της φύσεως άγασθείς και δυνατός τούτο πραττειν άπρύτω φύσει; "Η δραμων 10 καὶ αὐτὸς εἰς αἰώνα ἔσται καὶ οὐκ ἀποκλίνων οὐδαμη, ἴν' ή όμοιος καὶ αἰώνιος, τῶ ἐν αὐτῶ αλωνίω τον αλώνα και το αλώνιου θεώμενος. Ελ οδυ το ούτως έχου αλώνιου καλ άελ όυ, το μή αποκλίνον είς έτέραν φύσιν κατά μηδέν, ζωήν έχον, ην έχει πασαν ήδη, οι προαλαβου οιδέ 15 τροσλαμβάνον ἢ προσληψόμενον, εἴη ἄν ἀίδιον μέν τὰ ούτως ἔχον, ἀιδιότης δὲ ή τοιαύτη κατάστασις τοῦ ὑτοκειμένου έξ αὐτοῦ οὖσα καὶ ἐν αὐτῶ, αἰὼν δὲ τὸ ὑποκείμενον μετὰ τῆς τοιαύτης καταστάσεως εμφαινομένης. *Οθεν σεμνόν δ αζών. καὶ ταὐτὸν τῷ θεῷ ἡ ἔννοια λέγει· λέγει δὲ τυύτω το θεφ. Και καλώς ἄν λέγοιτο ό αιών 20 θεός εμφαίνων καὶ προφαίνων εαυτον οἰός εστι, τὸ είναι ώς άτρεμες καὶ ταὐτὸν καὶ ούτως καὶ τὸ

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5. But now, whenever, concentrating the attention of my soul on something, I am able to say this about it, or rather to see it as a thing of such a kind that nothing at all about it has ever come into beingfor if it has, it is not always existing, or not always existing as a whole—is it, therefore, already eternal, if there is not also in it a nature of such a kind as to give an assurance about it that it will stay as it is and never become different, so that, if you look attentively at it again, you will find it as it was? What then, if one does not depart at al. from one's contemplation of it but stays in its company, wondering at its nature, and able to do so by a natural power which never fails? Surely one would be (would one not?), oneself on the move towards eternity and never falling away from it at all, that one might be like it and eternal, contemplating eternity and the eternal by the eternal in oneself. If, then, what is in this state is eternal and always existing, that which does not fall away in any respect into another nature, which has life which it possesses already as a whole, which has not received any addition and is not now receiving any and will not receive any, then that which is in this state would be eternal, and everlastingness would be the corresponding condition of the substrate, existing from it and in it, and eternity the substrate with the corresponding condition appearing in it. Hence eternity is a majestic thing, and thought declares it identical with the god; 1 it declares it identical with this god [whom we have been describing]. And eternity could be well described as a god proclaiming and manifesting himself as he is, that is, as being which is unshakeable and self identical, and

The god is Intellect or Real Being, the Second Hypostasis.

βεβαίως ἐν ζωἢ. Εὶ δ' ἐκ πολλῶν λέγομεν αὐτόν, οὐ δεῖ θανμάζειν πολλὰ γὰρ ἔκαστον τῶν ἐκεῖ διὰ δύναμιν ἄπειρον ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἄπειρον τὸ ιιὴ ἄν ἐπιλείπειν, καὶ τοῦτο κυρίως, ὅτι μηδεν αὐτοῦ 25 ἀναλίσκει. Καὶ εἴ τις οὕτω τὸν αἰῶνα λέγοι ζωὴν ἄπειρον ἤδη τῷ πᾶσαι εἶναι καὶ μηδὲν ἀναλίσκειν αὐ.ῆς τῷ μὴ παρεληλυθέναι μηδ' αὔ μέλλειν ἤδη γὰρ οὐκ ἄν εἴη πᾶσα ἐγγὺς ἄν εἴη τοῦ ὁρίζεσθαι. [Τὸ γὰρ ἐξῆς « τῷ πὰσαν εἶναι καὶ μηδὲν ἀναλίσκειν » ἐξῆγησις ἄν εἴη τοῦ «ἄπειρον ἤδη εἶναι.»] ¹

6. Έπειδή δὲ ἡ τοιαύτη φυσις οὖτω παγκάλη καὶ ἀίδιος περὶ τὸ ἐν καὶ ἀπ' ἐκείνου καὶ πρὸς ἐκείνο, οὐδὲν ἐκβαίνουσα ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, μένουσα δὲ ἀεί περὶ ἐκείνο καὶ ἐν ἐκείνο καὶ ζῶσα καπ' ἐκείνο, εἴρηταί τε, ὡς ἐγὼ οἷμαι, τοῦτο τῷ Πλάτωνι 5 καλῶς καὶ βαθεια τῆ γνώμη καὶ οὐκ ἄλλως, τοῦτο δὴ τὸ μένοντος αἰῶνος ἐν ἐνί, ἴνα μὴ μόνον ἡ αὐτὸς αὐτὸν εἰς ἐν τρὸς ἐαυτὸν ἄγων, ἀλλ' ἡ περὶ τὸ ἔν τοῦ ὄντος ζωὴ ὡσαύτως, τοῦτο ὁ δὴ ζητοῦμεν· καὶ τὸ οὕτω μένειν² αἰὼν εἶναι. Τὸ γὰρ 10 τοῦτο καὶ οὔτω μένον καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ μένον ὅ ἐστιν ἐνέργεια ζωῆς μενούσης παρ' αὐτῆς πρὸς ἐκείνο καὶ ἐν ἐκείνω καὶ οὔτε τὸ εἶναι οὔτε τὸ ζῆν ψευδομένη ἔχοι ἀν τὸ αἰὼν εἶναι. Τὸ γὰρ ἀληθῶς εἶναί ἐστι τὸ οὐδέποτε μὴ εἶναι οὐδ' ἄλλως εἶναι.

² Timaeus 376D.

[always] as it is, and firmly grounded in life. But if we say that it is made up of many parts, there is no need to be surprised, for each of the beings There is many through its unending power, since endiessness, too, is not having any possibility of failing, and eternity is endless in the strict and proper sense, because it never expends anything of itself. And if someone were in this way to speak of eternity as a life which is here and now endless because it is total and expends nothing of itself, since it has no past or future—for if it had, it would not now be a total life—he would be near to defining it. [For that which comes next" because it is total and expends nothing" would be an explanation of the phrase "here and now endless."] 1

6. Now since the nature which is of this kind, altogether beautiful and everlasting in this way, is around the One and comes from it and is directed towards it, in no way going cut from it but always abiding around it and in it, and living according to it; and since this was stated by Plato, as I think finely and with deep meaning and not to no purpose, in these words of his "as eternity remains in one," 2 the intention of which is not merely that eternity brings itself into unity with relation to itself, but that it s the ife, always the same, of real being around the One; this, then, is what we are seeking; and abiding l.ke this is being eternity. For that which is this and abides like this and abides what it is, an activity of life abiding of itself directed to the One and in the One, with no falschood in its being or its life, this would possess the reality of eternity. For true being is never not being, or being otherwise; and this is being

¹ το . . . εleu del. Hememarn, Dodds.

² μένειν Dodds μένον codd , H-S·καὶ είνα del Theiler

 $^{^{\}rm T}$ The contense brasketed here is clearly a rather unintelligent gloss on the one before it.

τούτο δε ώσαύτως είναι τούτο δε άδιαφόρως 15 είναι. Οὐκ έχει οὖν ότιοθν [τό] 1 άλλο καὶ άλλο, οδδ' άρα διαστήσεις, οδδ' έξελίξες, οδδέ προάξεις οιδέ παρατενείς, ουδ' άρα ουδέ πρότερον αυτού ουδέ τι υστερον λαβείν έχεις. Εί ούν μήτε πρότερον μήτε υστερον περί αὐτό, τὸ δ' « ἔστιν » ἀληθέστατον 20 των περί αθτό καὶ αθτό, καὶ υθτω δέ, ότι έστὶς ώς οὐσία ή τω ζήν, πάλιν αὖ ήκει ήμῶν τοῦτο, ὁ δή λέγομει, ὁ αἰών. "Όταν δὲ τὸ ἀκὶ λέγωμεν και τὸ οὐ ποτὲ μὲν ὄν, ποτὲ δὲ μὴ ὂν, ἡμῶν ἔνεκα [τῆς σαφηνείας]2 δεί νομίζειν λέγεσθαι έπει τό γε άει τάχ' αν ου κιρίως λέγοιτο, αλλά ληφθέν els 25 δήλωσιν τοῦ ἀφθάρτου πλανῷ ἄν τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς έκτασι. 3 του πλείονος και έτι ώς μη επιλείψουτός ποτε. Το δε ίσως βέλτιον ήν μόνον το «ών » λέγειν. 'Αλλά ώσπερ το δυ άρκοθυ δυομα τῆ ούσία, επειδή και την γένεσιν ούσίαν ενόμιζον, έδεήθησαν πρός τὸ μαθείν καὶ προσθήκης του άεί. Ού γὰρ ἄλλο μέν ἐστιν ὄν, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ ἀεὶ ὅν, 30 ώσπερ οὐδ' ἄλλο μὲν φιλόσοφος, ἄλλο δὲ ὁ άληθινός άλλ' ότι τὸ ὑποδυόμενον ἦν φιλοσοφιαν. ή προσθήκη τοῦ ἀληθινοῦ ἐγένετο. Οὕτω καὶ τῷ ουτι το άει καὶ τῷ « ὢν » το ἀεί, ὥστε λέγεσθαι « ἀεὶ ιών » διὸ ληπτέον τὸ ἀεὶ οἶον « ἀληθως ων » λέγεσθαι καλ συναιρετέον το del els άδιαστα-35 τον δύνωμω την οδδέν δεομέτην οδδενός μεθ' δ ήδη έχει έχει δέ το πῶν.

1 -0 del. Volkmaan.

2 ms vatmveras ut glossam ad much del Dodds

B ektauw Bury: ekbaow codd

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always the same; and this is being without any difference. So it does not have any "this and that "; nor, therefore, will you be able to separate it out or unroll it or prolong it or stretch it; nor, then can you apprehend anything of it as before or after. If, then, there is no before or after about it, but its "is" is the truest thing about it, and itsef, and this in the serse that it is by its essence or its life, then again there has come to us what we are talking about, eternity. But when we use the word "always" and say that it does not exist at one time but not at another we must be thought to be putting it this way for our own sake; for the " always " was perhaps not being used in its strict sense, but, taken as ex plaining the incorruptible, might mislead the soul into imagining an expansion of something becoming more, and again, of something which is never going to fail. It would perhaps have been better only to use the word " existing." But, as " existing "is an adequate word for substance, since, however, people thought becoming was substance, they required the addition of 'always "in order to understand what "existing" really meant]. For existing is not one thing and always existing another, just as a philosopher is not one thing and the true philosopher another, but be cause there was such a thing as putting on a protonce of philosophy, the addition of "true" was made. So, too, "always" is applied to "existing," that is " aei " to " on," so that we say " aei on [aion]," so the "always' must be taken as saying "truly existing"; it must be included in the undivided power which in no way needs anything beyond what it already possesses; but it possesses the whole.

Πῶν οὖν καὶ ὄν καὶ κατὰ πῶν οὐκ ἐνδεἐς καὶ οὐ ταύτη μέν πλήρες, άλλη δε ελλείτον ή τοιαύτη φύσις. Το γαρ έν χρόνω, καν τέλειοι ή, ώς δοκεί, οίον σῶμά τι ἰκανὸν ψυχῆ τέλειον, δεόμενον καὶ 40 τοῦ ἔπειτα, ἐλλεῖπον τῷ χρόνω, οὖ δεῖται, ἄτε σύν έκείνω, εί παρείη αὐτῷ καὶ συνθέοι, ὂν απελές παθημόν δραστόριος αν τελειον λέγοιτο. "Ότω δὲ ὑπάρχει μηδὲ τοῦ ἔπειτα δεῖσθαι μήτε εἰς χρόνον άλλον μεμετρημένον μήτε τοι άπειρον καί άπείρως εσόμενον, άλλ' όπερ δει είναι, τούτο 4ο έχει, τοῦτό ἐστιν οῦ ἡ ἔννοια ἐπορέγεται, ῷ τὸ είναι ούκ έκ τοῦ τοσούδε, άλλά πρό τοῦ τουούδε. Έπρεπε γάρ αὐτῷ μηδὲ τοσῷδε ὄντι πάντη μηδειός εφάπτεσθαι τοσούδε, ίνα μη ή ζωή αὐποῦ μερισθείσα τὸ καθαρώς άμερες αὐτοῦ ἀνελη, ἀλλ' ή και τη ζωή αμερές και τή οδαία. Το δ' 50 «άγαθὸς ἢν » ἀναφέρει εἰς ἔννοιαν τος παντὸς σημαίνων τω έτέκεινα παντί το μή απο χρόνου τινός. ώστε μηδε τον κόσμον άρχην τινα χροιικήν είληφέναι τῆς αἰτίας τοῦ είναι αὐτῷ τὸ πρότερον παρεχούσης. 'Αλλ' όμως δηλώσεως χάριν τοῦτο 55 είπων μέμφεται ύστερον καὶ τούτω τῷ ὀνόματι ώς οὐδ' αὐτοῦ ἀρθώς πάντη λεγομένου ἐπὶ τῶν τὸν λεγόμενον καὶ νοούμενον αἰῶνα εἰληγότων.

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The nature which is of this kind, then, is all, and existent, and not deficient in its wholeness and not full at one point and deficient at another. For that which is in time, even if it is perfect, as it seems, in the way in which a body which is adequate for a soul is perfect, needs also time to come, being deficient in time, which it needs because it is with it, if time is present to and runs along with it, and so it is incomplete; and, existing in this way, it could only be called perfect by amere coincidence of name. But that which has no need of time to come, which is not measured by another time or by an unlimited time which will be without end, but possesses what it ought to be, this is what our thought stretches out to, that whose being does not come from a certain extent [of time]. but exists before extent [of time]. For, since it is not of any temporal extent itself, it was not right for it to have contact in any way with anything temporally extended, so that its life might not be divided into parts and destroy its pure partlessness, but it might be partless in life and substance. But Plato's "He was good "1 takes us back to the thought of the All [the physical universe]; he indicates that by virtue of the transcendent All it has no beginning in time; so that the universe, too, did not have a temporal beginning because the cause of its being provides what is prior to it.2 But all the same, after saving this for the sake of explanation, he objects to this expression, too, afterwards, as not being entirely correctly used about things which have a part in what we speak and think of as eternity.3

that Plato, too, objected to the use of expressions implying duration in time when referring to it (op. Timaeus 37E).

¹ Timaeus 29E1.

^{2 &}quot;The point is that the cosmos has indeed a prior (as it must have), but only in the sense of having a cause "(E. R. Dodds in a letter to H. R. Schwyzer)

Repletions goes back here, rather abruptly, to the description of sternal being as "always" existing, and points out

7. Ταθτα οθν λέγομεν δρά γε μορτυροθντες έτέροις και ώς περί άλλοτρίων τούς λόγους ποιούμεθα: Καὶ τίως: Τίς γὰρ ἄν σύνεσις γένοιτο μη εφαπτομένοις; Πώς δ' αν εφειμαίμεθα τοις δ άλλοτρίοις; Δεί ἄρα καὶ ἡμῶν μετεῖναι τοῦ αἰώνος. 'Αλλὰ ἐν χρόνω οὖσι πῶς; 'Αλλὰ πῶς ἐν χρόνω καί πως έν αίωνι έστιν είναι, γνωσθείη αν εύρεθέντος πρότερον τοῦ χρόνου. Καὶ τοίνυν καταβατέον ήμων έξ αιώνος έπι την ζήτησιν του χρόνου καί τοι χρόνου έκει μέν γάρ δεν ή πορεία πρός το 10 άνω, νῦν δὲ λέγωμεν ἤδη οὐ πάντη καταβάντες, άλλ' οΰτως, ὤστερ κατέβη χρόνος. Εἰ μὲν περὶ χρόνου είρημένον μηδέν ήν τοις παλαιοίς καὶ μακαρίοις άνδράσιν, έχρην τω αίωνι έξ άρχης συνείραντας το εφεξής λέγειν το δοκούντα περί αύτου, πειρωμένους τῆ έννοία αύτου ην κεκτήμεθα 15 εφαρμόζειν την λεγομένην υφ' ήμων δόξαν νθυ δ' ἀναγκαΐον πρότερον λαβεῖν τὰ μάλιστα ἀξίως λόγου εἰρημένα ακοπούντας, εἴ τινι αὐτῶν συμφώνως ό παρ' ήμῶν έξει λόγος. Τριχή δ' ἴσως διαιρετέον τους λεγομένους περί αυτοῦ λόγους την πρώτην. "Η γάρ κίνησις ή λεγομένη, ή το κινούμενον λέγοι αν, ή κωή σεώς τι τον χρόνον το γάρ 20 στάσων η το έστηκος η στάσεως τι λέγει παντά-

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7. Are we, then, saying this as if we were giving evidence on others' behalf and talking about what is not our own? How could we be? For what understanding could there be [of eternity] if we were not in contact with it! But how could we be in contact with what was not our own? We too, then, must have a share in eternity. But how can we, when we are in time? But what it means to be in time and what it means to be in eternity may become known to us when we have discovered time. So, then, we must go down from eternity to the enquiry into time. and to time, for there our way led us upwards, but now we must come down in our discourse, not altogether, but in the way in which time came down. Now if the blessed men of ancient times had said nothing about time, we should have to take eternity as our starting-point and link up our subsequent account of time with it, stating what we think about it and trying to make the opinion we express accord with the interior awareness of time which we have; but, as it is, we must first take the most important statements about it and consider whether our own account will agree with any of them. Perhaps we can, in the first instance, make a threefold division of the accounts of time which have been given, for either time is movement, as it is called, or one might say that it is what is moved, or something belonging to movement, for to say that it is rest, or what is at rest, or something belonging to rest, would be quite

view: cp note on ch 2, and Pseudo Plutarch, Plac. I 884B 5 That it was something belonging to movement was held in lifferent senses by some Academica, Aristotle, Stoics and Epicureans: see notes below

The view that time was the movement of the universe for one of its important parts) was current in the early Acodomy, op. the Platonic "Oper 411B. Houses filler kingurs, réspon $\phi op \hat{a}_s$, Aristotle, Physics A 10, 218b1 2; that it was the heavenly sphere (cp. l. 24-25) was a Pythagorean

πασι πόρρω τῆς ἐννοίας ἄν εἴη τοῦ χρόνου οὐδαμῆ τοῦ σὐτοῦ ὄντος. Τῶν δὲ κίνησιν λεγόντων οἱ μὲν πᾶσαν κίνησιν ἄν λέγοιεν, οἱ δὲ τὴν τοῦ παντός οἱ δὲ τὸ κινούμενον λέγοντες τὴν τοῦ παντός ἄν σφαῖραν λέγοιεν οἱ δὲ κινήσεώς τι ἢ διάστημα 25 κινήσεως, οἱ δὲ μέτρον, οἱ δὶ ὅλως παρακολουθοῦν

αθτή και ή πάσης ή της τεταγμένης.

8. Κίνησω μέν οἰχ οἶόν τε οὕτε τὰς συμπάσας λαμβάνοντι κινήσεις καὶ οἶον μίαν ἐκ πασων ποιοῦντι, οὕτε τὴν τεταγμένην ἐν χρόνα γὰρ ἡ κίνησις ἐκατέρα ἡ λεγομένη—εἰ δὲ τις μὴ ἐν χρόνω, πολὰ μαλλον ἄν ἀπείη τοῦ χρόνος εἰναι—ώς ὅ ἄλλου ὅντος τοῦ ἐν ῷ ἡ κίνησις, ἀλλου τῆς κινήσεως αὐτῆς οὕσης Καὶ ἄλλου λεγομένων καὶ λεχθέντων ἄν ἀρκεῖ τοῦτο καὶ ὅτι κίνησις μὲν ἂν καὶ παύσαιτο και διαλίποι, χρόνος δὲ οὕ. Εἰ δὲ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς κίνησιν μὴ διαλείπεω τις λέγοι, ἀλλὰ και αὕτη, εἴπερ τὴν περιφορὰν λέγοι, ἐν 10 χρόνω τινί καὶ αὕτη τεριφέροιτο ᾶν εἰς τὸ αὐτό, οὐκ ἐν ῷ τὸ ἤμισυ ἤνυσται, καὶ ὁ μὲν ᾶν εἴη ἤμισυς, ὁ δὲ διπλάσιος, κινήσεως τοῦ παντὸς

¹ Some Stones. cp. Stone. Vet. Fr. II. 514.

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remote from our interior awareness of time, which is never in any way the same. Now of those who say it is movement, some seem to mean that it is all movement, others the movement of the universe; those who say that it is what is moved seem to mean that it is the sphere of the universe; those who say that it is something belonging to movement, that it is the distance covered by the movement 2 or (others of them) the measure, 3 or (others again) that it is in a general way a consequence of movement; 4 and either of all movement or only of ordered movement.

8. It is not possible for it to be movement, whether one takes all movements together and makes a kind of single movement out of them, or whether one takes it as ordered movement, for what we call movement. of either kind, is in time; but if someone says that it is not in time, then it would be still further from being time, since that in which movement is, is something different from movement itself. And, though other arguments can be brought, and have been brought, against this position, this one is enough, and also that movement can stop altogether or be interrupted, but time cannot. But, if someone says that the movement of the universe is not interrupted, this, too (if he means the circuit of the heavens), is in a period of time; and it would go round to the same point not in the time in which half its course was finished, and one would be half, the other double time; each movement would be movement of the

sand time was σάσης κινήσεως διαστημα, Chrysippus that it was διάστημα της του κόσμου κινήσεως (Stric. Vet. Fr. II. 510,, other Stoics simply that time was movement (Stoic Vet. Fr. II. 514).

² Stoics (Zeno and Chrysippus; cp. Stoic. Va. Fr. II.

⁹ An Academic view taken up and developed by Aristotle:

op. Oper Le. Aristotle, Physics & 10 ff.

Friedrams op Stobaeus Rel. I 8 [1] 103 f; Wachsmith = Usener 294).

⁶ Cp. Sinc. Vet. Fragm. II. 509-510. It is only among Stores that the distinction between all movement and ordered movement (the movement of the imverse) appears. Zeno

ούσης έκατέρας, τῆς τε εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς εἰς τὸ ἤμισυ ἡκούσης. Καὶ τὸ οξυτατην δε καὶ ταχίστην Λέγειν τὴν τῆς ἐξωτάτης 15 σφαίρας κύησιν μαρτυρεῖ τῷ λόγῳ, ὡς ἔτερον ἡ κίνησις αὐτῆς καὶ ὁ χρόνος. Ταχίστη γὰρ πασῶν δηλονότι τῷ ἐλάττονι χρόνῳ το μεῖζον καὶ τὸ μέγιστον διάστημα ἀνύειν· τὰ δὸ ἄλλα βραδύτερα

20 Εἰ τοίνυν μηδὲ ἡ κίνησις τῆς σφαίρας ὁ χρόνος, σχολῆ γ' ἄν ἡ σφαῖρα αὐτή, ἡ ἐκ τοῦ κινεῖσθαι ὑπενοήθη γρόνος εἶναι.

τῶ ἐι πλείονι ἄν καὶ μέρος αὐτοῦ.

*Αρ' οὖν κινήσεως τι; Εἰ μὲν διάστημα, πρῶτον μὲν οὐ πάσης κινήσεως τὸ αὐτό, οὐδὲ τῆς
το ὁμοειδοῦς θόττον γὰρ καὶ βραδύτερον ἡ κίνησις και ἡ ἐν τόπῳ. Καὶ εἶεν ἄι ἄμφω μετρούμεναι αἱ διαστάσεις ἐνὶ ἐτέρῳ, δ δὴ ὀρθότερον ἄν τις εἴποι χρώνον. Ποτέρας δὴ αὐτῶι τὸ διάστημα χρόνος, μᾶλλον δὲ τίνος αὐτῶν ἀπείρων οὐσῶν; Εἰ δὲ τῆς τεταγμένης, οὐ πάσης μὲν οὐδὲ τῆς τοιμότης.
το πολλαὶ γὰρ αῦται "ἄστε καὶ πολλοὶ χρόνοι ἄμα ἔσονται. Εἰ δὲ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς διάστημα, εἰ μὲν τὸ ἐν αὐτῆ τῆ κινήσει διάστημα, τὶ ἄν ἄλλο ἢ ἡ κίνησις ἄν εἴη; Τοσήδε μέντοι τὸ δὲ τοσόνδε

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universe, one going from the same place to the same place again, and the other reaching the half-way point. And the statement that the movement of the outermost sphere is the most vigorous and quickest is evidence for our argument that its movement is something different from time. For it is, obviously, the quickest of all the spheres because it covers a greater distance than the others in fact, the greatest distance, in .ess time; the others are slower because they cover only a part of the distance [covered by the outermost sphere] in a longer time. If, then, time is not the movement of the sphere, it can hardly be the sphere itself, which was supposed to be time because it is in motion.

Is it, then, something belonging to movement? If it is the distance covered by the movement, first, this is not the same for all movement, not even uniform movement, for movement is quicker and slower, even movement in space. And both these distances covered [by the quicker and the slower movement] would be measured by some one other thing, which would more correctly be called time. Well then, of which of the two of them is the distance covered time. or rather of which of all the movements, which are infinite in number? But if it is the distance covered by the ordered movement, then not by all ordered movement, or by one particular kind of ordered movement, for there are many of these; so that there will be many times at once. But if it is the distance covered by the movement of the universe, if the distance in the movement itself is meant, what would this be other than the movement? The movement, certainly is quantitatively

τούτο ήτοι τῷ τόπω, ὅτι τοσόσδε ὅν διεξήλθε, μετρηθήσεται, καὶ τὸ διάστημα τοῦτο ἔσται· τούτο δὲ οὐ χρόνος, ἀλλὰ τόπος: ἡ αυτὴ ἡ κίνησις 35 τη συνεχεία αὐτης καὶ τω μη εὐθύς πεπαθσθαι, άλλ' ἐπιλαμβάνειν ἀεί, τὸ διάστημα έξει 'Αλλά τουτο τὸ πολύ της κινήσεως αν είη· καὶ εἰ μὲν els αθτήν τις βλέπων αποφανείται πολλήν, ώστερ αν εί τις πολύ τὸ θερμον λέγοι, οὐδ' ἐνταῦθα χρονος φανείται οὐδέ προυπίπτει, άλλά κινησις 40 πάλιν καὶ πάλιν, ώσπερεὶ ὕδωρ ρέον πάλιν καὶ πάλιν, καὶ τὸ ἐπ' αὐτῷ διάστημα θεωρούμενον. Καὶ τὸ μὲν παλιν καὶ πάλιν ἔσται άριθμός, ώσπερ δυάς ή τριάς, τὸ δὲ διάστημα τοῦ ὅγκου. Οἵτως οὖι καὶ πλήθος κινήσεως ώς δεκάς, η ώς τὸ έπιφαινόμενον τῷ οἱον ἄγκῳ τῆς κινήσεως διά-45 στημα, δ οὐκ ἔχει ἔννοιαν χρόνου, ἀλλ' ἔσται τὸ τοσόνδε τοθτο γενόμενον ἐν χρόνω, ἢ ὁ χρόνος ούκ έσται πανταχού, άλλ' έν ύποκειμένις τη κινήσει, συμβαίνει τε πάλιν αδ κίνησιν τον χρόνον λέγειν οὐ γὰρ ἔξω αὐτῆς τὸ διάστημα, ἀλλά κίνησις οὐκ ἀθρόα τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀθρόα εἰς τὸ ἀθρόον 50 εν χρόνω. Τὸ μη άθροου τίνι διοίσει τοῦ άθροας; η τω εν χρόνω, ωστε ή διεστώσα κίνησις και τὸ διώστημο αὐτῆς οὐκ αὐτὸ χρόνος, ἀλλ' ἐν χρόνω.

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determined; but this definite quantity will either be measured by the space, because the space which it has traversed is a certain amount of space, and this will be the distance covered; but this is not time but space; or the movement itself, by its continuity and the fact that it does not stop at once but keeps on for ever, will contain the distance. But this would be the multiplicity of movement; and if one, looking at movement, shows that it is mult ple (as if one were to say there was a great deal of heat), time will not appear or come into one's mind but movement which keeps on coming again and again, just like water flowing which keeps on coming again and again, and the distance observed in it. And the "again and again" will be a number, like the number two or three, but distance belongs to magnitude. So the amplitude of movement will be like the number ten or the distance from end to end which appears on what you might call the bulk of the movement, and this does not contain our idea of time, but this definite quantity will be something which came to be in time; otherwise time will not be everywhere but in move ment as its substrate, and we are back again at the statement that time is movement, for the distance covered is not outside movement but is movement which does not happen all at once; but the comparison of movement which does not happen all at once with what is all at once [the instantaneous] can only be made in time. In what way will the non instantaneous differ from the instantaneous? By being in time, so that movement which extends over a distance and the distance covered by it are not the actual thing, time, but are in time But if someone

9. 'Αριθμός δε κινήσεως η μέτρον-βέλτιον γαρ ούτω συνεχούς ούσης 1-τως, σκεπτέου Πρώτου μεν ούν και ενταύθα το πάσης όμοιως απορητέον, ώσπερ και επί του διαστήματος της κινήσεως, εξ τις της πάσης είναι ελέγετο. Πως γαρ αν τις άμιθμήσειε την άτακτον και ανώμαλον, η τίς άριθμός η μέτρον η κατά τι το μέτρον; Εὶ δε τω αὐτώ εκατέραν και όλως πάσαν, ταχείαν,

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were to say that the distance of movement is time, not in the sense of the distance of movement itself, but that in relation to which the movement has its extension, as if it was running along with it, what this is has not been stated. For it is obvious that time is that in which the movement has occurred. But this was what our discussion was trying to find from the beginning, what time essentially is; since this is like, in fact, the same as, an answer to the question "What is time" which says that it is distance of movement in time. What, then, is this distance which you call time and put outside the proper distance of the movement? Then, again, on the other side, the person who puts the distance in the movement itself, will be hopelessly perplexed about where to put the interval of rest. For something else could rest for the same space as something was moved, and you would say that the time in each case was the same, as being, obviously, different from both. What, then, is this distance, and what is its nature? For it cannot be spatial, since this also lies outside movement.

9. We must now enquire in what sense it is number of movement or measure 1—for it is better to call it measure of movement, since novement is continuous. First of all, then, a doubt must arise here, too, about its being the measure of all movement alike, just as it did with the distance of movement, if there was said to be a number or measure of all movement. For how could one number disordered and irregular movement? What would its number or measure be, or what its scale of measurement? But if one uses the same measure for both sinds of movement

² συνεχούς ούσης Jims: συνεχούσης codd.

Aristotle uses both terms (ἀριθμός κινήσεως, Physics Δ II. 21902, μέτρον κινήσεως, 12. 221a1) without distinction. 326

βραδείαν, έσται δ άριθμός και τὸ μέτρον τοιούτον, υίων εί δεκάς είη μετρούσα και ίππους και βούς, 10 ή εί το αυτό μέτρον και ύγρων και ξηρων είη. Εί δή τοιούτον μέτρον, τίνων μέν έστιν ό χρόνος είρηται, ότι κινήσεων, αὐτὸς δὲ ὅ ἐστιν οὕπω είρηται. Εὶ δέ ώσπερ δεκάδος ληφθείσης καί άνευ ίππων έστι νοείν τὸι ἀριθμόι, καὶ τὸ μέτρον μέτρον έστὶ φύσιν έχον τινά, κῶν μήπω μετρῆ, ούτω δει έχειν καὶ τὸν χρονον μέτροι όντα: εἰ 15 μεν τοιοθτόν έστιν εφ' έσυτοθ οξον άριθμός, τί αν τοθδε του άριθμου του κατά την δεκάδα η άλλου οτουούν διαφέροι μοναδικού; Εί δε συνεχές μέτρον έστι, ποσόν τι ὂν μέτρον ἔσται, οίον το πηγυαίον μέγεθος. Μέγεθος τοίνυν έσται, οίον γραμμή συνθέουσα δηλονότι κινήσει 'Αλλ' αὖτη συνθέ-20 ουσα πώς μετρήσει τὸ ῷ συνθεῖ; Τί γὰρ μάλλον όποτερονοθν θάτερον; Καὶ βέλτιον τίθεσθαι καὶ πιθανώτεροι οὐκ ἐπὶ τάσης, ἀλλ' ἡ σινθεί. Τοῦτο δὲ συνεγὲς δεῖ είναι, ἢ ἐφέξει ἡ συνθέοισα. 'Αλλ' οὐκ ἔξωθεν δεῖ τὸ μετροῦν λαμβάνειν οἰδὲ γωρίς, άλλα όμου κίνησα μεμετρημένην. Και τί 25 τὸ μετροθυ έσται; "Η μεμετρημένη μεν ή κίνησις έσται, μεμετρηκός δ' έσται μέγεθος. Καὶ ποιον αὐτῶν ὁ χρόνος ἔσται, Ἡ κίνησις ἡ μεμετρημένη,

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[regular and irregular] and in general for all movement quick and slow, the number and measure will be like the ten which counts both horses and cows, or like the same measure for liquids and solids. Now, if it is a measure of this kind, then it has been said what time is a measure of, that it is a measure of movements, but we have not yet been told what it is itself. But if, just as when one takes the ten even without the horses it is possible to think of the number, and the measure is a measure, with a certain nature, even if it is not yet measuring, so time, too, must have its own nature since it is a measure, and if it is a thing of this kind on its own like number, how can it differ from this number we were considering in the case of the ten, or from any other number made up of abstract units? But if it is a continuous measure, then it will be a measure because it is of a certain size, like a length of one cubit. It will be a magnitude, then, like a line which will obviously run along with movement. But how will this line running along measure that with which it runs? Why should one of them measure the other rather than the other the one? And it is better and more plausible to assume that it is not the measure of all movement but of the movement it runs along with. But this must be something continuous, or the line which runs with it will stop. But one ought not to take what measures as something coming from outside or separate but to consider the measured movement as a who.e. And what will the measurer be! Movement will be measured, and the measurer will be magnitude. And which of them will be time? The measured movement or the measuring magnitude?

η το μέγεθος το μετρήσαι; "Η γάρ ή κίνησις έσται ή μεμετρημένη ύπο τοῦ μεγέθους ο χρόνος, η τλ μένεθος το μετρήσου, ή το τῷ μεγέθει 30 χρησάμενον, ώσπερ τῷ πήγει πρός τὸ μετρήσαι όση ή κίνησις. 'Αλλ' έπι μεν πάντων τούτων ύποθέσθαι, όπερ εἴπομει πιθανώτερον εἰναι, τὴν όμαλην κίνησιν. άνευ γάρ όμαλότητος καί προυέτι μιᾶς καὶ τῆς τοῦ ὅλου ἀπορώτερον τὸ τοῦ λόγου 35 τω θεμένω όπωσούν μέτρον γίνεται. Εί δε δή μεμετρημένη κίνησις ο χρόνος καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ ποσοῦ μεμετρημένη, ώσπερ την κίνησω, εί έδει μεμετρήσθαι, ούχὶ ὑπ' αὐτῆς ἔδει μεμετρήσθαι, ἀλλ' έτερω, ούτως ανάγκη, είπερ μέτρον έξει άλλο ή 10 κίνησις παρ' αὐτήν, και διά τοῦτο ἐδεήθημεν τοῦ συνεχούς μέτρου cis μέτρησιν οὐτής, τον αὐτόν τροπον δεί και τῷ μεγέθει αὐτῷ μέτρου, τι' [ŋ] ή 1 κίνησις, τοσούδε γεγενημένου του καθ ο μετρείται όση, μετρηθή. Καὶ ὁ άριθμὸς του μεγέθους έσται τῆ κινήσει παρομαρτούντος ἐκείνος ὁ χρόνος, 45 άλλ' οὐ τὸ μέγεθος τὸ συνθέον τῆ κινήσει. Οδτος δε τίς αν είη η ο μοναδικός: "Ος όπως μετρήσει άπορείν άνάγκη. Έπεί, κάν τις έξεύρη όπως, οὐ χρόνον εύρήσει μετροθυτα, άλλά τον τοσόνδε γρόνον τούτο δε ού ταύτοι χρόνω. "Ετερον γάρ

¹ ή Kirchhoff: ἡή wxy: ἡ Q.

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For either the movement which is measured by the magnitude will be time, or the magnitude which measures, or what uses the magnitude, as one uses the cubit to measure how much the movement. is. But in all these cases one must assume (which we said was more plausible), uniform movement, for unless there is uniformity, and, besides that, the movement is single, and a movement of the whole thing,1 the way of proof becomes still more obstructed for whoever holds that time is in any sense a measure. But now, if time is a measured movement, and one measured by quantity; just as the movement, if it had to be measured, could not be measured by itself but by something else, so it is necessary, if the move ment is to have another measure besides itself, and this was the reason why we needed the continuous measure for measuring it—in the same way there is need of a measure for the magnitude itself, in order that the movement, by the fixing at a certain length of that by which it is measured as being a certain length, may itself be measured. And the number of the magnitude which accompanies the movement. but not the magnitude which runs along with the movement, will be that time which we were looking for. But what could this be except number made up of abstract units? And here the problem must arise of how this abstract number is going to measure Then, even if one does discover how it can, one will not discover time measuring but a certain length of time; and this is not the same thing as time. It is

movement, the circular movement of the heavers, is the standard by which in fact we measure other movements and time itself (223b).

¹ Aristotle points out that only a uniform movement can be considered a single movement in *Physics* F4 998hl5 ff; but for him time is the measure of absolutely any kind of movement (*Physics* Δ 14, 223a20 ff); though the most uniform

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one thing to say "time" and another to say "a certain length of time"; for before saying "a certain length of time" one ought to say what it is that is of a certain length. But perhaps the number which measures the movement from outside the movement is time, like the ten which counted the horses taken apart from the horses. Well, then, in this version it has not been said what this number is which is what it is before it begins to measure, like the ten. Perhaps it is the number which runs beside the movement and measures it by the sequence of " before " and " after." 2 But it is not yet clear what this number which measures by the sequence of "before" and "after" is, And then, too, anyone who measures by "before "and "after," either with a point or with anything else, will in any case be measuring according to time. So, then, this time of theirs which measures movement by "before" and "after" is bound to t me and in contact with time in order to measure. For one either takes "before" and "after" in a spatial sense, like "the beginning of the race-track," or else one must take them in a temporal sense. For in general, "before" and "after" mean, "before," the time which stops at the "now," and "after," the time which begins from the "now." Time, then, is something different from the number which measures by "before" and "after" not only any kind of movement but even ordered movement. Then, why, when number is added to movement, either on the measured or the measuring side -for there is the

άλλο A^m aliud Fienrus, άλλο H S: άλλὰ A^mExyQ.
 ἔσπ γαρ αδ H-S: ἔσπ γὰρ ῶι codd.

¹ Plotinus assumes here his own view that number has a separate substantial existence prior to the things which it numbers see VI 6 [34] 5.

 $^{^2}$ Aristotle defines time as ἀριθμος κινήσεως κατὰ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὅστερον (Physics Δ 4. 219b2-3).

τον αυτόν και μετρούντα και μεμετρημένον είναιάλλ' οὖν διὰ τί ἀριθμοῦ μεν γενομένου χρόνος έσται, κινήσεως δε ούσης και του προτέρου πάντως ύπαρχοντος περί αὐτὴν καὶ τοῦ ύστέρου οὐκ ἔσται χρόνος; "Ωσπερ αν εί τις λέγοι τὸ μέγεθος μή 75 είναι όσον έστίν, εί μή τις τὸ όσον έστὶ τοθτο λάβοι. 'Απείρου δὲ τοῦ χρόνοι ὅντος καὶ λεγομένου πως άν περί αὐτὸν ἀριθμός είη, Εί μή τις απολαβών μέρος τι αὐτοί μετροί, εν ψ συμβαίνει είναι καὶ πρὶν μετρηθήναι. Διὰ τί δὲ ουκ ἔσται πρίν και ψυχήν τήν μετρούσαν είναι, Εί μή τις 80 την γένεσιν αὐτοῦ παρὰ ψυχης λέγοι γίνεσθαι. Ειεί διά γε το μετρείν οδδαμώς άναγκαίον είναι ύπάρχει γὰρ ὄσοι ἐστί, κᾶν μή τις μετρῆ. Τὸ δὲ τῷ μεγέθει χρησάμενον πρὸς τὸ μετρήσαι 1 τὴν ψυχήν ἄν τις λέγοι τοῦτο δὲ τί ἃν εἴη πρὸς έννοιαν χρόνου;

10. Το δὲ παρακολούθημα λέγεω τῆς κυήσεως, τί ποτε τοῦτό ἐστω οὐκ ἔστι διδάσκοντος οὐδὲ εἰρηκέ τι, πρὶν εἰπεῖν τί ἐστι τοῦτο τὸ παρακολουθούν ἐκεῖνο γὰρ ἄν ἴσως εἴη ὁ χρόνος. Ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ τὸ παρακολούθημα τοῦτο εἴτε ὕστερον εἴτε ὕμα εἴτε πρώτερον, εἴπερ τι ἔστι τοιοῦτον παρακολούθημα ὅπως γὰρ ᾶν λέγηται, ἐν χρόνω λέγεται. Εἰ τοῦτο, ἔσται ὁ χρόνος παρακολούθημα κινήσεως ἐν χρόνω.

'Αλλ' ἐπειδή οὐ τί μή ἐστι ζητοῦμεν ἀλλὰ τί

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possibility that the same number could be both measured and measuring—why should time result from its presence, though when movement exists and, certainly, has a "before" and "after" belonging to it, there will be no time? This is like saying that a magnitude would not be the size it is unless someone understood that it was that size. But again, since time is, and is said to be. unbounded, how could it have a number? Unless, of course, someone took off a piece of it and measured it, but time would be in the piece before it was measured, too. But why can time not exist before the soul which measures it? Unless perhaps one is going to say that it originated from soul. But this is not in any way necessary because of measuring it. for it exists in its full length, even if no one measures it. One might say that the soul is what uses magnitude to measure time; but how could this help us to form the concept of time?

10. As for calling it an accompaniment of movement, this does not explain at all what it is, nor has the statement any content before it is said what this accompanying thing is. for perhaps just this might turn out to be time. But we must consider whether this accompaniment comes after movement, or at the same time as it, or before it—if there is any kind of accompaniment which comes before, for whichever may be said, it is said to be in time. If this is so, time will be an accompaniment of movement in time.

But, since we are not trying to find what time is not

 $^{^1}$ μετρήσοι Kirchhoff, Η- 3 : μετρήσον codd. 1 εἴρηκέ τι Page, Η- 3 : εἴρηκέναι codd.

10 έστιν, εἴρηταί τε πολλά πολλοῖς τοῖς πρὸ ἡμῶν καθ' ἐκάστην θέσιν, ἃ εἴ τις διεξίοι, ἱστορίαν μᾶλλον ἄν ποιοῖτο. ὅσον τε ἐξ ἐπιδρομῆς εἴρηταί τι περὶ αὐτῶν, ἔστι δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὸν λέγοντα μέτρον κινήσεως τοῦ παντὸς ἐκ τῶν ἤδη εἰρημένων 15 ἀντιλέγειν τά τε ἄλλα ὅσα νῦν περὶ μέτρου κινήσεως εἴρητα.—χωρίς γὰρ τῆς ἄνωμαλίας πάντα τὰ ἄλλα, ἃ καὶ πρὸς αὐτούς, ἀρμόσει—εἴη ἄν ἀκόλουθον εἰπεῖν, τί ποτε δεῖ νομίζειν τὸν χρόνον εἶναι.

11. Δεῖ δὴ ἀναγαγεῖν ἡμᾶς αυτοὺς πάλιι εἰς ἐκεινην τὴν διάθεσιν ἢν ἐπὶ τοῦ αἰῶνος ἐλέγομεν εἶναι, τὴν ἀτρεμῆ ἐκείνην καὶ ὁμοθ πᾶσαν καὶ ἄπε.ρον ἢδη ζωὴν καὶ ἀκλινῆ πάντη καὶ ἐν ἐν. καὶ πρὸς ἐν ἐστῶσαι. Χρόνος δὰ σὕπω ἢν, ἢ ἐκείνοις γε οὐκ ἢν, γεννήσομεν δὰ χρόνον λόγω καὶ φύσει τοῦ ὑστέρου Τούτων δὴ οὖν ἡσυχίαν ἀγόντων ἐν αὐτοῖς, ὅπως δὴ πρῶτον ἐξέπεσε χρόνος, τὰς μὲν Μούσας οὕτω τότε οὕσας οὐκ ἄν τις ἴσως καλοῦ εἰπεῖι τοῦτο ἀλλ' ἴσως, εἴπερ ἦσαν καὶ αἱ Μοῦσαι τότε, αὐτὸν δ' ἄν τις τάχα τὸν γενόμενον 10 χρόνον, ὅπως ἐστὶν ἐκφανεὶς καὶ γενόμενος. Λέγοι δ' ἄν περὶ αὐτοῦ ῶδέ πως ὡς πρότερον, τρὶν τὸ πρότερον δὴ τοῦτο γεννῆσαι καὶ τοῦ

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but what it is, and since a great deal has been said by a great many of our predecessors on every theory of its nature, and if one went through it all one would be making a historical rather than a philosophical en quiry; and since we have already made a cursory survey of some of their arguments, and it is possible from what has been said already to refute the philosopher who says that time is the measure of the movement of the All by using all our arguments about the measure of movement—for apart from the argument from irregularity all the others, which we used against them 1 too, will fit his case—it would be in order to say what one ought to think time is.

II. We must take ourselves back to the disposition which we said existed in eternity, to that quiet life, all a single whole, still unbounded, altogether without declination, resting in and directed towards eternity. Time did not yet exist, not at any rate for the beings of that world; we shall produce time by means of the form and nature of what comes after. If, then, these beings were at rest in themselves, one could hardly, perhaps, call on the Muses, who did not then yet exist, to tell us "how time first came out": 2 but one in glit perhaps (even if the Muses did exist then after all) ask time when it has come into being to tell us how it did come into being and appear. It might say something like this about itself; that before, when it had not yet, in fact, produced this

In Republic VIII (545 DSEI), Plato, about to describe the decadence of the ideal states, says η βούλει ὤοπερ "Ομηρος, εὐχάμεθα τοις Μούσοις εἰντείν ἡμῶν ἄπως ἔὴ πρῶτου στότος ἔμπερες from this, rather than directly from Homer, Plotinus playful variation is derived.

^{*} I.e. those who say amply that time is the measure of movement.

One of the most curious examples of adaptation of a Homeric tag to Platonic purposes. In Riad XVI. 112-113 we have

έσπετε νθν μοι, Μοθσαι 'Ολύμπια δώματ' έχουσαι, όππως δη πρώτον πθρ έμπεσε πρυσίν 'Αχοιών.

ύστέρου δεηθήναι, σύν αὐτῷ ἐι τῷ ὄντι ἀνεπαύετο χρόνος ούκ ών, άλλ' έν έκείνω και αὐτός ήσυχίαν ήνε Φύσεως δε πολυπράγμους και άρχειν αθτής 15 βουλομένης και είναι αὐτης και τὸ πλέον τοῦ παρόντος ζητείι έλομένης έκινήθη μέν αὐτή, έκφήθη δέ και αὐτός, και είς τὸ ἔπειτα ἀκὶ και τὸ ύστερον καὶ οὐ ταὐτόν, ἀλλ' ἔτερον εἶθ' ἔτερον κινούμενοι, μηκός τι της πορείας ποιησάμενοι αίωνος ελκόνα τον χρόνοι είργάσμεθα. Έπελ γάρ 20 ψυχης ήν τις δύναμις ούχ ήσυχος, το δ' έκει δρώμενον ἀεὶ μεταφέρει εἰς ἄλλο βουλομένης, τὸ μεν άθρουν αυτή πων παρείναι ουκ ήθελεν ωστερ δ' έκ σπέρματος ήσύχου εξελίττων αύτον δ λύγος διέξοδον είς πολύ, ώς οἴεται, ποιεῖ, ἀφανίζων τὸ 25 πολύ τῷ μερισμῷ, καὶ ἀνθ' ένὸς ἐν αύτῷ οὐκ ἐν αθτώ το έν δαπανών είς μήκος ασθενέστερον πρόεισιν, ούτω δὴ καὶ αὐτὴ κόσμον ποιούσα αλοθητόν μιμήσει έκείνου κινούμενον κίνησιν οὐ την έκει, όμοιαν δε τη έκει και έθελουσαν είκονα 30 έκείνης είναι, πρώτον μέν έαυτην έχρόνωσεν άντί τοι αίωνος τούτον ποιήσασα: ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τώ γενομένω έδωκε δουλεύειν χρόνω, έν χρόνω αὐτὸν πάντα ποιήσασα είναι, τὰς τούτου διεξόδους άπάσας εν αὐτώ περιλαβούσα. ει εκείνη γάρ

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' before" or felt the need of the "after," it was at rest with eternity in real being; it was not yet time, but itself, too, kept quiet in that. But since there was a restlessly active nature which wanted to control tself and be on its own, and chose to seek for more than its present state, this moved, and time moved with it; and so, always moving on to the "next" and the " after," and what is not the same, but one thing after another, we 1 made a long stretch of our journey and constructed time as an image of eternity. For because sou, had an unquiet power, which wanted to keep on transferring what it saw there to something clse, it did not want the whole to be present to it all together; and as from a quiet seed the formative principle, unfolding itself, advances, as it thinks, to largeness, but does away with the largeness by division and, instead of keeping its unity in itself, squanders it outside itself and so goes forward to a weaker extension; 2 in the same way Soul, making the world of sense in imitation of that other world, moving with a motion which is not that which exists There, but like it, and intending to be an image of it, first of all put itself into time, which it made instead of eternity, and then handed over that which came into being as a slave to time, by making the whole of it exist in time and encompassing all its ways with time. For since the world of sense moves in Soul-

significance of the first person in yeurspuper above 1. 5), but this may be simply the lecturer's "we."

^{1 &}quot;We" hersuse it is soul which moves and produces time, and we are souls, parts of universal soul and already present in it as it moves out from eternity. This may possibly be the

² One of the most vivid expressions in the *Enneads* of the deep and constant conviction of Plotinus that the beginning of a process of development is more perfect than the end, that simplicity, concentration and rest is better than large-scale expansion into a multiplicity of activities.

κινούμενος--ου γάρ τις αὐτοῦ τοῦδε τοῦ παντός 35 τόπος η 1 ψυχή-καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐκευης αδ ἐκινεῖτο χρόνη. Τὴν γὰρ ἐνέργειαν αὐτῆς παρεχομένη άλλην μετ' άλλην, είθ' έτέραν πάλιν έφεξης, έγεννα τε μετα της ένεργείας τὸ έφεξης καὶ συμπροήει μετά διανοίας έτέρας μετ' έκείνην τὸ μή πρότερον ὄν, ὅτι οὐδὶ ἡ διάνοια ἐνεργηθεισα 40 ήν οὐδ' ή νὖν ζωή όμοία τῆ πρὸ αὐτῆς. "Αμα οὖν ζωή άλλη και τὸ «άλλη» χρόνον είχεν άλλον. Λιοστασις οδυ ζωής χρόνον είχε και το πρόσω άει της ζωής χρόνον έχει ἀει καὶ ή παρελθούσα ζωή γρόνον έχει παρεληλιθότα. Εί οθν γρόνον τις λέγοι ψυχής εν κινήσει μεταβατική εξ άλλου είς 45 άλλον βίον ζωήν είναι, άρ' αν δοκοί τι λέγειν: Εί γάρ αἰών ἐστι ζωή ἐν στάσει καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ ώσαύτως καὶ ἄπειρος ήδη, εἰκόνα δὲ δεῖ τοῦ αίωνος του χρόνου είναι, ώσπερ καὶ τοδε τὸ πᾶν έχει πρός έκεινο, αυτί μέν ζωής της έκει άλλην δεί ζωήν τήν τησδε της δυνάμεως της ψυχης 50 ώσπερ διμώνυμον λέγειν είναι καὶ ἀντὶ κινήσεως νοεράς ψυχής τινος μέρους κίνησιν, άντὶ δὲ ταθτότητος καὶ τοῦ ώσαθτως καὶ μένοντος τὸ μὴ μένον έν τῷ αὐτῷ, ἄλλο δὲ καὶ ἄλλο ἐνεργοῦν, άντι δε άδιαστάτου και ενός είδωλον του ενός το

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there is no other place of it (this universe) 1 than Soul —it moves also in the time of Soul. For as Soul presents one activity after another, and then again another in ordered succession, it produces the succession along with activity, and goes on with another thrught coming after that which it had before, to that which did not previously exist because discursive thought was not in action, and Soul's present life is not like that which came before it. So at the same time the life is different and this "different" involves a different time. So the spreading out of life involves time; life's continual progress involves continuity of time, and life which is past involves past time. So would it be sense to say that time is the life of soul in a movement of passage from one way of life to another? Yes, for if eternity is life at rest, unchanging and identical and already unbounded, and time must exist as an image of eternity (in the same relation as that in which this All spands to the intelligible Al.), then we must say that there is, instead of the life There, another life having, in a way of speaking, the same name as this power of the soul, and instead of intelligible motion that there is the motion of a part of Soul; and, instead of sameness and self-identity and abiding, that which does not abide in the same but does one act after another, and, instead of that which is one without distance or separation, an image of

τοῦδε τοῦ παιτός may be bracketed as a gloss (This was tentatively suggested in H.S², and has now been done by Theler, with Schwyzer's agreement.) But there remains the possiblity that it may be a carelessly added amphification or explanation of αὐτοῦ by Plotinus himself, and therefore, with Henry-Schwyzer, I print and translate the MSS text.

 $^{^1}$ $\mathring{\eta}$ Figures: $\mathring{\eta}$ codd.

The juxtaposition of airoi and roise rai nairos here is extremely odd. Kirchhoff and Dodds would read $air\bar{\phi}$ (so, $r\bar{\phi}$) llaw air) there is no other place of this universe for Plato than soul," which is an attractive emendation. Alternatively,

έν συνεχεία εν, αντί δε απείρου ήδη καὶ όλου τὸ 55 cls απειρον πρὸς τὸ ἐφεξῆς ἀεί, ἀντί δε ἀθρόου ὅλου τὸ κατὰ μέρος ἐσόμενον καὶ ἀεὶ ἐσόμενον ὅλου. Οῦτω γὰρ μιμήσεται τὸ ήδη ὅλον καὶ ἀθρόον καὶ ἄπειρον ήδη, εὶ ἐθελήσει ἀεὶ προσκτώμενον είναι ἐν τῷ είναι καὶ γὰρ τὸ είναι οῦτω τὸ ἐκείνου μιμήσεται. Δεῖ δὲ οὐκ ἔξωθεν τῆς ψυχῆς λαμβάνειν τὸν χρόνον, ὥσπερ οὐδε τὸν 60 αἰῶνα ἐκεῖ ἔξω τοῦ ὅντος, οὐδὶ αἶ παρακολούθημα οὐδὶ ὕστερον, ὥσπερ οὐδὶ ἐκει, ἀλλὶ ἐνορώμενον καὶ ἐνόντα και συνόντα, ὥσπερ κάκεῖ ὁ αἰών.

12. Νοήσαι δέ δει καὶ ἐντεῦθεν, ὡς ἡ φύσις αὕτη χρόνος, τὸ τοιούτου μῆκος βιου ἐν μεταβολαις προιὸν ὁμαλαις τε καὶ ὁμοίαις ἀψοφητὶ προιούσαις, συνεχὲς τὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας ἔχον. Εἰ δὴ πάλιν τῷ λόγω ἀναστρέψαι ποιήσαιμεν τὴν δύναιιν ταύτην ὁ καὶ παύσαιμεν τοῦδε τοῦ βίου, ὅν νῦν ἔχει ἄπαυστον ὄντα καὶ οὕποτε λήξοντα, ὅτι ψυχῆς τινος ἀεὶ οὕσης ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια, οὐ προς αὐτὴν οὐδ' ἐν αὐτῆ, ἀλλ' ἐν ποιήσει καὶ γενέσει—εἰ οὖν ὑποθοίμεθα μηκέτι ἐνεργοῦσαν, ἀλλὰ παυσαμένην ταύτην τὴν ἐνέργειαν καὶ ἐπιστραφὲν καὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος τῆς 10 ψυχῆς πρὸς τὸ ἐκεῖ καὶ τὸν αἰωνα καὶ ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ μένον, τί ἄν ἔτι μετὰ αἰωνα εἴη; Τί δ' ἄν ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο πάντων ἐι ἐνὶ μεινάντων; Τί δ' ἄν ἔτι πρότερον; Τί δ' ἄν ὅστερον ἣ μέλλον, ¹ Ποῦ δ'

ι μέλλον Page, Η S: μᾶλλον codd.

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unity, that which is one in continuity; and instead of a complete inbounded whole, a continuous unbounded succession, and instead of a whole all together a whole which is, and always will be, going to come into being part by part. For this is the way in which it will initate that which is already a whole, already all together and unbounded, by intending to be always making an increase in its being, for this is how its being will imitate the being of the intelligible world. But one must not conceive time as outside Soul, any more than eternity There as outside real being. It is not an accompaniment of Soul nor something that comes after (any more than eternity There) but something which is seen along with it and exists in it and with it, as eternity does There [with real being].

12. We must understand, too, from this that this nature is time, the extent of life of this kind which goes forward in even and uniform changes progressing quietly, and which possesses continuity of activity. Now if in our thought we were to make this power turn back again, and put a stop to this life which it now has without stop and never-ending, because it is the activity of an always existing soul, whose activity is not directed to itself or in itself, but lies in making and production if, then we were to suppose that it was no longer active, but stopped this activity, and that this part of the soul turned back to the intelligible world and to etermity, and rested quetly there, what would there still be except eternity? What would "one thing after another" mean when all things remained in unity? What sense would "before" still have, and what 'after" or "future"? Where could the soul now fix its

αι έτι ψυχή επιβάλλοι είς άλλο ή εν ώ έστι. Μάλλον δε ούδε τούτω αφεστήκοι γορ αν 15 πρότερον, ίνα ἐπιβάλη. Ἐπεὶ οὐδ' ἄν ἡ σφαίρο αὐτὴ εἴη, ἡ οὐ πρώτως ὑπάρχει· [χρόνος] 1 ἐν χρόνω γάρ και αυτη και έστι και κινείται, και στή, ἐκείνης ἐνεργούσης, ὅση ἡ στάσις αὐτής, μετρήσομεν, έως εκείνη του αιώνός εστιν έξω 20 Ει οδν αποστάσης εκείνης και ένωθείσης ανήρηται χρόνος, δήλον ότι ή ταύτης άρχη πρός ταθτα κινήσεως καὶ οῦτος ὁ βίος τὸν χρόνον γεννά. Διὸ καὶ εἴρηται ἄμα τῷδε τῷ παντὶ γεγονέναι, ὅτι ψιχή αὐτον μετά τοῦδε τοῦ παντός ἐγέννησεν Έν γάρ τῆ το αύτη ένεργεία καὶ τόδε γεγένηται 25 το σάν και ή μευ χρόνος, ό δε ευ χρόνος Εί δε τις λέγοι χρόνους λέγεσθαι αὐτῷ καὶ τὰς τῶι άστρων φοράς, αναμνησθήτω, ότι ταιτά φησι γεγονέναι πρός δήλωσιν καὶ διορισμόν χρόνοι καί το ίνα ή μέτρον έναργές. Έτει γάρ οὐκ ήν τον χρόνον αὐτὸν τῆ ψυχῆ δρίσαι οὐδὲ μετρεῖι 30 παρ' αὐτοῖς ἔκαστον αὐτοῖ μέρος ἀοράτου ὅντος και οὐ ληπτοῦ και μάλιστα ἀριθμεῖν οὐκ ειδόσιν, ήμέραν καὶ νύκτα ποιεί, δι' ών ήν δύο τη έτερότητι λαβεῖν, ἀφ' οῦ ἔννοιά, φησιι, ἀριθμοῦ. Εἶθ' ὅσοι τὸ ἀπ' ἀνατολής εἰς τὸ πάλιν λαμβάνουσει ήν ὅσυν 85 χρύνου διάστημα, όμαλοῦ όντος τοῦ τῆς κινήσεως είδους ότω επερειδόμεθα, έχειν και οίον μέτρω

1 ypóvos del H S.

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gaze on something other than that in which it is? Rather, it could not even fix its gaze on this, for it would have to stand away from it first in order to do so. For the heaven,y sphere itself would not be there, since its existence is not primary, for it exists and moves in time, and, if it comes to a slop we shall measure the duration of its stop by the activity of soul, as long as soul is outside eternity. If, then, when soul leaves this activity and returns to unity time is abolished, it is clear that the beginning of this movement in this direction, and this form of the life of scul, generates time. This is why it is said that time came into existence simultaneously with this universe,1 because son, generated it along with this universe. For it is in activity of this kind that this universe has come into being; and the activity is time and the universe is in time. But it someone wants to say that Plato also calls the courses of the stars "times" he should remember that he says that they have come into existence for the declaring and "division of time," 2 and his "that there might be an obvious measure."3 For since it was not possible for the soul to delimit time itself, or for men by themselves to measure each part of it since it was invisible and ungraspable, particularly as they did not know how to count the god made day and night, by means of which, in virtue of their difference, it was possible to grasp the idea of two, and from this Plato says, came the concept of number.⁴ Then, by taking the length of the interval between one sunnse and the next, since the kind of movement on which we base our calculations is even, we can have an interval of time of a certain length, and we use this kind of

¹ Cp. Timaeus 38B6.

² Cp Timaeus 38C6.

³ Cp Tymaeus 39B2. 4 Cp Epinomis 978D1 6.

40 Οὐκοῦν ἄν, ἴνα μετρŷ, καὶ μὴ μέτρον; 'Η οὖν κωησις ἡ τοῦ παντὸς μετρουμένη κατὰ χρόνον ἔσται, καὶ ὁ χρόνος οὐ μέτρον ἔσται κινήσεως κατὰ το τί ἐστω, ἄλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὢν ἄλλο τι πρότερον παρέξει δήλωσιν τοῦ ὁπόση ἡ κίνησις. Καὶ ἡ κίνησις δὲ ληφθείσα ἡ μία ἐν τοσῷδε χρόνῷ πολλάκις ἀριθμουμένη εἰς ἔννοιαν ἄξει τοῦ ὁπόσος

45 παρελήλυθεν· ὥστε τὴν κίνησιν καὶ τὴν περιφορὰν εἴ τις λέγοι τρόπον τινὰ μετρεῖν τὸν χρόνον, ὅσον οἰόν τε, ὡς δηλοῦσαν ἐν τῷ αὐτῆς τοσῷδε τὸ τοσόνδε τοῦ χρόνου, οὐκ ὄν λαβεῖι οὐδὲ συνεῖναι ἄλλως, οὐκ ἄτοπος τῆς δηλώσεως. Τὸ οὖν μετρούμενον ὑπὸ τῆς περιφορᾶς—τοῦτο δέ ἐστι τὸ

50 δηλούμενον—ό χρόνος ἔσται, οὐ γενιηθεὶς ὑπὸ τῆς περιφορᾶς, ἀλλα δηλωθείς· καὶ οὕτω τὸ μέτρον τῆς κινήσεως τὸ μετρηθὲν ὑπὸ κινήσεως ὡρισμένης, καὶ μετρούμενοι ὑπὸ ταύτης ἄλλο ὄν αὐτῆς· ἐπεὶ κοὶ εἰ μετρούν ἄλλο ῆν, καὶ ἢ ¹ μετρούμενον ἔτερον,

55 μετρούμενον δὲ κατὰ ² συμβεβηκος. Καὶ οὕ-ως ἄν ἐλέγετο, ὡς εἰ τὸ μετρούμενον ὑπὸ πήχεως λέγοι

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interval as a measure; 1 but a measure of time, for time itself is not a measure. For how could it measure, and what could it say white it was measuring? "This is as large as such and such a part of myself?' Who, then, is the "I" here? Presum ably, that by which the measuring is being done. Then surely, if it is going to measure, it is not a measure? So, then, it will be the movement of the universe which will be measured by time, and time will not be a measure of movement essentially, but it will incidentally, being something else first, afford a clear indication of how long the movement is. And by taking one movement in a certain length of time and counting it again and again we shall arrive at an idea of how much time has passed; so that if one were to say that the movement and the heavenly circuit in a way measure time, as far as possible, in that the circuit shows by its extent the extent of time, which it would not be possible to grasp or understand otherwise, his explanation would not be out of place. So what is measured by the circuit—that is, what is shown—will be time, which is not produced by the circuit but manifested; and so the measure of motion is that which is measured by a limited motion, and since it is measured by this, is other than it, since, even if it was measuring it would be something else, and in so far as it is measured it is different (but it is [only] measured incidentally). This would have the same meaning as if one said that what is measured

 [§] Kirchhoff, H S¹: є² codd.
 ката Kirchhoff, H S²: каї codd.

 $^{^2}$ Here Plotinus uses some observations of Aristotle on the way in which, in fact, we measure time as the basis of an argument against Aristotle's own definition of time: cp. Physics $\Delta~12~220 \, \mathrm{bl} 3 - 221 \, \mathrm{s} 9$

τις τὸ μέγεθος είναι ὅ τί ποτ' ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνο μη λέγων, μέγεθος ὁριζόμενος, καὶ οίον εἴ τις τὴν κίνησιν αὐτὴν οὐ δινάμενος τῷ ἀόριστον είνων 60 δηλῶσαι λέγοι τὸ μετρούμενον ὑτὸ τόπον λαβῶν γὰρ τόπον τις, ὅν ἐπεξῆλθεν ἡ κίνησις, τοσαύτην ἃν είπεν είναι, ὅσος ὁ τόπος.

13. Χρόνον οὖν ή περιφορά δηλοῦ, ἐν ὧ αὖτη. Δεῖ δὲ αὐτὸν χρόνον μηκέτι τὸ ἐν ὧ ἔχειν, ἀλλά πρώτον αὐτὸν είναι ὅς ἐστιν, ἐι ὡ τὰ ἄλλα κινείται καὶ ἔστηκεν όμαλως καὶ τεταγμένως, και 5 πορά μέν τινος τεταγμένου ἐμφαίνεσθαι κα. προφαίνεσθαι είς έννοιαν, οδ μέντοι γίνεσθαι, είτε έστωτος είτε κινουμένου, μάλλον μέντοι κινου μένου μαλλον γάρ κινεί είς γνώρισα καί μετάβασιν έπὶ τὸν χρόνον ἡ κίνησις ἡπερ ἡ στάσις καὶ γνωριμώτερον το οπόσον κεκίνηταί τι ή όσοι 10 έστηκε. Διό καὶ κινήσεως ήνέχθησαν είς τὸ είπεῖν μέτρον ἀντὶ τοῦ εἰπεῖν κινήσει μετρούμενον είτα προσθείναι τί ον κινήσει μετρείται καὶ μή κατά συμβεβηκός γινόμενον περί τι αύτοῦ είτεῦ καὶ ταθτα ἐνηλλαγμένως. 'Αλλ' ἴσως ἐκεῖνοι οὐκ ένηλλαγμένως, ήμεις δε ού συνίεμεν, άλλα σαφώς 15 λεγόντων μέτρον κατά το μετρούμενον οὐκ έτνγχάνομεν της έκείνων γνώμης. Αίτιον δέ τοῦ μή συνιέναι ήμας, ότι τί ον έντε μετρούν έἴτε μετρούμενον οὐκ έδήλουν 1 διά τῶν συγγραμμάτων

1 έδήλουν Η S: έκδηλού» ΑνΕχΥ: έκδηλούσι Αρο

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by a cubit was the length, not saying what length was in itself but simply determining how long it was, and if one was not able to explain what movement itself was because of its indefiniteness and said it was what is measured by space, for one could take a space through which the movement went and say that the movement was as long as the space

13. The heavenly circuit, therefore, shows time. in which it is. But time itself cannot have something in which it is, but it must first of all be itself what it is. that in which the other thangs move and stand still evenly and regularly; it can be manifested to us by something set in order, and exhibited to our minds so that we form a concept of it, but it cannot be brought into existence by the ordered thing, whether it is at rest or in motion; but a thing in motion will give a better idea of it, for motion more effectively moves our minds to get to know time and to form a concept of it by analogy than rest, and it is easier to know how long something has been moving than how long it has stood still. This is why people were brought to call time the measure of movement, instead of saying that it was measured by movement and then adding what it is that is measured by movement, and not only mentioning something which applies incidentally to a part of it, and getting that the wrong way round. But perhaps they did not get it the wrong way round but we do not understand them, but, when they clearly meant " measure" in the sense of "what is measured," we missed the point of their thought. The reason why we do not understand is that they did not make clear what it is that either measures or is measured in their

ώς είδόσι καὶ ήκροαμένοις αὐτων γραφοντες. 'Ο μέντοι Πλάτων ούτε μετρούν είρηκεν ούτε μετρού-20 μενον ύπο τινος την οιλαίαν αύτοῦ είναι, άλλά είς δήλωσιν αὐτοῦ τὴν περιφοράν ἐλάγιστόν τι εἰλῆφθαι πρός ελάχιστον αὐτοῦ μέρος, ὧς ἐντεῦθεν γινώσκειν δύνασθαι, οΐον καὶ όσον ό χρόνος. Τὴν μέντοι οδαίων αὐτοῦ δηλώσαι θέλων ἄμα οδρανῷ φησι γεγονέναι κατά 1 παράδειγμα αίωνος καὶ εἰκόνα 25 κινητήν, ότι μη μένει μηδ' ό χρόνος της ζωής οὐ μενούσης, ή σπθεί και σπιρέχει άμω ιδραιώ δέ, ότι ζωή ή τοισύτη καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ποιεί καὶ μία ζωή οὐρανὸν καὶ χρόνον ἐργάζεται Ἐπιστραφείσης οδι ζωής ταύτης είς έν, εί δύναιτο, όμοῦ καὶ χρόνος πέπαυται εν τῆ ζωῆ ὢν ταύτη καὶ 30 ούρανὸς την ζωήν ταύτην οὐκ έχων. Εὶ δέ τις τησδε μέν της κινήσεως το πρότερον καὶ το ύστερον λαμβάνων χρόνον λέγοι-είναι γάρ τι τοθτο-της δ' άληθεστέρας κινήσεως τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ ὖστερον ἐχούσης μὴ λέγοι τι είναι, ἀτοπώτατος αν είη, κινήσει με αψύχω διδούς έχειν το 35 πρότερον καὶ ἵστερον και χρόνον παρ' αὐτήν, κινήσει δέ, καθ' ήν καὶ αὕτη ὑφέστηκε κατά μίμησιν μή διδούς τούτο, παρ' ής καὶ τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ ὖστερον πρώτως ὑπέστη αὐτοιργοῦ οὕσης κινήσεως καὶ ἄσπερ τὰς ἐνεργείας αὐτῆς ἐκάστας

1 nord Kirchhoff, H-52, nor codd

1 Cp. Timacus 39B C.

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writings, since they were writing for those who knew and had heard their lectures. Plato, however, has neither described the essential nature of time as measuring nor as measured by something else, but has said that, to show time, the heavenly circuit has put a least part of itself in relation with a least part of time, so that from this we can come to know the quality and quantity of time.1 But when he wants to declare its essential nature he says that it came into existence along with heaven according to the pattern of etermity, and as its moving image.3 because time does not stand still since the life with which it keeps pace in its course does not stand still; it comes into existence with heaven because this kind of life makes heaven, too, and one life produces heaven and time. So when this life-if it could turned back to unity, time would come to a stop with it, since it exists in this life, and so would heaven, if it did not have this life. But if someone were to take the "before" and "after" of this movement here and call it time-on the ground that this is something real -but though the truer movement [of soul] has a " before " and " after," were to deny this any reanty, he would be quite unreasonable, in that he would be granting that soulless movement has 'before" and "after" and time accompanying it, but denying this to the movement in imitation of which this [soulless] movement has come into exis tence, to the movement from which "before" and " after "first came into existence, since it is spontaneous and, as it generates its own individual activities,

² I maeus 38B3-C2.

³ Timaeus 37D4-C7

45 Πρώτη οθυ αθτη είς χρόνον και χρόνον εγέννησε και σύν τῆ ἐνεργεία αὐτῆς ἔχει. Πῶς οὖν πανταχού; "Ότι κάκείνη οὐδενός άφέστηκε τοῦ κόσμου μέρους, ωσπερ οὐδ' ή ἐν ἡμῖν οὐδενὸς ημών 1 μέρους. Εί δέ τις έν ούχ ύποστάσει η έν ούχ υπάρξει του χρόνου λέγοι, δηλουότι ψεύδεσθαι

ου καταθετέου, ο όταν λέγη « ήν » και « έσται ». ούτω γὰρ ἔσται καὶ ἦν, ώς τὸ ἐν ῷ λέγει αὐτὸν ἔσεσθαι. 'Αλλά πρός τούς τοιούτους ἄλλος τρόπος λόγων. Ἐκεῖνο δὲ ἐνθυμεῖσθαι δεῖ τρὸς ἄπασι τοῦς εἰρημένοις, ώς, ὅ-ων τις τὸν κινούμενον

55 ανθρωπον λαμβάνη όσον προελήλυθε, 3 καὶ την κίνησω λαμβάνει όση, καὶ όταν την κίνησω οίον τήν διά σκελων, δράτω 4 και το πρό της κινήσεως ταύτης έν αυτώ κίνημα ότι τοσούτοι ήν, εί γε έπὶ τοσούτον συνείχε την κίνησιν τού σώμανος. Τό μέν δή σώμα το κινούμενον τον τοσόνδε χρόνον

60 αναξει έπι την κίνησιν την τοσήνδε -αύτη γάρ αίτία—και του χρόνου ταύτης, ταύτην δε επί την

¹ ἡμῶν Kircnhoff, H S², ἡμῶν wBJy: om R. και εθει έντ πυπο Schwyzer. και τό θείν αξιόν codd, II-3.
 προελήλυδε Kirchhoff, Η S² προσελήλυθε codd.

4 δρατω Dodds, H-S2: δρα τῶ codd.

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so it generates their succession, and, along with their generation, the transition from one of them to another. Why, then, do we trace back the origin of this movement of the All to that which encompasses it, and say that it is in time, but do not say that the movement of soul, which goes on in it in everlasting progression, is in time? It is because what is before the movement of soul is etermity, which does not run along with it or stretch out with it. This movement of soul was the first to enter time, and generated t.me, and possesses it along with its own activity. How, then, is time everywhere? Because Soul, too, is not absent from any part of the Universe, just as the soul in us is not absent from any part of us. But if someone were to say that time is in something insubstantial or unreal, it must be stated that he is telling an untruth whenever he says that he "was" or "will be"; for he "will be" and "was' in the same sense as that in which he says he "will be." But against people like this we need another style of argument.

But, besides all that has been said, one must consider this further point, that, when one observes the distance anat a moving man has advanced, he also observes the quantity of his movement, and when he observes the movement, for instance, made by his legs, let him notice also that the movement in the man himself which preceded this movement was of a certain quantity, on the assumption that he kept the movement of his body within certain limits. Now the body moved for a certain time will take as back to a certain extent-for this is the cause-and its time, and this to the movement of the soul, which is

της ψυχης κίνησιν, ήτις τὰ ἴσα διειατήκει. Τὴν οἶν κίνησιν της ψυχης εἰς τί; Εἰς ὁ γὰρ ἐθελήσει, ἀδιάστατοι ήδη. Τοῦτο τοίνυν τὸ πρώτως καὶ τὸ ἐν ῷ τὰ ἄλλα· αὐτὸ δὲ οὐκέτι ἔν τῳ·¹ οὐ γὰρ εδ ἔξει [τοῦτο τοίνυν τὸ πρώτως].² Καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχης τοῦ παντὸς ώσαύτως. Âρ' οὖν καὶ ἐν ἡμῶν χρόνος; "Η ἐν ψυχη τῆ τοιαύτη πάση καὶ δμοειδιας ἐν πάση καὶ αἱ τᾶσαι μία. Διὸ οὐ διασπασθήσεται ὁ χρόνος· ἐπεὶ οὐδ' ὁ αἰων ὁ κατ ἄλλο ἐν τοῖς δμοειδέσι πᾶσιν.

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divided into equal intervals. To what, then, will the movement of soul take us back? For that to which one will want to take it back is already without intervals. This, then [the movement of soul] is that which exists primarily and in which the others are; but it is not any more in anything, for it will have nothing to be in. And the same is true also of the Soul of the All. Is time, then, also in us? It is in every soul of this kind, and in the same form in every one of them, and all are one. So time will not be split up, any more than eternity, which, in a different way, is in all the [eternal] beings of the same form.

¹ ἐν τω Dodds, H-S3. ἐν ῷ codd.

² τοῦτο . . . πρώτως del Kirchhoff, II -S.

HI. 8. ON NATURE AND CONTEMPLATION AND THE ONE

Introductory Note

This treatise No. 30 in the chronological order) s in fact the first part of a major work of Plotmus, including also Nos. 31 33 (V8, V5 and II9) the four sections of which Porphyry arbitrarily separated and placed in three different Enneads according to his own too rigidly systematic remarples of arrangement. The doctrine of contemplation which it contains is the very heart of the philosophy of Plotinus. He shows contempation as the source and goal of all action and production at every level; all life for him is essentially contemplation. And in showing this he leads our minds up from the lowest level of contemplative life. that of Nature, the last phase of Soul which is the unmanent principle of growth, through Soul to share in Intellect's contemplation of the One or Good, which he demonstrates must be beyond it as source of contemplation and life. In the next two parts into which Porphyry has divided the work (V8 and V5) he develops his thought about first the beauty, and then the truth of Intellect, and again eads our minds back from it to the Good, In the first three chapters of II9 he sums up his thought about the One, Intellect and Soul; then he adds a polemical appendix, directed against Chostic members of his circle. which occupies the rest of the treatise (cp. Introductory Note to II9)

¹ See R. Harder, "Eine Neue Schrift Plotine" in Kleine Schriften (Beck, Munich, 1960), pp. 303-313.

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Synopsis

Let us play with the idea that all things contemplate. even plants and the earth from which they grow (ch. 1). How Nature makes things, and new contemplation underhes its making chs. 2-3) Plotinus makes Nature speak and comments on what it says, showing how its dreamlike contemplation is the last and weakest, and how weak contemplation leads to action (ch. 4). Contemplation, action and production on the level of Soul, and in human life (chs. 5-6). Contemplation is always the goal of action (ch. 7). The perfect identity of contemplation and object contemplated in Intellect: all life is a kind of thought and the truest life is the truest thought, that of Intellect (ch. 8). Why Intellect is many and not one, and being many cannot be the first, but must have something beyond it, the absolutely simple Good, which we know by immediate awareness of its presence to us (chs. 3-9). The Good is the one productive power of all taings ch. 10). Intellect needs the Good, always desiring it and always attaining, but the Good needs nothing (ch. 11).

ΙΗ. 8. (30) ΠΕΡΙ ΦΥΣΕΩΣ ΚΑΙ ΘΕΩΡΙΑΣ ΚΑΙ ΤΟΥ ΕΝΟΣ

1. Παίζοντες δη τὴν πρώτην πρὶν ἐπιχειρεῖν σπουδάζειν εἰ λέγοιμεν πάντα θεωρίας ἐφἰεσθαι καὶ εἰς τέλος τοῦτο βλέπειν, οὐ μόνον ἔλλογα ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλογα ζῷα καὶ τὴν ἐν φυτοῖς φύσιν καὶ τὴν ταῦτα γεννῶσαν γῆν, καὶ πάντα τυγχάνειν 5 καθ ὅσον οἶόν τε αὐτοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἔχοντα, ἄλλα δὲ ἄλλως καὶ θεωρεῖν καὶ τυγχάνειν καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀληθῶς, τὰ δὲ μίμησιν καὶ εἰκόνα τούτου λαμβάνοντα—άρ ἄν τις ἀνάσχοιτο τὸ παράδοξον τοῦ λόγου; Ἡ πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοῦ γινομένου κίνδινος εὐδεὶς ἐν τῷ πιίζειν τὰ αὐτῶν γενήσετα. ᾿Αρ' 10 οὖν καὶ ἡμεῖς παίζοντες ἐν τῷ παρόντι θεωροῦμεν; Ἡ καὶ ἡμεῖς καὶ πάντες ὅσοι παίζουσι τοῦτο τοιοῦσιν ἢ τούτου ¹ γε παίζουσιν ἐφιέμενοι. Καὶ κινδυνεύει, εἴτε τις παῖς εἴτε ἀνὴρ παίζει ἡ σπον-

1 ή τούτου H-S2: ή τούτο Α20 Εχυ καὶ τούτου Figinus, Α30

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1. Suppose we said, playing 1 at first before we set out to be serious, that all things aspire to contemplation, and direct their gaze to this end-not only rational but irrational living things,2 and the power of growth in plants, and the earth which brings them forth—and that all attain to it as far as possible for them in their natural state, but different things contemplate and attain their end in different ways, some truly, and some only having an imitation and image of this true end —could anyone endure the oddity of this line of thought? Well, as this discussion has arisen among ourselves, there will be no risk in playing with our own ideas. Then are we now contemplating as we play? Yes, we and all who play are doing this, or at any rate this is what they aspire to as they play. And it is likely that, whether a child or a man is playing or being serious, one plays and

takes extremely seriously is introduced is entirely in the spirit

² Cp. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics K.2 1172b10 Eudoxus thought that pleasure was the good because all things, rational and irrational aspired to it). Plotatus is taking Aristotle's conception of θεωρία (K.6 and K.7) as the starting-point of his discussion, and is perhaps deliberately indicating by this phrase that his own conception of it is much more universal than Aristotle's.

δάζει, θεωρίας ενεκεν ὁ μὲν παίζειν, ὁ δὲ σπουδάζειν, καὶ πρᾶξις πᾶσα εἰς θεωρίαν τὴν σπουδὴν
16 έχειν, ἡ μὲν ἀναγκαία καὶ ἐπιπλέον τὴν θεωρίαν
ἔλκουσα πρὸς τὸ ἔξω, ἡ δὲ ἐκούσιος λεγομένη ἐπ'
ἔλαττον μέν, ὅμως δὲ καὶ αὕτη ἐφέσει θεωρίας
γινομένη. ᾿Αλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ὕστερον νῦν δὲ
λέγωμεν περί τε γῆς αὐτῆς καὶ δένδρων καὶ ὅλως
20 φυτῶν τίς αὐτῶν ἡ θεωρία, καὶ πῶς τὰ παρ'
αὐτῆς ποιούμενα καὶ γεννώμενα ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς
θεωρίας ἀνάξομει ἐνέργειαν, καὶ πῶς ἡ φύσις, ἢν
ἀφάνταστόν φασι καὶ ἄλογον εἶναι, θεωρίαν τε ἐν
αὐτῆ ἔχει καὶ ἃ ποιεῖ διὰ θεωρίαν ποιεῖ, ἢν οὐκ
ἔχει, [καὶ πῶς].¹

2 *Oτι μεν οδυ οδιτε χειρες ενταιθα οδιτε πόδες ούτε τι δργανον έπακτον η σύμφυτον, ύλης δε δεί, εφ' ής ποιήσει, και ην ενειδοποιεί, παντί που δηλον. Δεί δε καὶ το μοχλεύειν ἀφελείν εκ της το φυσικης ποιήσεως. Ποίος γὰρ ἀθισμός η τίς μοχλεία χρώματα ποικίλα καὶ παντοδαπά καὶ σχηματα ποιεί; Επεὶ οὐδε οἱ κηροπλάσται [η κοροπλάθαι], εἰς οὐς δη καὶ βλέποντες ἀήθησαν την της φύσεως δημιουργίαν τοιαύτην εἰναι,

1 gol was del Müller, H-S2.

* ἐνειδοπριεῖ nunc Henry et Schwyzer: ἐν είδει πριεῖ codd, Π ⑤.

a η κοροπλάθοι del. Müller, Η S³

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the other is serious for the sake of contemplation, and every action is a serious effort towards contemplation; compulsory action drags contemplation more towards the outer world, and what we call voluntary, less, but, all the same, voluntary action, too, springs from the desire of cortemplation. But we will discuss this later: but now let us talk about the earth itself, and trees, and plants in general, and ask what their contemplation is, and how we can relate what the earth makes and produces to its activity of contemplation, and how nature, which people say has no power of forming mental images 1 or reasoning, has contemplation in itself and makes what it makes by contemplation, which it does not have.

2. Well, then, it is clear, I suppose, to everyone that there are no hands here or feet, and no instrument either acquired or of natural growth, but there is need of matter on which nature can work and which it forms. But we must also exclude levering from the operation of nature. For what kind of thrusting or levening can produce this rich variety of colours and shapes of every kind? For the wax-modellers—people have actually looked at them and thought that natures workmanship was like

¹ The Stoics used the terms φύσις ἀφάνταστος and νοερὰ φύσις to distinguish between "nature" in the sense of the Aristotelian growth principle and in their own sense of the all-pervading divine reason: cp. Sioic Vet. Fragm. H. 1016.

² Cp. V. 8[31] 7. 10-II, and V. 9[5] 6. 22, 23. It is part of Floraus's consistent effort at eliminate materialistic and spatial conceptions from our ideas of spiritual existence and activity that he insists frequently that soul and nature are not to be thought of as forming the material world with hands and tools and machines. He seems to have in mind the sort of crude Epicurean criticism of Plato which we find in Cicero De Natura Deorum I. 8.19 quae molitic? quae ferramenta? qui vectes? quae machinae?

χρωματα δύνανται ποιείν μη χρώματα άλλαχόθεν 10 επάγοντες οίς ποιούσιν. 'Αλλά γάρ έχρην συννοούντας, ώς και έπι των τάς τέχνας τάς τοιαίτας μετιόντων, [ύτι] 1 δεί τι έν αὐτοίς μένειν, καθ' δ μένον διά χειρών ποιήσουσιν & αὐτών ἔργα, ἐπὶ τὸ τοιούτον ανελθείν τής φύσεως και αὐτούς και συνείναι, ώς μένειν δεί και ένταθθα την δύναμιν 15 την ού διά χειρών ποιούσαν και πάσαν μένειν. Οὐ γὰο δὰ δεῖται τῶν μὲν ώς μενόντων, των δὲ ώς κινουμένων-ή γάρ ύλη το κινούμενον, αὐτῆς δὲ ούδεν κινούμενον-ή έκεινο ούκ έσται το κινούν πρώτως, οὐδὲ ή φύσις τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ το ἀκίνητον τὸ ἐν τῶ ὅλω. Ὁ μὲν δη λόγος, φαίη ἄν τις, άκίνητος, αύτη δὲ άλλη παρά τὸν λόγον καὶ 20 κινουμένη. 'Αλλ' εί μέν πάσαν φήσουσι, καὶ δ λόγος εί δέ τι αύτης ακίνητον, τοῦτο καὶ ό λόγος. Καὶ γὰρ είδος αὐτήν δεῖ είναι καὶ οὐκ έξ ύλης καὶ είδους τί γαρ δεί αὐτῆ ύλης θερμής ή ψυχρώς, 'Η γά, δποκειμένη και δημιουργουμένη ύλη ήκει τούτο φέρουσα, ή γίνεται τοιαύτη ή μή 25 ποιότητα έχουσα λογωθείσα. Οὐ γὰρ πῦρ δεῖ προσελθείν, ενα πύρ ή ύλη γένηται, άλλά λόγου. ο και σημείον οὐ μικρόν τοῦ ἐν τοῖς ζώοις και ἐν τοις φυτοίς τούς λόγους είναι τους ποιούντας καί την φύσιν είναι λόγον, θε ποιεί λόνον άλλον

1 on del. Fiemus, H S

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theirs—cannot make colours unless they bring colours from elsewhere to the things they make. But those who make this comparison ought to have considered also that even with those who practise crafts of this kind there must be something in themselves, something which stays unmoved, according to which they will make their works with their hands; they should have brought their minds back to the same kind of thing in nature, and understood that here, too, the power, all of it, which makes without hands, must stay unmoved. For it certainly has no need to have some unmoving and some moving parts-matter is what is in motion, and no part of nature is in motionotherwise its unmoving part will not be the primary mover, nor will nature be this, but that which is unmoved in the universe as a whole. But someone might say that the rational forming principle is unmoved, but nature is different from the forming principle and is in motion. But if they are going to say that nature as a whole is in motion, then so will the forming principle be; but if any part of it is unmoved, this, too, will be the forming principle. In fact, of course, nature must be a form, and not composed of matter and form; for why should it need hot or cold matter? For matter which underlies it and is worked on by it comes to it bringing this sheat or cold) or rather becomes of this quality (though it has no quality itself) by being given form by a rational principle. For it is not fire which has to come to matter in order that it may become fire, but a forming principle; and this is a strong indication that in animals and plants the forming principles are the makers and nature is a forming principle, which

γέννημα αὐτοῦ δόντα μέν τι τῷ ὑποικτιμένῳ, 30 μένοντα δ' αὐτόι. 'Ο μὲν οὖν λόγος δ κατὰ τὴν μορφὴν τὴν δρωμένηι ἔσχατος ἥδη καὶ νεκρὸς καὶ οὐκέτι ποιεῖι δύναται ἄλλον, δ δὲ ζωὴν ἔχων ὁ τοῦ ποιησαντος τὴν μορφὴν ἀδελφὸς ὧν καὶ αὐτὸς τὴν αὐτην δύναμιν ἔγων ποιεῖ ἐν τῶ γενομένω.

3. Πώς οδν ποιών καὶ ούναι ποιών θεαρίας ανός αν εφάπτοιτο: "Η, εί μένων ποιεί και έν αὐτώ μένων καί έστι λόγος, εἴη ἄν αὐτὸς θεωρία. Ἡ μέν γὰρ πράξις γένοιτ' ἂν κατὰ λόγον έτέρα οδαα δηλονότι τοῦ λόγου. ὁ μέντοι λόγος καὶ αὐτός ὁ ο συνών τη πράξει καὶ ἐπιστατῶν οὐκ ἄν εἴη πρûξις. Εί οδυ μή πράξις άλλά λόγος, θεωρία καί έπί παντός λόγου ό μεν εσχατος έκ θεωρίος και θεωρία ούτως ώς τεθεωρημένος, ὁ δὲ πρό τούτοι πᾶς ὁ μεν άλλος άλλως, ὁ μη ώς φύσις άλλα ψυχή, ὁ δ' έν τῆ φύσει καὶ ἡ φύσις. *Αρά γε καὶ αὐτὸς ἐκ 10 θεωρίας; Πάντως μεν εκ θεωρίας. 'Αλλ' εί καί αύτος τεθεωρηκώς αύτόν; ἢ πῶς; ἔστι μέν γάρ άποτέλεσμα θεωρίας και θεωρήσαντός τινος. Πώς δε αύτη έχει θεωρίαν: Την μεν δη έκ λόγου ούκ έχει λέγω δ' έκ λόγου τὸ σκοπεῖσθαι περὶ τῶν 15 ἐν αὐτη - Διὰ τί οῦν ζωή τις οὖσα καὶ λόγος καὶ makes another principle, its own product, which gives something to the substrate, but stays unmoved itself. This forming principle, then, which operates in the visible shape, is the last, and is dead and no longer able to make another, but that which has life is the brother of that which makes the shape and has the same power itself, and makes in that which comes into being.

3. How then, when it makes, and makes in this way, can it attain to any sort of contemplation? If it stays unmoved as it makes, and stays in itself, and is a forming principle, it must itself be contemplation. For action must take place according to a rational principle, and is obviously different from the principle; but the principle itself, which accompanies and supervises the action, cannot be action. If, then, it is not action but rational principle, it is contemplation; and in every rational principle its last and lowest manifestation springs from contemplation, and is contemplation in the sense of being contemplated; but the manifestation of the principle before this is universal, one part in a different way. the part which is not nature but soul; the other is the rational principle in nature, and is nature. Then is this itself, too, the result of contemplation? Yes. it is altogether the result of contemplation. But is it so because it has itself contemplated itself, or how? For it is a result of contemplation, and something has been contemplating. But how does this, nature, possess contemplation? It certainly does not have the contemplation that comes from reasoning:1 I mean by " reasoning" the research into what it has in itself. But why [should it not have it] when it is a

This is a good example of the variety of meaning which the word $\lambda \dot{\phi}_{VOS}$ can have in Plotinus. The logical subject of the sentence is $\lambda \dot{\phi}_{VOS}$ in the special sense which it often hears in the Enneads, combining the ideas of intelligence, intelligibility and formative activity, which I translate by 'rational principle" or "rational formative principle", it is a $\lambda \dot{\phi}_{VOS}$ in this sense which does not have some application $\dot{\epsilon}_R \lambda \dot{\phi}_{VOS}$ in the ordinary sense of 'reasoning," "discursive thinking."

δύναμις ποιοῦσα; *Αρ' ὅτ. τὸ ακοπεῖοθαί ἐστι τὸ μήπω ἔχειν; 'Η δὲ ἔχει, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ὅτι ἔχει καὶ ποιεῖ. Τὸ οὧν εἶναι αὐτῆ ὅ ἐστι τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ ποιεῖν αὐτῆ καὶ ὅσον ἐστὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ ποιοῦν. Εστι δὲ θεωρία καὶ θεώρημα, λόγος γάρ. Τῷ 20 οδν εἶναι θεωρία καὶ θεώρημα καὶ λόγος τούτω καὶ ποιεί ῆ ταῦτά ἐστιν. 'Η ποίησις ἄρα θεωρία ἡμῖν ἀναπέφανται: ἔστι γὰρ ἀποτέλεσμα θεωρίας μενούσης θεωρίας οὐκ ἄλλο τι πραξάσης, ἀλλὰ τῶ

είναι θεωρία ποιησάσης.

4. Καὶ εἴ τις δὲ αὐτὴν ἔροιτο τίνος ἔνεκα ποιεῖ, εἰ τοῦ ἔρωτῶντος ἔθέλοι ἐπαίειν καὶ λέγειν, εἴποι ἄν· « Ἐχρῆν μὲν μὴ ἐρωτῶν, ἀλλὰ συνιέναι καὶ αὐτὸν σιωπῷ, ώσπερ ἐγὼ σιωπὼ καὶ οὐκ εἴθισμαι δ λέγειν. Τί οὖν συνιέναι; "Οτι τὸ γενόμενόν ἐστι θέαμα ἐμόν, σιωπώσης, καὶ φυσει γενόμενον θεώρημα, καὶ μοι γανομάνη ἐκ θεωρίας τῆς ώδὶ τὴν φύσιν ἔχειν φιλοθεάμονα ὑπάρχειν. Καὶ τὸ θεωροῦν μου θεώρημα ποιεῖ, ὥσπερ οἱ γεωμέτραι θεωροῦντες γράφουσιν ἀλλὰ ἐμοῦ μὴ γραφούσης, 10 θεωρούσης δέ, ὑφίστανται αὶ τῶν σαμάτων γραμμαὶ ὥσπερ ἐκπίπτουσαι. Καὶ μοι τὸ τῆς μητρὸς καὶ τῶν γειναμένων ὑπάρχει πάθος· καὶ

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life and a rational principle and a power which makes? Is it because research means not yet possessing? But nature possesses, and just because it possesses, it also makes. Making, for it, means being what it is, and its making power is coextensive with what it is. But it is contemplation and object of contemplation, for it is a rational principle. So by being contemplation and object of contemplation and rational principle, it makes in so far as it is these things. So its maxing has been revealed to us as contemplation, for it is a result of contemplation, and the contemplation stays unchanged and does not do anything else but makes by being contemplation.

4. And if anyone were to ask nature why it makes, if it cared to hear and answer the questioner it would say: "You ought not to ask, but to understand in silence, you, too, just as I am silent and not in the habit of talking. Understand what, then? That what comes into being is what I see in my silence, an object of contemplation which comes to be naturally, and that I, originating from this sort of contemplation have a contemplative nature. And my act of contemplation makes what it contemplates, as the geometers draw their figures while they contemplate. But I do not draw, but as I contemplate, the lines which bound bodies come to be as if they fell from my contemplation. What happens to me is what happens to my mother and the beings that

primary bodies in *Timaeus* 53C-55C. But the intuitive spontaneity of the process here, as contrasted with the careful and deliberate mathematical planning in Plato's symbolical description, brings out cearly an important difference in the mentality of the two philosophers.

 $^{^{1}}$ σιωπώσης Coloridge (secundum Dodds) et nunc Henry et Schwyzer: σιώπησις ccdd., Η S.

¹ Though this is not a precise allusion to anything in Plato. Plotinus is thinking in terms of something like the construction of the regular solids which are the figures of the

Τί οὖν ταθτα βούλεται; 'Ως ή μεν λεγομένη 15 φύσις ψυχή οδσα, γέννημα ψυχής προτέρας δυνατώτεροι ζώσης, ήσυχη εν έπυτη θεωρίαν έχουσα οὐ τρὸς τὸ ἄνω οὐδ' αὖ ἔτι πρὸς τὸ κάτω, στάσα δε ει ώ έστιν, εν τη αύτης στάσει και οίον συναιοθήσει, τῆ συνέσει ταύτη καὶ συναιοθήσει 20 το μετ' αθτήν είδεν ώς οίον τε αθτή και οθκέτι έζήτησεν άλλα θεώρημα ἀποτελέσασα άγλαὸν καὶ χάριεν. Καὶ είτε τις βούλεται σύνεσίν τινα ή αξαθησιν αθτή διδόναι, ολχ αξαν λέγομεν έπε των άλλων την αισθησιν ή την σύνεσιν, άλλ' οίον εί τις την καθύπνου 1 τη 2 έγρηγορότος προσεικάσειε. 25 Θεωρούσα γάρ θεώρημα αὐτής άναπαύεται γενό μενον αὐτῆ ἐκ τοῦ ἐν αύτῆ καὶ σὺν αὐτῆ μένειν καὶ θεώρημα είναι καὶ θεωρία ἄψοφος, άμυδροτέρα δέ. Έτέρα γὰρ αὐτῆς εἰς θέαν ἐναργεστέρα, ἡ δὲ είδωλον θεωρίας άλλης. Γαύτη δή και το γεννηθέν ύπ' αὐτης ἀσθενές παντάπασιν, ὅτι ἀσθενούσα 30 θεωρία ασθενές θεώρημα ποιείτ έπεὶ καὶ ἄνθρωποι, όταν άσθενήσωσα είς το θεωρείν, σκιάν θεωρίας καὶ λογου τὴι πράξιν ποιοθνται. "Ότι γάρ μὴ ίκανδη αθτοίς το της θεωρίας θη ασθενείας ψυγής.

generated me, for they, too, derive from contemplation, and it is no action of theirs which brings about my birth; they are greater rational principles, and as they contemplate themselves I come to be.

What does this mean? That what is called nature is a soul, the offspring of a prior soul with a stronger life; that it quietly holds contemplation in itself, not directed upwards or even downwards, but at rest in what it is, in its own repose and a kind of self perception, and in this consciousness and self perception it sees what comes after it, as far as it can, and seeks other things no longer, having accomplished a vision of splendour and delight. If anyone wants to attribute to it understanding or perception, it will not be the understanding or perception we speak of in other beings; it will be like comparing the consciousness of someone fast asleep to the consciousness of somethe awake. Nature is at rest in contemplation of the vision of itself, a vision which comes to it from its abiding in and with itself and being itself a vision; and its contemplation is silent but somewhat blurred. For there is another, clearer for signt, and nature is the image of another contemplation. For this reason what is produced by it is weak in every way, because a weak contemplation produces a weak object. Men, too, when their power of contemplation weakens, make action a shadow of contempation and reasoning. Because contemplation is not enough for them, since their souls are weak and they are not able to grasp the

καθυπνου nine Henry et Schwyser: τοῦ ῦπνοι codd., H-S.
 τῆ H S: τοῦ wxUS: om C.

[&]quot;'my mother" = the higher soul: "the brings that generated me" = the λόγοι in soul which are the immediate expressions of the Forms in Intellect.

λαβεῖν οὐ δυνάμενοι -ὸ θέαμα ἰκανῶς καὶ διά τούτο οὐ πληρούμενοι, εφιέμενοι δε αὐτὸ ίδεῖν, εἰς

35 πράξιν φέρονται, Για ίδωσιν, ὁ μὴ νῷ ἐδύναντο. "Ότιν γούν ποιώσι, και αὐτοὶ δράν βούλονται αὐτὸ καὶ θεωρεῖν καὶ αισθάνεσθαι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους. όταν ή προθεσις αὐτοις ώς οἱόν τε πράξις ή.

40 Πανταχού δή ανευρήσομεν την ποίησιν και την πράξιν η ἀσθένειαν θεωρίας ή παρακολούθημα. ασθένε αν μέν, εί μηδέν τις έχοι μετά το πραγθέν. παρακολούθημα δέ, εὶ ἔχοι ἄλλο πρὸ τούτου κρείττου του ποιηθέντος θεωρείν. τίς 1 γάρ θεωρείν τη πληθινόν δυνάμενος προηγουμένως έρχεται έπὶ

45 το είδωλον του άληθινου; Μαρτιρούσι δέ και οί νωθέστεροι των παίδων, οι πρός τας μαθήσεις καὶ θεωρίας άδυνάτως έχοντες έπὶ τὰς τέχνας καὶ τὰς

έργασίας καταφέρονται.

5. 'Αλλά περί μεν φύσεως είπόντες δυ τρόπου θεωρία ή γένεσις, έπι την ψυχήν την πρό ταύτης έλθόντες λέγωμεν, ώς ή ταύτης θεωρία και τὸ φιλομαθές και το ζητητικόν και ή έξ ων έγνωκει 5 ώδις και το πλήρες τεποίηκεν αὐτὴν θεώρημα παν γενομένην άλλο θεώρημα πιιήσαι οίον ή

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vision sufficiently, and therefore are not filled with it, but still long to see it, they are carried into action, so as to see what they cannot see with their intellect. When they make something, then, it is because they want to see their object themselves and also because they want others to be aware of it and contemplate it, when their project is realised in practice as well as possible. Everywhere we shall find that making and action are either a weakening or a consequence of contemplation; 1 a weakening, if the doer or maker had nothing in view peyond the thing done, a consequence if he had another prior object of contemplation better than what he made. For who, if he is able to contemplate what is truly real will delberately go after its image? The duller children, too, are evidence of this, who are incapable of learning and contemplative studies and turn to crafts and manual work.

5. But, now that we have said, in speaking of nature, in what way coming into being is contemplation, we must go on to the soul prior to nature and say how its contemplation, its love of learning and spirit of enquiry, its birth-pangs from the knowledge it attains and its fullness, make it, when it has itself become all a vision, produce another vision; it is

which is a consequence of contemplation should imply any weakness in the contemplation itself (however imperfectly it may represent it); and the activity of nature in forming the material world is an activity of this sort. But Plotinus is so deeply convinced of the inferiority of the material world that he has to represent the activity of soul in forming material things as an activity of the lowest form of soul and lue to its weakness in contemplation; hence the comparison with the substitute activities of uncontemplative men

¹ τίς Αρο et nunc Henry et Schwyzer: τί ΑωΕπγ, H-S.

This distinction between the action which is a substitute for contemplation and that which naturally issues from it is a varuable one, and the description of the way in which weakness n contemplation leads through dissatisfaction to sabstitute activities (II. 33-30) is a good piece of psychological observation But there is a certain confusion of thought in the passage. There is no real reason why the kind of action

τέχνη ποιεί. δταν εκάστη πλήρης ή, άλλην οίαν μικράν τέχνην ποιεί ει παιγνίω 1 ϊνδαλμα έχοντι άπαντουν άλλος μέντοι ταθτα ώσπερ άμυδρα καί οὐ δυνάμενα βοηθείν ξαυτοίς θεάματα καὶ θεωρή-10 ματα· τό πρώτοι [τὸ λογ,στικόν] 2 οὖν αὐτῆς ἄνω πρός το ἄνω ἀεὶ πληρούμενον καὶ ἐλλαμπόμενον μένει έκει, τό δέ τή του μεταλαβόντος πρώτη μεταλήψει μεταλαμβάνον πρόεισι (πρόεισι) γάρ ἀεὶ ζωή έκ ζωής· ἐνέργεια 4 γὰρ πανταχοί φθάνει καὶ οἰκ έστω ότου άποστατεί. Προιούσα μέντοι ές τὸ 15 πρότερον [το έαυτης πρόσθεν] μέρος 5 οὖ καταλέλοιπε μένειν· ἀπολιποῦσα γὰρ τὸ πρόσθεν οὐκέτι έσται πανταχοῦ, ἀλλ' ἐν ὧ τελευτᾶ μόνον. Οἰκ Τσου δέ το προιόν τὰ μείναντι Εί οθυ πανταχού δεί γίνεσθαι καὶ μὴ είναι όπου μὴ τὴν ἐνέργειαν την αθτήν αεί τε το πρότερον έτερον του θστέρου, ήκει δὲ ή ἐνέργεια ἐκ θεωρίας ή πράξεως, πράξις 20 δε ούπω ήν—ού γάρ οδόν τε πρό θεωρίας—ανάγκη άσθενεστέραν μεν ετέραν ετέρας είναι, πάσαν δε θεωρίαν άστε την κατά την θεωρίαν πράξιν δοκούσαν είναι την ἀσθενεστάτην θεωρίαν είναι-

2 το λογιστικον del Kirchhoff et minc Henry et Schwyzer.

* (πρόεω) Theiler et nunc Henry et Schwyzer
 * ἐνέργεια wy et nunc Henry et Schwyzer: ἐνεργεία:
 ἐνεργεία Η S.

δ το ζαυτής πρόσθεν, del. Dodds.

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like the way in which art produces; when a particular art is complete, it produces a kind of another little art in a toy which possesses a trace of everything in it. But, all the same, these visions, these objects of contemplation, are dim and helpless sorts of things. The first part of soul, then, that which is above and always filled and illuminated by the reality above, remains There; but another part, participating by the first participation of the participant goes forth, for soul goes forth always, life from life; for actuality reaches everywhere, and there is no point where it fails. But in going forth it lets its prior part remain where it left it, for if it abandoned what is before it, it would no longer be everywhere, but only at the last point it reached. But what goes forth is not equal to what remains, If, then, it must come to be everywhere, and there must be nowhere without its activity; and if the prior must always be different from that which comes after; and if activity originates from contemplation or action, and action did not exist at this stage—for it cannot come before contemplation—then all activity of soul must be contemplation, but one stage weaker than another. So what appears to be action according to contemplation is really the weaker form

Henry-Schwyzer, seems to me irrefutable. As the text stands, it makes Plottius say that the soul allows its higher part to remun where it left it (in the intelligible world) for if it left its higher part the soul would lose its imapresence (which it does not do). This does not really make sense. I therefore follow Dodds in bracketing $\neg \delta$ caurôs $m\rho\delta\sigma\theta_{ev}$, as a gloss on $\tau\delta$ $\pi\rho\sigma\sigma\rho\sigma$, designed to show that the prority is in the order of being, not temporal $\tau\delta$ $m\rho\delta\sigma\theta_{ev}$ (1–16) can then refer, as it should, to Intellect.

¹ The argument of Dodds (in his Notes in Ennead III viti, Studi Italiani di Fulologia Classica Vol. xxvv-vvv, Florence 1956, p. 109) against the received toxt here, though not accepted by

δμογενες γάρ ἀεὶ δεῖ τὸ γεννώμενον εἶναι, ἀσθενέστερον μὴν τῷ ἐξίτηλον καταβαῖνον γιγνεσθαι.

25 ᾿ Λφοφητὶ μὰν δὴ πάντα, ὅτι μηδὰν ἐμφανοῦς καὶ τῆς ἔξωθεν θεωμίας ἢ πράξεως δεῖται, καὶ ψυχὴ δὲ ἡ θεωροῦσα καὶ τὸ οὕτω θεωρῆσαν ἄτε ἐξωτέρω και οὐχ ιὑπαύτως τῷ πρὸ αὐτῆς τὸ μετ᾽ αὐτὴν ποιεῖ καὶ θεωρία τὴν θεωρίαν ποιεῖ. Καὶ γὰρ οὐκ

30 ἔχει πέρας ἡ θεωρία οὐδὲ τὸ θεώρημα. Διὰ τοῦτο

30 ἔχει πέρας ἡ θεωρία οὐδὲ τὸ θεώρημα. Διὰ τοῦτο δὲ [ἢ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο] 1 πανταχοῦν ποῦ γὰρ οὐχί; Ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν πάση ψυχῆ τὸ αὐτό. Οὐ γὰρ περιγέγραπται μεγέθει. Οὐ μὴν ὡσαύτως ἐν πᾶσιν, ὥστε οὐδὲ ἐν παντὶ μέρει ψυχῆς δμοίως. Διο ὁ ἡνίοχος τοῖς ἵπποις δίδωσιν ὧι εἶδεν, οἱ δὲ

35 λαβόντες δήλον ὅτι ὀρέγουτο ἃν ὧν είδον ΄ ἔλαβον γὰρ οὐ πῶν. 'Ορεγόμενοι δὲ εἰ πράττοιεν, οῦ ὀρέγονται ἔνεκα πραττουσιν. 'Ην δὲ θεώρημα καὶ θεωρία ἐκεῖνο.

6. Ἡ ἄρα πράξις ἔνεκα θεωρίας καὶ θεωρήματος ἄστε καὶ τοῖς πράττουσιν ἡ θεωρία τέλος, καὶ οἷον ἐξ εὐθείας ὁ μὴ ἡδυνήθησαν λαβεῖν τοῦτο περιπλανώμενοι ἐλεῖν ζητοῦσι. Καὶ γὰρ αὖ ὅταν 5 τύχωσιν οὖ βούλονται, ὁ γενέσθαι ἡθέλησαν, οὐχ

1 ή καὶ διὰ τοῦτο del Kirchhoff et nunc Henry et Schwyzer.

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of contemplation, for that which is produced must always be of the same kind as its producer, but weaker through losing its virtue as it comes down. All goes on noiselessly, for there is no need of any obvious and external contemplation or action; it is soul which contemplates, and makes that which comes after it, that which contemplates in a more external way and not like that which precedes it and contemplation makes contemplation. Contemplation and vision have no limits.1 This is why soul makes everywhere, for where does it not? Since the same vision is in every soul. For it is not spatially limited. It is, of course, not present in the same way in every soul, since it is not even in a like way in every part of the soul. That is why the charioteer gives the horses a share of what he sees; and they in taking it obviously would have desired what they saw, for they did not get it all. And if in their longing they act, they act for the sake of what they long for; and that was vision and contemplation.

6. Action, then, is for the sake of contemplation and vision, so that for men of action, too, contemplation is the goal, and what they cannot get by going straight to it, so to speak, they seek to obtain by going round about. For, again, when they reach what they want, the thing which they wished to exist, not so that they should not know it but so that they

of which production is the inseparable other side: and for Plotinus, as for Plato, nothing exists which is not the product of soul's activity.

¹ θεωρία has now received its full extension of meaning, going far beyond the Aristotelian conception from which the treatise started. It is for Plotinus the whole activity of soul.

The ambroma and nectar with which the character foods his horses in the *Phaedrus* myth 24 Eo-5) are interpreted as the share which the lower parts of the soul can receive of the divine vision of the higher.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 8.

ίνα μή γνώσιν, άλλ' ίνα γνώσι καὶ παρόν ίδωσιν έν ψυχή, δήλον ότι κείμενον θεατόν. Έπεὶ καὶ ά/αθού χάριν πράττουσι τούτο δέ ούχ ένα έξω αθτών, οὐδ' ἴνα μή ἔχωσω, ἀλλ' ἴνα ἔχωσω τὸ ἐκ της πράξεως αγαθόν. Τοῦτο δὲ ποῦ, Ἐν ψυχί. .0 'Ανέκημήσεν οδε πάλων ή πράξις εἰς θεωρίαν. δ γαρ ἐν ψιχη λαμβάνει λόγω ούση, τί ἄν ἄλλο ή λογος σιωπών είη; Καὶ μάλλον, ὅσω μάλλον. Τότε γάρ καὶ ἡσυχίαν ἄγει καὶ οὐδὲν ζητεὶ ὡς πληρωθείσα, καὶ ἡ θεωρία ἡ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ τῷ πιστεύειν έχειν είσω κείται. Καὶ ὄσω έναργεστέρα 15 ή πίστις, ήσυχαιτέρα καὶ ή θεωρία, ή μαλλον εἰς έν άνει και το γινώσκον όσω γινώσκει-ήδη γαρ σπουδαστέον-είς εν τῷ γνωσθέντι έρχεται. Εί γαρ δύο, τὸ μὲν ἄλλο, τὸ δε ἄλλο ἔσται ωστε οίον παρακειται, και το διπλούν τούτο ούπω ωκείωσεν, οδον όταν ένόντες λόγοι εν 1 ψυχη μηδέν 20 ποιώσι. Διὰ δεῖ μὴ ἔξωθεν τὸν λόγον είναι, ἀλλ' ένωθηναι τή φυχή του μανθάνοντος, έως αν οίκείον εύρη. 'Η μέν οδι ψειχή, όταν ολκειωθή καί διατοθή, όμως προφέρει και προχειρίζεταιου γάρ πρώτως είχε-και καταμαθάνει, και τή προχειρίσει οΐον έτέρα αὐτοῦ γίνεται, καὶ διανο-25 ουμένη βλέπει ώς άλλο ον άλλο καίτοι και αυτη λόγος ήν και σίου νοῦς, άλλ' όρων άλλο. "Εστι

1 λόγο, έν Αρο, Η S: λέγοιεν Ααο Εχγ.

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should know it and see it present in their soul, it is, obviously, an object set there for contemplation. This is so, too, because they act for the sake of a good; but this means, not that the good arising from their action should be outside them, or that they should not have it, but that they should have it. But where do they have it? In their soul. So action bends back again to contemplation, for what someone receives in his soul, which is rational form what can it be other than silent rational form? And more so, the more it is within the soul. I or the soul keeps quiet then, and seeks in thing because it is filled, and the contemplation which is there in a state like this rests within because it is confident of possession. And, in proportion as the confidence is clearer, the contemplation is quieter, in that it unifies more, and what knows, in so far as it knows-we must be serious now-comes into unity with what is known. For if they are two, the knower will be one thing and the known another, so that there is a sort of jixtaposition, and contemplation has not yet made this pair akin to each other, as when rational principles present in the soul do nothing. For this reason the rational principle must not be outside but must be united with the soul of the learner, until it finds that it is its own. The soul, then, when it has become akin to and disposed according to the rational principle, still, all the same, utters and propounds itfor it did not possess it primarily—and learns it thoroughly and by its proposition becomes other than it, and looks at it, considering it, like one thing looking at another; and yet soul too, was a rational principle and a sort of intellect, but an intellect seeing

γάρ οὐ πλήρης, άλλά έλλείπει τῷ πρό αὐτῆς όρῷ μέντοι καὶ αὐτὴ ἡσίχως ἃ προφέρει. "Α μεν γάρ εθι προήνεγκεν, σύκει προφέρει, ά δε προφέρει, τῶ ἐλλιπεῖ προφέρει εἰς ἐπίσκεψιι καταμανθάνουσα δ έχει. Έν δὲ τοῖς πρακτικοῖς ἐφαρμόττει ἃ ἔχει 30 τοις έξω. Καὶ τῷ μέν μαλλον έχειν ή ή φύσις ήσυγαιτέρα, καὶ τῷ πλέον θεωρητική μᾶλλον, τῷ δε μή τελέως εφιεμένη μάλλον έχεω την τοῦ θεωρηθέντος καταμάθησων καὶ θεωρίαν την έξ ἐπισκέψεως. Kal ἀπολείπουσα δὲ καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις γινομένη, είτ' έπανιοῦσα πάλιν, θεωρεί τῷ ἀπολει-36 φθέντι αὐτῆς μέρει ή δὲ στασα ἐν αὐτη ήττον τούτο ποιεί. Διὸ ὁ σπουδαίος λελόγισται ήδη καὶ τὸ παρ' αύτοῦ πρὸς ἄλλον ἀποφαίνει πρὸς δὲ αύτον όψις. "Ηδη γάρ ούτος προς το έν καὶ πρός τὸ ήσυχον οὐ μόνον τῶν ἐξω, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς αὐτόν, 40 καὶ πάντα εἴοω.

7. "Οτι μὲν οὖν πάντα τά τε ὡς ἀληθῶς ὄντα ἐκ θεωρίας καὶ θεωρία, καὶ τὰ ἐξ ἐκείνων γενόμενα θεωρούντων ἐκείνωι καὶ αὐτὰ θεωρήματα, τὰ μὲν αἰσθήσει τὰ δὲ γνώσει ἢ δόξη, καὶ αἱ πράξεις τὸ τέλος ἔχουσιν εἰς γνῶσιν καὶ ἡ ἔφεσις γνώσεως 5 καὶ αἱ γεννήσεις ἀπὸ θεωρίας εἰς ἀποτελεύτησιν

1 & Theiler et nunc Henry et Schwyzer: ov codd., H.S.

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something else. For it is not full, but has some thing wanting in relation to what comes before it; yet it itself sees also quietly what it utters. For it does not go on uttering what it has uttered well already, but what it utters, it utters because of its deficiency, with a view to examining it, trying to learn thoroughly what it possesses. But in men of action the soul fits what it possesses to the things outside it. And because the soul possesses its content more completely it is quieter than nature, and because it has a greater content it is more contemplative; but because it does not have perfect possession it desires to learn more thoroughly what it has con templated and gain a fuller contemplation, which comes from examining it. And when it leaves itself and comes to be among other things, and then returns again, it contemplates with the part of itself it left behind; but the soul at rest in .tself does this less., The truly good and wise man, therefore, has already finished reasoning when he declares what he has in himself to another; but in relation to himself he is vision. For he is already turned to what is one, and to the quiet which is not only of things outside but in relation to h.mself, and all is within him.

7. That all things come from contemplation and are contemplation, both the things which truly exist and the things which come from them when they contemplate and are themselves objects of contemplation, some by sense-perception and some by knowledge or opinion; and that actions have their goal in knowledge and their driving force is desire of knowledge; and that the products of contemplation are directed to the perfecting of another form and object

είδους καὶ θεωρήματος ἄλλου, καὶ ὅλως μιμήματα όντα έκαστα τών ποιούντων θεωρήματα ποιεί καὶ elly, kat at subjected becarbacts juinaries buren οθσαι ποιοθντα δείκνισι τέλος ποιούμενα οὐ τὰς ποιήσεις οίδε τὰς πράξεις, ἀλλά τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα 10 ίνα θεωρηθή, καὶ τοῦτο καὶ αἱ διανοήσεις ίδεῖν θέλουσι και έτι πρότερον αί αλοθήσεις, αίς τέλος ή γνώσις, καὶ ἔτι πρὸ τούτων ή φύσις τὸ θεώρημα τὸ ἐν αὐτῆ καὶ τὸν λόγον ποιεῖ ἄλλον λόγον άποτελούσα τὰ μέν ην αὐτόθεν λαβείν, τὰ δ' ύπέμνησεν ὁ λόγος-δηλόν που. Ἐπεὶ κάκεῖνο 15 δήλου, ώς άναγκαῖον ήν τῶν πρώτων ἐν θεωρία ουτων και τα άλλα πάντα εφίσοθαι τούτου, είπερ τέλος ἄπασιν ή ἀρχή. Ἐπεὶ καί, ὅταν τὰ ζῷα γεννά, οἱ λόγοι ἔνδον ὅντες κινοῦσι, καὶ ἔστιν 20 ενέργεια θεωρίας τοῦτο καὶ ώδὶς τοῦ πολλά ποιείν είδη καὶ πολλά θεωρήματα καὶ λόγων πλη: ρώσαι πάντα καὶ οίον ἀεὶ θεωρείν τὸ γὰρ ποιείν είναι τι είδος έστι ποιείν, τούτο δέ έστι πάντα πληρωσαι θεωρίας. Και αι άμαρτίαι δέ, αι τε έν τοίς γινομένοις αί τε έν τοίς πραττομένοις, θεωρούντων είσιν έκ τοῦ θεωρητοῦ παραφορά. 28 καὶ ο γε κακός τεχυίτης ἔοικεν αλοχρά εἴδη

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of contemplation; and that in general all active things, which are representations, make objects of contemplation and forms; and that the realities which have come into existence, which are representations of real beings, show that their makers had as their goal in making, not makings or actions, but the finished object of contemplation; and that this is what processes of reasoning want to see, and, even before them, acts of sense perception, whose goal is knowledge; and that before them again nature makes the object of contemplation and the rational principle in itself, perfecting another rational principle; all these points are, I suppose, clear—some of them were self-evident, and the discussion brought others to mind. What follows, too, is clear; that it was necessary, since the first principles were engaged in contemplation, for all other things to aspire to this state, granted that their originative principle is, for all things, the goal. For when living things, too, produce, it is the rational principles within which move them, and this is an activity of contemplation, the birthpain of creating many forms and many things to contemplate and filling all things with rational principles, and a kind of endless contemplation, for creating is bringing a form into being, and this is filling all things with contemplation. And failures, too, both in what comes into being and what is done, are failures of contemplators who are distracted from their object of contemplation; and the bad workman is the sort of person who makes ugly

Nicomachean Ethics A.3, 1095a5; Z.2, 1139a21-b4; A.10, 1179a35 ff.), and makes the whole kfe, not only of man but the universe, philosophy in Aristotle's sense.

¹ This is one of the fundamental principles of Greek philosophical thought, here given a special application. By making $\theta \epsilon \omega s a$ the end of all perception and action P ctimus abolishes, no doubt consciously and deliberately, Aristotle's distinction between $\pi \rho a \kappa \tau \kappa \dot{\eta}$ and $\theta \epsilon \omega \rho \eta \tau \kappa \dot{\eta}$ enoring or $\delta \omega \nu \omega a$ (op.

ποιούντι. Καὶ οἱ ἐρώντες δὲ ἰδόντων καὶ πρός είδος σπευδόντωι.

8. Ταθτα μέν ούτιο Της δε θεωρίας αναβαινούσης έκ της φύσεως έπὶ ψυχήν καὶ άπὸ ταύτης είς νοθν καὶ ἀεὶ οἰκειοτέρων τῶν θεωριῶν γιγνομένων και ένου, ένων τοις θεωρούσι και έπι της 5 σπουδαίας ψυχής πρός τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ ὑποκειμένω ίοντων των έγνωσμένων άτε είς νούν σπευδόντων, ἐπὶ τούτου δηλονότι ήδη εν ἄι φω οὐκ οἰκειώσει, ώσπερ έπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς - ῆς ἀρίστης, ἀλλ' οδοία καὶ τῶ ταὐτὸν τὸ είναι καὶ τὸ νοεῖν είναι. Οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ἄλλο, τὸ δ' ἄλλο· πάλω γὰρ αὖ ἄλλο 10 έσται, ὁ οὐκέτι ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο. Δεῖ οὖν τοῦτο είναι έν όντως άμφα. τοῦτο δέ έστι θεωρία ζώσα, οὐ θεώρημα οἷοι τὸ ἐν ἄλλω. Τὸ γὰρ ἐν ἄλλω ζωι δι' έκεωο, ούκ αὐτοζων. Εὶ οὖν ζήσεταί τι θεώρημα καὶ νόημα, δει αὐτοζωὴν είναι οὐ φυτικήν οὐδὲ αἰσθητικήν οὐδὲ ψυχικήν την ἄλλην. Νοήσεις μέν γάρ πως και άλλαι άλλ' ή μέν 16 φυτική ιόησις, ή δε αλπθητική, ή δε ψυχική Πως ούν νοήσεις; "Οτι λόγοι. Καὶ πάσα ζωή νόησίς τις, άλλὰ ἄλλη ἄλλης ἀμυδροτέρα, ὥσπερ

1 ζων h'èsche, Dodds ζων σ, Kirchhoff H.S. ζωνσ, Cr, codices inter ζών π et ζώνπ non distinguint,

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forms. And lovers, too, are among those who see and press on eagerly towards a form.

8. This, then, is so. But, as contemplation ascends from nature to soul, and soul to intellect, and the contemplations become always more intimate and united to the contemplators, and in the soul of the good and wise man the objects known tend to become identical with the knowing subject, since they are pressing on towards intellect, it is clear that in intellect both are one, not by becoming akin, as in the best soul, but substantially, and because "thinking and being are the same" 1. For there is not still one thing and another, for if there is, there will be something else again, which is not any more one thing and another. So this must be something where both are really one. But this is living contemplation, not an object of contemplation like that in something else. For that which is in something else is alive because of that other, not in its own right.2 If, then, an object of contemplation and thought is to have life, it must be life in its own right [absolute and unqualified life], not the life of growth or sense-perception or that which belongs to the rest of the soul For the other lives are thoughts in a way, but one is a growth-thought, one a sense-thought, and one a soul-thought. How, then, are they thoughts? Because they are rational principles. And every life is a thought, but one is dimmer than another, just as life [has degrees of clarity and strength].

¹ Plotinus is here alluding to Parmenides fr. B3DK, which he quotes accurately at V. 1 10 8, 17, and uses explicitly, as he does here impactly, in support of his doctrine that the intelligible objects are not outside intellect.

² Like E. R. Dodds (art. oit, p. 111) I can make no sense of εκεινο with the received text, and therefore follow him in reading ζῶν δι ἐκεῖνο for ζῶν τι ἐκεῖνο, which gives a good and appropriate sense

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καὶ ζωή. Ἡ δὲ ἐναργεστέρα ¹ αὖτη καὶ πρώτη ζωὴ καὶ πρώτος νοῦς εἶς. Νόησις οὖν ἡ πρώτη ζωὴ καί ζωή δευτέρα νόησις δευτέρα και ή έσχάτη 20 ζωη ἐσγάτη νόησις. Πάσα οὖν ζωὴ τοῦ γένους τούτου καὶ νόησις. 'Αλλὰ ζωῆς μέν ἴσως διαφοράς τάχ' ἂν λέγοιεν δο ἄνθρωποι, νοήσεων δε οὐ λέγουσιν, άλλα τας μέν, τας δ' όλως οὐ νοήσεις, ότι όλως τὴν ζωὴν ὅ τι ποτέ ἐστιν οὐ ζητοῦσιν. 'Αλλ' 25 ἐκείνό γε ἐπισημαντέον, ὅτι πάλιν αδ ὁ λόγος πάρεργον ενδείκνυται θεωρίας τὰ πάντα όντα. Εί τοίνυν ή ζωή ή άληθεστάτη νοήσει ζωή έστιν, αΰτη δέ ταὐτὸν τῆ άληθεστάτη νοήσει, ή άληθεστάτη νόησις ξή καὶ ή θεωρία καὶ το θεώρημα τὸ τοιούτο ζων καὶ ζωή καὶ έν όμου τὰ δύο. "Εν 30 οὖν ὂν τὰ δύο πῶς αὖ πολλὰ τοῦτο τὸ ἔν; "Η ὅτι ούχ ει θεωρεί "Επεί και όταν τὸ ει θεωρη ούχ ώς έν εί δε μή, οὐ γίνεται νούς. 'Αλλά ἀρξάμενος ώς εν ούν ώς ήρξατο εμεινεν, άλλ' ελαθεν έαιτον πολύς γενόμενος, οίον βεβαρημένος, καὶ έξείλιξεν 35 αὐτὸν πάντα ἔχειν θέλων—ώς βέλτιον ἢν αὐτώ μή έθελήσαι τουτο, δεύτερον γάρ έγενετο-οίον γάρ κύκλος έξελίξας αὐτὸν γέγονε καὶ σχήμα

èvapyearépa, Ficinus, H S èvepyearépa codd.
 λέγοιο Malier, H S: λέγοιμεν codd

¹ For the doctrme that Intellect in its contemplation of the One necessarily sees it as many and so becomes a multiplicity in-unity, ep. V 3[49]11 VI. 7[38]15. The view, however,

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But this life is clearer; this is first life and first incellect in one. So the first life is thought, and the second life thought in the second degree and the last life thought in the last degree. All life, then, belongs to this kind and is thought. But perhaps men may speak of different kinds of life, but do not speak of different kinds of thought but say that some are thoughts, but others not thoughts at all, because they do not investigate at all what kind of thing life is. But we must bring out this point, at any rate, that again our discussion shows that al, things are a hyproduct of contemplation. If, then, the truest life is life by thought, and is the same thing as the truest thought, then the truest thought lives, and contemp lation, and the object of contemplation at this level, is living and life, and the two together are one. So, if the two are one, how is this one many? Because what it contemplates is not one. For when it contemplates the One, it does not contemplate it as one: 1 otherwise it would not become intellect. But beginning as one it did not stay as it began, but, without noticing it, became many, as if heavy [with drunken sleep], and unrolled itself necause it wanted to possess everything how much better it would have been for it not to want this, for it became the second! for it became like a circle unrolling itself,

taken here of the generation of Intellect as a fall due to the desire for self-expression on a lower plane (cp. 1-34-36) is unusual for Plotinus in its pessimistic tone. Though Intellect is for him always inferior to the One he usually thinks and speaks of it as altogether good and does not emphasise that its generation is a fall or declension, as he does in speaking of the generation of Soul from Intellect (cp., e.g., III 7 [45] 11)

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καὶ ἐπίπεδου καὶ περιφέρεια καὶ κέντρου καὶ γραμμαὶ καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄνω, τὰ δὲ κάτω βελτία μὲν δθεν, χείρω δὲ εἰς ὅ. Τὸ γὰρ εἰς ὅ¹ οὐκ ἦυ 40 τοιοῦτον οἷον τὸ ἀφ' οῦ καὶ εἰς ὅ, οἰδ' αῦ τὸ ἀφ' οῦ καὶ εἰς ὅ, οἰδ' αῦ τὸ ἀφ' οῦ καὶ εἰς ὁ οῦν τὸ ἀφ' οῦ μόνον. Καὶ ἄλλως δὲ ὁ νοῦς οὐχ ἐνός τινος νοῦς, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάς πας δὲ ῶν καὶ πάντων. Δεῖ οὖν αὐτὸν πάντα ὅντα καὶ πάντων καὶ τὸ μέρος αὐτοῦ ἔχειν πῶν καὶ πάντα εἰ δὲ μή, ἔξει τι μέρος οὐ νοῦν, καὶ συγκείσεται ἐξ 45 οὐ νῶν, καὶ σωρος τις συμφορητὸς ἔσται ἀναμένων τὸ γειέοθαι νοῦς ἐκ πάντωι. Διὸ καὶ ἄπειρος οῦτως καί, εἴ τι ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, οὐκ ἡλάττωται, οῦτε τὸ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ὅτο πάντα καὶ αὐτό, οῦτε ἐκεῦνος ὁ ἐξ οὖ ὅτι μὴ σύνθεσις ἦν ἐκ μορίων.

9. Οδτος μεν οῦν τοιοῦνος διο οὐ πρώτος, ἀλλὰ δεῖ εἶναι τὸ ἐπέκεινα αὐτοῦ, οὖπερ χάριν καὶ οἱ πρόσθεν λόγοι, πρώτον μέν, ὅτι πλῆθος ένὸς ὕστερον καὶ ἀμιθμὸς δὲ οὖτος, ἀριθμοῦ δὲ ἀρχὴ 5 καὶ τοῦ τοιούτου τὸ ἔντως ² ἔν καὶ οὖτος νοῦς καὶ νοητὸν ἄμα, ὤστε δύο ἄμα. Εὶ δὲ δυο, δεῖ τὸ πρὸ τοῦ δύο λαβεῖν. Τί οδν, Νοῖς μόνον, ᾿Αλλὰ παντὶ νῷ σινέζευκται τὸ νοητόν εἰ οὖν δεῦ μὴ συνεζεῦχθαι τὸ νοητόν, οὐδὲ νοῦς ἔσται. Εὶ οὖν μὴ νοῦς, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκφεύζεται τὰ δύο, τὸ πρότερον τῶν

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shape and surface and circumference and centre and radii, some parts above and some below. The better is the "whence," the worse the "whither." For the " whither " is not of the same kind as the " whenceand-whither," nor, again, the " whence and-whither " the same kind as the "whence by itself. And, to put it another way, Intellect is not the intellect of one individual, but is universal; and being universal, is the Intel ect of all things. So, if it is universal and of all things, its part must possess everything and all things: otherwise it will have a part which is not intellect, and will be composed of non intellects, and will be a heap casually put together waiting to become an intellect made up of all things. Therefore, too, it is unbounded in this way and, if anything comes from it, there is no diminution, neither of what comes from it, because it, too, is all things, nor of that from which it comes, because it is not something made out of pieces put together.

9. This, then, is what Intellect is like: and for this reason it is not the first, but what is beyond it must exist (that to which our discussion has been leading) first of all, because multiplicity comes after unity; and Intellect is a number, but the principle of number, of this kind of number too, is that which is really one; and it is intellect and intelligible at one, so that it is two things at once. But if it is two, one must understand what comes before the two. What is it, then? Intellect only? But with every intellect its intelligible is coupled; if, then, it must not have its intelligible coupled with it, it will not be intellect. If, then it is not intellect, and is going to get out beyond the two, that which comes before

¹ εls δ Dodds, H-S2: ἀφ' δι codd.
2 δυτως Kirchhoff, οὐτως codd

¹ Cp. Plato, Republic 509B9.

ο άγνοησει και εαυτο· ωστε τι σεμνον; Ουδέ γάρ, εἰ λέγοιμεν τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ ἁπλούστατον εἶναι, δῆλόν τι και σαφὲς ἐροῦμεν τὸ ἀληθὲς λέγοντες, ἔως ἄν μὴ ἔχωμεν ἐπὶ τί ἐρείδοντες τὴν διάνοιαν λέγομεν. Καὶ γὰρ αὖ τῆς γνώσεως διὰ νοῦ τῶν ἄλλων γινομένης καὶ τῷ νῷ νοῦν γινώσκειν

20 δυναμένων ὑπερβεβηκὸς τοῦτο τὴι νοῦ φύσιν τινι ἄν ἀλίσκοιτο ἐπιβολῆ ἀθρόᾳ; Πρὸς ὅι δεῦ σημῆναι, ὅπως οἰόν τε, τῳ ἐι ἡμιν ὁμοίῳ φήσομεν. "Εστι γάρ τι καὶ παρ' ἡμῖν αὐτοῦ· ἡ οἰκ ἔστιν, ὅπου μὴ ἔστιν, οῖς ἐστι μετέχειν αὐτοῦ. Τὸ γὰρ πανταχοῦ

26 παρύν στήσας 1 όπουσθν τό δυνάμενον έχειν έχεις έκείθεν ώσπερ εί φωνής κατεχούσης έρημίαν ή καὶ μετὰ τής έρημίας καὶ ἀνθρώπους έν ότωοθν τοθ έρήμου στήσας οδς τὴν φωνήν κομιεῖ πῶσων καὶ αδ οὐ πῶσων. Τί οδν ἐστιν ὅ κομιοθμεθα νοθν ταραστησάμενοι, "Η δεῖ τὸν νοθν σίον εἰς τοδτίσω

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these two must be beyond intellect. What then, prevents it from being the intelligible? The fact that the intelligible also is coupled with intellect If, then, it is neither intellect nor intelligible, what can it be? We shall assert that it is that from which Intellect and the intelligible with it come. What, then, is this, and what kind of thing shall we imagine it to be? For certainly it will be either a thinking being or something unthinking. Welt, if it is thinking it wil be an intellect, but if it is unthinking, it will be ignorant even of itself: so what will be grand about it? For even if we say that it is the Good and absolutely simple, we shall not be saying anything clear and distinct, even though we are speaking the truth, as long as we do not have anything on which to base our reasoning when we speak. For, again, since knowledge of other things comes to us from intellect, and we are able to know intellect by intellect, by what sort of simple intuition could one grasp this which transcends the nature of intellect? We shall say to the person to whom we have to explain how this is possible, that it is by the likeness in ourselves. For there is something of it in us too; or rather there is nowhere where it is not, in the things which can participate in it. For, wherever you are, it is from this that you have that which is everywhere present, by setting to 't that which can have it; just as if there was a voice filling an empty space, or with the empty space, men too, and by setting yourself to listen at any point in the empty space, you will receive the whole voice, and yet not the whole. What is it, then, which we shall receive when we set our intellect to it? Rather, the intellect

^{&#}x27; το codd.: τὰ Kirchhoff, Η δ': παρόν στήσας Theiler: παραστήσας codd., Η-δ'. το γὰο παιταχοῦ παρόν στήσας nunc Henry et Schwyzer

35 έστι καὶ πάντα ακριβώς καὶ σὖχ όλοσχερώς ἔχει ἀτελώς γὰρ ἄν καὶ ἀδιαρθρώτως ἔχοι—ἔκ τινος ἄλλου αὐτὸν εἶναι, ὁ οὐκέτι ἐι διεξόδω, ἀλλὰ ἀρχὴ διεξόδου καὶ ἀρχὴ ζωῆς καὶ ἀρχὴ νοῦ καὶ τῶν

40 πάντων. Ο θ γαρ ἀρχή τὰ πάντα, ἀλλ' εξ ἀρχής τὰ πάντα, αὕτη δὲ οὐκέτι τὰ πάντα οἰδέ τι τῶν πάντων, ἴνα γεννήση τὰ πάντα, καὶ ἵνα μὴ πλήθος ἢ, ἀλλὰ τοῦ πλήθους ἀρχή τοῦ γὰρ γεννηθέντος πανταχοῦ τὸ γεννῶν ἀπλούστερον Εἰ οῦν τοῦτο νοῦν ἐγέννησεν, ἀπλούστεροι νοῦ δεῦ αὐτὸ εἶναι.

45 Εἰ δέ τις οἴοιτο αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν καὶ τὰ πάντα εἶναι, ήτοι καθ' ἐν ἔκαστον τῶν πάντων ἐκεῖνο ἔσται ἢ ὁμοῦ πάντα. Εἰ μὲν οὖν ὁμοῦ πάντα σινηθροισμένα, ὕστερον ἔσται τῶν πάντων· εἰ δὲ πρότερον τῶν πάντων, ἄλλα μὲν τὰ πάντα, ἄλλο δὲ αὐτὸ ἔσται τῶν πάνταν· εἰ δε ἄμα καὶ αὐτὸ καὶ τὰ 50 πάντα, οὐκ ἄρχὴ ἔσται. Δεῖ δὲ αὐτο ἀρχὴν εἶναι

 1 какеї Kırchhoff, H-S-: какеїva codd . † какеїva H S².

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must return, so to speak, backwards, and give itself up, in a way, to what lies behind it (for it faces in both directions); and there, if it wishes to see that First Principle, it must not be altogether intellect. For it is the first life, since it is an activity manifest in the way of outgoing of all things; outgoing not in the sense that it is now in process of going out but that it has gone out. If, then, it is life and outgoing and holds all things distinctly and not in a vague general way for [in the latter case] it would hold them imperfectly and marticulately -it must itself derive from something else, which is no more in the way of outgoing, but is the origin of outgoing and the origin of life and the origin of intellect and all things. For all things [together, the total ty of being] are not an origin, but they came from an origin, and this is no more all things, or one of them; 1 [if it is, it will not be of such a kind | that it can generate all things, and not be a multiplicity, but the origin of multiplicity; for that which generates is always simpler than that which is generated. If this, then, generated Intellect, it must be simpler than Intellect. But if anyone should think that the One itself is also all things, then either it will be each one taken separately or all of them together. If, then, it is all of them collected together, it will be posterior to all things; but if it is prior to al, things, all things will be other than it, and it will be other than all things, but if it and all things are simultaneous, then it will not be an origin. But it must be an origin, and exist before

Platonists who accepted the identification of the totality of being with Intellect, but did not see the need for the transcendent Onc

¹ Plotinus could hardly make it clearer than he does in this passage that he is not a parthest. He is arguing here either against the Stoics, for whom the visible universe was both the totality of being and the supreme unity and divinity, or against

καὶ είναι πρὸ πάντων, ἴνα ἡ μετ' αὐτὸ καὶ τὰ πάντα. Τὸ δὲ καθ' ἔκαστοι τῶν πάντων πρῶτον μὲν τὸ αὐτὸ ἔσται ὁτιοῦν ὁτιροῦν, ἔπειτα ὁμοῦ πάντα, καὶ οὐδὲν διακρινεῖ. Καὶ οὕτως οὐδὲι τῶν πάντων, ἀλλὰ πρὸ τῶν πάντων.

10. Τί δη όν; Δύναμος των πάντων ής μη ούσης οὐδ' ἄν τὰ πάντα, οὐδ' ἄν νοῦς ζωή ή πρώτη καὶ πάσα. Τὸ δὲ ὑπὲρ τὴν ζωὴν αἴτιον ζωής οὐ γὰρ ή της ζωής ἐνέργεια τὰ πάντα οδσα πρώτη, άλλ' ὤσπερ προχυθείσα αὐτὴ οίον 5 έκ πηγής. Νόησον γάρ πηγήν άρχην άλλην οὐκ ἔχουσαν, δοῦσαν δὲ ποταμοῖς πᾶσαν 1 αὐτήν, ούκ άναλωθείσαν τοίς ποταμοίς, άλλά μένουσαν αθτήν ήσύχως, τους δε εξ αθτής προεληλυθότας πρίν άλλον άλλη ρείν όμου συνόντας έτι, ήδη δέ οδον έκάστους είδότας οδ άφήσουσην αὐτών τὰ 10 βεύματα: η ζευήν φυτοῦ μεγίστου διὰ παντός έλθουσαν άρχης μενούσης και ού σκεδασθεισης περί πῶν αὐτῆς οἶον ἐν ρίζη ίδρυμένης. Αὕτη τοίνυν παρέσχε μέν την πάσαν ζωήν τῷ φυτῷ την πολλήν, έμεινε δε αὐτή οὐ πολλή οὖσα, ἀλλ' ἀρχή της πολλης. Και θαθμα ούδέν. "Η και θαθμα, πως το πλήθος της ζωής έξ ου πλήθους ήν, και 15 οὐκ ἦν τὸ πληθος, εἰ μὴ τὸ προ τοῦ πλήθους ἦν δ μή πλήθος ήν. Οὐ γαρ μερίζεται είς το παν ή

1 πάσαν Mras et nunc Henry et Schwyzer: πάσω codd. H-S.

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all things, in order that all things, too, may exist after it. But as for its being each one taken separ ately, first, any one of them will be the same as any other, then all will be confounded together and there will be no distinction [between them]. And so it is not one of all things, but is before all things.

10. What is it, then? The productive power of all things; 1 if it did not exist, neither would all things, nor would Intellect be the first and universal life. But what is above life is cause of life; for the activity of life, which is all things, is not first, but itself flows out, so to speak, as if from a spring. For think of a spring which has no other origin, but gives the whole of itself to rivers, and is not used up by the rivers but remains itself at rest, but the rivers that rise from it. before each of them flows in a different direction, remain for a while all together, though each of them knows, in a way, the direction in which it is going to let its stream flow; or of the life of a huge plant, which goes through the whole of it while its origin remains and is not dispersed over the whole, since it is, as it were, firmly settled in the root. So this origin gives to the plant its whole life in its multiplicity, but remains itself not multiple but the origin of the multiple life. And this is no wonder. Or, yes, it is a wonder how the multiplicity of life came from what is not multiplicity, and the multiplicity would not have existed, if what was not multiplicity had not existed before the multiplicity. For the origin is not divided up into the All, for if it were divided up

Arisopelia, sense, 17.8 (acher as translated here)' productive power," supremely active, not passive, a formlessness productive of forms, not a formlessness which submits to forms

¹ For the application of the word δύωμις to the One as principle of all things, cp. IV. 8 [6] 6. 11, and VI 9 [9] 5. 36 It should not be misunderstood as meaning "potentiality" in the

11. "Ετι δὲ καὶ ώδε: ἐπεὶ γὰρ ὁ νοῦς ἐστιν ὅ,μες τις καὶ ὅψις ὁρῶσα. δύναμις ἔσται εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἐλθοῦσα. "Εσται τοίνων τὸ μεν ὅλη, τὸ δὲ εἶδος αὐτοῦ—[οἶον καὶ ἡ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ὅρασις]2—

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it would destroy the All too; and the All could not any more come into being if the origin did not remain by itself, different from it. Therefore, too, we go back everywhere to one. And in each and every thing there is some one to which you will trace it back, and this in every case to the one before it, which is not simply one, until we come to the simply one; but this cannot be traced back to something else. But if we take the one of the plant—this is its abiding origin and the one of the animal and the one of the soul and the one of the universe, we are taking in each case what is most powerful and really valuable in it; but if we take the one of the beings which truly exist, their origin and spring and productive power, shall we lose faith and think of it as nothing? It is certainly none of the things of which it is origin; it is of such a kind, though nothing can be predicated of it, not being, not substance, not life, as to be above all of these things. But if you grasp it by taking away being from it, you will be filled with wonder. And, throwing yourself upon it and coming to rest within it, understand it more and more intimately, knowing it by intuition and seeing its greatness by the things which exist after it and through it.1

11. And again, consider it this way, for since Intellect is a kind of sight, and a sight which is seeing, it will be a potency which has come into act. So there will be a distinction of matter and form in it, but the matter will be [the kind that

¹ dros abroû H.S. dros abroû codd , H.S. dros savroû Dodds.

² alov . . . őpasis del. Theiler et nine Henry et Schwyzer.

¹ The repeated our—in this sentence defies translation—it suggests the intimate presence of the One both with the Forms which spring from it and the contemplating mind.

δύλη δὲ ἐν νοητοῖς. ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡ ὅρασις ἡ κατ' ει έργειαν διττον έχει πρίν γοιν ίδειν ήν εν. Τὸ οδυ εν δύο γέγονε και τὰ δύο έν. Τῆ μεν οδυ όράσει ή πλήρωσις παρά τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ καὶ ή οἶον τελείωσις, τη δέ τοῦ νοῦ ὄψει τὰ ἀγαθὸν τὸ πληρούν. Εί γάρ αὐτὸς τὸ ἀγαθόν, τί ἔδει δράν 10 ή ένεργείν όλως; 1 ά μέν γάρ άλλα περί τὸ άγαθοι καὶ διὰ τὸ άγαθον ἔχει τὴν ἐνέργειαν, τὸ δε αγαθόν οὐδενός δείται διό οὐδεν εστιν αὐτώ η αδιύ. Φθεγζάμενος αδν ο άγαθον μηδέν έις προσυόει εάν γάρ τι προσθής, ή προσέθηκας ότιοθν, ενδεες ποιήσεις. Διο οιδε το νοείν, ίνα μη 15 καὶ ἄλλο, καὶ ποιήσης δύο, νοῦν καὶ ἀγαθόν 'Ο μέν γὰρ νοῦς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν οἱ δείται · ἐκείνου· ὅθεν καὶ τυγχάνων τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀγαθοειδὲς γίνεται καὶ τελειούται παρά τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, τοῦ μέν είδους του έπ' αὐτώ παρά του άγαθου ήκοντος άγαθοειδή ποιούντος. Οίον δὲ ἐνορᾶται ἐπ' αὐτῷ 20 έγνος του άγαθου, τοιούτον το άρχέτυπον έννοείν προσήκει το άληθινον δικείνου δυθυμηθέντα δικ του δπί τῷ τῷ ἐπιθέοντος ἔχνους. Τὸ μὲν οὖι ἐπ' αὐτοῦ ἔχνος αύτοθ τῷ νῷ ὁρῶντι ἔδωκεν ἔχειν. ὥστε ἐν μὲν τώ τώ ή έφεσες και εφεέμενος άει και άει το χχάνων, έκεῖ(νος) δε οὖτε εφιέμενος τίνος γάρ;-25 ούτε τυγγάνων οὐδε γάρ εφίετο. Οὐ τοίνυν

 $^{-1}$ ekeî(205) l'heiler et nanc Henry et Schwyzer. exeî codd., H S

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exists in] the intelligible world: 1 since actual seeing, too, has a doubleness in it, it was, certainly, one before seeing. So the one has become two and the two one. For seeing, then, fulfilment and a kind of completion comes from the object perceived, but it is the Good which brings fulfilment to the sight of Intellect. For if it was itself the Good, why would it have to see, or to be active at all? For other things have their activity about the Good and because of the Good, but the Good needs nothing: therefore it has nothing but itself. Therefore, when you have said "The Good" do not add anything to it in your mind, for if you add anything, you will make it deficient by whatever you have added. Therefore you must not even add thinking, in order that you may not add something other than it and make two. intellect and good. For Intellect needs the Good. but the Good does not need it; hence, too when it attains the Good it becomes conformed to the Good 2 and is completed by the Good, since the form which comes upon it from the Good conforms it to the Good. A trace of the Good is seen in it, and it is in the likeness of this that one should conceive its true archetype, forming an idea of it in oneself from the trace of it which plays upon Intellect. The Good, therefore has given the trace of itself on Intellect to In tellect to have by seeing, so that in Intellect there is desire, and it is always desiring and always attaining, but the Good is not desiring for what could it desire?-or attaining, for it did not desire [to attain anything]. So it is not even Intellect.

² Op. Republic 509A3.

¹ For matter in the intelligible world, cp. II. 4 [12] 3-5.

PLOTINUS: ENNEAD III. 8.

ούδε νούς. "Εφεσις γάρ και εν τούτω και σύννευσις προς τὸ είδος αὐτοῦ. Τοῦ δὴ νοῦ καλοῦ ὄντος καὶ σάντων καλλίστου, εν φωτί καθαρώ και αύγθ καθαρά κεμένου καὶ τὴν τῶν ὅντων περιλαβόντος φύσιν, οδ καὶ δ καλὸς οδτος κόσμος σκιὰ καὶ εἰκών, καὶ ἐν πάση ἀγλαία κειμένου, ὅτι μηδὲν 30 ανόητον μηδέ σκοτεινόν μηδ' αμετρον έν αὐτώ, ζώντος ζωήν μακαρίαν, θάμβος μέν αν έχοι τον ίδόντα καὶ τοῦτον καὶ ώς χρη εἰς αὐτὸν εἰσδύντα καὶ αὐτῷ 1 γενόμενον ενα. 'Ως δή ό ἀναβλέψας είς τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὸ τῶν ἄστρων φέγγος ἰδὼν 35 τον ποιήσαντα ενθυμείται καὶ ζητεί, ούτω χρή καὶ του νοητου κόσμου δε εθεόσατο και ενείδε και εθαύμασε τὸν κἀκείνου ποιητήν τίς ἄρα ὁ τοιοῦτον ύποστήσας ζητείν, [η ποῦ] 2 η πως, ό τοιοῦτον παίδα γεννήσας νοθν, κόρον καλόν καὶ παρ' αὐτοθ γενόμενον κόρον. Πάντως τοι ούτε νους εκείνος 40 οὖτε κόρος, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸ νοῦ καὶ κόρου μετὰ γὰρ αὐτὸν νοῦς καὶ κόρος, δεηθέντα και κεκορέσθαι καὶ νενοηκέναι ά πλησίον μέν έστι τοῦ ἀνενδεοῦς καὶ τοῦ νοείν οὐδεν δεομένου, πλήρωσιν δε άληθινήν καὶ νόησιν έχει, ότι πρώτως έχει. Τὸ δὲ πρὸ αὐτών οὖτε δείται οὖτε έχει. ἡ οὐκ αν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ήν.

air@ Dodds, H S²: airo@codd.
 n ποῦ del. Dodds, H S².

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For in Intellect there is desire and a movement to convergence with its form. Intellect is, cer tainly, beautiful, and the most beautiful of all; its place is in pure light and pure radiance and it includes the nature of real beings; this beautiful universe of ours is a shadow and image of it; and it has its place in all glory, because there is nothing unintelligent or dark or unmeasured in it, and it lives a blessed life; so wonder would possess him 2 who saw this too, and, as he should, entered it and became one with it. As certainly, one who looks up to the sky and sees the light of the stars thinks of their maker and seeks him, so the man who has contemplated the intelligible world and observed it closely and wondered at it must seek its maker, too, and enquire who it is who has brought into being something like this, and how, he who produced a son like Intellect, a beautiful boy filled full from himself? He is most certainly neither Intellect nor fullness, but before Intellect and fullness. For Intellect and fullness came after him; they needed to come into their fulfilment and intelligence; they are near to that which needs nothing and has no necessity to think, but have true fufilment and true thinking, because they have them at first hand. But that which is before them neither needs nor has; or it would not be the Good

Phaedrus 250C4.

² An oddly mappropriate verbal reminiscence of *Hiad* III. 342.

⁸ There is an untranslateable word play here on κόρος (boy) and κόρος (satiety, funces).

III. 9. VARIOUS CONSIDERATIONS

Introductory Note

This odd little collection of notes (No. 13 in Porphyry's chronological order, but the numbering must be quite arbitrary: the notes are unlikely all to have been written at accord the same time), which Purplyry found among his master's papers and put together to make a ninth " treatise" to complete his Third Ennead, on the whole adds httle to our understanding of the thought of Plotinus. They are quite disconnected, and each of them deals with a point discussed more fully elsewhere in the Enneads. The first and longest is, however, of some interest. In it we find Plotinus reflecting on a problem much discussed in his school, that of the relationship of Intellect to the Forms. which arises in the interpretation of Timaeus 39E 7-9. And in the course of his discussion of it (l. 15 ff.) he appears to be considering with some sympathetic interest the posability of a subdivision of Intellect very like that which is reported to have been taught by Amelius,1 and which he decisively rejects in his treatise Against the Gnostics: 2 he certainly does not, however, commit himself to this, and at the end of the note seems to be putting forward his usual view that there are three, and only three, hypostases without subdivisions.

Synopsis

The correct interpretation of *Tunaeus* 39E. 7-9: does it require a subdivision of Intellect, or can we interpret it in

Proclus, In Tim. I. 306 1-3.
II. 9 [33] 1.25 ff.

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terms of a single Intellect and Soul? (Note 1) We must unite ourselves as subjects of study are united in one discipline and direct our united selves to the higher world (Note 2). Universal Soul is not in place and unmoving, but individuals move and change, in a sense and in so doing make their bodily images (Note 3). The One is everywhere and nowhere (Note 4). The soul is matter in relation to Intellect (Note 5). Intellect at rest exists before our sef thinking (Note 6). The One is beyond motion and rest, and transcends thinking Note 7). Act and potency in compounded and uncompounded beings (Note 8). The Good does not think, and is not conscious of itself (Note 9)

ΙΙΙ. 9. (13) ΕΠΙΣΚΞΨΕΙΣ ΔΙΑΦΟΡΟΙ

1. Νοίς, φησω, όρα ἐνούσας ἰδέας ἐν τῶ ἄ έστι ζώον· είτα διενοήθη, φησίν, ό δημιουργός. α όνους όρα εν τῷ ὅ ἐστι ζῷον, καὶ τόδε τὸ πάν έχειν. Οὐκοῦν φησιν ήδη είναι τὰ είδη ποὸ 5 τοῦ νοῦ, ὄντα δὲ αὐτὰ νοεῖν τὸν νοῦν: Πρώτον οὖν ἐκείνο, λέγω δὲ τὸ ζῷον, ζητητέον εἰ μὴ νοῦς. άλλ' έτερον νοῦς τὸ γὰρ θεώμενον νοῦς τὸ τοίνον ζώον αὐτό οἱ νοῦς, ἀλλά νοητον αὐτό φήσομεν καὶ τον νούν έξω φήσομεν αὐτοῦ α όρα έχειν. Είδωλα άρα καὶ οὐ τάληθη ἔχει, εὶ ἐκεῖ τάληθη. Ἐκεῖ 10 γάρ καὶ τὴν ἀλήθειάν φησιν είναι ἐν τῷ ὅντι, οδ αὐτὸ ἔκαστοι. "Η, κᾶν ἔτερον ἐκάπερον, οὐ γωρίς άλλήλων, άλλ' ή μόνον τω έτερα. "Επειτα οὐδεν κωλύει όσον έπὶ τῷ λεγομενώ εν είναι ἄμφω, διαιρούμενα δὲ τῆ νοήσει, εἴπερ μόνον ὡς ὂν τὸ μέν νοητόν, τὸ δὲ νοοῦν ο γάρ καθορά οὔ φησιν έν έτέρω πάντως, άλλ' έν αὐτῷ τῷ ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ

1. Timaeus 39E, 7-9.

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I. "Intellect," Plate says, " sees the Ideas exist ing in the real living creature " then, he says, " the Maker planned that, what Intellect sees in the real living creature, this universe too should have.1" Does he, then, say that the Forms exist already before Intellect, and that Intellect thinks them when they [already exist's East of all, then, we must investigate that reality (I mean the living creature), to see if it is not intellect, but something other than Intellect; for that which contemplates it is Intellect; so we shall say that the living creature is not Intellect, but intelligible, and that Intellect has what it sees outside itself.2 So, then, it has images and not true realities, if the true realities are there [in the living creature]. For there, Plato says, is truth too, in real being, where each and every thing in itself is.3 Now, even if the two are different from each other, they are not separate from each other except in so far as they are different. Further, there is nothing in the statement against both being one, but distinguished by thought, though only in the sense that one is intelligible object, the other intelligent subject; for Plato does not say that what it sees is in something absolutely different, but in it,

Longinus, who made the Forms not only outside, but posterior to, the Demiurge (Proches, l.c.'

B Ct. Phaedrus 247C-E.

This view, which Potrius here and elsewhere consistently opposes, was at one time held by Porphyry (sp. Life, ch. 18, 11, and Proclus, In Tim. I 322, 22-4). It differs from that of

15 νοητον έχειν. "Η το μεν νοητόν οὐδεν κωλύει καί νούν είναι έν στάσει καὶ ένότητι καὶ ήσυχία, τὴν δέ τοῦ νοῦ φύσαν τοῦ όρωιτος ἐκεῶνον τὸι νοῦι τὸν ἐν αύτω ἐνέργειὰν τινα ἀπ' ἐκείνου, ἡ ὁρᾶ έκεῖνον: όρωντα δὲ ἐκεῖνον οῖον [ἐκεῖνον] ¹ εἶναι νοῦι έκείνου, ότι νοεί έκείνον νοούντα δὲ έκείνον καί 20 αὐτὸν νοῦν καὶ νοητὸν ἄλλως είναι τῷ μεμιμῆσθαι. Τοῦτο οὖν ἐστι τὸ "διανοηθέν," ἃ ἐκεῖ ὁρᾶ, ἐν τῷδε τῷ κόσμῳ ποιῆσαι ζώων γένη τέσσαρα. Δοκεῖ γε μήν το διανοούμενοι έπικεκρυμμένως έτερον έκείνων των δύο ποιείν. "Αλλοις δε δόξει τα τρία εν είναι, το ζώον αὐτο ο έστι, ο νοθς, το διανοού-25 μενον. "Η, ασπερ εν πολλοίς, προτείνων άλλως, δ δὲ ἄλλως νοεῖ τρια είναι. Καὶ τὰ μὲν δύο είρηται, τό δε τρίτον τί, δ διενοήθη τὰ δρώμενα ύπο του νου έν τω ζώω κείμενα αυτό έργάσασθαι και ποιήσαι καὶ μερίσαι; "Η δυνατόν τρόπον μέν άλλον τον νούν είναι τον μερίσαντα, τρόπον δέ 30 έτερον τὸν μερίσαντα μη τύν νοῦν είναι ή μέν γάρ παρ' αὐτοῦ τα μερισθέντα, αὐτον είναι τὸν μερίσαντα, ή δ' αὐτὸς ἀμέρωστος μένει, τὰ δ' ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἐστι τὰ μερισθέντι-ταῦτα δέ ἐστι ψιχαί ψυχής είναι της μερίσασας είς πολλάς ψυχάς. Διδ

ἐκεῖνον Jel. Volkmann, Η S².

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in that it has the intelligible object in itself. Or there is nothing against [this solution]; the intelligible object is also an intellect at rest and in unity and quietness, but the nature of the intellect which sees that intellect which remains within itself is an activity proceeding from it, which sees that [static] intellect; and by seeing that intellect it is in a way the intellect of that intellect, because it thinks it; but that thinking intellect itsef too is intelligent subject and intelligible object in a different way, by imitation. This, then, is that which "planned" to make in this universe the four kinds of living creatures 2 which it sees in the intelligible. Plato seems, nevertheless, to be making, obscurely, the intending principle something other than those two. But to others it will seem that the three are one, the living creature which exists in itself, the intellect, and the planning principle. Just as in many other questions, different people understand "being three" in different ways because they formulate the problem differently. We have dealt with the two, but what is the third, which "planned itself to construct and make and divide into parts the things seen by Intelect in the living creature! Now it is possible that in one way it may be Intellect that divides, but in another way the divider may not be Intellect; for in so far as the things divided into parts come from it, it is itself the divider, but in so far as it remains undivided itself, and it is the things which come from it which are divided-and these are souls-it is Soul which makes the division into many souls. This

birds, fishes and land animals, one kind for each of the elements, fire, air, water and earth.

 $^{^{1}}$ This may be a misinterpretation, or corcless reading, of Tinaeus 3007-8.

² Timaeus 39E10-40A2. The "four kinds" are gods,

καί φησι τοῦ τρίτου είναι τὸν μερισμόν καὶ ἐν τῷ 35 τρίτω, δτι διενοήθη, δ οὐ νοῦ ἔργον ή διάνοιαάλλα ψυχής μεριστήν ενέργειαν έχρυσης εν μεριστή φύσει.

2. Οίον γάρ μιᾶς ἐπιστήμης τῆς ὅλης ὁ μερισμός είς τα θεωρήματα τα καθέκαστα οὐ σκεδασθείσης ουδέ κατακερματισθείσης, έχει δέ έκαστον δυνάμει τὸ ὅλον, οὖ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀρχή καὶ τέλος, καὶ οὕτω χρή 5 παρασκευάζειν αὐτόν, ώς τὰς ἀρχὰς τὰς ἐν αὐτῷ και τέλη είναι και όλα και πάντα είς το τής φύσεως άριστον ο γενόμενός έστιν έκει τούτω γάρ τῷ ἀρίστῳ αὐτοῦ, ὅταν ἔχη, ἄψεται ἐκείνου.

3. Ἡ πᾶσα ψυχή οὐδαμοῦ ἐγένετο οὐδὲ ήλθεν. ούδε γάρ ήν όπου άλλά το σώμα γειτονήσαν μετέλαβεν αὐτῆς. διὸ οὐκ ἐν τῷ σώματι οὐδ' ὁ Πλάτων φησί που, άλλὰ τὸ σῶμα εἰς αὐτήν. Αί 5 δ' άλλαι έχουσιν όθει-άπο γαρ ψυχής-καὶ είς ό, καί κατελθείν και μετελθείν όθεν και άνελθείν. 'Η δ' ἀεὶ ἄνω ἐν ῷ πέφυκεν είναι ψυχή· τὸ δὲ έφεξης το παν, οίον το πλησίον η το ύφ' ηλίω. is the reason why Plato also says that the division belongs to the third and is in the third, because it "planned," this-planning-is not the work of Intellect, but of Soul, which has a divided activity in a divided nature,1

2. Just as one discipline which is a whole is not scattered or broken into pieces by the division into the single subjects of study, but each of these contains potentially the whole, which has the same principle and goal; in the same way, too, a man must prepare himself so that the principles in him are also his goals, and each as a whole and all together are directed to the best of his nature; when he has become this, he is there [in the higher world]; for with this best of him, when he possesses it, he will

grasp that higher reality.

3. Universal Soul did not come to be anywhere or come to any place, for there was no place; but the body came near to it and participated in it; for this reason Plato, too, does not say anywhere that it is in the body, but that the body was put into it.2 But the other souls have somewhere they come fromfor they come from [universal] Soul and somewhere to go to, and a going down and going about: consequently also a going up. But the [universal] Soul is always above, where it is natural for it to be: that which comes next to it is the All [the physical universe] both the immediately neighbouring part and that which is beneath the sun.3 The partial soul,

¹ Plotinus is here very freely interpreting Timaeus 35A. Porphry held that Soul was the Demiurge, and believed that this interpretation agreed with that of Plotinus (Proclus, In Tim. I 306. 32-307, 2); this passage gives him come support, and, though elsewhere (II. 3[52]18. 15, and V. 9[5]3. 26) Plotinus identifies the Demiurge with Intellect, he makes it clear that it is Soul which actually makes the visible universe. Intellect is only "the true demiurge and maker" in the sense that it supplies Soul with the forms according to which it

² Cp. Timaeus 36D9-E1.

² This extremely puzzling remark may possibly be meant to exclude the literal, spatial meaning of" above "and to indicate that all parts of the universe, the lower as well as the upper, are " next " to scul.

Φωτίζεται μὲν οὖν ἡ μερικὴ πρὸς τὸ πρὸ αὐτῆς φερομένη—ὅντι γὰρ ἐντυγχάνοι—cἰς δὰ τὸ μετ' αὐτὴν εἰς τὸ μὴ ὅν. Τοῦτο δὰ ποιεῖ, ὅταν πρὸς 10 αὐτήν πρὸς αὐτὴν γὰρ βουλομένη τὸ μετ' αὐτὴν ποιεῖ εἴδωλον αὐτῆς, τὸ μὴ ὅν, υἰον κενεμβατοῦσα καὶ ἀυριστοτέρα γινομένη καὶ τούτου τὸ εἴδωλον τὸ ἀόριστον πάντη σκοτεινόν ἄλογον γὰρ καὶ ἀνόητον πάντη καὶ πολὺ τοῦ ὄντος ἀποστατοῦν. 15 Εἰς δὲ τὸ μεταξύ ἐστιν ἐν τῷ οἰκείω, πάλιν δὲ ἰδοῦσα οἷον δευτέρα προοβολῆ τὸ εἴδωλον ἐμόρφωσε

καὶ ἡσθείσα ἔρχεται εἰς αὐτό.

4. Πως οὖν ἐξ ἐνὸς πλῆθος; "Οτι πανταχοῦ οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ὅπου οὖ. Πάντα οὖν πληροῦ· πολλὰ οὖν, μᾶλλον δὲ πάντα ἤδη. Αὐτὸ μὲν γὰρ εἰ μόνον πανταχοῦ, αὐτὸ ἂν ἦν τὰ πάντα· ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ οὐδαμοῦ, τὰ πάντα γίνεται μὲν διὶ αὐτόν, ὅτι 5 πανταχοῦ ἐκεῖνος, ἔτερα δὲ αὐτοῦ, ὅτι αὐτὸς οὐδαμοῦ. Διὰ τί οὖν οὐκ αὐτὸς μόνον πανταχοῦ καὶ αὐ πρὸς τούτψ καὶ οὐδαμοῦ; "Οτι δεῖ πρὸ πάντων ἐν εἶναι. Πληροῦν οὖν δεῦ αὐτὸν καὶ ποιεῖν πάντα, οὐκ εἶναι τὰ πάντα, ἃ ποιεῖ.

5. Τὴυ ψαιχὴυ αὐτὴν δεῖ εὅσπερ ὅψεν εἶναι, ὅρατὸν δὲ αὐτῆ τὸν νοῦν εἶναι, ἀόριστον πρὶν ἰδεῖν, πεφυκυῖαν δὲ νοεῖν ὑλην οὄν πρὸς νοῦν.

6. Νοοῦντες αὐτοὺς βλέπομεν δηλονότι νοοῦσαν φύσιν, ἢ ψευδοίμεθα ἂν τὸ νοεῖν. Εἰ οῦν νοοῦμεν

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then, is illuminated when it goes towards that which is before it—for then it meets reality—but when it goes towards what comes after it, it goes towards non-existence. But it does this, when it goes towards itself, for, wishing to be directed towards itself it makes an image of itself, the non-existent, as if walking on emptiness and becoming more indefinite; and the indefinite image of this is every way dark: for it is altogether without reason and unintelligent and stands far removed from reality. Up to the time between it is in its own world, but when it looks at the image again, as it were directing its attention to it a second time, it forms it and goes into it rejoicing.

4. How then does multiplicity come from one? Because it is everywhere, for there is nowhere where it is not. Therefore it fills all things; so it is many, or rather it is already all. Now if it itself were only everywhere, it would itself be all things; but since it is also nowhere, all things come into being through him, because he is everywhere, but are other than him, because he is nowhere. Why, then, is he not only everywhere, and is also, besides being everywhere, nowhere? Because there must be one before all things. Therefore he must fill all things and make all things, not be all the things he makes.

5. The soul itself must be like sight, and what it sees must be Intellect; before it sees it is indeterminate, but naturally adapted to intellection: so it is matter in relation to intellect.

6. When we are thinking ourselves we are, obviously, looking at a thinking nature, or our statement that there is thinking would be false. If, then, we

καὶ ἐαυτοὺς νοοῦμεν, νοερὰν οὖσαν φύσιν νοοῦμεν·
πρὸ ἄρα τῆς νοήσεως ταύτης ἄλλη ἐστὶ νόησις
οἶον ἦσυχος. Καὶ οὐσίας δὴ νόησις καὶ ζωῆς
δ νόησις· ὤστε πρὸ ταύτης τῆς ζωῆς καὶ οὐσίας
ἄλλη οὐσία καὶ ζωή. Ταῦτα ἄρα εἶδεν, ὅσα
ἐνέργειαι. Εὶ δὲ νόες αὶ ἐνέργειαι αὶ κατὰ τὸ νοεῦν
οὕτως ἑαυτούς, τὸ νοητὸν ἡμεῖς οἱ ὄντως. Ἡ δὲ
νόησις ἡ αὐτῶν τὴν εἰκόνα φέρει.

7. Το μεν πρώτον δύναμες εστι κινήσεως καὶ στάσεως, ώστε ἐπέκεινα τούτων το δὲ δεύτερον ἔστηκέ τε καὶ κινείται περὶ ἐκείνο καὶ νοῦς δὲ περὶ τὸ δεύτερον ἄλλο γὰρ ὅν πρὸς ἄλλο ἔχει τὴν νόησιν, τὸ δὲ ἐν νόησιν οὐκ ἔχει. Διπλοῦν 5 δὲ τὸ νοοῦν, κὰν ¹ αὐτὸν νοῆ, καὶ ἐλλιπές, ὅτι ἐν τῷ νοεῖν ἔχει τὸ εδ, οὐκ ἐν τῆ ὑποστάσει.

8. Το ἐνεργεία παντί τῷ ἐκ δυνάμεως εἰς ἐνέργειαν ὅ ἐστι ταὐτὸν ἀεί, ἔως ἂν ἢ ἄστε καὶ τὸ τέλειον καὶ τοῖς σώμασιν ὑπάρχει, οἷον τῷ πυρί ἀλλ' οὐ δύναται ἀεὶ εἰναι, ὅτι μεθ' ὕλης ὅ δος ὰν ἀσύνθετον ὂν ἐνεργεία ἢ, ἀεὶ ἔστιν. "Εστι δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐνεργεία ὂν δυνάμει κατ' ἄλλο εἶναι.

9. 'Αλλ' οὐ νοεί 2 τὸ πρῶτον ἐπέκεινα ὅντος·3 ὁ δὲ νοῦς τὰ ὅντα, καὶ ἔστι κίνησις ἐνταῦθα καὶ στάσις. Περὶ οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτὸ τὸ πρῶτον, τὰ ἄλλα

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think, and think ourselves, we think a nature which is thinking; then before this thinking there is another which is, so to speak, at rest. And there is, certainly, a thinking of substance and a thinking of life; so that before this life and substance there is another substance and life. These, then, all the things which are activities saw. But if the activities engaged in thinking themselves in this way are intelligences, then our real selves are their intelligible object. But their thinking brings [only] the image of it.

7. The First is the power which causes motion and rest, so that it is beyond them; but the Second is at rest and also in motion around the First; and Intellect is in the sphere of the Second, for it is one thing and has its thought directed to another, but the One does not have thought. So that which thinks is double, even if it thinks itself, and defective, because it has its good in its thinking, not in its being.

8. Being in act is, for everything which passes from potency to act, that which is always the same as long as the thing exists; so that completion exists for bodies too, fire, for instance; but they cannot always exist, because they are compounded with matter; but that which is uncompounded and in act always exists. But it is possible for the same thing which is in act to be in potency in another respect.

9. But the First beyond being does not think: Intellect is the real beings, and there is movement here and rest. The First itself is not related to anything, but the other things are related to it, staying

¹ kar II-9: mi codd.

² νοεί Inge, H-S: θεοί wxy.

⁸ čvros Vitringa, H-S: čvres wxy.

¹ Cp. Plato, Second Letter 312E3.

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δε περί αὐτὸ ἀναπαυόμενα ἔστηκε καὶ κινεῖται ή γὰρ κίνησις ἔφεσις, τὸ δὲ οὐδενὸς ἐφίεται τίνος γὰρ στό γε ακρύιωτον; Οὐ νοεί οδν οἰδέ έαυτό; "Η ή έχει έαυτό, καὶ νοεῖν ὅλως λέγεται; Ἡ τῷ ἔχειν έαυτο ου νοείν λέγεται, άλλα τω πρός το πρώτον βλέπειν. "Εστι δέ πρώτη ενέργεια καὶ αὐτή ή νόησις. Εί οὖν αὖτη πρώτη, οὐδεμίαν δεῖ προτέραν. Τὸ οὖν παρέχον ταύτην ἐπέκεινα ταύτης: ὤστε 10 δευτέρα ή νόησις μετ' έκεῖνο. Οιδέ γλρ τὸ πρώτως σεμνόν ή νόησις οὔκουν οὖδὲ πᾶσα, ἀλλ' ή τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ· ἐπέκεινα ἄρα νοήσεως τάγαθόν. 'Αλλ' οὐ παρακολουθήσει αὐτῷ. Τί οὖν ἡ παρακολούθησις αὐτῶ; 'Αγαθοῦ ὄντος ἢ οῦ; Εἰ μὲν γὰρ ὅντος, ήδη ἐστὶ πρὸ τῆς παρακολουθήσεως Ιδ τάγαθόν· εί δ' ή παρακολούθησις ποιεί, οὐκ ἂν είη πρό ταύτης το άγαθόν. ώστε οιδό αὐτή έσται μή οδοα άγαθου. Τί οδυ; Οὐδέ ζη; "Η ζην μέν οὐ λεκτέου, είπερ δέ, ζωήν δίδωσι. Τὸ δέ παρακυλουθούν έαυτφ καὶ τὸ νοοῦν αύτὸ δεύτερον. παρακολουθεί γάρ, ινα τη ένεργεία ταύτη συνή 20 αύτό. Δεῖ οὖν, εἰ καταμανθάνει αὐτό, ἀκαταμάθητον τετυχηκέναι είναι αὐτοῦ και τή αὐτοῦ φύσει έλλιπες είναι, τη δε νοήσει τελειούσθαι. Το άρα κατανοείν εξαιρετέου ή γάρ προσθήκη άφαίρεσιν και έλλευμιν ποιεί.

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around it in their rest, and moving around it, for movement is desire, but it desires nothing, for what could it desire, it which is the highest? Does it not, then, even think itself? Is it not said in a general way to think in that it possesses itself? It is not by possessing itself that anything is said to think, but by looking at the First. But thinking itself is also the first actuality. If, then, this is the first, there is no need of anything before it. That, then, which produces this is beyond it, so thinking is second after that. For thinking is also not the primarily venerable; all thinking is certainly not venerable, only thinking about the Good, so the Good is beyond thinking. But the Good will not be conscious of itself. What, then, would its consciousness of itself be? A consciousness of itself as being good or not? Well, then, if it is of itself as being good, the Good exists already before the consciousness; but if the consciousness makes it good, the Good would not exist before it, so that the consciousness itself would not exist, since it is of the Good. What then? Is it not alive either? No, it cannot be said to live, but if it can, [only in the sense that] it gives life. That which is conscious of itself and thinks itself comes second, for it is conscious of itself in order that in this actuality of consciousness it may understand itself. Therefore, if it becomes acquainted with it self, it must have been unacquainted with itself and deficient in its own nature, and is completed by its thinking. So, then, thinking must be excluded from the Good, for the addition causes diminution and defect.